Monthly Archives: December 2025

December 1, 2025

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

Welcome to the December Mutual Fund Observer, and to the holiday season.

The Christmas of the early American republic would be barely recognizable to us. In many colonies, it was a workday, ignored or mistrusted; only some immigrant communities treated it as a true festival. You’ll remember the Christmas of 1776, when George Washington forced his army across the ice‑clogged Delaware and struck the Hessian garrison at Trenton, counting on an enemy shaped by a Christmas‑keeping culture facing an army for whom December 25 was, at best, optional.

Between the founding of the Republic and 1820, New England’s premier newspaper – The Hartford Courant – had neither a single mention of Christmas-keeping nor a single ad for holiday gifts. In Pennsylvania, the Harrisburg Chronicle – the newspaper of the state’s capital – ran only nine holiday advertisements in a quarter century, and those were for New Year’s gifts. The great Presbyterian minister and abolitionist orator Henry Ward Beecher, born in 1813, admitted that he knew virtually nothing about Christmas until he was 30: “To me,” as a child, he wrote, “Christmas was a foreign day.” In 1819, Washington Irving, author of The Legend of Sleepy Hollow and Rip van Winkle, mourned the passing of Christmas. And, in 1821, the anonymous author of Christmas-keeping lamented that “In London, as in all great cities … the observances of Christmas must soon be lost.” Though he notes, “Christmas is still a festival in some parts of America.”

Why? At base, Christmas was suppressed by the actions and beliefs of just two groups: the rich people… and the poor people.

The rich, the Protestant descendants of the founding Puritans, concentrated in the booming commercial and cultural centers of the Northeast, reviled Christmas as pagan and unpatriotic. About which they were at least half right: pagan certainly, unpatriotic… ehhh, debatable.

Here we seem to have a contradiction in terms: a pagan Christmas. To resolve the contradiction, we need to separate a religious celebration of Christ’s birth from a celebration of Christ’s birth on December 25th. Why December 25th? The most important piece of the puzzle is obscured by the fact that we use a different calendar system – the Gregorian – than the early Christians did. Under their calendar, December 25th was the night of the winter solstice, the darkest day of the year, but also the day on which light began to reassert itself against the darkness. It is an event so important that every ancient culture placed it as the centerpiece of their year. We have a record of at least 40 holidays taking place on, or next to, the winter solstice. Our forebears rightly noted that the choice of December 25th was a calculated marketing decision meant to draw pagans away from one celebration (Dies Natalis Solis Invicti, the birthday of the Invincible Sun) and into another.

So the Puritans were correct when they pointed out – and they pointed this out a lot – that Christmas was simply a pagan feast in Christian garb. Increase Mather found it nothing but “mad mirth…highly dishonorable to the name of Christ.” Cromwell’s Puritan parliament banned Christmas-keeping in the 1640s, and the Massachusetts Puritans did so in the 1650s.

And while the legal bans on Christmas could not be sustained, the social ones largely were.

The rich, who didn’t party, were a problem. The poor, who did, were a far bigger one.

There was, by long European tradition, a period of wild festivity to celebrate New Year’s. Society’s lowest classes – slaves or serfs or peasants or blue collar toilers – temporarily slipped their yokes and engaged in a period of wild revelry and misrule.
In America, the parties were quite wild. Really quite wild.

Think: Young guys.

Lots of them.

With guns.

Drunk.

Ohhh … way drunk, lots of alcohol, to… uh, drive the cold winter away.

And a sense of entitlement, a sense that their social betters owed them good food, small bribes, and more alcohol.

Then add lots more alcohol.

Roving gangs, called “callithumpian bands,” roamed night after night, by a contemporary account, “shouting, singing, blowing trumpets and tin horns, beating on kettles, firing crackers … hurling missiles” and demanding some figgy pudding. Remember?

“Oh, bring us a figgy pudding and a cup of good cheer
We won’t go until we get some;
We won’t go until we get some;
We won’t go until we get some, so bring some out here”

Back then, that wasn’t a song. It was a set of non-negotiable demands enforced by rampant vandalism, and the cheery blue flame was a signal of the amount of rum poured over it.

By the early 1800s, this annual eruption of disorder had become intolerable to the emerging urban middle class. New York, Philadelphia, and Boston were growing rapidly, packing different classes into anxious proximity. The old rural rhythms, where the poor could blow off steam in relative isolation, no longer worked when thousands of armed, drunken young men were roaming streets lined with shops and respectable homes. Something had to give.

Perversely, what saved Christmas was its commercialization. Beginning in New York around 1810 or 1820, merchants and civic boosters – notably the New York Historical Society, intent on marketing their city’s Dutch heritage – began ‘discovering’ old New Amsterdam Christmas traditions. Conveniently, these rediscovered customs centered on family gatherings, communal meals, and presents. Lots of presents. The timing was serendipitous: the Industrial Revolution was producing a surplus of manufactured goods that needed buyers, and the middle class was eager for respectable ways to celebrate that didn’t involve armed gangs at the door.

The commercial Christmas was a triumph of the middle class, but also something more valuable. Over a generation, it transformed a celebration of misrule into an occasion for family connection. It helped bridge centuries-old divides between Christian denominations, the Christmas-keepers and the others. Most importantly, it recentered the holiday around children and the future they represented, rather than around young men and the disorder they embodied.

Which brings us, however awkwardly, to why we invest. Not to maximize our portfolios or beat some benchmark. We invest for the same reason the middle class of the 1820s desperately needed a new version of Christmas, to create some measure of security and possibility for the people we care about, to bridge the gap between the world as it is and the world we hope to leave behind. The markets will continue their callithumpian revelry – shouting, demanding, hurling missiles. Our job is the quieter, more domestic work: protecting what matters, planning for people we love, and occasionally pausing to acknowledge that we’re doing this together, in defiance of cold and dark and uncertainty.

That seems worth raising a cup of good cheer to, even without the figgy pudding.

In this month’s Observer …

In this issue of the Observer…

Lynn Bolin examines portfolio construction for an environment where elevated debt levels intersect with longer-term risks of financial crisis and currency devaluation. In “As the World Turns,” he constructs six model portfolios optimized for Great Financial Crisis-level drawdowns while maintaining reasonable returns, deliberately emphasizing recent market behavior—COVID bear market, high inflation, tariff uncertainty—over the less relevant 2022 normalization and 2024 valuation extremes. His conservative portfolio combines established defensive funds like Palm Valley Capital and Columbia Thermostat with tactical managers running light equity exposure, while adding a small gold position he views as overbought short-term but positioned for long-term appreciation through debt monetization.

Lynn’s companion piece, “Portfolio Performance During One Hundred Years of Bear Markets,” provides a century-spanning framework for understanding how portfolios behave across market crises. The analysis reveals that mixed portfolios (20-60% equity) recovered within 4-7 years after 1929, while all-stock portfolios didn’t recover before WWII, and that gold has outperformed stocks in every bear market over the past 58 years, particularly during inflationary crises and severe financial dislocations. Lynn concludes that while gold is currently overbought, it offers long-term hedge potential as debt levels approach historical extremes.

Both essays reflect Lynn’s methodical preparation for increased economic uncertainty, combining rigorous quantitative analysis with strategic defensive positioning for a changing debt cycle. They’re worth your time.

I share a Launch Alert for GMO Domestic Resilience ETF, which brings GMO’s 40-plus years of quality investing discipline to companies positioned to benefit from reshoring and nearshoring. The fund represents a tactical bet on a policy-dependent industrial trend, massive commitments through the CHIPS Act, Infrastructure Act, and IRA converging with genuine corporate action and structural cost shifts. Tom Hancock’s team applies the same discipline that has driven GMO’s U.S. Quality strategy to top-tier long-term returns, though this remains satellite positioning rather than core equity exposure.

My second Launch Alert examines MFS Active Mid Cap ETF, portfolio manager Kevin Schmitz’s 17-year mid-cap value strategy now available in an ETF wrapper. The parallel mutual fund has never finished in the bottom quartile in any calendar year since 2009, a testament to consistency rather than heroic outperformance. It’s the kind of fund that earns words like solid, sensible, and reliable: consistent, competent, rarely brilliant, almost never disastrous.

“The Kids are Alright” identifies 10 notable rookies from the 1,087 funds launched through November, separating legitimately interesting opportunities from the 300+ niche trading toys destined to perish in droves. The lowest-risk rookies aren’t experiments; they’re proven managers bringing tested disciplines to investors who couldn’t previously access them, whether through Capital Group’s ETF versions of franchise strategies, T. Rowe Price extending their closed Capital Appreciation discipline into new formats, or GMO bringing institutional deep-value strategies to retail investors.

And The Shadow, as ever, tracks down a horde (perhaps a hoard) of industry developments, including the return of Tiffany Hsiao to Matthews, the conversion of a weird and wonderful fund to a slightly less weird but likely still wonderful ETF, a bunch of fund launches or conversions, and a remarkably long list of liquidations.

When Despair Drives Markets

The US stock market continues its improbable rise through elevated valuations and mounting economic uncertainty. More troubling still: that rise is paced not by the market’s highest-quality companies but by its lowest-quality ones. Something fundamental has shifted.

The evidence points to a phenomenon commentators call “financial nihilism,” a rational response by young investors to an economy that has locked them out. Three in ten Gen Z have abandoned hopes of homeownership. The median age of first-time homebuyers hit an all-time high of 40 this year, up from the low 30s a generation ago. Stagnant wages, crushing student debt, and housing costs that have outpaced income growth by 60% since 1985 have made traditional paths to security seem unattainable. The response: swing for the fences. Meme stocks, leveraged ETFs, crypto derivatives, prediction markets where you can bet on everything from Fed decisions to Taylor Swift’s pregnancy—anything offering moonshot potential over steady accumulation. Monthly wagers on platforms like Polymarket and Kalshi now exceed $1 billion.

Meanwhile, veteran investor Louis Navellier surveys an economy where “the Fed’s been backed into a corner,” companies navigate surging tariffs, and “many households are increasingly struggling to make ends meet as layoffs rise and pay raises shrink,” and offers his assessment for 2026 in two words: “economic nirvana.”

Economic nirvana?

Damn, dude.

The disconnect is stunning. Wall Street doesn’t live on Main Street, and billionaire advisors don’t navigate the economy their clients face, don’t stand in front of the meat counter wondering what they can afford, and don’t worry about what happens when the money runs out before the month does. When traditional success metrics become unreachable for an entire generation, speculation stops being irrational and starts being a survival strategy.

This dynamic, if it proves to be broadly true, complicates your life and your portfolio. Markets driven by despair don’t correct like markets driven by fundamentals: they extend further, persist longer, and collapse faster. Stocks that capitalism should obliterate instead thrive on social media momentum. An AI bubble of epic magnitude, built on trillion-dollar compute clusters and pure faith, comforts investors rather than terrifying them. Traditional risk metrics break down when the investment thesis is “nothing else will work anyway.”

Many observers have struggled to explain the lagging performance of so-called “quality” strategies—ones that (foolishly) believe that really good businesses are more attractive than really bad ones. Much of what we’ve noted above suggests the driver: folks in despair for their (or America’s or the world’s) future don’t adhere to the adage “slow and steady wins the race.” They’re drawn to the bravado of despair, “go big or go home,” as they pour resources into moonshot assets.

All of which makes the argument for getting out, diversifying deeply into assets uncorrelated with meme-driven momentum, while the getting’s good. Quality will matter again, eventually. But “eventually” offers cold comfort when your retirement timeline doesn’t accommodate a decade-long detour through financial nihilism. We might want to think about the implications of embedding despair as a principle in our children’s lives, which we’ll take up in “The Quality Conundrum” in our January issue.

Thanks from, and to, Warren Buffett

Warren Buffett is remarkable, for his persistence and humility and self-reflection quite as much as for his enormous investment success. On November 10, 2025, he issued what is likely one of his last Thanksgiving letters in which he hints, distantly and without drama, at the fact that his body is failing. He talks, laconically and with humor, about the past and heroes and friends, before closing with a reflection on these latter days and his Thanksgiving wishes for you.

One perhaps self-serving observation. I’m happy to say I feel better about the second half of my life than the first. My advice: Don’t beat yourself up over past mistakes – learn at least a little from them and move on. It is never too late to improve.

Get the right heroes and copy them. You can start with Tom Murphy (former CEO of Capital Cities/ABC and the guy who taught Buffett more about running a business than anyone else); he was the best.

Remember Alfred Nobel, later of Nobel Prize fame, who – reportedly – read his own obituary that was mistakenly printed when his brother died and a newspaper got mixed up. He was horrified at what he read and realized he should change his behavior. Don’t count on a newsroom mix-up: Decide what you would like your obituary to say and live the life to deserve it.

Greatness does not come about through accumulating great amounts of money, great amounts of publicity or great power in government. When you help someone in any of thousands of ways, you help the world.

Kindness is costless but also priceless.

I write this as one who has been thoughtless countless times and made many mistakes but also became very lucky in learning from some wonderful friends how to behave better (still a long way from perfect, however). Keep in mind that the cleaning lady is as much a human being as the Chairman.

I wish all who read this a very happy Thanksgiving. Yes, even the jerks; it’s never too late to change. Remember to thank America for maximizing your opportunities.

But it is – inevitably – capricious and sometimes venal in distributing its rewards.

Choose your heroes very carefully and then emulate them. You will never be perfect, but you can always be better.

Buffett urges his readers to “choose your heroes wisely.” That struck me, particularly in the fraught moment in our nation’s political life and this season when we’re meant to reflect on gratitude and what we owe each other. So I’ll ask: Do you have a hero?

The word hero has become oddly complicated. In contemporary life, we often use it as a category rather than a description — a title automatically conferred on anyone who wears a uniform or holds a certain job. It’s an earnest instinct, born of gratitude and respect. But it can also make the word harder to use for its older purpose: to name a person whose conduct, in a moment of real testing, reveals something exceptional about the human spirit.

That’s not quite the sense I mean here. I’m not using hero as a status or a social honorific. I’m trying to use it in a more personal, more demanding sense to point toward the rare individuals whose choices under pressure illuminate what we might hope to be ourselves.

Perhaps a hero is someone who, in the worst of times, embodies the strength we show only in our best moments.

Do you have a hero?

Not a celebrity, not someone you follow online, not even merely a person you admire for a single virtue, but someone whose conduct under strain inspires you to imagine how you might rise to your own moment of testing. Someone, perhaps, whose spirit you wish you could bestow upon your own children. Someone who would inspire, in a eulogy, the person you most admire to grow misty-eyed and admit, “they were my hero, though I never told them.”

I do, though you’ve likely never heard of him. Frank Minis Johnson (1918-1999). Johnson was born in the hill country in northwest Alabama, son of the only Republican in the Alabama legislature, thrice-decorated veteran of the Normandy invasion, appointed by President Eisenhower first as a US Attorney, where he successfully prosecuted modern-day slavery charges against white farmers, and then as the youngest Federal district judge in the country.

Judge Johnson’s rulings weren’t about a single issue or his personal preferences. They embodied an uncomfortable principle: the law applies to everyone, not just the powerful. He desegregated public parks, schools, facilities, and employment, including the state troopers who’d enforced segregation. He upheld women’s rights to serve on juries and receive equal treatment in the military. He made the Selma to Montgomery march possible by ruling that the state couldn’t bar citizens from public highways their taxes had built.

But his commitment extended beyond civil rights to anyone the powerful had deemed unworthy of legal protection. He ruled that patients committed to mental institutions have a constitutional right to adequate care, that prisoners cannot be confined in facilities unfit for human habitation, that undocumented children have the right to a free public education, and that Georgia’s law criminalizing homosexuality was unconstitutional. The law is the law for all, he insisted—for the mentally ill, the imprisoned, the undocumented, the gay, not just for those with power to enforce their preferences.

On what would have been his 100th birthday, the conservative Federalist Society aired a short documentary on his life in which Johnson explained a fundamental tenet: “I never looked on any desegregation case with moral standards in mind … I wasn’t hired to be a moral judge. I wasn’t hired to be a preacher or an evangelist. I’m hired to apply the law.”

According to the Academy of Achievement, “His former law school classmate, George Wallace, called Johnson an ‘integrating, scallawagging, carpetbagging liar.’ The Ku Klux Klan called him ‘the most hated man in Alabama,’ and white students burned a cross on his lawn. The judge and his family received constant death threats. His elderly mother’s house was bombed – they’d meant it for him – but she escaped injury and refused to move.” Federal marshals provided around-the-clock protection for his family from 1961–1975. 

Bill Clinton awarded Johnson a Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1995. Civil-rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. once called him “the man who gave true meaning to the word justice.” Judge Johnson changed the world through the simple, principled, repeated application of the word “no.” As in: no, you may not order soldiers beaten. No, you may not close the roads to the citizens whose labor and taxes built them. No, you may not exclude women from public service for a simple reason of their sex. No, no, no … quiet, reflective, principled, unpopular, unbowed “no.”

Saying “no” to what’s wrong matters, even when—especially when—it’s unpopular, dangerous, and yields no immediate reward.

Do you have a hero? I do, and if you ever wonder why I persist at being sort of quietly disagreeable, perhaps it’s because I have a very peculiar angel on my shoulder.

And thanks to you, now and ever

Augustana students, December 2025

You’d be surprised at how difficult this section is for us to write, mostly because words so poorly capture the sense of gratitude that your faith inspires in us. To our faithful “subscribers,” Greg, William, the good folks at S & F Advisors, William, Stephen, Wilson, Brian, David, Doug, and Altaf, thanks!

Thanks, as ever, to The Grinch, passing on his way to the Whobilation, who tossed a gift, though not the roast beast—he’s saving that for himself.

Nick and Debbi

This is the fourth anniversary of the passing of my friend, Nick Burnett, who lives in memory yet green. Debbi shared a gift with MFO in his memory.

If you share our sense of gratitude for the blessings that have come to you, this might be an opportune moment to choose to share them with those who struggle. Chip and I have a strong and ongoing commitment to supporting our regional food bank, our community foundation, and keeping folks warm during these winter months.

From Chip, me, and all the folks at the Observer, best wishes for a joyful end to the year. We’ll see you on (or about) New Year’s!

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As The World Turns…

By Charles Lynn Bolin

Setting aside uncertainty this year over tariffs, affordability, a slowing economy, high stock market valuations, and government shutdowns, this article is focused on the long-term risk of the next financial crisis. I am not worried about a gloom and doom scenario.  I do want to have a portion of my overall portfolio prepared for another financial crisis or currency devaluation, whether it is associated with the next bear market or one after that.

This Time Is Different – Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (2009) by Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff covers debt cycles and financial crises:

“If there is one common theme to the vast range of crises we consider in this book, it is that excessive debt accumulation, whether it be by the government, banks, corporations, or consumers, often poses greater systemic risks than it seems during a boom.”

Federal debt as a percentage of gross domestic product rose from 62% of GDP in 2007 to 119% currently. In Our Dollar, Your Problem (2025), Kenneth Rogoff writes that he expects “a sustained period of global financial volatility marked by higher average real interest rates and inflation and more frequent bouts of debt and financial crises.”

I just finished reading Principles for Dealing with the Changing World Order – Why Nations Succeed and Fail (2021) by Ray Dalio, focusing on the “Big Cycle of Money, Credit, Debt, and Economic Activity”. Mr. Dalio summarizes the powers and prospects of the United States to be that the United States appears to be a strong power in gradual decline, and its “weaknesses are its unfavorable economic/financial position and its large domestic conflicts.”

In this article, I create a range of portfolios for drawdowns during the financial crisis and returns for the past eighteen years. I then combine the best of the established funds with newer funds that have high risk-adjusted performance since the beginning of the COVID pandemic. I consider that the bear market (2020), high inflation (2021), recovery of stocks (2023), and tariff uncertainty (2025) of the past six years to be more indicative of performance for the next six years while The Great Normalization (2022) bear market with interest rates rising from a low level to closer to historical levels and the stock market becoming highly valued (2024) to be less relevant. My Excel optimization is intended to capture these relevant aspects while excluding the less relevant years (2022, 2024). In the final section, I conclude by showing how my conservative target portfolio performed over the past six years.

Investment Environment

S&P Global Ratings lowered its rating of U.S. Government debt in 2011. Fitch Ratings lowered its rating from AAA to AA+ in 2023, and Moody’s Investors Service lowered its rating on U.S. government debt from Aaa to Aa1 this year. The Third Quarter 2025 Survey of Professional Forecasters by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia estimates that real GDP for the U.S. in 2025 will be about 1.7% and 1.6% in 2026. The price-to-earnings ratio of the S&P 500 is nearly as high as it was prior to the bursting of the Dotcom Bubble.

Fiscal and monetary stimulus, along with supply shocks following the pandemic, resulted in high inflation not seen for fifty years. The stage was set for the rise in gold prices with the announcement in April 2020 of the Federal Reserve injecting $2.3T into the economy, rise of inflation starting in March 2021 which peaked in June 2022, Russia invading Ukraine in February 2022, the ten-year to two-year yield curve inverting in July 2022 warning of a recession, central banks accelerating the purchase of gold in 2022, banking crisis of March 2023 triggered by the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank followed by troubles at Credit Suisse, and the start of the Israeli-Hamas war in October 2023.

Inflation peaked in mid-2022 while gold began its recent ascent at the end of 2022 after inflation was well on its way to being tamed. Bondholders would be repaid in dollars that would have lower purchasing power. The Federal Reserve began lowering the funds rate in September 2024, making it less expensive to own gold, and flows into iShares Gold Trust (IAU) started to rise in November 2024.

Figure #1 shows that the Treasury yield curve is still slightly inverted, but starting to fall on the short end as the Federal Reserve lowers rates to address the softening of the labor market. Long-term yields have risen because investors want to be compensated for the risk of rising national debt and the risk of inflation.

Figure #1: Treasury Yield Curve

Source: Author Using St Louis Federal Reserve (FRED)

Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) members report the total of all debit balances in securities margin accounts, and the total of all free credit balances in all cash accounts and all securities margin accounts. In Figure #2, I show the free cash in margin accounts adjusted for inflation back to 1994. I also show my estimate of domestic stock valuations, which is a composite of six common valuation methods. A negative one for valuation is highly overvalued. The markets are both highly leveraged and richly valued.

Figure #2: Inflation Adjusted Free Cash in Margin Accounts vs Stock Valuation

Source: Author Using St Louis Federal Reserve (FRED), Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)

Commodity Prices to Hit Six-Year Low in 2026 as Oil Glut Expands (October 2025) by the World Bank Group states, “It [gold price] is projected to increase by a further 5% next year, leaving gold prices at nearly double their 2015-2019 average.” They qualify, “Conversely, geopolitical tensions and conflicts could push oil prices higher and boost demand for safe-haven commodities such as gold and silver.”

Portfolio Performance – Great Financial Crisis to Date

During the Great Financial Crisis bear market to now, 9% (by assets under management) of the mixed-asset funds with less than 65% allocated to stocks and alternative funds had drawdowns of less than fifteen percent and returns over the past twenty years of seven percent or more. Of the 677 similar funds with a six-year history, 58% had drawdowns of less than fifteen percent during the COVID bear market and returns over the past six years of seven percent or more.

I constructed five model portfolios with drawdowns during the Great Financial Crisis, ranging from 4% to 20% and with long-term returns of 5% to 10%. I then built a global portfolio to reflect my view that domestic stocks are overvalued, and foreign stocks are likely to outperform because of lower valuations.

Table #1 contains the twenty-three funds selected by the optimizer to be included in the six model portfolios, sorted from lowest risk (Ulcer Index) to the highest for the eighteen-year period. The funds shaded light blue are the least risky as measured by the Ulcer Index, which measures the depth and duration of drawdowns. The funds shaded red are the riskiest, with the yellow being moderate risk.

Table #1: Funds Selected in Optimizer Scenarios

Table #2 contains the allocations in the model portfolios. The allocations transition from the least risky for the Ultra-Conservative portfolio on the left to the riskiest in the Growth portfolio on the right, somewhat along the path of the arrow. The Ultra and Very conservative portfolios are invested in the low and moderate-risk funds. The Conservative, Global, and Moderate portfolios tend to take more of a barbell approach with lower-risk and higher-risk funds. The Growth portfolio has only one fund in the lower risk sections. Most portfolios include either Permanent Portfolio (PRPFX) or iShares Gold Trust (IAU) or both.

Table #2: Allocations Across Six Model Portfolios – 18 Years

Source: Author using MFO Premium fund screener and Lipper global dataset.

Finalizing My Target Portfolio for Lessons Learned

Shorter-term risk includes policy uncertainty, high equity valuations, and rising geopolitical risks. Risk during a severe bear market is not being able to meet spending needs and financial obligations. Longer-term risks are high national debt and currency devaluation. The role of this conservative sub-portfolio is to combine some funds that are doing well in any environment with other funds providing some growth potential, and of course, to keep it simple.

Table #3 contains the nine funds that I have been buying this past year at the top of the table, followed by four defensive funds (EAGMX, PRPFX, DIVO, VDC) that I may consider next year, depending upon market conditions. The bottom five funds (FMSDX, UTES, NWJCX, QQQ) are the types of funds that I may want to add during the next correction for longer-term growth at reasonable prices.

Table #3: Author’s Watchlist – Metrics for Six Years

Source: Author Using MFO Portfolio Tool and Lipper global dataset.

Table #4 is a comparison of the funds in my conservative portfolio, equally weighted plus Amplify CWP Enhanced Dividend Income ETF (DIVO) to Permanent Portfolio (PRPFX), Vanguard Global Wellesley Income (VGYAX), and Vanguard Global Wellington (VGWAX). My portfolio performance had higher returns and lower drawdown than the Global Wellington. The link to Portfolio Visualizer is provided here.

Table #4: Portfolio Performance – May 2019 – October 2025

Source: Author Using Portfolio Visualizer

My “Conservative Portfolio” is 32% allocated to stocks. Bonds are mostly higher than investment grade “BBB”. The yield is 3.0%. The expense ratio is a relatively high 1.04%, but I’m paying for downside protection. I believe that the conservative portfolio in the table above would likely have a drawdown of 15% or less during a financial crisis as severe as the Great Financial Crisis. Separately, I invest at Vanguard for a low-cost, buy-and-hold strategy.

Figure #3 is a visual display of portfolio performance. The performance of Vanguard Global Wellesley Income (VGYAX) was hurt in 2022 because of its allocation to bonds with rising interest rates. It has a high allocation to financial sectors, which should benefit from falling rates, and a low allocation to technology, which is highly valued.

Figure #3: Portfolio Performance – May 2019 – October 2025

Source: Author Using Portfolio Visualizer

My portfolio has advantages over Global Wellington in that I can strategically rebalance the portfolio and tilt it for market conditions. I can sell a fund that is doing well in a down market if I need to. Global Wellington has the advantage of simplicity and being professionally managed without the need to rebalance. Permanent Portfolio has a smooth profile, and a drawdown slightly higher than the Author’s target portfolio during the COVID bear market.

Fund Spotlight

Over the past several months, I focused on the funds in Table #5 and purchased Palm Valley Capital (PVCMX), PIMCO Income (PONAX), Columbia Thermostat (COTZX, CTFAX), and a small amount of iShares Gold Trust (IAU). Palm Valley Capital and Columbia Thermostat have tactical strategies and are currently twenty-two percent and twenty-seven percent invested in stocks. Both have averaged seven to nine percent annual returns for the past six years. David Snowball described PVCMX in “Portfolio update #1: added Palm Valley Capital” for the September 2020 MFO newsletter. Since the financial crisis, managers at Columbia Thermostat have changed their strategy to gradually change the allocation to stocks instead of being all stocks or bonds.

Table #5: Author’s Shortlist of Funds for Recent Purchases

Source: Author using MFO Premium fund screener and Lipper global dataset.

Figure #4 shows the total returns of the funds. Notice the smooth profile of PVCMX (light blue line). I like Eaton Vance Global Macro Absolute Return (EAGMX) and Amplify CWP Enhanced Dividend Income ETF (DIVO), and might have bought them had I done the research for this article earlier. I also like Permanent Portfolio (PRPFX) but opted to have iShares Gold Trust (IAU) as a long-term holding in my conservative sub-portfolio.

Figure #4: Author’s Shortlist of Funds for Recent Purchases

Source: Author Using MFO Premium fund screener and Lipper global dataset.

Closing

Gold can help protect against the inflationary impacts of debt monetization (“printing money”) and rising geopolitical risk. My conclusion is that gold is both overbought in the short-term and at the start of a long rise in prices because of the debt cycle and the gradual weakening of the dollar as the world’s global currency. I added a small amount of iShares Gold Trust (IAU) to my conservative sub-portfolio last month and plan to buy more over time. Since yields are high, falling rates will benefit bond performance during a recession.

I will conclude with one last quote from Ray Dalio:

“The goal of printing money is to reduce debt burdens, so the most important thing for currencies to devalue against is debt (i.e., increase the amount of money relative to the amount of debt, to make it easier for debtors to repay).”

The Kids are Alright

By David Snowball

MFO’s founding mission is to “write for the benefit of intellectually curious, serious investors— managers, advisers, and individuals—who need to go beyond marketing fluff, beyond computer-generated recommendations and beyond Morningstar’s coverage universe.” But one of our core precepts is “80% of all existing funds could disappear today with no loss to anyone, except possibly the managers who have to explain it to their spouses.” The goodriddance group includes two overlapping sorts of idiocy: (1) many are launched at the behest of an advisor’s marketing department or strategic team. Short version: “hey, we need at least one bond fund if we’re going to keep their money in-house. Why don’t you go make one for us?” Or “everything who’s anybody has a target-date retirement series. Why don’t we have a target-date retirement series, hmmmmm???” And (2) many are cynical ploys to play on human weakness. Short version: “look, the guys in my fantasy football league know Tesla better than Musk does, and they want a way to do a quick-pivot from doubling down on Tesla’s morning performance to double-shorting it in the afternoon, so let’s do this crazy thing!”

Through November 1,087 new funds and ETFs were launched in 2025. Of those, over 300 were niche trading toys: ether, hedged bitcoin, crypto index, altcoin, onchain, Litecoin, bitcoin covered call, long bitcoin / short ether, hedera coin, double-short Palantir, leveraged long + income Palantir, selling put options on ETFs that are double-long Robinhood Markets stock … The mix included six new ways to play Tesla, up or down, and one that combines Tesla and Uber, which gives us a total of 13 Tesla-specific ETFs.

Bad news: these are designed to suck the life out of you, while convincing you that you’re better at this than Warren Buffett ever was. Look at column #3, dear friends: losses of 50-75% before they reach their first birthday. They are invitations to play a trading game where your reaction time is measured in minutes and your opponents’ are measured in milliseconds.

Good news: these are going to perish in droves because they’re a bad idea and they can’t convince enough people long enough that they aren’t. That was the fate of the flood of internet funds (remember Nothing But Net?), blockchain funds, the flood of “green funds,” the flood of alts-for-the-masses funds, the flood of emerging market consumers funds …

And yet, each year also brings several dozen legitimately interesting opportunities: often experienced managers or teams exploring new asset classes or extending proven disciplines in interesting new ways. We want to suggest that you add 10 notable rookies to your year-end research list.

What makes these funds rookies? Our sibling site, MFO Premium, has an amazing fund screener which does calculations inconceivable on any site charging less than $12,000 a year (looks toward Chicago). One function of the site allows you to screen funds by age (from “launched this year” to “rookies” to “over 90 years old”). The rookie screener selects for funds with between one and two years of operation: long enough to take a few hits, short enough to remain fresh and interesting.

What makes these funds notable? We screened each of six broad baskets of rookie funds – US equity, global equity, international equity, mixed asset, alternatives, and bonds – for funds that met two performance criteria. First, they had to have downside deviation ratings that were average-to-excellent.

“Deviation” is a fund’s bounciness. Standard deviation measures the bounces both up and down. Downside deviation recognizes that you don’t object to having your fund bounce higher; you’re only steamed when it bounces down. So downside deviation measures a fund’s return below the risk-free rate of return; that is, if you make less in a period than the 90-day T-bill, you’re generating downside, and we’re measuring it.

Second, they had to have Ulcer Indexes that were average-to-excellent. The Ulcer Index captures two metrics: how far a fund falls and how long it stays down. The logic is simple: if your manager (or index) falls flat on their face and struggles to get up, you’re going to get an ulcer. Big fall, long time down = major ulcer, high Ulcer Index. Little stumble, up and dusted off = barely any ulcer at all.

That gave us a list of funds that, so far, have resisted the impulse to implode. We then sorted by Sharpe ratio – the most common measure of risk-adjusted returns – and began with the fund atop the list. If that fund shows two further criteria – it’s available to the general public, and it does not evidently rely on financial engineering, blackbox strategies, or disciplines so complex that I couldn’t explain them to myself – then we shared them with you. After that, I scanned the top 10 list in each category, asking the question, “What looks interesting here?”

Our answers follow.

US equities

First Trust Bloomberg R&D Leaders ETF

What can I say? The ETF tracks an index of large cap companies that (a) put a lot of money into research and development and (b) have increased that commitment in each of the past three years. It ranks them, invests in the top 50, and rebalances once a year. The target is finding companies that are reinvesting in their own growth. Here are the particulars from First Trust:

  • begins with a universe of all the securities comprising the Bloomberg US 1000 Index
  • screen for firms in the top 10% of market cap and trading volume, which means “large and liquid.”
  • Within that subset, identify firms that have both increased R&D expenditures for three consecutive years and are in the top 10% for in R&D Expenditures to Sales Ratio
  • Invest in the 50 largest
  • Rebalanced quarterly, reconstituted semi-annually.

The fund’s Investors Guide is pretty thin. The short summary: the world is changing fast, R&D is essential to keeping up, and we find the most R&D intensive large caps for you. Plausible, though not a lot of depth there. The premise that companies investing heavily in R&D will matter more than those coasting on yesterday’s patents isn’t new. What’s new is that ‘R&D’ in 2025 increasingly means AI compute clusters and model training, not better mousetraps. First Trust isn’t picking winners; they’re just betting that the companies willing to light billions on fire today are more likely to own tomorrow than those protecting margin today. Those interested in a more active approach to the same discipline might consider Guinness Atkinson Global Innovators Fund (IWIRX), a five-star actively managed fund that found life in the late 1990s as the Wireless (magazine) Index of innovative companies. Matthew and Ian do exceptional work.

Capital Group Conservative Equity ETF (CGCV)

The $111 billion American Funds American Mutual Fund (AMRMX) annoys me. First, you’ve got this dumb reduplicative name. Second, they push it out in 19 distinct share classes. Third, it’s a whale: $111 billion, with low Active Share (58) and a 0.58% expense ratio on the “A” shares. That having been said, it’s also got $111 billion for a reason: it’s really good at delivering what it promises and has been so for a really long time. American Mutual does not specialize in raw outperformance – over the past 60 years, it has outperformed its peers by an average of just 0.3% per year – it specializes in getting you there with less trauma. MFO Premium tracks dozens of risk metrics, and AMRMX outperforms its peers on virtually every metric for virtually every trailing period.

CGCV is the ETF version of that fund. While it is only 1% of the size of American Mutual, the ETF charges substantially less than the retail “A” shares of the fund for the same strategy and same management team.

What you’re getting: Conservative Equity tries to balance current income, growth of capital, and principal protection. It typically holds about 90 stocks, primarily in well-established, dividend-paying US and Canadian companies with strong balance sheets. We checked 756 rolling three-year periods for American Mutual, dating back to 1960. The typical experience of an investor holding on for three years is a return of 11.0%. Its worst-ever three-year run was -11.0% and its worst-ever five-year span was -4.1% APR.

Mixed asset lead profile

T. Rowe Price Capital Appreciation and Income Fund (PRCFX)

The fund many people wished they were in is T. Rowe Price Capital Appreciation, but you can’t have it. The fund has been kicking butt, under three different managers, since the 1980s: for every trailing period from one to 40 years, it has higher total return, higher Sharpe, smaller maximum drawdown, and lower Ulcer Index than its peers. And it’s closed.

The fact that the success spans manager tenures suggests it’s the process that works, and TRP has been rolling out a suite of funds that incorporate variations of the discipline. This version is a mixed‑asset conservative fund that seeks total return by pairing income‑oriented fixed income with a risk‑aware equity sleeve, typically keeping roughly half to two‑thirds of assets in bonds and other debt instruments and the balance in stocks. With a 12.5% APR that is about 1.9 percentage points ahead of its peer group and a Sharpe ratio of 1.52, it has delivered competitive results with a profile designed to feel more like a cautious “paycheck plus growth” vehicle than an aggressive balanced fund. What really sets PRCFX apart is that it extends the discipline, team, and “capital appreciation with downside defense” DNA of the long‑closed Capital Appreciation Fund into a more income‑tilted format, giving investors access to a seasoned, franchise‑level process that was previously hard to reach.

International equity funds

SEI Select Emerging Markets Equity ETF (SEEM)

SEI is a manager-of-managers (MOM?) advisor. We all know that within any asset class (US equities), there are many sensible investment approaches, but no one strategy (large-cap momentum) works all the time. One alternative is that you could own three or four complementary funds and then shift their weight in your portfolio as market conditions change. Or you could surrender that particular fantasy and adopt a new one: you’ll hire someone who will hire managers representing three or four complementary strategies and will rebalance them for you within the fund. That “someone” is SEI.

For SEEM, SEI hired three fundamental EM managers—one focused on quality, one on momentum with a small-cap tilt, one on value with macro overlay—and then uses their own quant tools to decide how much each should control.

The goal is a broadly diversified, all‑cap portfolio across Asia, Latin America, Africa, and other developing regions. The fund has had an unusually strong first year, with both higher returns (29% APR vs 24% for its peers) and lower volatility (measured by maximum drawdown, standard deviation, and downside deviation) than its peers, leading to substantially higher risk-adjusted returns metrics (Sharpe ratio and Ulcer Index are strikingly higher). The fund has drawn $320 million in assets and charges 0.60% after waivers, a noticeable bargain price.

One caveat is that the MOM approach does not tend to generate star performance. Morningstar tries it with their nine house-branded funds, seven of which are three stars or below. Litman Gregory (which now bears the ugly name iMPG) made it the heart of their business model in the Masters funds, only two of which survive. SEI has done exceptionally well with the model, but the caveat remains. The other is that not a single one of the thirty-eleven managers, including SEI employees, has invested a penny of their own money in the fund.

GMO International Value ETF

GMO International Value ETF (GMOI) is the retail incarnation of GMO International Opportunistic Value (GTMIX), an institutional fund that’s been around since 1998. The strategy there (and here), is to concentrate on what GMO calls “deep value” stocks in developed markets outside the U.S., seeking total return from a heavily contrarian, valuation‑driven discipline.

Its record since inception is exceptional, though perhaps a tiny bit irrelevant. It has outperformed its peers over every trailing measurement period (3-, 5-, 10-, 20-, inception), generally by 100 – 250 bps. Its risk metrics (maximum drawdown, standard deviation, downside deviation) are generally in line with or better than its peers, and its risk-adjusted returns metrics (Sharpe ratio and Ulcer index) are consistently better. The three current managers arrived in May 2023, meaning this 27-year track record is largely someone else’s work, even if the new team has decades of GMO experience elsewhere and responsibility for implementing the strategy that others have piloted. (And two of the three have declined to invest in the ETF.)

The ETF has done well since launch. Its 31.7% APR beats its peers by 620 bps, and its risk metrics have been pretty much in line with its peers. The fund has gathered $215 million in assets in just over a year. This rookie vehicle is part of the rising wave of ETF launches, which give the rest of us access to an institutional‑grade GMO discipline that has historically lived in separate accounts and mutual funds.​

Global equity funds

Rockefeller Global Equity ETF (RGEF)

Rockefeller Capital Management launched a Global Equity Strategy in 1991. Marketed primarily for institutional clients, intermediaries, high-net-worth individuals, and family offices, the strategy has accumulated $4.5 billion. There’s no public performance record that we can find. The Rockco.com website is among the world’s most annoying, offering a rich and slow-loading visual experience with virtually no content concerning its investment capabilities beyond the moral equivalent of “we cool. We cool!”

Here’s what we do know. The firm talks a lot about the overemphasis on short-term metrics among most investors (it has its roots in 1882 so the bias is explicable), about its global scope and unconventional sources of insight (mostly unexplained). The firm has three equity and three muni bond ETFs. The two older equity ETFs (Climate Solutions and US Small Cap Core) are … okay. Climate Solutions is in a meaningless peer group (Specialty / Miscellaneous), and Small Cap mostly tracks its peers.

In October 2024, the firm launched Rockefeller Global Equity ETF (RGEF) with approximately $700 million in assets. This actively managed ETF invests primarily in large‑cap stocks across developed and emerging markets, using a bottom‑up fundamental process to build a 45–75 stock portfolio of companies with durable competitive advantages and a long‑term earnings runway.

It has done quite well, on both upside and downside measures, in its short life. It has an APR of 23.2% versus its peers’ 18.9%, with dramatically lower volatility and a dramatically higher Sharpe ratio. Whether the advisor’s opacity reflects confidence born of 33 years managing money for people who know them personally, or simply indifference, is unclear. What is clear: investors considering RGEF are being asked to trust the Rockefeller name more than any articulated investment philosophy.

Fidelity Hedged Equity ETF (FHEQ)

This is the ETF version of Fidelity Hedged Equity Fund (FEQHX), a $550 million, four-star fund whose two managers are responsible for about $1 billion in hedged equity products at Fido. At base, the managers construct an equity portfolio that looks like the S&P 500 and then buy puts on their holdings to buffer the effects of market declines. The puts can rise in value when markets fall, so they make a positive contribution at much less than the cost of shorting stocks as a hedge.

We long ago stopped reading Fidelity’s annual reports and manager “interviews” because they are so templated and sanitized that you learn virtually nothing from them, and that’s the case here, too. A chatbot comes across as much human and thoughtful. That said, the fund’s performance numbers are solid.

Relative to an unhedged peer group, the fund posted solid absolute returns with 15-20% less volatility.

FHEQ is an actively managed global large‑cap core strategy that owns a diversified equity portfolio while using put options and related techniques to buffer downside, targeting a smoother ride through equity cycles. Its 19% APR, about 0.2 percentage points ahead of peers, and a 1.81 Sharpe ratio suggest that investors have been reasonably rewarded for accepting the complexity and costs of its options overlay.

The fund charges 0.55%, the ETF charges 0.48%. It’s a fascinating insight into the changing dynamics of the industry: the fund with the exceptional public record has drawn fewer assets in 40 months ($550 million) than the ETF has in 20 months. ($620 million).

Capital Group Global Equity ETF

Capital Group Global Equity ETF (CGGE) is a global large‑cap core ETF that mimics American Funds Global Insight (AGVHX). Same management team, same discipline.

Global Insight is an actively managed global large‑cap equity fund that aims for prudent long‑term growth of capital while seeking to limit downside risk. It invests mainly in established companies across the U.S. and international markets, with meaningful exposure to sectors like industrials, technology, and financials. It has a far larger non-US stake than its peers (44% versus 34%), low turnover, low Active Share, and more industrials (21% versus 13% for peers) than more. So far, that has not triggered a noticeable performance difference with its peers – it trails by 0.9% annually with a little less downside, leading to comparable Sharpe ratios.

The ETF has performed exceptionally well, but that translates to “the ETF has operated for its first 16 months in a market that favored it;” its longer-term performance is likely to be another verse of the Global Insight song, “stodgy, cheap, reliable me!” The argument for the ETF is that it offers a more tax‑ and fee‑efficient wrapper. The ETF charges 0.47% on $1.4 billion in assets, the fund’s retail “A” shares ring in at 0.86% on $19 billion in assets.

Bond funds

Palmer Square Credit Opportunities ETF

Palmer Square Credit Opportunities ETF (PSQO) is an actively managed, flexible multi‑asset credit strategy that allocates across CLOs, corporate bonds, ABS, and bank loans, drawing on Palmer Square’s existing opportunistic multi‑asset credit strategies and funds. Palmer Square frames it in terms of the opportunistic, relative‑value credit approach they’ve been running across separate accounts, funds, and other vehicles … but it does not identify one specific mutual fund or listed fund that PSQO is meant to replicate.

The fund has only been around a year, but has dramatically outperformed its Global Income peer group in that period.

The main “red flag” is that PSQO is a complex, opportunistic credit vehicle whose risk may only show up under real stress; it belongs firmly in the adventurous side of a bond sleeve, not as a core bond replacement.​ It has attracted about $107 million in assets over its first year of operation and charges 0.52%.

Palmer Square CLO Senior Debt ETF

Palmer Square CLO Senior Debt ETF (PSQA) tracks the Palmer Square CLO Senior Debt Index. Senior debt sits atop the stack of debts to get paid in the case of a default. As a general matter, CLO senior debt has returns like intermediate bonds but responds to a different set of risk factors. It is not high-yield debt, Palmer Square screens for securities with the equivalent of AA or AAA ratings, but like high-yield debt. CLO senior debt is sensitive to default or impairment rates but not sensitive to rising interest rates.

The index has returned 3.46% annually since 2012 and 4.75% annually over the past five years, which sort of looks like this:

The ETF itself has returned 5.9% in its first year with far better risk metrics than the average “loan participation” fund, so that its Sharpe ratio is twice as large. This strikes us as a “know what you own” story: structurally safer than mezzanine CLO exposure, but far from a simple investment‑grade bond fund, and not something to hold without tolerance for complexity and episodic drawdowns even if backward‑looking Sharpe ratios look excellent.​

CrossingBridge Nordic High Income

Let’s start at Square One: I’m a fan of CrossingBridge. I’m amazed by the consistency with which David Sherman and his team have done exactly what they’ve promised: generated substantial upside with extremely well-managed downside in a collection of strategies that you can’t find elsewhere. I’m invested in two of their funds, Chip is invested in one, and MFO’s tiny “endowment” is, too.

We wrote about CrossingBridge Nordic High Income Bond Fund (NRDCX) at its launch, and it has done well since. They seek high income and capital preservation while investing in bonds issued, originated, or underwritten in the Nordic countries. Part of the corporate DNA is a willingness to pursue small issues and event-driven ones that larger managers could not exploit. They see the Nordic markets as embodying a sort of gold standard for corporate governance and transparency, report that Nordic bonds represent better values than US high yield, and believe that the Nordic region has a distinctive market niche.

For high-yield investors looking beyond the US, this is the quintessential “get this on your due diligence list” fund.

Alternative funds

Miller Market Neutral Income

Miller Market Neutral Income Fund (MMNIX) is a relative‑value, market‑neutral strategy that seeks positive total return with low correlation by emphasizing convertible and synthetic convertible structures, using long/short and hedging techniques to dampen broad equity and rate risk. To be clear, this isn’t the famous “Miller” and the CIO’s leadership of “Wellesley Asset Management” isn’t the Vanguard Wellesley. This Miller and this Wellesley are convertible bond specialists primarily serving an institutional clientele and managing about $2 billion in assets. At 9.8% APR, about 1.9 percentage points above its market‑neutral peers, and with a 3.80 Sharpe ratio, it fits our “alternatives with real risk‑adjusted payoff” preference, but (1) the 1.69% expense ratio is way high, and (2) it appears that it’s only available to institutional investors. I mention it here for the benefit of our professional readers who might have avenues to access a specialist shop’s flagship.

SGI Enhanced Core ETF

SGI Enhanced Core ETF (USDX) is an “absolute‑return‑ish” bond and options hybrid that holds a diversified portfolio of high‑quality, short‑term money‑market instruments while running an actively traded put‑and‑call overlay on broad equity indices such as the S&P 500 to generate incremental income. Morningstar, by the way, likes no part of it. Or, more narrowly, Morningstar’s machine-learning analyst likes no part of it.

That having been said, it’s posted pretty much top 1% returns since its launch about two years ago.

The combination of very short‑duration fixed income and options‑driven yield is a sort of complexity trade: potentially smoother performance than long‑duration bonds, but with structural and behavioral risks that require some sophistication and tolerance for an expense ratio of 1.05% for a bond ETF. The advisor, Summit Global of Bountiful, Utah, manages about $760 million and advises five funds.

Bridgeway Global Opportunities

Where to start, where to start? Hmmm … I really like the leadership of Bridgeway Capital, and once invited founder John Montgomery to speak to the students at the Institute for Leadership and Service at Augustana. That reflected two things: first, Bridgeway’s unswerving commitment to follow the evidence rather than the crowd, and their deep commitment to serving their community and their investors. John was obsessively cheap long before Vanguard and ETFs made it the vogue. Mr. Montgomery’s analysis of “the small company effect” led him to the conclusion that only the smallest of small companies – those in the so-called tenth decile – actually manifested it, and so their very first fund, Bridgeway Ultra-Small Company, which targeted companies so small that it had to have a hard close at just over $25 million. That having been said, the firm has seen relentless outflows and inconsistent performance over the past decade.

So, here’s the story: Bridgeway Global Opportunities Fund (BRGOX) is trying to offer long-short “hedge fund” capabilities at mutual fund prices. It is an equity market‑neutral strategy that aims for long‑term positive absolute returns by running a roughly dollar‑neutral long/short portfolio in U.S. and foreign stocks. (Market-neutral and dollar-neutral translates to: our returns are independent of the stock market and currency fluctuations.) The key differentiator is Bridgeway’s work on “intangible capital” such as research & development spending. Accounting rules treat R&D as outflows, like the cost of buying coffee for the breakroom, not as investments. As a result, traditional metrics undervalue them. Here’s Bridgeway’s official description of what they do:

Global Opportunities seeks consistent risk–adjusted absolute returns agnostic to market direction, with reduced volatility and granular diversification. Our systematic stock selection approach targets inefficiencies and opportunities in global markets. Innovations in accounting theory and financial analysis are employed to evaluate company fundamentals contextually, opening the opportunity to capitalize on slower price discovery in overlooked market segments. Limited discretion is applied when research assumptions do not hold. Our portfolio construction process is designed to emphasize idiosyncratic over systematic exposures.

Bridgeway has published three peer-reviewed articles on the investment relevance of intangible capital, and the fund has done well so far.

Bridgeway’s well‑documented commitment to donating a large share of profits to charity, its quantitative research ethos, and its history of sometimes brilliant but inconsistent funds make BRGOX feel like a high‑conviction expression of a very distinctive culture—one that investors may admire for its mission and process even if they should be cautious about extrapolating early‑stage performance.​

Final note, the fund charges a lot, 1.63% on assets of $34 million, if you think of it as a mutual fund, and not much at all if you think of it as a hedge fund. Your call!

Bottom Line

The flood of crypto derivatives and leveraged trading toys will wash out as it always does, leaving behind a small cohort of genuinely interesting opportunities. The lowest-risk rookies are precisely what MFO has always hunted for: experienced managers with solid, verifiable track records who are now available in new forms, whether that’s Capital Group’s franchise strategies wrapped in lower-cost ETFs, GMO’s institutional disciplines accessible to retail investors, or T. Rowe Price’s closed-to-new-money process extended into a complementary vehicle. These aren’t experiments or marketing plays. They’re proven managers bringing tested disciplines to investors who couldn’t previously access them. The question isn’t whether these strategies work, many have decades of demonstrating they do, but whether the new wrapper fits your portfolio. For serious investors willing to look past the noise, that’s a far more promising starting point than whatever Tesla-leveraged monstrosity launches next month.

Launch Alert: GMO Domestic Resilience ETF

By David Snowball

On October 1, 2025, GMO launched the GMO Domestic Resilience ETF (DRES), bringing the firm’s time-tested quality-focused investment discipline to a distinctly contemporary challenge: identifying companies positioned to benefit as manufacturing, defense production, and critical supply chains return to U.S. soil. DRES represents GMO’s bet that reshoring and nearshoring—the movement of production capacity back onshore or to nearby allies—constitutes more than political theater or a temporary supply-chain correction. The fund targets sectors at the heart of this shift: manufacturing and automation, transportation and logistics, energy and materials, and defense. It’s apt to hold 30-40 stocks with high sector concentration.

The investment case

The investment case for domestic resilience rests on three converging forces. First, massive policy commitments: the CHIPS and Science Act, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act, together represent hundreds of billions in federal support for domestic industrial capacity. Second, genuine corporate action: major manufacturers from semiconductor fabricators to pharmaceutical producers have announced multi-billion-dollar U.S. facility expansions, motivated by supply-chain vulnerabilities exposed during COVID-19 and rising geopolitical tensions. Third, structural cost shifts: while U.S. labor remains expensive relative to offshore alternatives, automation and the narrowing wage gap with China make domestic production increasingly viable for certain industries. Whether this represents the “start of a new era of reindustrialization,” as some analysts suggest, or a more limited adjustment to specific supply-chain risks, remains to be seen. What’s clear is that announced commitments run into the trillions, giving the thesis substance beyond political rhetoric.

GMOs strategy

GMO’s approach to this opportunity leverages the firm’s 40-plus years of experience in quality investing, research pioneered in the 1980s by co-founder Jeremy Grantham. The Focused Equity team, led by Tom Hancock, applies the same discipline that has driven GMO’s U.S. Quality strategy: identifying companies with strong profitability, stable earnings, and sound balance sheets, then assessing whether current market prices offer attractive entry points. Dr. Hancock, a GMO partner since 1995 with a PhD in Computer Science from Harvard, has built a substantial track record applying this framework. The firm’s GMO Quality IV fund (GQEFX) has a five-star / Gold rating from Morningstar and $12 billion in assets, while the U.S. Quality ETF (QLTY) has $3 billion after two years of operation. Both funds have, to put it gently, pretty much clubbed their peers with top 1% to top 10% returns over the longer term.

For DRES, this process gets applied to a more concentrated universe: companies with high U.S. revenue exposure in sectors central to reshoring. The fund will be, in GMO’s words, “far more concentrated and more U.S.” than traditional equity benchmarks. Quality (45 stocks), US Quality (36), and Domestic Resilience (36) are all notably concentrated, with the senior fund, GMO Quality, having below-average risk scores over the past 3-, 5-, and 10-year periods. If the reshoring thesis plays out over the next 3-5 years, a focused portfolio of industrial beneficiaries should outperform. If policy support wavers or, to be blunt, Trump loses interest, cost disadvantages persist, or the announced projects fail to materialize at scale, that same concentration becomes a liability. The fund’s sector tilts (heavy industrials, cyclical materials, capital-intensive energy infrastructure) also mean higher sensitivity to economic cycles than a diversified quality strategy.

The bottom line

DRES charges 0.50% annually, entirely reasonable for an actively managed ETF. The GMO discipline is sensible and wins a lot over time. Mr. Hancock seems exceptional at his job.

That having been said, this remains a tactical bet on a policy-dependent industrial trend.

DRES functions as satellite positioning, not core equity exposure. An investor who believes the reshoring thesis has genuine multi-year tailwinds, values GMO’s disciplined approach to stock selection, and can accept concentration risk in cyclical sectors owes it to themselves to put DRES on their shortlist for further research. The fund offers a thoughtful implementation of a compelling theme, but you need to realize that you’re making simultaneous bets on manager skill (which is demonstrable) and political and macro-economic developments, sustained policy support, corporate follow-through, and favorable economic conditions for capital-intensive industrial investment, which are far less certain. It will, I think, prove a worthwhile tactical holding for portfolios that can accommodate sector concentration and are positioned to benefit from domestic reindustrialization, if that reindustrialization materializes as promised.

Launch Alert: MFS Active Mid Cap ETF

By David Snowball

On September 24, 2025, MFS Investment Management launched the MFS Active Mid Cap ETF (MMID), bringing one of the firm’s most seasoned mid-cap strategies into the ETF wrapper. The fund represents a straightforward translation of MFS Mid Cap Value – a strategy portfolio manager Kevin Schmitz has managed since 2008 – into a more tax-efficient and accessible structure. What distinguishes MMID is not novelty but pedigree: a 17-year track record, a manager who joined MFS as an equity analyst in 2002 and has spent more than two decades refining his craft, and an investment discipline that balances fundamental analysis with valuation awareness without resorting to leverage, derivatives, or sector timing.

The strategy seeks what Schmitz describes as “business quality and durability” – characteristics he believes are often overlooked in the mid-cap space. The approach combines bottom-up fundamental research (drawing on MFS’s 300+ investment professionals) with a focus on free cash flow per share growth as the primary driver of long-term returns. This isn’t a pure value fund chasing the cheapest stocks, nor a growth fund willing to pay any price for momentum. Instead, it occupies that middle ground where companies have established business models and competitive positions but haven’t yet commanded the premium multiples of large-cap darlings. The portfolio typically holds 40-60 positions with modest turnover (the mutual fund version shows 27% annual turnover), suggesting a patient approach to building positions and allowing these to play out.

MFS brings considerable credibility to this effort. The firm launched the first U.S. mutual fund in 1924 and manages $644 billion across its platform. While MFS entered the ETF space only in December 2024, it has taken a conservative approach: converting proven mutual fund strategies rather than creating new products. The parallel mutual fund strategy (available in multiple share classes, including MCVIX and MVCKX) manages over $17 billion and earned Morningstar’s Gold rating as of late 2025, along with a four-star overall rating and “Above Average People” and “High Process” pillar ratings. Morningstar analyst David Carey noted in October 2025 that the fund’s “capable managers and best-in-class approach” merited those elevated assessments.

The fund has a sort of T. Rowe Price vibe to it – a pretty consistent singles hitter that rarely strikes out. A close look at the strategy’s performance metrics over the past 16 years leads to words like solid, sensible, self-aware, and reliable. Among 30 mid-cap value funds with track records extending back to 2009, the MFS strategy ranks in the top quartile for risk-adjusted returns (Sharpe ratio of 0.64, sixth-best in the peer group) while delivering above-average absolute returns (11.6% annually, seventh-best, and about 0.9% above its peers). The maximum drawdown of -30.9% sits squarely in the middle of the pack – neither especially protective nor especially vulnerable. The capture ratios tell a similar story; it’s a bit better in both up and down markets than its Lipper peers. It captures: 94% of the S&P500’s gains in up periods (93% for peers), 107% of its losses in down periods (112% for peers). This isn’t a fund that will shoot the lights out or provide exceptional downside protection. It’s a fund that shows up, does the work, and delivers respectable results year after year.

We charted MFS against the iShares Russell Mid-cap Value ETF (IWS) for the 16 years since the current MFS team settled in. The MFS and Russell Midcap Value lines track each other closely for most of the 16-year journey, rarely diverging dramatically. But by November 2025, that initial investment had grown to $77,373 in the MFS fund versus $68,410 in the index – roughly $9,000 of additional wealth created not through heroic outperformance but through the quiet compounding of consistent, modest edge.

Since Taylor and Schmitz shaped the portfolio to their liking in January 2009, the mutual fund’s 12.8% annualized return through September 2025 slightly edged the Russell Midcap Value Index’s 12.5%. Impressively, the fund has never finished in the bottom quartile of the mid-cap value category in any calendar year since 2009 – a testament to the managers’ consistency if not their ability to deliver exceptional protection during market stress.

Doubters might glance at 2025’s results and conclude the strategy has lost its edge. Through November, the fund’s institutional share class gained 6.1% against the index’s 9.25% rise, lagging 73% of mid-cap value peers. Three holdings – Newell Brands, Ashland, and Teleflex – fell more than 30% and weighed on returns. Perhaps more significantly, the managers’ refusal to own richly valued names like Robinhood and Coinbase, two of the index’s largest and best-performing constituents, cost them dearly in relative terms. But this is precisely the discipline that has kept the fund from landing in the bottom quartile over nearly two decades. The managers are willing to accept short-term underperformance rather than chase expensive stocks into dangerous valuations. As Morningstar’s David Carey noted in his October 2025 assessment, “While the recent performance stings, the managers are sticking to their time-tested approach, and long-term investors should be rewarded.”

The bottom line

MMID charges 0.59% annually, 40 bps less than the fund’s retail “A” shares, and has gathered roughly $26 million in assets since launch. For investors seeking mid-cap exposure through active management, this fund warrants serious consideration.

The mid-cap space has historically offered better risk-adjusted returns than large caps with only modestly higher volatility, and it remains underrepresented in many portfolios despite constituting roughly 15% of market capitalization in cap-weighted indices. An investor looking to add dedicated mid-cap exposure – whether as a substitute for a portion of their large-cap core holdings, as a complement to existing large-cap and small-cap positions, maybe as a tactical overweight to an underappreciated market segment – owes it to themselves to put MMID on their shortlist for further research. The 17-year record of the parallel mutual fund provides substantial evidence for evaluating how this discipline performs across market cycles: consistent, competent, rarely brilliant, almost never disastrous. It will, I think, prove a compelling option for investors who value reliability over flash and who are building portfolios meant to compound steadily rather than swing for the fences.

Portfolio Performance During One Hundred Years of Bear Markets

By Charles Lynn Bolin

I just finished reading Principles for Dealing with the Changing World Order – Why Nations Succeed and Fail by Ray Dalio. Mr. Dalio states:

“Dealing with the future is all about 1) perceiving and adapting to what is happening, even if it can’t be anticipated; 2) coming up with probabilities for what might happen; and 3) knowing enough about what might happen to protect oneself against the unacceptable, even if one can’t do that perfectly.”

I recently spent a weekend in the historic mining town of Leadville, Colorado, and marveled at the riches-to-rags story of Horace and “Baby Doe” Tabor. They became one of the richest couples in the wild, wild west during the 1880s when the dollar was backed by silver. Mr. Tabor grubstaked miners and was fortunate enough to have grubstaked claims to three rich silver deposits. In 1893, the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890 was repealed under President Grover Cleveland, and the silver market crashed. The Tabors failed to diversify and died paupers.

100 Years of Bear Markets

Figure #1 shows the bear markets of the past one hundred years by allocation to stocks. The run-of-the-mill bear markets (blue shaded area) are usually associated with mild to moderate recessions. The area between the Great Financial Crisis starting in late 2007 and the Great Depression of the 1930s (burnt orange shading) reflects performance during the two severe macro-financial crises. The severe Dotcom bear market located between the two shaded areas was the result of high stock valuations.

Figure #1: Portfolio Drawdowns During Bear Markets of the Past 100 Years

Source: Author using MFO Premium fund screener and Lipper global dataset.

100 Years of Debt Cycles, Gold Prices, and Currency Devaluation

The bear markets of the past one hundred years are a story that includes debt cycles, financial crises, inflation, and currency devaluation. The Gold Reserve Act of 1934 effectively devalued the dollar by changing the statutory gold content of the U.S. Dollar from $20.67 to $35 an ounce. In 1971, President Richard Nixon ended international convertibility of the dollar to gold. The dollar became a fiat currency.

Figure #2 shows how gold performed against stocks and Treasury Bills for the fifty-four-year period since the U.S. left the gold standard. Stocks, including dividends, have outperformed gold, but there are three notable periods when gold has performed as well or better than stocks: 1) the 1970s, 2) 2000 – 2011, and 3) the past two years.

Figure #2: Large Cap Stock and Gold Performance – 54 Years

Source: Author using MFO Premium fund screener and Lipper global dataset.

Mr. Dalio wrote, “Most people worry about whether their assets are going up or down; they rarely pay much attention to the value of their currency.” Figure #3 shows the growth of $1 invested in each of gold and the S&P500 on January 1st, 1971. The black line shows the returns of the S&P 500 when priced in gold. Inflation and currency devaluations lowered the purchasing power of investments in stocks. In addition, gold deposits have gotten deeper and lower grade over time, making gold more expensive to produce. Stock prices are high relative to gold, so gold may again be a hedge against high valuations.

Figure #3: Total Stock Returns Priced in Gold

Source: Author using MFO Premium fund screener and Lipper global dataset.

Table #1 compares the changes in the price of gold to returns on stocks during stock market bull and bear markets for the past fifty-eight years. The key take aways are: 1) gold outperforms stocks in every bear market, 2) gold had positive price increases in all but two bear markets, 3) gold outperformed stocks in three of the seven bull markets, 4) gold outperformed stocks by the widest margin during the inflationary OPEC bear market and Great Financial Crisis, and 5) stocks outperformed gold by the widest margin during long periods of relative stability.

Table #1: Gold Performance During Stock Market Cycles

Source: Author using MFO Premium fund screener and Lipper global dataset.

Asset Universe

This article uses indexes available through the MFO Premium fund screener and Lipper global dataset to interpret how portfolios would have performed during the Great Depression. By the start of the Great Financial Crisis, there were 61 alternative funds, 53 dedicated short funds, and 55 equity leverage funds that have survived to today. Currently, there are over a thousand alternative and trading funds that have nearly $700B in assets under management. My point is that many of these funds have not been tested under severe market conditions, and some of these financial innovations will lead to amplified volatility and losses.

The Great Depression

Figure #4 shows how portfolios of stocks and government bonds would have performed following the 1929 crash. Portfolios with stock-to-bond ratios ranging from 20% to 60% would have recovered in four to seven years, while an all-stock portfolio would not have recovered before World War II started.

Figure #4: Portfolio Performance During the Great Depression

Source: Author using MFO Premium fund screener and Lipper global dataset.

To prevent depressions like the 1930s, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was created to regulate the stock market, the Federal Reserve was realigned to more effectively provide liquidity, the FDIC was created by the Banking Act of 1933 to insure bank deposits, and Social Security and unemployment insurance were established to provide a safety net.

Post WWII Period (Jun 1946 – Dec 1961)

Gross federal debt at the end of the war was 120% of GDP. The real GDP grew at an annual rate of 3.5%. By 1961, the gross federal debt had been lowered to 50%, largely by growing our way out of debt. Figure #5 shows portfolio performance during the post-WWII period.

Figure #5: Portfolio Performance During the Post-WWII Period

Source: Author using MFO Premium fund screener and Lipper global dataset.

The Secular Bear Market of the 1970s

The OPEC embargo occurred at the end of the Vietnam War, and inflation rose to 11% by 1974 before falling 6% in 1976. The Iranian revolution brought a second energy crisis in 1979. Federal budget deficits began to rise in 1974 and reached -3.8% by 1982. Paul Vocker eventually “breaking the back of inflation” in 1982

Mutual funds were available during this time, and mixed-asset funds usually had a stock-to-bond allocation of about 60/40. Figure #6 shows that most mixed asset funds would have performed about as well as a large-cap core equity fund such as American Funds Investment Company of America (AIVSX). However, most did not beat inflation. Bonds did not provide much protection during this period of high inflation.

Figure #6: Portfolio Performance During the 1970s Stagflation

Source: Author using MFO Premium fund screener and Lipper global dataset.

Figure #7 shows that commodities and gold were the places to invest during this period, but they can be very volatile.

Figure #7: Gold and Commodities for Inflation and Uncertainty

Source: Author using MFO Premium fund screener and Lipper global dataset.

The average price of gold had a low of $138 in 1977 and rose to over $670 in 1980, with the real (inflation-adjusted) yield on the 10-year Treasury falling to zero. The real yield climbed to over 6% in 1981, providing an alternative to gold. The Federal deficit was rising and reached nearly -6% as a percent of GDP in 1983. By 1985, gold had fallen back to only $312 per ounce.

Savings And Loan Crisis and the Fabulous Decade

Approximately a third of the savings and loan associations failed during the ten years starting in 1986, leading to the Black Monday bear market in 1987. Gold rose from a low of $338 in 1986 to a high of $465 in 1988. The stock bull market after Black Monday climbed for nearly thirteen years, with stocks rising on average 19% per year while gold fell 3.6% annually on average.  The decade of the 1990s became known as the Fabulous Decade. During this age of globalization from 1986 through 1999, real GDP grew at 3.3%. In 1987, the deficit to GDP ratio was -3% but reached a surplus for the three years starting in 1999. The real yield on ten-year Treasuries averaged 4.4% for the thirteen-year period. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan warned of “irrational exuberance” in 1996. It was a prelude to the Dotcom bear market.

The DOTCOM and Great Financial Crisis Secular Bear Market

The severity of the Dotcom bear market was the result of high valuations and was only associated with a mild recession. The Great Financial Crisis was a macro-financial crisis in which extreme fiscal and monetary policies were employed to avoid a 1930s-style depression. Figure #8 shows that conservative mixed asset funds protected on the downside while growth-oriented mixed-asset funds provided long-term growth. Both beat the S&P 500 during this twelve-year period in part because of the concentration of technology stocks in the S&P 500. Commodities fell hard during the financial crisis.

Figure #8: Fund Performance During the Dotcom – GFC Secular Bear

Source: Author using MFO Premium fund screener and Lipper global dataset.

Great Financial Crisis to the Present

For the twenty-seven years since 1999, real GDP has grown at a slower annual rate of 2.2%. The total gross Federal debt as a percent of gross domestic product has risen from 55% prior to the Dotcom bear market to 90% at the end of the Great Financial Crisis to 105% prior to the COVID pandemic, and again sits at high levels similar to the end of WWII.

Gold averaged $280 per ounce in 1999. It then rose steadily to $1,700 at the end of 2012 for an increase of over 600% during the twelve-year period. There were many factors that may have contributed to the rise: The bombing of the World Trade Center occurred in 2001, 2) the war in Afghanistan in (2001 – 2021), war in Iraq (2003 to 2011), the European debt crisis (2010 – 2012), the real yield on 10-year Treasuries declining, current account balance including trade deficit has been negative for almost the entire period, Quantitative Easing added over two trillion dollars to the financial system, the dollar fell by 27%, and World GDP averaged 7% growth so more affluent investors could buy gold.

I downloaded 623 funds in 97 Lipper Categories that have been in existence for the past twenty years. Figure #9 shows the average risk-free return versus the downside deviation of twenty-seven Lipper Categories over the past two decades. Those between the two blue lines have had high risk-adjusted returns. Notice that precious metals (gold) also had high risk-adjusted returns. The laggards like international, small-cap, and natural resources now have low valuations and high momentum, and I expect them to perform better in the coming decade. Notice that U.S. Treasury General funds have had lower risk-adjusted returns.

Figure #9: Risk-Free Return vs Downside Drawdown – Two Decades

Source: Author using MFO Premium fund screener and Lipper global dataset.

Closing

I spent three decades in the gold mining industry, and did not invest in gold because my livelihood was already impacted by the price of gold. Now that I am retired, I believe that gold is overbought in the short term, but has long-term potential as a hedge against a future crisis and currency devaluation. I made a small purchase of iShares Gold Trust (IAU), and plan to add to the position.

The cautionary warning from Mr. Dalio is:

“To review, holding debt as an asset that provides interest is typically rewarding early in the long-term debt cycle when there isn’t a lot of debt outstanding, but holding debt late in the cycle, when there is a lot of debt outstanding, and it is closer to being defaulted on or devalued, is risky relative to the interest rate being offered.”

Briefly Noted…

By TheShadow

Updates

On November 10th, Tiffany Hsiao rejoined Matthews Asia after leaving the firm in August 2020 to join Artisan Partners to launch a China-focused private fund. Prior to her departure, Tiffany managed the firm’s China Small Companies, former Asia Small Companies (now Emerging Markets Small Companies), and Asia Innovators strategies.

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission cleared the way for Dimensional Fund Advisors to launch an exchange-traded fund share class on 13 of its existing mutual funds (see the November Commentary for the 13 funds) on November 17th.

Briefly Noted . . .

On or about January 28, 2026, CrossingBridge Pre-Merger SPAC ETF will change its name and its investment objective. The new name will be CrossingBridge Ultra-Short Duration ETF with a new investment objective to offer a higher yield than cash instruments while maintaining a low duration. The current ETF advisers allow that “the investor base interested in a very narrow pre-merger SPAC arbitrage strategy has diminished and the cost to acquire new potential clients is high.” First impressions aside, the Pre-Merger SPAC ETF is a low volatility strategy (maximum lifetime drawdown of 0.4%, annualized returns of 5.3%), which is consistent with CrossingBridge’s corporate ethos: “Return of capital is more important than return on capital. CrossingBridge seeks high current income and capital appreciation consistent with the preservation of capital.” Five of their six older funds have earned MFO’s Great Owl designation for having consistently top quintile risk-adjusted returns over all trailing measurement periods; the seventh fund, Nordic High Income, is fascinating but too young to qualify.

Launches and Reorganizations

Brown Advisory International Value Select ETF is in registration. Expenses have not been stated. Brown Advisory LLC serves as the investment adviser.

FPA Queens Road Value ETF is in registration with the intent of reorganizing FPA Queens Road Value Fund into an ETF. Expenses have not been stated. Steve Scruggs, CFA, will remain the portfolio manager and has served as the portfolio manager of the predecessor fund.

T Rowe Price has announced four new active fixed income exchange-traded funds: T. Rowe Price Short Municipal Income ETF (TMNS), T. Rowe Price Long Municipal Income ETF (TMNL), T. Rowe Price High Income Municipal ETF (THYM, Snowball begins humming about parsley, sage, rosemary, and …), and the T. Rowe Price Multi-Sector Income ETF (TMSF).

  • T. Rowe Price Short Municipal Income ETF (TMNS) invests primarily in short- and intermediate-term investment-grade municipal bonds. It is managed by James Lynch, CFA, who has 18 years of investment experience and also manages the T. Rowe Price Intermediate Municipal Income ETF (TAXE). The fund’s net expense ratio is 0.18%.
  • T. Rowe Price Long Municipal Income ETF (TMNL) invests primarily in longer-term municipal bonds. It is managed by Austin Applegate, CFA, who has 21 years of investment experience, and Timothy Taylor, CFA, who has 28 years of investment experience. TMNL’s net expense ratio is 0.26%.
  • T. Rowe Price High Income Municipal ETF (THYM) invests primarily in longer-term, low- to upper-medium quality municipal bonds. Jim Murphy, CFA, who is head of the Municipal Bond team at T. Rowe Price and has 31 years of investment experience, manages the fund with co-portfolio managers Colin Bando and Michael Kane, who have 14 and 16 years of investment experience, respectively. The net expense ratio for THYM is 0.32%.
  • The T. Rowe Price Multi-Sector Income ETF (TMSF) invests across the full global fixed income universe, spanning multiple credit sectors, countries, and currencies. The fund is managed by four co-portfolio managers, Kenneth Orchard, Vincent Chung, Adam Marden, and Jeanny Silva, who respectively have 21, 11, 13, and 22 years of investment experience. TMSF’s net expense ratio is 0.37%.

Vanguard has launched three new actively managed ETFs: Vanguard Wellington U.S. Growth Active ETF (VUSG), Vanguard Wellington Dividend Growth Active ETF (VDIG), and Vanguard Wellington U.S. Value Active ETF (VUSV).

VUSV’s strategy and management are similar to the Wellington Management portion of the Windsor Fund, with an expense ratio of 0.30%. VUSG’s strategy and management are similar to the Wellington Management portion of the Vanguard Global Equity Fund, with an expense ratio of 0.35%. VDIG is managed by the same team that is responsible for the Vanguard Dividend Growth Fund, with an expense ratio of 0.40%.

Small Wins for Investors

Clearbridge Small Cap Growth fund is reopening to new investors on December 1st. The fund has been soft-closed since October 2013.

Vanguard has trimmed its fees on its Primecap Funds:

  • PRIMECAP: down 0.02%–0.37% to 0.35%
  • PRIMECAP Core: down 0.06%–0.43% to 0.37%
  • Capital Opportunity: down 0.03%–0.43% to 0.40%

Additionally, Vanguard has eliminated its longstanding fee agreement with Primecap. Primecap will be paid a base fee plus (when it exceeds its benchmark) or minus (when it underperforms its benchmark). Previously, PRIMECAP was paid a simple, asset-based fee: a set percentage of each fund’s assets, billed quarterly.

Closings (and related inconveniences)

Bumpkus.

Old Wine, New Bottles

DoubleLine Floating Rate Fund and DoubleLine Select Income Fund will, pending shareholder approval, be subject to a “Plan of Reorganization and Termination” through which they’ll become American Beacon funds on February 6, 2026. In each case, the change will involve stapling the words “American Beacon” to the front of the current name.

If shareholders approve, the $23 million Fidelity U.S. Low Volatility Equity Fund is expected to reorganize into the $1.5 billion Fidelity Low Volatility Factor ETF on or about May 8, 2026. If they don’t approve, their fund will be liquidated and the orphans cast out into the street.

Laffer | Tengler Equity Income ETF will be reorganized into the Wedbush LAFFER|TENGLER New Era Value ETF.

Off to the Dustbin of History

abrdn Bloomberg Industrial Metals Strategy K-1 Free ETF will liquidate on or about December 5, 2025. Fascinating factsheet: the fund has $23,214,433.06 in assets – presumably for about a 12-second window, has been in operation since 9/23/2021, and seems to have returned 0.43% since inception.

The Acclivity Mid Cap Multi-Style Fund has closed and will discontinue its operations effective December 22, 2025.

AB Sustainable US Thematic Portfolio will be variously terminated, liquidated, and dissolved on or about January 16, 2026.

The two-year-old, $31 million American Beacon AHL Multi-Alternatives Fund has closed and will liquidate and terminate on or about December 30, 2025.

BlackRock U.S. Insights Long/Short Equity Fund will close to new and subsequent investments on December 31, 2025, in anticipation of a January 30, 2026, liquidation.

City National Rochdale U.S. Core Equity Fund will be liquidated on December 22, 2025. Decent fund with nearly $200 million in assets, but it appears that it lost a single large shareholder recently, with assets dropping by $199.46 million (per Morningstar) all at once.

CoinShares Bitcoin Leverage ETF (BTFX) will be dissolved on December 16, 2025. Apparently, the advisor wasn’t able to find enough adrenaline junkies who wanted to take a ride in a vehicle twice as volatile as Bitcoin itself. How volatile? Ummm … on 10/6/2025, the Grayscale Bitcoin Mini Trust ETF (BTC) hit $55.96/share. Six weeks later, it visited $36.42, a 35% drawdown. Year to date, BTC has lost 4% and BTFX has booked a 37% loss.

Conestoga Mid Cap Fund will be liquidated on or about January 31, 2026.

Cromwell Balanced Fund (formerly Cromwell Sustainable Balanced Fund) terminated the public offering of its shares and discontinued its operations on November 17, 2025.

The microscopic DailyDelta Q100 Upside Option Strategy ETF, which pursues short-term upside bets on the NASDAQ 100, and its evil twin DailyDelta Q100 Downside Option Strategy ETF, both disappear on or about December 8, 2025, after just eight months of operation despite high nominal returns for QUP and correspondingly large losses for QDWN.

Following the resignation of Raymond James as the fund’s subadviser, the FT Raymond James Multicap Growth Equity ETF will be liquidated on January 16, 2026.

Goose Hollow Multi-Strategy Income ETF was liquidated on November 28, 2025.

Lazard Global Equity Select Portfolio disappears on or about December 30, 2025.

Matthews China Dividend Fund will be reorganized into the Matthews Asia Dividend Fund on or about January 27, 2026.

The $16 million Rice Hall James Micro Cap Portfolio will liquidate on or about December 29, 2025.

State Street Nuveen Municipal Bond ESG ETF, State Street SPDR S&P SmallCap 600 ESG ETF, State Street SPDR MSCI USA Climate Paris Aligned ETF, and State Street SPDR MarketAxess Investment Grade 400 Corporate Bond ETF are slated to undergo a singularly slow unwinding, with the funds closing on May 12, 2026, and liquidating on May 18th.

Texas Capital Texas Small Cap Equity Index ETF, which promised you the opportunity to “harness the potential of small companies benefiting from the business-friendly Texas economy,” will be liquidated on or about December 15, 2025. Based on a simple comparison with Mairs & Power Small Cap, it appears that the “economic, regulatory, taxation, workforce, and other benefits” of operating in Texas might be just a little less compelling than those of operating in Minnesota.

The $14 million Touchstone Climate Transition ETF (HEAT) will be liquidated on December 23, 2025, a decision attributed to the fund’s limited growth potential. The #1 and #2 holdings are NVIDIA and Facebook / Alphabet, dubious champions of the climate transition.

Sanford C. Bernstein Emerging Markets Portfolio will be reorganized into an ETF through a merger with the AB Emerging Markets Opportunities ETF. While Bernstein is the investment adviser for both the fund and the ETF, the ETF is managed by a different portfolio team, one that employs an integrated approach that combines both fundamental and quantitative research to identify attractive investment opportunities to manage risk. The acquisition “is expected to be consummated on or about January 23, 2026.” (That sounds creepily like the description of some feudal lord’s wedding night, by the way.”

Sterling Capital Short Duration Bond and Sterling Capital Ultra Short Bond Funds will be reorganized into the Sterling Capital Short Duration Bond ETF and Sterling Capital Ultra Short Bond ETF, respectively. The reorganizations are expected to occur on or about March 30, 2026.