Reply to @scott: (Waiting for rest of your comments Scott.) --- Meantime, here's a question: IS THERE ANYONE on this board who hasn't done better than John Hussman over the past decade??? HSGFX returned +0.15% over that period. A $10,000 investment in this fund compounded annually would be worth $10,151.02 today. By contrast, at only a modest 7% compounded rate, the same $10,000 would be worth $19,071.51 today.
There are many widely differing approaches on display at MFO that should have achieved a 7% return over the decade with plenty of diversification and only moderate risk to principal. But how on earth can anyone crank out that kind of decade-long return and still consider themselves a financial genius? Your child would have gone from third grade to their first year of college over that time. ... And you'd have earned just $151.02 to help pay their first year's expenses?
I understand he's selling safety and peace of mind. That's very appealing. But if that's all you want for your investments, a good TIPS fund or GNMA fund will provide much more of that at less expense - and without all the accompanying verbage.

Reply to @VintageFreak: Nope. The link msf provided states:

...fund supermarkets such as Schwab and Fidelity add to the fee layers because they charge fund companies between 30 and 40 basis points to be included on their no-transaction fee platforms. Some funds pay part of this cost with a 12b-1 fee, and others pay it from their management fee.

Implication here is that the hidden NTF fee is not necessarily covered by the 12b-1 fee.
It's certainly not just WB. Here's extract from FUNDX SAI, which we profiled last month:

The Funds’ Advisor, out of its own resources and without additional cost to the Funds or their shareholders, may provide additional cash payments or other compensation to certain financial intermediaries who sell shares of the Funds.

The practice is widespread. It was actually the interview David did with Steven Dodson, where I started becoming aware of it. Mr. Dodson's reluctance to embrace such practices is one reason BRTNX does not have widespread availability at the "fund supermarkets."

CAUTION: Attempting to time markets can be hazardous to your financial health. --- This guy's writings make me think of the old SNL Chris Farley skit about the "motivational speaker" who lived in a van down by the river:-)

"Fidelity Global Balanced Fund (FGBLX) manager Ruben Calderon has taken a leave of absence for an unspecified person."
Any guesses on who she is? :-)
Whitebox " Investor and Advisor shares carry a 12b-1 fee. Some brokerages, like Fidelity and Schwab, offer Advisor shares with No Transaction Fee. (As is common in the fund industry, but not well publicized, Whitebox pays these brokerages to do so – an expensive borne by the Advisor and not fund shareholders.)"
I think that's a bit disingenuous. As M* (and others) note, "fund supermarkets such as Schwab and Fidelity add to the fee layers because they charge fund companies between 30 and 40 basis points to be included on their no-transaction fee platforms. Some funds pay part of this cost with a 12b-1 fee, and others pay it from their management fee."
One cannot complain about a 12b-1 fee on the one hand, and then suggest that the management is paying for the platform out of the goodness of their hearts. Even funds without a 12b-1 fee simply charge higher management fees to cover their platform expenses. The fund shareholders bear the costs.
"Interest rate resets – uhhh [...] I’m confident that the “cushion bonds” of the RPHYX portfolio, where the coupon rate is greater than the yield-to maturity, would fall into this category."
I'm inclined to think the opposite - these are not cushion bonds (though I'll have to check the transcript when it's available). Reset bonds are just floating rate bonds - their interest rate is changed ("reset") periodically. Think ARMs, where there may be no cap on maximum interest or rate change per period. Each time they reset, their market value should be brought back to par (since they reset to market rate interest), barring increased credit risk (due to the borrower's inability to pay the higher rate).
That would be the opposite of a cushion bond, which is a bond that sells at a premium (because its coupon is higher than market rate), and thus expected to be called early. The "cushion" comes into play not because of a reset, but rather because it is priced to call (worst), but carries a risk (and hence an interest premium or cushion) of not getting called (and thus paying a lower rate for a longer time, i.e. to maturity or a later call date).

Always worth reviewing.From Howard Marks' Client Memo, dated August 05,2013
Excerpted from http://www.oaktreecapital.com/MemoTree/The Role of Confidence_08_05_13.pdf
A word about the long run: While conditions, confidence and asset prices all seem
moderate today, meaning there's
’nothing brilliant to say about the short-term outlook, the
long term remains worrisome.
Because the U.S. is still able to attract capital from abroad and
print money, our financial problems aren't pressing
at the moment. But the combination of
intractable deficit spending, unsustainable entitlement promises and a total dearth of responsible
action in Washington certainly raises alarms regarding the future
If the economy continues to recover and the Fed's
bond buying eases off, interest rates are likely to go
further on the upside. But given the modest level of confidence at play, the markets should
not turn out to be perilous. Most assets are neither dangerously elevated (with the possible
exception of long-term Treasury bonds
and high grades) nor compellingly cheap.
It's easier to
know what to do at the extremes than it is in the middle ground, where I believe we are
today. As I wrote in my book, when there's nothing
clever to do, the mistake lies in trying
to be clever. Today it seems the best we can do is invest prudently in the coming months,
avoiding
aggressiveness and remembering to apply caution.

Hi Guys,
Some recent research that focused on a portfolio’s fixed income holdings by financial and retirement planning heavyweights has prompted a reevaluation of the recommended bond percentages in that target portfolio as a function of time horizon.
Some of this debate raged in the MFO discussion titled “Bonds, Be Gone”. For completeness, here is the Link to that discussion:
http://www.mutualfundobserver.com/discussions-3/#/discussion/8079/bonds-be-gone
Not surprisingly, the research wizards conclude that the proper percentage is time dependent. The newer body of research emphasizes a tipping point between the accumulation and the distribution phases of a portfolio’s lifecycle.
The conventional wisdom had been that a bond allocation should increase with age to dampen volatility disruptions, especially critical soon after the distribution phase begins.
More controversial is the finding that current Monte Carlo-based research suggests that just before the retirement date, and soon afterward, the portfolio should go heavy into bonds to blunt the possible impact of any Black Swan events in this crucial timeframe. Further, these newer findings advocate an increase in equity positions as the retirement progresses to battle inflation and to augment the likelihood of portfolio survival.
Flexibility in annual drawdown rate, especially after a market downturn, remains a recommended tactic to enhance survival probability prospects. An obvious successful tactic to escape portfolio bankruptcy is to reduce withdrawal rates immediately after a market down year.
The standard portfolio wisdom almost never advocates a totally 100 % equity portfolio, except for perhaps the situation of an investor who is 30 years removed from any withdrawal needs. This is not a novel concept. It has been a constant part of retirement planning for centuries. Prudent investors like Benjamin Graham have consistently recommended this policy.
Benjamin Graham is recognized as one of the rare Wall Street masters. It is less well known that he was the teacher of many other Wall Street giants. That tiny group includes the likes of Warren Buffett, Bill Ruane, Walter Schloss, and a host of others identified in Buffett’s famous “The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville" paper.
Graham summarized his lessons from a lifetime of mostly successful investing in a little known lecture that he delivered in a November 1963 San Francisco presentation. His lessons learned are still pertinent today since the fundamental uncertainties of yesteryear are still relevant today. There is much investment sagacity in this 14 page record of his speech. Here is the Link to this Graham lecture treasure:
http://www.jasonzweig.com/documents/BG_speech_SF1963.pdf
Graham warns that “Hence a large advance in the stock market is basically a sign for caution and not a reason for confidence”. The San Francisco presentation is dense with these common sense observations.
For example, Graham notes that the higher the market advances, the more the investor should mistrust its future advance.
Graham accepts wild market price fluctuations (volatility) as a rule rather than an exception. He claimed he gave up trying to make market predictions after 1914 because it was not a dependable, prudent investor’s game; he is very humble when he proclaims that even making a one year forecast is an unreliable, unproductive chore.
Even in 1963, Graham reluctantly acknowledged the difficulties that professional money managers encountered in beating appropriate market indices. He is skeptical about the efficacy of economic, stock market, and financial forecasting. The evidence suggests otherwise; predictions are notoriously error prone.
Graham preemptively makes the global Bill Sharpe argument about the requirement to balance all returns among the investment population before Bill Sharpe himself makes an identical case. What one active investor earns above some standard metric, another less fortunate investor must sacrifice.
Graham talks about the relative dividend gap between bonds and stocks, and highlights the modeling of this gap over the years. He defends a mixed fixed income-equity portfolio asset allocation that varies between 25 % to 75 % equity holdings. Although Graham favors a higher concentration of equity positions when the price is right (cheap), bonds are always part of the Graham ideal portfolio. He favors dollar cost averaging approaches. He likes mutual funds as an easy, cost effective way to fully diversify. He doubts that many investors have the skills and discipline to invest in individual stocks.
I strongly recommend that you access the Graham 1962 presentation. Although the quoted data are stale, the basic concepts retain their vitality. Be patient; the download is slow, but well worth the wait. Benjamin Graham’s market acumen and operational rules will make you a better investor.
Graham asserts that (from page 8) “… there is no indication that the investor can do better than the market averages by making his own selections or by taking expert advice.”
That’s a significant concession from a market legend. With the exposure and absorption of 5 decades of experience, Graham observed that he knew less and less about what the market would do, but he gained perspective on what investors ought to do.
In the end, without explicitly stating it, Graham was really touting passively managed Index mutual fund/ETFs since professional managers did not advance returns above general market rewards. Remember, in the 1962 lecture timeframe, Bogle’s Index fund dream was just starting to jell.
Graham concluded his lecture, as I will this post, with the positive admonition that “by following sound policies almost any investor- even in this insecure world – should be able to eat well enough without having to loss any sleep”. Amen to that.
Your comments are always welcomed and encouraged.
Best Regards.

The various perspectives on this whole subject are fascinating. I had absolutely no intention of provoking either an ethical or a political issue. My question was simply an economic one: If we want health care at a minimal cost, how is that consistent with lots of profit for investors who are, in the final analysis, raking in profits from the top of whatever system is in practice?
While I certainly share Scott's very dim view of our present government, this particular topic seems to be so complex, with so many interested players from so many disparate areas that it's no wonder no one can agree on anything. In that light, Scott's observation that some politician said "We have to pass it so that you can find out what is in it" should perhaps be given some rhetorical slack.
Consider the ever-evolving universe of the internet, another area of incredible complexity and financial upset and interaction. What if the internet had not been allowed to come into being until after all interested parties had reached agreement on what exactly it was going to look like after ten or fifteen years? Does anyone really think that there would be an internet today if forced to get over that hurdle? Would the print media, for example, have signed off on their own demise?
With respect to the proposals of Obamacare, I submit that the situation is quite similar: again we have an incredibly complex situation which is certainly going to affect many players with financial interests in the game. How will this play out in the end? I don't believe for a minute that anyone out there really knows what the ultimate result is going to look like. Already there seem to be cracks showing in the implementation.
The point is simply this: either we want a medical-care system that is in no way different than buying a new car... "no money, no health... too bad... that's life" or we acknowledge that this entire subject has ethical overtones. If the latter is to be the choice, and we also believe that the present system is seriously flawed, then experimentation as we try to find a new paradigm is simply unavoidable. Not easy, not fun, but that's life if we want to continue to evolve.
Anyone who blathers that they know exactly how this is going to play out is either a moron or a charlatan.

The whole concept of making investment profit on the healthcare sector is very interesting. I believe that it's fair to say that the main underlying driver of Obamacare and every other proposed reform is the excessive cost and inefficiency of our present system.
The very concept of making an investment profit of any significant magnitude obviously requires that the cost of the underlying medical care be overpriced, so as to provide that profit margin. So how do we rationalize the desire for a lower cost system with the concept of huge profits?
At the risk of being accused (again!) of being either a socialist or worse, I simply raise the question of what it is that we expect from our medical system, without advocating for any particular design change, Obamacare or otherwise. It's pretty well irrefutable that whatever we're pretending is a "system" now is in fact neither logically designed nor even really a system, but rather a clapped-together batch of attempts to provide at least some level of basic service to almost anyone, while also providing an excellent level of care for those few who can afford it.
The result is a "system" that charges the often-quoted "$10 for an aspirin" so that we can provide minimal service to those who show up at the emergency room with serious problems but no cash. Now, the very existance of this situation strongly implies that perhaps medical care should not logically be considered in the same perspective as other financial transactions. For example, no one seriously believes that if you show up at a new-car dealership with no money you should be entitled to "some basic level of new-car ownership". This dichotomy suggests that regardless of whether it is expressed or not, our society does, at some level, make an exception to the normal capitalist model with respect to health care. From Ted's Ritholtz article:
"The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) was signed into law by Ronald Reagan. It mandated that “Hospitals provide care to anyone needing emergency healthcare treatment regardless of citizenship, legal status or ability to pay.”
If we accept that as a fact, (realizing that whatever we are doing now is both irrationally expensive and discriminatory to those without adequate insurance coverage) and desire to make our health-delivery system as efficient as possible, how do we expect to do that while providing great amounts of profit for investors who have no skin in the game other than to make money on the deal?
I cannot square this circle: I simply do not understand how to make the health system more efficient and less expensive while simultaneously building in great investment profits at the same time.
I apologize for the length of this... it approaches that typical of others who I have chastised for the same weakness.

Charles certainly is a gem! That's one of the most straightforward and understandable perspectives on debt, credit and economies that I've ever seen or heard. I've downloaded the pdf, and will be working through it a few pages at a time.
By the way, this paper (even in the 30-minute video format) makes a great supplement to a book originally recommended to me by Investor: "The Power of Gold", by Peter L. Bernstein. That book will take you from the original concepts of economies, using trade and barter, right up until the modern financial era. Mr. Dalio's paper makes a remarkably well-fitting addendum to the book, taking us right up to the present moment in financial history and economic development.
For information on "The Power of Gold" (and an Amazon link) look above under Resources/Books (pg 2).
I missed the original post, and thank you very much for the reference.
Regards-
OJ

Reply to @VintageFreak:
While the fund is closed to new investors, since you already have a position in the fund, you should be able to open a new account in a taxable account provided that you can demonstrate you own the shares by submitting a recent statement. You need to speak with CSR for more information.
Fund Eligible Purchases Closed to New Investors
The Fund is closed to new investors. Except as indicated below, only investors of the Fund on December 31, 2009, whether owning shares of record or through a processing intermediary, are eligible to purchase shares of the Fund. Exceptions include:
Participants in an employee retirement plan for which the Fund is an eligible investment alternative and whose records are maintained by a processing intermediary having an agreement with the Fund in effect on December 31, 2009.
Clients of a financial adviser or planner who had client assets invested in the Fund on December 31, 2009.
Employees, officers and directors of the Fund or the Adviser, and members of their immediate families (namely, spouses, siblings, parents, children and grandchildren).
Firms having an existing business relationship with the Adviser, whose investment the officers of the Fund determine, in their sole discretion, would not adversely affect the Adviser’s ability to manage the Fund effectively.
The Fund reserves the right, at any time, to re-open or modify the extent to which the future sales of shares are limited.

FYI:
Regards,
Ted
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/09/20/decoding-fee-only-sometimes-it-isnt-what-you-think/tab/print/

FYI:
Regards,
Ted
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323665504579032950048436762.html#printMode

A few of other BIG mistakes that were not included:
1. Failing to read the prospectus description of what the manager can and cannot do, what the fund will usually invest in. It amazes me how many people do not read fund prospectuses, even the now-legal short versions. READ THE PROSPECTUS!
2. Not learning about the manger/management team who is running the fund. You are buying a manager, not a fund, after all.
3. Listening to political talk-show people, most of whom know NOTHING about economics and investing.
4. Watching network and cable financial television and believing what you hear to be gospel.
5. Believing the end of the world is around the corner. Remember the Peanuts' quote..."The world is not going to end today. It's already tomorrow in Australia."

Fund has a load. Class A Shares (LEFAX), Class C Shares (LEAFX), and Class I Shares (LEFIX).
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1555919/000116204413001057/tealeaf497201309.htm
Excerpt:
PRINCIPAL INVESTMENT STRATEGIES:
The Fund invests in long positions in equity securities of American and Canadian companies identified by the Fund's investment adviser (AMH Equity, Ltd. or "AMH") as undervalued and takes short positions in equity securities that AMH has identified as overvalued. The Fund invests, both long and short, primarily in securities principally traded in the United States markets. AMH will determine the size of each long or short position by analyzing the tradeoff between the attractiveness of each position and its impact on the risk of the overall portfolio. AMH examines various factors in determining the value characteristics of such issuers including net cash per share, price-to-sales ratios, price-to-tangible book value ratios and price-to-earnings ratios. These value characteristics are examined in the context of the issuer's operating and financial fundamentals such as length of operating history, return on equity, earnings growth and cash flow growth. AMH generally meets with company management at investment conferences, through site visits or by teleconference, and often speaks with company suppliers, customers and/or competitors as part of its research process. Additionally, AMH screens securities for the Fund based on a continuous study of trends in industries and company-specific earnings, cash flow power and growth of sales and earnings per share. AMH may buy index-based exchange traded funds ("ETFs") to gain market exposure. Additionally, AMH may also sell short ETFs or buy inverse ETFs, including leveraged inverse ETFs, to hedge overall equity market risk when it believes market conditions are unfavorable.
The Fund may invest up to 20% of its total assets in equity securities of companies located outside of the U.S. or Canada through American Depositary Receipts ("ADRs") traded on a U.S. exchange and through equity securities traded on a foreign exchange outside of the U.S. or Canada. AMH selects equity securities without restriction as to market capitalization, although it anticipates that a significant portion of the Fund's assets will be invested in long positions in equity securities of smaller issuers (issuers with a market capitalization below $1.5 billion at the time of investment). The Fund may invest a large percentage of its assets in a few sectors, such as information technology, healthcare, energy/alternative energy, consumer cyclicals, and industrials. When AMH believes market conditions are appropriate, the Fund may borrow money from banks to make additional portfolio investments. The Fund may borrow an amount equal to as much as one-third of the value of its total assets (which includes the amount borrowed). The Fund may purchase put and call options on equity securities, equity indexes and ETFs as substitutes for the underlying instrument or index, to hedge its portfolio, to manage risk or to obtain market exposure. To generate additional returns, the Fund may also write "covered" call options on equity securities and ETFs it owns and on equity indexes that are expected to have return characteristics substantially similar to the Fund's portfolio.
The Fund intends, under normal circumstances, to maintain at least 65% net exposure (longs (other than inverse ETFs) minus shorts (including inverse ETFs)) to equity securities. Additionally, under normal circumstances, AMH expects that the Fund's gross exposure to equity securities will not exceed 150% of the Fund's net assets. The Fund defines gross exposure as the value of longs plus shorts plus options as a percentage of the Fund’s net assets. The Fund generally restricts short positions to 75% of net assets and long positions to 120% of net assets. AMH will not take a greater than 10% position at cost, and will generally keep position size at or below 15% through sales or other portfolio management techniques.
AMH sells a long position when a price target is reached, fundamentals have deteriorated or more attractive investments are available. AMH may also sell a position to adjust the Fund's net exposure to equity securities or to implement its hedging strategy. AMH covers (buys back) short positions when a price target is reached, fundamentals have improved or more attractive short positions are available or it believes hedging is no longer attractive. AMH closes out written call options when a price target is reached, fundamentals have improved or more attractive call options are available.

Hi Guys,
If you don’t know, I have some skills and experience that contribute to my qualifications in assessing Monte Carlo-based retirement analyses. I have reviewed much of the literature, have done countless specific analyses, and have even written a Monte Carlo code when not many existed. So, this is not a casual posting; it has a serious purpose.
The NY Times article that reviewed the Pfau and Kitces study did a respectable job at summarizing the researcher’s basic findings. But, like any broad-brush evaluation aimed at a general readership, it is not necessarily nuanced or complete. A study of this magnitude deserves special attention since an interpretation of its discoveries can be very personal. Also, the authors are heavyweights in the retirement arena; these researchers speak with authority.
Therefore, my first recommendation is that you not be satisfied with a reasonable review, but that you go directly to the source. The referenced document is not mathematical, is a breezy read, has specific recommendations, contains useful charts that summarize all its findings, and is only19 pages long. Here is a Link to this fine Monte Carlo research paper:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2324930
The study itself is comprehensive, but it is simultaneously limited in scope because it only partially deals with the complex continuum of retirement issues. For example, retirement planning must address both the accumulation and the distribution phases of an overall retirement strategy. The referenced study only focuses on the distribution portion of retirement.
The study examines the survival prospects of a retirement portfolio under the commonly accepted 4 % and 5 % annual withdrawal schedules (adjusted for inflation) for three representative market rewards scenarios. Not shockingly, the postulated returns scenarios are a primary determinant force in any portfolio survival study. The three reasonable postulated scenarios are: one developed by Harold Evensky for professional financial planning purposes, another calibrated to the current low interest rate environment, and a third that reflects historical equity and bond returns.
The major distinction in the Pfau and Kitces work is that the equity/bond asset allocation mix is not held constant during the retirement period; 121 equity glide-pathways are defined and evaluated. Monte Carlo analyses randomly selects the portfolio’s returns annually for each of 10,000 cases considered for each equity glide-path. A 30-year retirement lifecycle is documented.
In some instances, the retirement portfolio is favored with positive returns in its early years; in other instances, the reverse is randomly selected and the portfolio suffers initial erosive market drawdowns. Portfolio survival is definitely dependent upon both the magnitude and the order of these future projected returns.
For a more complete assessment of the entire retirement planning process, I recommend you visit another research paper. The paper is authored by Javier Estrada, another financial research wizard; his paper is titled “Rethinking Risk”. Here is a Link to the compact 23 page study:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2318961
Estrada examined returns data from 19 countries over a 110 year timeframe. He makes the case for a heavier commitment to equity positions during the accumulation phase of retirement planning, even just before the retirement date. He observes that “ In fact, stocks have both a higher upside potential and a more limited downside potential
than bonds, even when tail risks strike.” He’s writing here about Black Swan low probability events late in the lifecycle period.
In his conclusion section, Estrada writes “ … it is clear that stocks are more volatile than bonds, but it is far from clear that they are riskier than bonds for the type of investor considered here. This is because, even when tail risks strike, stocks enable investors to accumulate more wealth by the end of the holding period than bonds. Hence, in what sense are stocks riskier than bonds for a long‐term investor that focuses on the endgame?”
In essence, the Pfau & Kitces Monte Carlo studies, and the Estrada empirical assembly and analysis of market data dovetail to fit an emerging picture. These researchers are advocating for more aggressive portfolios with a higher fraction of equity holdings. However, Pfau & Kitces endorse a U-shaped percentage equity holding profile that features more fixed income products immediately after the retirement date.
Their study is soundly constructed, but its numerical findings are not overwhelming. That’s why you need to examine the results for yourself. It is likely that some of the reported trends are within the uncertainty (the noise) of the calculations. Basically, the study documents marginal benefits, small gains in survival likelihoods.
In many instances, the reported portfolio survival probabilities are at totally unacceptable survival rates. That is especially true for the Evensky model returns and today’s low fixed income returns forecasts. From my viewpoint, the only actionable portfolio equity glide-path scenario is that coupled to the historical market returns. That’s a rude awakening.
Referring to the Pfau & Kitces figures, their analyses show portfolio survival rates above the 90 % likelihood mark only for historical-like annual return rates. That might also be interpreted as a clue that a 4 % withdrawal rate is unacceptable if current, muted market conditions hold for the next decade or so.
There is a lot to be learned from the two referenced studies. Please take advantage of them. I believe that although they offer interesting and new insights, they do not make overwhelmingly compelling arguments. If I do decide to act on them, it will be very incremental in character.
Nobody sees the future market returns with clarity, so conservative retirement approaches and planning are always the order of the day.
I hope these references are helpful in that regard.
Best Wishes.

"RiverPark Advisors announced the launch of its third liquid alternatives fund, the Structural Alpha Fund, which joins the RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity Fund and RiverPark Gargoyle Hedged Value Fund."
That's a very peculiar press release, in the sense that "the launch" of RSAFX occurred almost three months ago (June 28, to be exact). The press release announcing "the launch" has been faithfully reproduced at The Street, Motley Fool and - along with reports on the work of "intimacy coaches" - the sports-oriented SportBalla site.
Odd.
David

http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/912036/000119312513367597/d598072d497.htm
497 1 d598072d497.htm ASTON FUNDS
Aston Funds
ASTON/Fairpointe Mid Cap Fund
Class N Shares and Class I Shares
Supplement dated September 16, 2013 to the Prospectus dated February 28, 2013 and supplemented on July 2, 2013 for Aston Funds (the “Prospectus”) and Summary Prospectus dated March 1, 2013 for the Fund (the “Summary Prospectus” and together with the Prospectus, the “Prospectuses”)
IMPORTANT NOTICE
This supplement provides new and additional information beyond that contained in the Prospectuses and should be retained and read in conjunction with the Prospectuses. Keep it for future reference.
Effective after the close of business on Friday, October 18, 2013 (the “Soft Close Date”), the ASTON/Fairpointe Mid Cap Fund (the “Fund”) is closed to new investors until further notice, with the following limited exceptions, where the Fund determines that the exception processing is operationally feasible and will not harm the Fund’s investment process:
• Financial advisors and/or financial consultants that have clients invested in the Fund may continue to recommend the Fund to their clients and/or open new accounts or add to the accounts of their clients.
• Financial advisors and/or financial consultants that have approved the inclusion of the Fund as an investment option for their clients and such inclusion was approved by the Fund prior to the Soft Close Date may designate the Fund as an investment option for their clients.
• Participants in a retirement plan that includes the Fund as an investment option on the Soft Close Date may continue to designate the Fund as an investment option.
• Trustees of Aston Funds, employees of Aston Asset Management, LP and Fairpointe Capital LLC and their immediate household family members may open new accounts and add to such accounts.
The Fund reserves the right to make additional exceptions, to limit the above exceptions or otherwise to modify the foregoing closure policy at any time and to reject any investment for any reason.
For more information, please call Aston Funds: 800-992-8151 or visit our website at www.astonfunds.com.

Hi rono,
Yuppers...........a financial physcopath, tis he. An insiders, insider; among the others of the global financial world.
Take care over your way.
Catch

Hi Lawlar and the MFO Gang,
My experiences with regard to group behavior at investment seminars dovetails exactly with your observations. Folks attending these forums have low tolerance for investment principles and guidelines, but hungrily seek specific stock picking tips. They don’t want to learn to fish, just a few fish tossed into their nets.
That’s sad, but has been a constant for at least two decades based on my anecdotal evidence from loyally attending the popular Las Vegas MoneyShow for that period. Investing wizards such as Louis Navellier and Jeremy Grantham always jam-packed their sessions to standing room only status with excited potential clients. Typically, they initiated their presentations with general global projections that bored the audience who really wanted stock recommendations. In the end, they satisfied their anxious fans who took copious notes.
I attended at least a half dozen Upgrader presentations by Janet Brown. She is an intelligent, dedicated, informed, and charming financial professional. She also is an engaged seller. I like her.
Several times, especially in the earlier years after the formal sessions, we discussed the asymmetric nature of the Upgrader holdings in terms of an unbalanced portfolio diversification perspective. Fundamentally, the Upgrader methodology is short-term momentum-based with a heavier weighting to the most recent performance data. Consequently, its portfolio allocations favored concentrated positions in a few market sectors while completely ignoring others. The evolving Upgrader techniques are designed to mitigate this effect. That’s in the goodness direction.
Still, the Upgrader program remains a short-term momentum strategy. The most recent academic work in this area controversially suggests that short-term momentum tactics not only do not add to excess returns, but actually subtracts an amount that approximates the cost of doing the technical analysis. That’s more sorry news for committed chartists. Recent Upgrader fund (FUNDX) performance has definitely not excelled.
Private investors continually seek the Holy Grail. They do so in an impatient manner. They search for the equivalent of a racetrack tout’s winning picks list, and are all to anxiously prepared to act on these ill-conceived tips. Trade frequently seems to be the operative mantra. But that wealth depleting action plan is not limited to individual investors alone. That mindset has penetrated into the mutual fund management community.
Indeed, mutual fund managers have developed some wealth eroding habits over the decades. Today, they trade far too often. Just after World War II, portfolio turnover rates were far lower than they currently are. Back in the 1940s, mutual funds held stocks for a 6 year average length with an annual portfolio turnover rate of only 20 %. Today, mutual fund managers hold positions for half a year with 100 % - like turnover rates.
All that that frenetic portfolio action accomplishes is to increase ownership costs. These guys are not investing; they’re speculating.
Historical data and academic studies document that the Holy Trinity for improved mutual fund returns is low costs, low turnover rates, and long-tenured, seasoned management. More controversial, low beta funds and tactical momentum funds are sometimes added to that mix. Sadly, the current crop of active mutual fund managers more frequently than not violates the proven triad to the detriment of their shareholders.
Unfortunately, given our behavioral biases, we will continue to fill the hallways when market experts make their carefully crafted and misleading pitches. They are the modern version of the old West’s snake oil pitchmen. They will influence and sell; we will wistfully buy.
This is a major reason why individual investors underperform the markets, why mutual fund owners underperform the funds they own, and why active mutual fund managers underperform their benchmarks. It is a sad story that is repeated across decades of disappointment.
There are attractive alternatives.
Best Wishes.

"We think equities have a lot of tail winds," says Wolle. "We believe that they're still reasonably valued, that the likelihood of recession is quite low, and that financial conditions and price trends are supportive."

I think Mr. Scott Wolle has this part right.
But, despite the article's praise, he did not have it right in May, like the other leveraged bond allocation funds, namely AQRIX and PAUIX. Maybe a bit less severe, but all trail a simple fixed allocation fund, like VBINX, badly this year.
Here is M* comparison, YTD:

I'm not sure what "full cycle" means for these funds. Is it 30 plus years? The length of the last bond run? And, with the bond vehicle deteriorating, can they still use leverage as effectively as they did through May of this year?
Nor does the article call attention to the front-load Invesco charges for most of this fund's share classes.
BTW, I sold my AQRIX holding in mid-August. Disappointed with AQR's lack of transparency and their untimely commentaries, given their terrible performance in 2Q. They still only show commentary for 1Q. If they ever do post an update, I'll attempt a postmortem. In any case, I sure got that one wrong.