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@ET91: Well - and I think this is probably the last I'll say about Fairholme because even I think I'm going over the same ground.
1. I hope Fairholme does well/turns around for the people who own it.
2. I think Berkowitz is an excellent investor, but even I thought the banks simply were in the eye of the storm before problems appeared again. Some other major investors (Tepper, etc) who had a similar thesis ("OMG, the banks are values!") got largely out before the turn. While Berkowitz can continue to believe that this is a repeat of the '90's, there's a point where people aren't willing to follow on a massive - to the point where the fund relied on it - bet that isn't working. Fairholme has almost always been concentrated, but I don't believe bets have been made similar to the size of the AIG bet, for example. Managers get upset when people run during a tough period - I believe Whitman also got royally pissed when people ran in 2008 - but money (whether it be rich money, smart money, dumb money, old money, funny money) will head for zee hills in this sort of situation, without fail. Again, read the Cramer book - managers think that "I've made so much money, people won't leave." Yes, they will. Raising the minimum investment doesn't do anything - people are still going to leave.
Even hedge fund managers are coming up with new ideas to get stable sources of money - Ackman is taking a fund public next year and Third Point has started a reinsurance company like Einhorn has (although it isn't public, yet.)
2a. I'm surprised there haven't been hedge fund-like mutual funds created with a lock-up period (as a trade-off, they would have far greater flexibility than traditionally seen with a mutual fund.) Then managers could make unusual/risky/hedge-fund like bets on anything and have the ability to use hedge-fund like tactics - private equity, whatever - and people would know going in.
2b. Here's a question that could deserve its own thread: can you be a mutual fund like Fairholme and make a massive bet (and while the fund has been concentrated, I don't think it's ever been this concentrated in terms of the size of the bets and the hot money probably allowed him the ability to go that big in terms of the bets) on something like financials that may not work for a year or two or three when the level of underperformance will cause large redemptions, negative press and a general negative feedback loop (having to sell positions to raise cash, people not in the fund staying away because of what they're seeing and reading) probably by the end of the first year? It doesn't matter if it's Berkowitz, either: John Paulson could make the biggest trade ever and if his fund tanks the next year (worse than Berkowitz is doing), it really is a "what have you done for me lately?" They're not going to go, "Oh ok, better luck next year." (Speaking of, I wonder how Paulson's fund betting on literal real estate in the SW is doing.)
Every manager is going to have a bad period - it's a given. However, I think how they handle it shows a lot.
One almost has to be a smaller, specialized fund to make these sorts of bets and be able to sit on them under the radar and with investors who know what they're getting into. People on here can know what Fairholme is generally about, but I'd be curious what % of money in Fairholme is average people who invested in "this Berkowitz guy" who was "Morningstar's Manager of the Decade".
2c. Does raising the minimum investment for a mutual fund to $10K, $25k, etc cause money to be redeemed faster when things go South? If people have less money at stake, maybe they'll give the manager a little more time. Some are obviously dealing with giant portfolios, but how many people had Fairholme as a gigantic holding in a smaller portfolio, given how it's done in prior years?
3. The "thank you note" to the government was off-putting and seemed really about ego; it may as well have said "thank you for continuing to bail out my top positions." The banks may be bailed out/backstopped again if they get into trouble (actually, it seems likely), but I think that's a really unsatisfactory investment thesis. If you're telling me there's no better ideas out there than piling money - doubling and tripling down - into financial stocks who will continue if things go bad again because they'll get bailed out, things are even worse than I think.
Even if the world doesn't turn sour again, not seeing what the catalyst for banks will be anytime soon - they'll be dealing with increased regulations, increasing anger from the general population, etc. I will say at least Berkowitz has admitted it hasn't been a good year, it isn't like Kinetics Paradigm and their response when they stuck with financials all the way down in 2008.
4. It's exciting to me when great investors offer new products that can give retail investors new strategies or asset classes or even just another take on the usual asset classes from a great investor. I look at Fairholme Allocation and I think the idea of having nearly half the fund in two names is absurd, and what's new in it?. Fairholme Allocation almost feels like it was a way to get more money to invest in the same financial bets. If the fund isn't going to take a different approach than the other fund, then really - why offer it? Closing Fairholme also should have been considered.
5. I'm a little surprised that the situation with Fernandez was so sudden, although it appears as if it was prepared for.