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Here's a statement of the obvious: The opinions expressed here are those of the participants, not those of the Mutual Fund Observer. We cannot vouch for the accuracy or appropriateness of any of it, though we do encourage civility and good humor.
  • has gold finally peak & a few more reads.. large caps studs and duds
    http://www.smartmoney.com/invest/strategies/has-gold-finally-peaked-1317061906723/?cid=djem_sm_dailyviews_h
    holmes weekly commentary
    http://www.usfunds.com/investor-resources/investor-alert/index.cfm?&INJECTION-DETECTED
    http://etfdb.com/2011/large-cap-etfs-studs-and-duds/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed:+etfdb+(ETF+Database)
    safe haven or missed chance
    http://www.onwallstreet.com/news/muni-bonds-investment-outlook-2675277-1.html?zkPrintable=true
    buffett - market is cheap
    http://www.benzinga.com/analyst-ratings/analyst-color/11/09/1943719/warren-buffett-thinks-the-market-is-cheap
    Vanguard Exec Warns of 'Contagion' From Looming Greek Default
    http://www.onwallstreet.com/news/greece-debt-crisis-vanguard-2675273-1.html?ET=onwallstreet:e4028:2131761a:&st=email&utm_source=editorial&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=OWS_Daily__092611
    RBC WEALTH MANAGEMENTS WEEKLY COMMENTARY - Michael D. Ruccio, AAMS
    The Markets
    Investors did a 180 from the previous week, deciding once again that the risk of global recession and financial contagion was high enough to justify getting rid of equities, commodities, and practically everything else except U.S. Treasuries. A midweek global selloff took the small-cap Russell 2000 to just below its August low; having lost almost 25% since its April 29 high of 865, it has now reentered bear-market territory. The S&P 500 once again dipped below 1,200 and is down almost 17% from its April high, while the Dow is off almost 16% and the Nasdaq almost 14% in the same time period. Gold provided no refuge from the selling as it plummeted almost $150 an ounce, while oil prices turned downward to the $80 per barrel mark. The dollar continued to attract nervous global investors, and 10-year Treasury yields took a 16-basis-point nosedive on Thursday as prices shot up.
    Market/Index 2010 Close Prior Week As of 9/23 Week Change YTD Change
    DJIA 11577.51 11509.09 10771.48 -6.41% -6.96%
    NASDAQ 2652.87 2622.31 2483.23 -5.30% -6.39%
    S&P 500 1257.64 1216.01 1136.43 -6.54% -9.64%
    Russell 2000 783.65 714.31 652.43 -8.66% -16.74%
    Global Dow 2087.44 1840.92 1700.42 -7.63% -18.54%
    Fed. Funds .25% .25% .25% 0 bps 0 bps
    10-year Treasuries 3.30% 2.08% 1.84% -24 bps -146 bps
    Last Week's Headlines
    Let's twist again: The Federal Reserve announced it will sell $400 billion worth of short-term bonds in its portfolio and buy an equal amount of longer maturities. The plan, which echoes a 1960s maneuver called Operation Twist, also will involve reinvesting principal payments on the Fed's agency debt holdings in agency mortgage-backed securities. The move is intended to support economic recovery by keeping already low long-term interest rates really low. The Fed cited concerns about "significant downside risks to the economic outlook, including strains in global financial markets."
    Italy's debt challenges worsened when Standard and Poor's cut its credit rating by one notch, to A, and issued a negative outlook, meaning further cuts are possible. Moody's downgraded eight Greek banks and three U.S. banks, citing uncertainty about the level of government support for "too big to fail" banks in the event of a 2008-style financial crisis.
    The International Monetary Fund cut its forecast for U.S. economic growth this year to 1.5%--1% below its estimate of just three months ago--and to 1.8% for 2012. Globally, the 4% annual growth forecast for both this year and next is down from 2010's 5% growth rate. Even China's 2012 forecast was lowered from 2011's 9.5% to 9%, and its factory sector contracted in September for the third straight month. Meanwhile, the Conference Board's index of leading economic indicators rose 0.3% in August, the third straight month of increases. However, it said weak consumer confidence has increased the possibility of reentering recession.
    Despite tight credit and appraisal problems, existing home sales were up 7.7% in August, according to the National Association of Realtors®. The median sales prices was 5.1% lower than last August, which may have helped push home resales up 18.6% from a year earlier. More purchases were made by investors looking for bargains and a hedge against inflation, according to the NAR, and distressed properties represented 31% of sales.
    President Obama laid out his proposal for deficit reduction, which the administration said would cut the deficit by more than $3 trillion over the next 10 years. The proposal anticipates a $1.5 trillion reduction from raising taxes on higher-income taxpayers by letting the so-called Bush-era tax cuts expire in 2013, limiting some deductions for households earning more than $250,000 a year, and closing some tax loopholes. It also calls for a minimum tax rate for individuals making more than $1 million a year--the "Buffett rule" advocated by billionaire Warren Buffett, who has said his secretary shouldn't pay a higher tax rate than he does. The plan would cut an estimated $580 billion in spending, including cuts in Medicare and Medicaid, largely from changes in payments to drug companies and institutional care providers. It also factors in an estimated $1.1 trillion from winding down the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and $430 billion saved on interest payments.
    Eye on the Week Ahead
    As a volatile quarter draws to a close, investors will be watching to see how--and how quickly--world financial leaders follow through on their pledge to coordinate efforts to stave off global financial problems. Germany's governing body is scheduled to vote Thursday on expanded powers and financing for the European Financial Stability Facility. Italian bond auctions will be of interest in the wake of S&P's downgrade, and the final report on Q2 U.S. economic growth is due Thursday.
    Key dates and data releases: new home sales (9/26); home prices, consumer confidence (9/27); durable goods orders (9/28); final Q2 GDP, weekly new jobless claims (9/29); personal income/spending, consumer sentiment (9/30).
  • Congressional Effect Investor Fund
    CEFFX:
    Manager Info:
    Eric Singer, Manager of the fund Advisor, Congressional Effect Management, first published an article on the general effect of Congress on daily stock prices in an article published in Barron’s in 1992. Since then the idea has attracted support and evidence from both the financial and academic community
    Interesting strategy...Congress in Session = Go away.
    Invests in the S&P 500 index when congress is not in session. Not sure if the fund follows this exactly but here's (was) the congressional schedule for 2011:
    http://www.thecapitol.net/FAQ/cong_schedule.html
    Interesting stats:
    http://www.congressionalfund.com/
  • New Commentary on Volatility from Dr. Hasenstab
    I'd suggest reading this article for a further discussion regarding currency action recently:
    http://www.zerohedge.com/news/financial-warfare
    I'd suggest reading this on Brazil's decision to slap a 30% tariff on certain imports from China:
    http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/218488/20110922/brazil-tariff-china-trade-war.htm
    And Protectionism in Brazil: http://www.economist.com/node/21530144
    More from Jim Rogers: http://wallstreetpit.com/84285-the-current-dire-straits-jim-rogers
    Personally, with inflation and things like the Brazil decision, I think there's a lot of concern about emerging markets and issues that are not being discussed very much in the financial media.
    I do think that people should invest in emerging markets and I think - to some degree - EM debt, but be willing to have a long-term viewpoint because the short-term could become increasingly rocky. While I'm concerned about what EM debt has done lately, anyone looking to start a position in a more conservative (by comparison) EM debt play should use this downturn in Hasenstab's terrific fund to start a position.
    One other note, some companies still see growth, as Yum dumps A & W and Long John Silver to focus on expanding in EM's.
    http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-09-22/yum-brands-sells-a-w-long-john-silver-s-chains-separately.html
  • Stupid Investment Of The Week : Fairholme Fund
    Reply to @Anonymous: Do I agree that it's a little late and little obvious? Sure. However, Jaffe's points about ego getting in the way may be - I think - valid (I still think the Bank of America conference call and the "thank you note" to the government took tremendous ego ("Thank you for continuing to bail out my positions with taxpayer dollars", it might as well have said), and Berkowitz thinking that this was a repeat of financial crises before:
    __________________
    2011: "For his part, Berkowitz seems prepared to wait. “I’ve studied these companies for decades. This is how I made my money in the 90’s with at the time what was Wells Fargo”, explains Berkowitz.
    “Wells Fargo was said to be going bust, everybody was shorting Wells Fargo. Well, it only was up seven or eight times in as many years. ***I don’t know how the banks are going to work it out this time***, but they’re very cheap, they are priced to fail and we’re going to make some good money.” "
    http://www.cnbc.com/id/43343328/Fairholme_s_Berkowitz_Still_Bullish_on_Bank_of_America
    vs in 2009:
    Berkowitz: "Maybe it's because I don't invest in things I can't understand. Eighteen years ago, after the financial stocks got killed, I was a big buyer of Wells Fargo, Freddie Mac and MBIA. They were simpler businesses then -- and they were cheap and understandable. You could read an annual report or a 10-K and you knew what you were getting.
    Or take American International Group. If you looked at an AIG annual report six or seven years ago, you saw one paragraph on derivatives. You look at an AIG annual report today and you see 15 pages on derivatives. I don't think company insiders fully understand what's going on, let alone outsiders. So if I don't understand something, I've learned to walk away."
    http://www.kiplinger.com/magazine/archives/2009/01/bruce_berkowitz.html?kipad_id=x?kipad_id=x
    ___________________________
    "I don't know how they're going to work it out this time?" Not what I would want to hear as a Fairholme shareholder (and I don't think it's crazy to say that: if I was ever invested with a fund making a concentrated bet and the manager said, "I don't know how they're going to work it out this time", I'd sell.
    So, what's the thesis if he "doesn't know how they're going to work it out this time?" I mean, it's ASTONISHING to hear those words out of the mouth of a manager - even if he is well aware of how they will, don't say you're not - who essentially has made a massive bet on them working it out. I've said it after the government thank you note, and I'll say it again: I continue to believe that Berkowitz is making a tremendous bet that TBTF will continue onward, and that's what the thesis is.
    Do I think TBTF will continue? Maybe, maybe not. If not and Bank of America goes, that will be a black hole that will take a lot down with it.
    I don't agree with Jaffe's discussion that Berkowitz can't/shouldn't go activist with St Joe. How that plays out who knows (is it too much of a distraction?) but I don't agree with that aspect of the article.
    If anything, the Stupid Investment of the Week should have been Fairholme Allocation; having two positions make up nearly 50% of the fund is taking an ABSURD risk, and the fund continues to look to me like a dumping ground for more of the same Berko-bets. Why bring out another fund only to have it bring nothing new to the table? If these financial stocks get much worse, how does Berkowitz get out if need be if it means unwinding gigantic positions? One can say that he won't, he can say that he won't, but what if it comes to that, and where will the fund be if it does?
    Lastly, I will say positively about one Berkowitz position that Berkshire Hathaway-like (a conglomerate with investments in many different businesses, Leucadia has often been described as "Berkshire-like") Leucadia National (LUK) has gotten really c-h-e-a-p (likely knocked around recently due to its holding in Jefferies - JEF). I don't know if I will, but I'm actually thinking about finally buying that next week. That could *absolutely* go lower in this market, but I think Leucadia at $23 and change is absolutely very interesting. Brookfield Asset Management (BAM) is another Berkowitz idea I continue to like, although I think Leucadia is very, very tempting (to me, at least) at these levels/valuation. Former Berkowitz St Joe nemesis David Einhorn's Greenlight RE is also looking cheapish at $20 and change. (GLRE)
  • Arnott: Time to pull in expectations for a decade or two
    http://blogs.marketwatch.com/thetell/2011/09/22/time-to-pull-in-expectations-for-a-decade-or-two/
    Time to pull in expectations for a decade or two
    September 22, 2011, 2:18 PM
    Rob Arnott of Research Affiliates told financial advisers to reshape their return expectations dramatically for the coming decade and beyond.
  • EM Debt Boom: EM Debt No Safe Haven
    Regarding EM, I'd suggest reading this article. Some may not like the source, but some of the points made regarding currencies and EM may be of interest, whether in regards to EM stocks or bonds.
    http://www.zerohedge.com/news/financial-warfare
  • Funds Boat, look ahead, silly me, eh?
    Bank of America downgraded today by Moody's. Uh, I thought they were a-ok? What a surprise, a financial company that acts like it's a-ok and doesn't need to raise money until it is (soon after) desperate to raise money by begging Buffett and selling prime assets.
    This could very likely be entirely wrong, but I tend to wonder if the Republicans drafting a letter to tell Bernanke not to do QE3 is because he absolutely is going to do QE3 and they want to get out ahead of that with their response to what will likely be unpopular.
    Edited to add: Moodys now downgrades Wells Fargo, according to CNBC (Citi reportedly also likely to be considered for a downgrade). Anyone else still think these financials are values?
    Edited to add 2: Citi downgraded.
  • EM Debt Boom: EM Debt No Safe Haven
    Of course there are risks. On the other hand, Michael Hasenstab wrote an extensive piece on emerging market local debt that suggests it is an appropriate diversifier away from the dollar, and that countries that are in stronger financial condition than the U.S., Japan, and much of western Europe, should continue to see the ratings of their debt increase. To put all of our faith in the U.S. dollar for the long term, to me, is more risky than having a portion of my investments tied to non-dollar currencies.
    Given the experience of Riddel and Hasenstab, as well as the funds they run, their comments are not unexpected. One deals with the Euro, Dollar, Yen, and other major industrialized currencies. The other uses all of those, plus most other world currencies. One is obviously comfortable hedging, owning, and making bets on different world currencies, including those from emerging market economies. The other, from what I can tell, is not.
  • credit concerns linger but some good news... plus few more reads
    http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20110916-711869.html
    http://www.google.com/#sclient=psy-ab&hl=en&source=hp&q=Concerns+Linger,+But+Some+Good+News+Too+&pbx=1&oq=Concerns+Linger,+But+Some+Good+News+Too+&aq=f&aqi=&aql=1&gs_sm=e&gs_upl=968l968l0l2977l1l1l0l0l0l0l226l226l2-1l1l0&bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.&fp=a6739e3f98e052ae&biw=1366&bih=541
    http://www.kiplinger.com/columns/fundwatch/archive/our-7-favorite-actively-managed-vanguard-funds.html
    http://seekingalpha.com/article/294079-how-many-stocks-or-funds-should-your-portfolio-contain
    Mortgage REITs Keep Gaining; Is SEC Review A Threat?
    http://blogs.barrons.com/focusonfunds/2011/09/15/mortgage-reits-keep-gaining-is-sec-review-a-threat-to-industry/?mod=BOLBlog
    oil news
    http://www.marketwatch.com/story/oil-futures-extend-gains-in-asian-trading-2011-09-16?dist=countdown
    investment advisors showing ‘realistic optimism’
    http://www.marketwatch.com/story/investment-advisers-showing-realistic-optimism-2011-09-15?reflink=MW_news_stmp
    investors pulled out of MF & ETFs in august
    http://www.financial-planning.com/news/ETFs-Mutual-Funds-Outflows-August-2011-Morningstar-2675141-1.html
    4 signs to dump your mf
    http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/09/16/4-signs-its-time-to-dump-your-mutual-fund/
    little known fund manager scores 100%
    http://www.thestreet.com/story/11249946/1/little-known-fund-manager-scores-100-gains.html
    Fund-amentals: Is Fidelity overstretching Feingold?
    http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/16/us-feingold-fidelity-idUSTRE78F52520110916
    Fund managers: Bleak outlook in European crisis
    http://www.cnbc.com/id/44554822
  • Gundlach Verdict
    Highlights from the Los Angeles Times:
    Star bond fund manager Jeffrey Gundlach was found liable Friday for breaching his fiduciary duty to his former employer, asset management giant TCW Group Inc., ... a Los Angeles jury found no harm to TCW in that breach and awarded the firm no financial compensation.
    Further, the jury found that TCW must pay $66.7 million to Gundlach and his three co-defendants for failure to pay wages owed them before leaving the money-management firm to set up a rival company in 2009.
    On a separate issue, the jury of five women and seven men agreed with TCW’s claim that Gundlach had misappropriated the company’s trade secrets in setting up a rival firm in 2009, causing harm to TCW. Any damages on that claim will be decided by Judge Carl J. West. TCW is asking for $89 million.
  • What's with Muda?
    Hi Guys,
    The Japanese have a great term that summarizes unnecessary work, inefficient effort, and wasted time; the single word is “muda”. We do a lot of muda when constructing and monitoring an investment portfolio.
    Scottish philosopher and economics thinker David Hume observed that “In proportion as any man’s course of life is governed by accident, we always find that he increases in superstition.” Since investment performance returns are not controlled by anybody, we are subject to uncertainty that is often interpreted as bad luck when an investment sours. That is an uncontrollable accidental outcome.
    To compensate for our misfortunes we sometimes fall under the spell of false prophets, to the charades of charlatans, or to the superstitious beliefs that some wizard can reliably foresee the future. That is abject nonsense; it is surely not commonsense.
    Reflect on the unimpressive, and in some instances dismal, records accumulated by acclaimed market wizards and gurus. The CXO Advisory Group has a lengthy posting that documents the performance of 84 experts, not all of whom have a sufficiently large record that permits a statistical rating. Notice how the accuracy listing scales between a 67 % high to a 23 % low correct score. The average successful score typically hovers around the rather mundane 50 % level.
    Here is the Link to the CXO survey:
    http://www.cxoadvisory.com/gurus/
    A 50 % accuracy rating is equivalent to a coin flip probability. It should be much better because the equity marketplace has historically delivered positive returns about 70 % of the time annually. Given that statistical loading, a guru should be correct in excess of 70 % of his predictions to demonstrate any special skills at forecasting future results.
    If I were to project positive returns every year forever, it is likely that I would accrue about a 70 % successful forecasting record. Note that the highest rating scored by the CXO guru participants is currently below that level.
    Also, because of a few of their dubious crystal ball mystic readings, some of the so-called gurus on the CXO list belong in a flaky fringe category of financial wizards.
    Another aspect of our investment profile is our tendency to overreact to a dynamic marketplace. These changes are overemphasized and overly analyzed by a duplicitous media seeking attention. These same market gurus understand that bias, and build a career satisfying our fears with seemingly daily updates. Excitement and explanations proliferate in this environment. Most of them are simplistically wrong.
    In the Roman Empire period during the reign of Nero, writer Gaius Petronius observed that “We tend to meet any new situation by reorganizing; and a wonderful method it can be for creating the illusion of progress while producing confusion, ineffectiveness and demoralization.” We reorganize our portfolios far too frequently.
    Numerous industry and academic studies have demonstrated that “frequent trading is hazardous” to the wealth of individual investors. Since women are typically more cautious investors than men, and consequently trade less often, these same studies have discovered that, on average, women generate outsized returns relative to their male counterparts.
    Annually, the individual investor mutual fund performance survey reported by Dalbar also documents the underperformance of private fund owners relative to the returns delivered by the funds themselves. Over a long time horizon, we only claim about one-third of the returns generated by the funds that we buy.
    We investors get into hot funds too late, and often bailout of currently poorly performing funds too early. There appears to be a regression-to-the-mean tendency in play among mutual fund products. As a cohort, we have failed to demonstrate any market timer or trading acumen. But we are predictably proactive. Unfortunately, much of our misdirected efforts are muda. It is counterproductive and destructive to end wealth.
    One obvious answer to this debilitating dilemma is to avoid over-activity. Don’t permit our emotions to dictate ill-advised action. We must take time to engage the deliberate, analytical portion of our brains. As Jason Zweig concluded in his “Your Money and Your Brain” book, all good decisions require a merging of the reflective and reflexive portions of our brains to reach solid investment decisions. Patience and balance are needed attributes that must be consistently applied. And costs always matter.
    Stay cool and deliberate during this stressful period. The rugged equity landscape is just the market being the market, warts as usual. Volatility has its rewards as well as its pitfalls. Depending on your investment style and strategy, an investor can profit by just recognizing and integrating market volatility into his investment program planning.
    The easy access to all the endless investment information is a double-edged sword. It should improve our decision making if it is properly assimilated and interpreted. However, there is such an Intel abundance that it likely saturates our ability to put it in context and analyze it correctly. It could be overwhelming. As management educator John Naisbett said, “We are drowning in information, but starving for knowledge”. The mixed metaphor aside, Naisbett is on-target.
    I am not comfortable given this overload condition. I continue to search for ways to simplify. The emerging science of Knowledge Discovery in Databases (KDD) potentially offers techniques that will enhance forecasting accuracy. It is very complex mathematically, and today is mostly a promise rather than a functioning actuality. I classify it as experimental data mining with added constraints and enhancements.
    KDD deploys conventional data mining methods, but augments it with a priori insights, expert advice, market models, multi-parameter inputs, screening for bad data, and numerous and frequent computer iterations. IBM researchers have worked on the problem for years and have generated some successes. But it is a tough slog and not yet ready for prime time. It may never be.
    Here is a Link to a website white paper that I recently discovered. I am a rookie in this arena so I can not vouch for its accuracy or completeness. I am now in a learning mode. For what its worth, the introduction seems honest enough and the paper is current. Good luck. The Link is:
    http://www.conradyscience.com/white_papers/SP500_V12.pdf
    Hope springs eternal. KDD seems to violate Occam’s Razor to keep things at their most simple level. I suspect I’m guilty of muda with my attempts at understanding KDD.
    Best Regards.
  • Has Dodge and Cox become fundamentally flawed?
    One way to prevent poor performance in a portfolio is to appropriate small amounts of your allocated amount to a investment group in multiple top rated funds instead of one fund. This prevents poor performance if allocated to one fund. You will then think , I just created an Index fund. Well that is what the financial media will tell you. By my calculations and those at Fidelity which calculates total return on my portfolio that just is not so. In fact with a well chosen group, say 4-6 Large Cap funds you can do 1-7 percent better as I do. This is for a taxable account where I use tax saving loss harvesting of the poor/losing funds. One example. Sold Fairholme fund for tax loss harvesting and bought Jensen. I left my other 5 Large Cap funds alone as they are doing well. You have to be willing to do research so that you are well diversified and not creating an index fund but this is rather easy. And you will have a full house of funds to deal with. But in the end you do not have all or most of your money in poor or losing funds and will come out ahead. I currently own 40+ funds more or less and it works for me
  • Has Dodge and Cox become fundamentally flawed?
    Reply to @msf: It's even easier with Morningstar's "chart" feature. It calculates a fund's returns between any two points in time and charts it against any other option in Morningstar's database.
    It seems to me that the question is whether, or to what extent, to discount the fund's troubled first nine months. The managers admit to two miscalculations in the face of a massive financial crisis (premature optimism and over commitment to financials, if I recall correctly). They claim to have reversed the mistakes and to have learned from the episode. From then through August 2011, they had a strong record. In the past six weeks, they've had a weak record.
    The vexing question is how to think about the data; what 'narrative framework' should we impose on it? Is the story "great active managers whose low-turnover discipline will inevitably lead to soft spots?" or "a committee that's trying a 20th century model in a 21st century environment"? Once you pick your story (almost regardless of what it is), all of the data will magically fall in place.
    David
  • Do Gurus Follow Their Own Advice? (w/a note on Snowball's portfolio)
    Hi Guys,
    Thank you all for your extensive and varied replies. Each of these, in their own way, enhanced and enlarged the topic.
    "Why" an investment decision is made is more vital to understanding and learning than "what" it exactly is. That explanation requires more detailed postings. I greatly appreciate your fine efforts.
    "Why" helps to inspire confidence which ultimately generates trust. Trust is mandatory in a fragile, uncertain investment environment, especially when discussing matters over the Internet. It compliments knowledge which is yet another requisite quality when researching investment options and opportunities.
    When preparing my submittal, and again when reviewing the many superior responses, I was reminded of several pertinent quotes from renown authorities. Here is a formidable triad from folks you’ll recognize.
    From ex-GE boss Jack Welch: “Everytime you meet somebody, you’re looking for a better and newer and bigger idea. You are open to ideas from anywhere.” That searching philosophy makes for a more successful investor.
    From Nicolo Machiavelli: “ Whoever desires constant success must change his conduct with the times.” That’s not a bad maxim for our volatile markets that seem to change in quicksilver time. Sometimes I think you have to be Flash Gordon to keep pace.
    From an earlier posting when I quoted Mark Twain: “It ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble. It's what you know for sure that just ain't so.” It is crucial to distinguish between what is real and what is imagined.
    All these mantras emphasize the need for investment learning, adaptability and flexibility. It takes courage to accept that some of your purported investing knowledge was wrong, and/or that circumstances have made that knowledge irrelevant. But in our wild dynamic world today, the courage to change is essential to financial success.
    I am fascinated by Professor Snowball’s reference to "the Mendoza line". For those not familiar with that reference, Mario Mendoza was a Pittsburg Pirate (among others) infielder in the 1970s. He is more or less famous in baseball folklore by fashioning a meager lifetime batting average of about two hundred (his actual lifetime average was 215). That means he was a successful hitter only one of five attempts. Most ballplayers are not tolerated for every long with that dismal batting skill; he must have been an astonishing shortstop in the field. Or, perhaps, he was just plain lucky.
    That’s a miserable record by any measurement standard. I sure hope that David is setting a slightly higher hurdle for his own benchmark. Don’t get angry guys; that’s my poor attempt at humor. I know David sets a more demanding performance standard, and he is succeeding.
    Thanks for your portfolio disclosures David. We all appreciate your continuing commitment and your outsized efforts. Your energy and enthusiasm are truly outstanding.
    Best Wishes.
  • Do Gurus Follow Their Own Advice? (w/a note on Snowball's portfolio)
    Reply to @Investor: I think Cramer has changed somewhat in the last couple years after the "Bear Stearns" incident (among many other things), which he talked about during a near-fight with Simon Hobbs (and I wish Cramer had gone after Hobbs with much more fury than he did) the other day (http://www.mediaite.com/tv/watch-jim-cramer-freak-out-on-cnbc-cohort-simon-hobbs-as-bank-stocks-tank/)
    I still disagree with Cramer at times, but I do like the fact that he appears to be trying to evolve and adapt to a market that's increasingly difficult and where the kind of volatility that's been seen is only going to lead to further outflows, which has been seen in the ICI numbers. (Just 25 out of 1004 months over the past 83 years have experienced higher realized volatility than August 2011 -http://www.zerohedge.com/news/goldmans-laments-horrible-august-comes-begging-help-bernanke)
    I think people have to be invested, but the average person (or, in Cramer terms, "the home gamer") is not going to stick around.
    This is a generalization, but I think what's really required is financial education from an early age - personal economics (and investing can fall under that) rather than home economics in HS. Giving people the building blocks to research and then make informed decisions about investing, rather than simply hitting the sell button when things get as they are. I'd rather the serious Cramer that you see early in the morning be the Cramer you see on "Mad Money" (which I think was one of the John Stewart criticisms), but then it might not get the ratings it does.
    " tracking active funds and managers is too much work for most people. " Suze Orman in one of her recent specials essentially said that people have to do their homework for their investments and if they don't like it, too bad.
  • Do Gurus Follow Their Own Advice? (w/a note on Snowball's portfolio)
    Hi Guys,
    Is guru advice to be trusted? Does the chef eat his own cooking? In most instances it is heartening to see experts practice what they preach. Too often that is not the case.
    It is fitting to challenge a financial advisor by asking if he invests in the products that he recommends or endorses. There are both hard and soft interpretations for this common scenario and their likely replies.
    In many instances an affirmative reply would considerably increase confidence in the recommendation, and command more mutual trust. However, in other instances, because each investor has his own special objectives, priorities, portfolio plan, and risk tolerances, a negative response is equally acceptable.
    Several recent postings highlight the apparent disparity of endorsements with perceived actions. I was motivated to prepare this posting after reading the Forum exchanges on these subjects. More on this matter later.
    Searching for a causal-effect relationship between two observed parameters is a respected and an honored scientific research tool. However, it must be applied sensibly; an indispensable constraint is that a logical coupling must exist that reasonably explains why the independent parameter influences the behavior of the dependent parameter. That coupling is a mandatory requirement. When that linkage is distorted or completely abandoned, the output is often Junk Science. There are both good correlations and bad correlations. A solid researcher knows the difference.
    Carefully executed Data Mining has contributed significant discoveries that have advanced our investment knowledge base. I have personally developed an attractive correlation between corporate profits and GDP growth rate; that’s an illustration of useful data mining. Data mining need not be a pejorative. Unfortunately, it has also been extensively misdirected to produce meaningless, junk correlations.
    All savvy investors are familiar with at least three such egregious examples of data mining misuse. You likely remember the false correlations between butter prices in Bangladesh, between women’s skirt lengths, between Super Bowl outcomes, and the expected return from the S&P 500 Index as a proxy for the equity marketplace. Since only correlations that historically reproduce the data collection period with considerable fidelity are reported, they obviously work – at least for that data period. The issue is, do they remain viable in the future? They work until they stop working. That’s the nature of poorly executed data mining exercises.
    A mutual fund learning lesson from a poorly performed data mining study was documented in the James O’Shaughnessy 1996 book titled “What Works on Wall Street”. It was touted as “a guide to the best-performing investment strategies of all time.” The method used a multiple parameter regression modeling of conventional fundamental stock ratios to define a portfolio of anticipated superior performing equity positions.
    The book was a huge success and made O’Shaughnessy instantly famous and wealthy. A mutual fund was designed based on the study and sold to the public intending to exploit the study’s findings. In a few years it failed after some minor early successes. The procedure worked until it stopped working.
    Recently, a portfolio from vintage FundAlarm archives has been resurrected on this Forum. You may recall that when it was assembled it was called the MMLL portfolio. It was designed to be conservative, with dampened volatility and forgiving response in market downhill periods as its primary attributes. Those are exemplary goals. It does exactly that. Of course, in an expansive marketplace environment, the MMLL portfolio will likely underperform. There are no free lunches.
    The portfolio was proposed and constructed by a departed participant from these discussions; he used the sobriquet Fundmentals. I am sure many remember that Fundmental did not invest in the well diversified, multi-holding portfolio that he cobbled together. It includes bond holdings. He made no claims in that direction since he freely posted his own portfolio components. Fundmental’s portfolio was highly focused, often in energy products, and not diversified. His personal portfolio properly reflected his investment style. By nature, he believed in a momentum investing philosophy, and applied a sector rotation strategy as an implementation tool. That’s okay because that’s a representation of his investment profile.
    He constructed this more diversified portfolio as a service to Forum members. At the time of its construction it was based solely on a careful review of recent, past mutual fund performance. He exclusively used a rearview mirror approach when assembling the portfolio. He correctly postulated that the diversification would provide protection during an equity market meltdown.
    From Fundmental’s perspective, it was a paper exercise. He did not eat that portion of his cooking. If you trust his investment acumen and research diligence, you might consider investing in his MMLL portfolio; but remember that he did not have a pony in that race. As always, the individual investor must make his own decisions in his quiet deliberations. Fundmental was serving as a financial advisor who did not eat his own cooking in that capacity. Personally, I am not alarmed by that observation.
    A second minor eruption has emerged from a fund review that David Snowball published many months ago. The posting analyzed the merits and shortcomings of the Nakoma Absolute Return Fund (NARFX). Some Forum members interpreted his summary as an endorsement of the fund. It is not; it is simply for informational purposes.
    The report is a very detailed and an attractive fund review. I certainly understand why some Forum participants glommed onto NARFX. Unluckily, it has generated disappointing returns; too bad, but those are the risks and uncertainties that exist for all investment products, especially glitzy ones.
    Surely no member of this Forum imagines that Professor Snowball commits resources to all the mutual funds that he assesses in a positive way. I do not recall David ever stating or even implying that he owned NARFX. If he did follow that nutty policy, his portfolio would be hopelessly distorted with scores of highly correlated holdings. That’s not a portfolio grounded in firm diversification principles. That’s not what Professor Snowball is about.
    When making a personal portfolio selection, I am convinced that David uses a sharp scalpel, and not a hatchet. Again, if you choose to buy a fund based on a favorable Forum review that it your prerogative. The factoid that David does not eat his own cooking in this instance should not sway you one way or the other; it does not matter whatsoever. He is providing data in an appealing format that allows Forum members to make more informed decisions. You judge if he has an iron in the fire. I don’t think it matters.
    As investors we must always be alert and be skeptical of all investment advice. In many financial circles the term “guru” is a polite substitute for the word “charlatan”. Peter Drucker was one such individual who made that connection. So care must always be exercised. Much of what is reported, what is spoken, and even what is written is simply hogwash.. It has no gravitas to anchor it.
    Investment advice is frequently faddish-driven. At various times, buy-and-hold, sector rotational, or momentum tactics are the Lion Kings of portfolio management strategies. The current favorite fad changes with shifting investment winds, usually reflecting what worked in the most recent past. One thing is certain; it will change again – and soon.
    As an independent investor responsible for your own successes and shortfalls, a huge dose of skepticism is always a prudent quality. A charlatan will always present an outstanding record. That record has been prepared by a disingenuous selection of facts, or a judicious choice of timeframe, or is totally a fake. Good research must dig deeper to expose the actual, not merely the claimed, data sets. Also prudence demands that a judgment must be made of the purveyor’s character, motives, and honesty. Trust in the messenger is mandatory.
    The cautionary warning is simply this: Don’t fall victim to the mad ranting of an unscrupulous profit seeking guru. They are masters to their goals first, yours are a distant and unhappy secondary consideration. The good news is that separating the good and the ugly investment gurus demands the same skill set that is needed to assess candidate active mutual fund managers. We have considerable experience with that task.
    What do you think?
    Best Regards.
  • Important Comments From Dr. John Hussman
    Hussman did not believe that QE1/2/2.5/etc would have the effect it did and that logic and fundamentals still had a place of any significance in the market. Silly Hussman. I don't think Hussman doesn't believe what he says; he certainly makes thoughtful, well-researched arguments, but his playbook was not what was required for the last couple of years. Different era/time, maybe. I believe he even discussed that he was adjusting his methods a few months back.
    The thing about Hussman that I find rather curious is that he hedges against names like Panera, Amazon, Chipotle and Bed Bath; if he's negative on his outlook, why not go a little more boring/less volatile with the stock selection and maybe hedge a little less? I don't know, while the fund is hedged, I think there are some rather interesting names in there for someone who doesn't have the most vibrant outlook.
    I'm sure his opinion isn't going to change, even if Chicago Fed President Evans - who has been screaming on financial media, including to Fed puppet Steve Leisman, for more QE while saying the Fed isn't responsible for anything bad - gets his way.
    http://www.zerohedge.com/news/when-fed-doves-cry-chicago-feds-evans-urges-very-significant-amounts-added-accommodation
  • Important Comments From Dr. John Hussman
    In his 9/5/11 Weekly Market Comments entitled: "An Imminent Downturn: Whom Will Our Leaders Defend?" on the Hussman funds website, Dr. Hussman gives a cogent discussion of why the financial systems in the U.S. and Europe remain distressed, why unemployment/underemployment persists at an extremely high rate, why measures enacted over the past three years have predictably failed, and what the solutions are if the economy is to begin recovery. HInt: neither the Fed nor the ECB are on the correct tack.
    Dr. Hussman also states that based on his measureable and observable economic criteria we are in or about to be in a recession with near 100% certainty. This is discussed in his section "Measuring the Probability of Oncoming Recession". This is important to us as investors because if he is correct, I recall reading that:
    1. a recession is always accompanied by a bear market.
    2. the average peak-to-trough decline in a bear market is 40% or so.
    If one take 1370 for the S&P peak then a 40% decline from that level brings the S&P 500 to 822, nearly 30% below current market levels. Read his comments and analysis carefully because if you agree with his comments regarding recession, you may want to begin lightening up on your equity fund exposure (and other volatile categories such as junk bonds, etc.) if you haven't already done so. Link to the Hussman website is given below. Click on the commentary title under "Weekly Market Comments".
    http://www.hussmanfunds.com
  • Buffett Equals Persistence
    Hi Guys,
    If you choose one factor that characterizes Warren Buffett’s investment style, it is persistence. And Warren Buffett is an appropriate topic for MFO discussions; he manages his Berkshire Hathaway operation exactly like a focused mutual fund.
    Buffett sharpened his business investment style under the tutelage of Benjamin Graham at Columbia University. In addition to Buffett, Graham informed the financial acumen of famous practitioners like Walter Schloss, Tom Knapp (Tweedy Browne founder), and Bill Ruane (Sequoia Fund). Buffett documented the performance of this pantheon of hugely successful investors in a 1984 debate at Columbia. Here is a Link to “The Superinvesters of Graham-and-Doddsville”.
    http://www.beinvestors.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/superinvestors.pdf
    Graham and Buffett always insisted on enforcing the distinctions between an Investment and a Speculation. In particular, Graham extolled the virtues of constructing a defensive Investment portfolio; he mightily resisted the temptations of a speculative flier that promised, but rarely delivered, outsized profits. These guys invested using large safety factors when making a decision.
    In the investment universe a large safety factor can be interpreted as one that is very asymmetric in its upside/downside expected payoff matrix. From probability theory (sorry about that), an Expected payoff is simply the result from multiplying the anticipated reward by the estimated likelihood of the event occurrence (its probability of happening). The probabilities of all possible outcomes must sum to a value of 1 if all possible outcomes are exhaustively listed.
    Warren Buffett only commits resources when the ratio of positive Expectations (forecasted profits) to negative Expectations (loser outcomes) is considerably above 1. I suspect that Buffett only enters the fray when expected potential upside exceeds likely downside by factors in excess of 5. That’s one implementation of the safety factor rule that prudent risk takers often demand.
    I suspect that this logic framework dominated Buffett’s decision to bankroll Bank of America with a 5 billion dollar cash infusion. He sees an undervalued corporation with little further downside risk contrasted against huge upside recovery potential. Buffett and Graham jumped at these opportunities; it is a classic asymmetric investment opportunity.
    Buffett has firmly established his wealth and fame by persistently applying safety factor assessments as an integral part of his tool kit. The persistence element is a necessary component of his success story. Without it, he would never have been rewarded with decades of superior investing results.
    So, performance persistence is one quality that an individual investor should seek when searching for a productive active mutual fund manager.
    Unfortunately, even a rather long-term performance record for a mutual fund manager does NOT guarantee an astute, prescient leadership. The outsized performance might be due to skill, but it is also possible that luck was a major contributor. If an individual tosses 10 consecutive heads, he might be a skilled coin flipper, but it is more likely that he was simply lucky (a third possibility is that the coin was not fair; perhaps it was weighted).
    It is a tricky assignment to identify truly perceptive active fund managers because of the dichotomous nature of this skill/luck tradeoff. Truly perceptive fund managers are a rare breed. The Standard and Poor’s annual Persistence Scorecard studies demonstrate just how rare this cohort is.
    The S&P scorecard statistically illustrates that very few active fund managers produce excess returns beyond passive benchmarks for periods as short as 3 and 5 years. In many instances the statistics establish that the percentages of active managers who outperform their benchmarks are less than what would be expected from random, lucky coin tosses. That’s a gloomy finding.
    A few days ago, I posted a Link to the current S&P Scorecard. Their Persistence Scorecard is a companion study; the two study sets supplement each other. I like to examine both to inform my portfolio decisions when choosing either passively or actively managed fund components. Unfortunately, the Scorecard is published twice a year, whereas the Persistence Scorecard is just issued annually.
    Once again, here is the Link that will provide access to the Persistence Scorecard:
    http://www.standardandpoors.com/indices/spiva/en/us
    Please visit the reference. I suggest that you review both document sets to make better investment decisions.
    The Persistence Scorecard consistently demonstrates that active managers have a difficult time overcoming their cost structure. Before costs are deducted, the active management cohort do typically outperform their proper benchmarks. However, costs prove to be a high hurdle to overcome. Once the costs are subtracted to determine the net returns delivered to their customers, actively managed funds often underperform passively managed options. Costs matter greatly.
    Typically, the S&P Persistence Scorecard shows just how daunting the active manager’s task is. Here is an excerpt from their most recent release. It was issued in May, 2011 so there is a minor time distortion between S&P’s Scorecard and Persistence Scorecard documents. That time warp does not detract from their usefulness.
    “Very few funds manage to consistently repeat top-half or top-quartile performance. Over the five years ending March 2011, only 0.96% of large-cap funds, 1.14% of mid-cap funds and 2.59% of small-cap funds maintained a top-half ranking over five consecutive 12-month periods. Random expectations would suggest a rate of 6.25%.”
    This most recent S&P finding is consistent with earlier results.
    Do not interpret this submittal as a blanket endorsement for passive investing strategies. It is not. It is merely a cautionary alert. My intent is NOT to say that active mutual fund management is a loser’s game. It is not. About one-half of my portfolio is committed to actively managed products. However, when investing with active managers, exhaustive due diligence and emotional control is mandatory. It is not an easy task to identify these rare birds. The problem is made more complex by biased advertisements, and by the observation that even historical super managers have bad years.
    The measure of a great manager is that he recovers from his shortfalls, is adoptive to an evolving marketplace, and resumes his march. Such is the case with Warren Buffett.
    But even for superinvestors like Warren Buffett, good luck is an essential ingredient in the complex investing mix. Good luck to all of us.
    Best Regards.
  • FPA Changes Tune on Banks
    http://finance.yahoo.com/video/marketnews-19148628/kotok-adding-to-bank-holdings-for-first-time-since-2007-26420736
    Kotok Adding to Bank Holdings for First Time Since 2007
    6 hours ago - Bloomberg
    Aug. 25 (Bloomberg) -- David Kotok, chairman and chief investment officer of Cumberland Advisors, talks about his investment strategy for financial shares. Kotok also discusses Warren Buffett's $5 billion investment in Bank of America Corp. and the outlook for Apple Inc. shares.