One of the worst investments I ever made was in Artisan Global Small Cap. It was losing money after three years and then Artisan decided to close it, ensuring my losses.

Another Tool that looks useful slanted towards rich looks good for all.
I would rather use this than borrowing against a house !!
https://www.wsj.com/articles/buy-borrow-die-how-rich-americans-live-off-their-paper-wealth-11625909583
— 5:30 AM ET 07/10/2021
By Rachel Louise Ensign and Richard Rubin
Rising stocks and rock-bottom interest rates have delivered a big perk to rich
Americans: cheap loans that they can use to fund their lifestyles while minimizing their tax bills.
Banks say their wealthy clients are borrowing more than ever before, often using loans backed by their portfolios of stocks and bonds. Morgan Stanley (MS) wealth-management clients have $68.1 billion worth of securities-based and other nonmortgage loans outstanding, more than double five years earlier. Bank of America Corp. (BAC) said it has $62.4 billion in securities-based loans, dwarfing its book of home-equity lines of credit.
The loans have special benefits beyond the flexible repayment terms and low interest rates on offer. They allow borrowers who need cash to avoid selling in a hot market. Startup founders can monetize their stakes without losing control of their companies. The super rich often use these loans as part of a "buy, borrow, die" strategy to avoid capital-gains taxes.
The merely rich are also borrowing against their portfolios. When Tom Anderson started at Merrill Lynch & Co. in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, in 2002, many of his fellow advisers had just one or two securities-based loans in their book of business. Over the years, he encouraged more clients to borrow and noticed peers doing the same. Now it is common for advisers at big firms to have dozens of these loans outstanding, he said. Merrill Lynch is now a part of Bank of America (BAC).
"You could buy a boat, you could go to Disney World, you could buy a company," said Mr. Anderson, who now consults with banks on how to manage the risks associated with these loans. "The tax benefits are stunning."
For borrowers, the calculation is clear: If an asset appreciates faster than the interest rate on the loan, they come out ahead. And under current law, investors and their heirs don't pay income taxes unless their shares are sold. The assets may be subject to estate taxes, but heirs pay capital-gains taxes only when they sell and only on gains since the prior owner's death. The more they can borrow, the longer they can hold appreciating assets. And the longer they hold, the bigger the tax savings.
"Ordinary people don't think about debt the way billionaires think about debt," said Edward McCaffery, a University of Southern California law professor who says he coined the buy-borrow-die phrase. "Once you're already rich, it's simple, it's easy. It's just buy, borrow, die. These are planks of the law that have been in place for 100 years."

It all depends on how long you think the next bear market will last. You need to have enough cash to avoid selling stocks at the bottom to live on. If portfolio ( or SP500 or whatever index you like) value is within 5% of top sell some equities for replacement of that year's expenses. If less than that use the remaining cash/bond portion.
In 1929 it took 32 months to recover but got hit again in 1937 and it took five years.

A bit more about how AMG handled the Brandywine funds (Friess Associates):

In 2001, Friess Associates facilitated succession from its founder by partnering with Affiliated Managers Group (AMG), making Friess Associates a majority-owned subsidiary of a public company. In the years following the 2008 financial crisis, senior management determined that Friess Associates needed to restructure to better position the firm to meet the long-term needs of clients and employees. Friess Associates and AMG agreed to terms that returned Friess Associates to private ownership in 2013.

https://friess.com/about/
The management company regained its independence. But the funds were reorganized into AMG owned funds, technically series of Managers Funds (later AMG Managers funds). Friess Associates continued managing them, becoming the subadvisor.
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/780253/000089853113000434/fa_497e.htm
AMG shut down AMG Managers Brandywine Advisors Mid Cap Growth Fund (BWAFX) a year ago.
https://www.mutualfundobserver.com/2020/05/briefly-noted-45/
As I noted above, AMG recently fired Friess Associates as the manager of the remaining funds (Brandywine and Brandywine Blue), hired AMG-affiliated managers, renaming and rebranding the funds. Friess Associates did not go quietly.

Friess Associates, which managed Brandywine Funds on Affiliated Managers Group's (AMG) platform since 2013, [in April] filed preliminary proxy materials with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Reuters reported the firm's plans before the filing, which protests the firm's firing and points out that investors had no say in the termination.
Friess Associates said that investors are being harmed because their money is no longer being managed the way it was when they first invested.
The Global Impact Fund [formerly Brandywine Fund] follows an ESG mandate and the Global Real Return Fund [formerly Brandywine Blue] follows a real return strategy including short positions in global index futures.

https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/fired-fund-manager-friess-battle-amg-over-brandywine-portfolios-2021-04-22/
The denouement of this tale is that Friess Brandywine Funds FBRWX and FBLUX) just launched a week ago. (This is not a recommendation.)
https://friess.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/BrandywineFunds.pdf
And the coda is that the founder, Foster Friess, just died last May.
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/28/us/politics/foster-friess-dead.html

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/889284/000139834421014273/fp0067111_497.htm
497 1 fp0067111_497.htm
Filed pursuant to 497(e)
File Nos. 033-49098 and 811-06719
STERLING CAPITAL FUNDS
SUPPLEMENT DATED JULY 12, 2021
TO THE
CLASS A AND CLASS C SHARES PROSPECTUS AND THE
INSTITUTIONAL, CLASS R AND CLASS R6 SHARES PROSPECTUS,
EACH DATED FEBRUARY 1, 2021, AS SUPPLEMENTED
This Supplement provides the following amended and supplemental information and supersedes any information to the contrary in the Class A and Class C Shares Prospectus and the Institutional, Class R and Class R6 Shares Prospectus, each dated February 1, 2021 (collectively, the “Prospectuses”), with respect to Sterling Capital Special Opportunities Fund and Sterling Capital Equity Income Fund:
Sterling Capital Special Opportunities Fund
Effective immediately, Joshua L. Haggerty is appointed as a co-portfolio manager of Sterling Capital Special Opportunities Fund, and Daniel A. Morrall is appointed as an associate portfolio manager of the Sterling Capital Special Opportunities Fund. In addition, it is anticipated that George F. Shipp will retire from Sterling Capital Management LLC on or about January 7, 2022 and will cease to serve as a co-portfolio manager on or about December 24, 2021 .
Accordingly, the “Management—Portfolio Managers” section in the Prospectuses with respect to Sterling Capital Special Opportunities Fund is hereby deleted and replaced with the following:
Portfolio Managers
George F. Shipp, CFA
Senior Managing Director of Sterling Capital and Co-Portfolio Manager
Since inception
Joshua L. Haggerty, CFA
Executive Director of Sterling Capital and Co-Portfolio Manager
Since July 2021
(formerly, Associate Portfolio Manager from February 2016 - July 2021)
Daniel A. Morrall
Executive Director of Sterling Capital and Associate Portfolio Manager
Since July 2021
Sterling Capital Equity Income Fund
Effective immediately, Adam B. Bergman is appointed as a co-portfolio manager of Sterling Capital Equity Income Fund, and Charles J. Wittmann is appointed as an associate portfolio manager of Sterling Capital Equity Income Fund. In addition, it is anticipated that George F. Shipp will retire from Sterling Capital Management LLC on or about January 7, 2022 and will cease to serve as a co-portfolio manager on or about December 24, 2021.
Accordingly, the “Management—Portfolio Managers” section in the Prospectuses with respect to Sterling Capital Equity Income Fund is hereby deleted and replaced with the following:
Portfolio Managers
George F. Shipp, CFA
Senior Managing Director of Sterling Capital and Co-Portfolio Manager
Since inception
Adam B. Bergman, CFA
Executive Director of Sterling Capital and Co-Portfolio Manager
Since July 2021
(formerly, Associate Portfolio Manager from February 2016 - July 2021)
Charles J. Wittmann
Executive Director of Sterling Capital and Associate Portfolio Manager
Since July 2021
The following replaces the description of the Portfolio Managers set forth under “Fund Management—Portfolio Managers” in the Prospectuses with respect to the Sterling Capital Special Opportunities Fund and Sterling Capital Equity Income Fund:
Special Opportunities Fund and Equity Income Fund. George F. Shipp, CFA, Managing Director, founded what is now the Sterling Capital Equity Opportunities group in December 2000, after serving for 18 years as a sell-side equity analyst with the broker-dealer BB&T Scott & Stringfellow. He is Co-Portfolio Manager of the Special Opportunities Fund and Equity Income Fund and has been a portfolio manager of those funds since their inception. George is a graduate of the University of Virginia where he received a BA in Biology, and an MBA from its Darden Graduate School of Business in 1982. He holds the Chartered Financial Analyst® designation.
Joshua L. Haggerty, CFA, Executive Director, joined the CHOICE Asset Management team of BB&T Scott & Stringfellow in 2005, which integrated with Sterling Capital in January 2013. He has investment experience since 1998. He has been Co-Portfolio Manager of the Special Opportunities Fund since July 2021 and was Associate Portfolio Manager of the Special Opportunities Fund from February 2016 to July 2021. Josh is a graduate of James Madison University where he received his BBA in Finance. He holds the Chartered Financial Analyst® designation.
Adam B. Bergman, CFA, Executive Director, joined the CHOICE Asset Management team of Scott & Stringfellow in 2007, which integrated with Sterling Capital Management in January 2013. He has investment experience since 1996. He has been Co-Portfolio Manager of the Equity Income Fund since July 2021 and was Associate Portfolio Manager of the Equity Income Fund from February 2016 to July 2021. Adam is a graduate of the University of Virginia’s McIntire School of Commerce where he received his BS in Commerce. He holds the Chartered Financial Analyst® designation.
Charles J. Wittmann, CFA, Executive Director, joined Sterling Capital Management in 2014 and has investment experience since 1995. He is an equity portfolio manager and has been Associate Portfolio Manager of the Equity Income Fund since July 2021. Prior to joining Sterling Capital, he worked for Thompson Siegel & Walmsley as a portfolio manager and (generalist) analyst. Prior to TS&W, he was a founding portfolio manager and analyst with Shockoe Capital, an equity long/short hedge fund. Charles received his B.A. in Economics from Davidson College and his M.B.A. from Duke University's Fuqua School of Business. He holds the Chartered Financial Analyst® designation.
Daniel A. Morrall, Executive Director, joined Sterling Capital Management in 2014 and has investment experience since 2001. Dan is a portfolio manager and has been Associate Portfolio Manager of the Special Opportunities Fund since July 2021. Prior to joining Sterling Capital, he worked as an equity analyst for Harber Asset Management and S Squared Technology LLC, technology-biased long/short funds. Dan received his B.S. in Business and Economics from Washington and Lee University, his M.B.A. from Columbia Business School, and his M.S.I.T. from Capella University.
SHAREHOLDERS SHOULD RETAIN THIS SUPPLEMENT
WITH THE PROSPECTUSES FOR FUTURE REFERENCE.
STAT-SUP-0721

From cited paper:

One of the primary questions clients want answered is: What is the safe maximum withdrawal rate? Once again, Bengen has done some of the seminal work on this topic and has currently settled on a withdrawal figure of 4.15 percent for a portfolio with 63 percent in stocks.

This was outdated in 2008, let alone today. Bengen had raised the figure to 4.5% in 2005 by incorporating small cap stocks, and today his figure is even higher:

Bill [Bengen]: [I]n 2005, while I was working on my book, I introduced small cap stocks, U.S. small cap stocks, which really juiced everything. The return – they didn't have a perfect correlation with large cap, so that juiced it from 4.15% to almost 4.5%. ... And that's when I came up with that number.
...
Michael [Kitces]: And so, what do you think about as the number in the environment today?
Bill: I think somewhere in 4.75%, 5% is probably going to be okay. We won't know for 30 years, so I can safely say that in an interview.

Kitces, Financial Advisor Success Podcast!, Oct 13, 2020
https://www.kitces.com/blog/bill-bengen-4-percent-rule-safe-withdrawal-rates-historical-returns-research-book/

Nice piece. Evensky is a common sense kind of guy. I'm not sure where that excerpt came from, because it looks somewhat like a mashup of three consecutive paragraphs on p. 71 (pdf p. 9) of the cited paper. It's worth reading what's in the paper for emphasis. I've highlighted some additonal text:

Clients think that because they are retired, the way to get income is through dividends and interest. Such thinking arises from what my partner Deena calls the “paycheck syndrome,” and it is nonsense. ...
... if clients depend on income largely from their bond portfolios, then when interest rates go up, they feel rich. But what is actually happening to the value of their portfolio? It is going down. When interest rates go down, they feel poor, but the portfolio value is going up. The strategy runs counter to financial reality. ...
People need real income. They need real cash flow, not nominal cash flow, and they do not get that real cash flow from an income portfolio.

In a nutshell, this is why I (and some other posters here) focus on total return, not yield.
See also M*, Income vs. Total Return: Who Says You Need to Take Sides?
Needless to say, I also like what he has to say about Monte Carlo analysis:

[T]here is nothing new about it. ... I think it has been misused and overused. ...
I see several problems ... First, the increased number of guesses that Monte Carlo allows does not mean more accuracy. Second, Monte Carlo devalues the goal-setting process. Third, Monte Carlo probabilities are all or nothing. If Monte Carlo says I have a 70 percent chance of success, what does the remaining 30 percent mean? Starvation? Finally, Monte Carlo offers no insight into the unexpected, such as a Katrina event or the subprime crisis.

He goes on for several paragraphs with examples and ways to address his concerns.
The cash flow strategy described may be better known as the two bucket strategy:

The first bucket strategy was developed by financial planning pioneer Harold Evensky in 1985. This was a two-bucket approach with a cash bucket holding five years of retirement spending, and a longer-term investment bucket consisting mostly of stocks. When the stock market performed poorly, withdrawals were taken from the cash account to avoid selling stocks in a down market, and when the stock market did well withdrawals were taken from the investment bucket, and investments from this bucket were also sold to replenish cash.

https://www.advisorperspectives.com/articles/2020/04/20/bucket-strategies-challenging-previous-research
As a complement to the final section of the paper, Other Strategies, here's Wade Pfau's Fortune piece on managing sequence of return risk.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadepfau/2017/04/12/4-approaches-to-managing-sequence-of-returns-risk-in-retirement/?sh=5bda15b66fcf

An excerpt from a longer writing. Both seemed worth sharing.

E&K Cash Flow Strategy. Sometime in the early 1980s, at Evensky and Katz we developed the E&K cash flow strategy that we continue to use today. It allows us to break the paycheck syndrome -The traditional withdrawal strategy for retirement is the income portfolio. It is a deeply flawed strategy, and any financial adviser who recommends income portfolios should cease and desist. Clients think that because they are retired, the way to get income is through dividends and interest. Such thinking arises from what my partner Deena calls the “paycheck syndrome,” by providing clients with a regular cash flow that they can depend on. Typically, it also includes an inflation adjustment because pay typically goes up with inflation.
To implement the cash flow strategy, we bifurcate the portfolio into two components—the cash flow reserve and the investment portfolio. The cash flow reserve portfolio is made up of two parts: two years’ worth of cash flow and any amounts needed for lump-sum expenses—a wedding, a new car, for instance—over the next five years. We base this amount on our five-year planning model. We do not believe in investing in stocks or bonds unless we have a five-year window in which to decide when to sell. We thereby mitigate the timing risk because we have control over the timing.

Retirement_Income_Redesigned_Master_Plans_for_Distribution

The problem is no one in Congress thought about putting an upper limit on Roth IRA withdrawals when they wrote the law

Congress has done the opposite for inherited IRAs by eliminating the stretch provision for heirs. All inherited IRAs (including Roth IRAs) must be fully distributed within 10 years. This at least forces this $5 billion Roth account to be liquidated 10 years after the death of the Account holder.
Had Theil bought these shares in a taxable account the $5 Billion would also be mostly tax free to his heirs based on the step up provision that:

When someone inherits property and investments, the IRS resets the market value of these assets to their value on the date of the original owner’s death. Then, when the heir sells these assets, capital gains taxes are applied based on this reset value. The result is a situation – often considered a tax loophole – that allows investors to pass assets to their heirs virtually tax-free.

https://darrowwealthmanagement.com/blog/step-up-in-basis-on-certain-inherited-assets/
Also,

If President Biden gets his way, many wealthy Americans will no longer be able to pass stocks, real estate, and other capital assets to their heirs when they die without paying capital gains tax. He wants to do this by changing the tax rules that allow a "step up" in basis on inherited property. This proposal, along with others designed to increase taxes on the wealthy, is included in Biden's recently released American Families Plan – a $1.8 trillion package that includes spending on childcare and education, guaranteed paid family and medical leave, tax breaks for lower- and middle-income Americans, and more.

https://kiplinger.com/retirement/estate-planning/602701/biden-hopes-to-eliminate-stepped-up-basis-for-millionaires

It is understood that investing overseas has its inherent geopolitical risk. Given the worsening political climate between China and US since the Trump administration, we have reduced our exposure especially to China substantially after profited nicely in the last 10 years. Biden just signed an executive order to delist a number of Chinese companies from US stock exchanges that are considered doing business to benefit Chinese military.
Alibaba situation in spring should be a warning indicating the communist party is tightening its control of their private business. Jack Ma disappeared from the public for several months. Many suspected he was house-arrest until he behaves properly, i.e. no more bad mouthing of the communist party in the public. Chinese tech companies like to list themselves in the “rich” foreign stock exchanges. I believe Didi situation is the early sign of not so pleasant things to come.

@Baseball_Fan.... To be nice, I'll mention that Hussman's Total Return fund (HSTRX) only had 2 down calendar years out of 18, with a +5% average return over the life of the fund.
Not sure which of his funds you dabble with. His newer Allocation fund (HSAFX) has done kinda ok so far.
But yeah, he missed the Fed boat completely, and he never corrected/adjusted appropriately. Stubborn.

Thanks @msf for the enlightening retort to the article I linked from the WSJ. I agree that the lending ability of mutual funds has been public information for many years. The % of fund investors actually aware of it, however, may not be high.
IMHO this article doesn’t appear to be up to the general caliber of the WSJ. I’ve gone back and updated the OP by providing the author’s name which is Dereck Horstmeyer. Horstmeyer in the piece referesences an assist from his able assistant, Pamy Arora. Apparently, Arora did some of the number crunching.
Who is Derek Horstmeyer? “Derek Horstmeyer is an associate professor at George Mason University School of Business, specializing in exchange-traded fund (ETF) and mutual fund performance. He currently serves as Director of the new Financial Planning and Wealth Management major at George Mason and founded the first student-managed investment fund at GMU.” Source

Author: Derek Horstmeyer (with assistant Pamy Arora
“Unannounced to their investors, mutual-fund managers will often lend the shares they hold to short sellers who bet against particular stocks.By doing so, a fund manager can earn a little extra money (on the interest charged) and reduce the overall costs to operate the mutual fund—hopefully passing on the cost savings in the form of a lower expense ratio to the investor. But the flip side is that if the manager is lending out a good amount of the fund’s holdings, this means there is a lot of demand by other investors to bet against the exact holdings the fund manager has in the mutual fund.
“When all is said and done, if your fund manager is lending out a good amount of the underlying portfolio, is this a negative sign for future returns? The answer is a resounding yes: Active fund managers who lend out more than 1% of their holdings on average during the year underperform their fellow mutual-fund managers by an average of 0.62 percentage point a year across multiple asset classes …
“In the U.S. large-cap arena, we can see that if a fund manager is lending out shares, it isn’t a good sign for the fun fund performance. Active large-cap fund managers who lent out more than 1% of their shares averaged a return of 12.93% a year over the past 10 years. Active large-cap fund managers who lent out less than 1% of the shares averaged a return of 13.29 a year over the past 10 years. This amounts to a 0.36 percentage point difference in returns a year. … When we look at mutual fund managers who have lent out more than 2% of their portfolio on average, the results look even worse for lenders …“
WSJ July 6, 2022
Interesting Article - However, “total return” doesn’t tell the whole story. Article doesn’t address impact on fund volatility or downside performance. My (uninformed) guess is that the lenders perform better on those scores, even while generating lower overall returns.

The Ulcer Index measures the length and duration of the maximum drawdown over a period of time which in this case was three years including the 2020 bear market.
Each bear market is unique, but I believe that it is a great relative risk indicator. Over the past three years the S&P 500 had an UI of 5.2.

Each month, I download hundreds of ETFS and generally require that they have at least three years of history, and at least $100M in assets before up loading them into my Ranking System. I maintain a list of funds that have at least $100M but aren't three years old. This is a short listing of the funds:
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4438107-infant-exchange-traded-funds-attracting-inflows
ESGV, BBAX, USSG, SUSL, IVOL, VSGX, EAGG, RPAR, VCMDX, PTBD, SWAN, DRSK, NTSX, NUSI, LDSF, XLSR, JCPB, PTIN, MUST
All but three of these funds have lower risk than the S&P 500 as measured by the Ulcer Index. These funds either have positive three-month trends or inflows. All but one fund have earned more than 6 percent annualized.

Well, Hussman is still the king of perma-bears. Does anybody hold any of his mutual funds? Even his defense is questionable, and there is no offense.

He’s done somewhat better recently. But for 10 years you’d still be underwater. Wonder what they’d say if you phoned and asked them why that’s the case. I did something like that once years ago with a different fund. The response was: “Our manager has been positioning himself.”
HSGFX 10-Year Chart from Lipper (shaded dark blue.)

I like to look at upside and downside cature ratios of mutual funds to see how defensive a fund is. The Morningstar site provides this data (look in the "risk" tab). When I use Portfolio Visulaizer's data it appears inconsistent with M* (FWIW). You may to constrain PV to the last ten years of data to match M*'s data. PV data can go back to 1985 if the fund is that old.
One of the best funds for this type of risk/reward is PRMTX. Here's its risk profile (Upside=114 / Downside=65):
https://morningstar.com/funds/xnas/prmtx/risk
Some others I hold:
FSMEX (100/58)...100% of the upside with 58% of the downside
PRWCX (117/88)
PRNHX (108/69)
PRHSX (98/71)
PRGSX (122/86)
A fund like CTFAX has a (78 upside cature/13 downside capture) so this fund captures 78% of the upside (reward) while only taking 13% of the downside risk. Pretty good risk/reward.
SVARX works hard (ER over 3%) to produce an upside of 128 and a downside of (-53). Help me understand the negative downside capture number.
Some other notables in this thread:
TGHNX (123/72)
Explanation of Upside and Downside Capture:
https://freefincal.com/how-upside-and-downside-capture-ratios-are-calculated/

Taking a quick look at MWFSX, I couldn't help but notice that M* reports a rather suspiciously high SEC yield of 8.55%! Just curious how that is possible in today's low interest rate environment? Certainly raises a red flag for me.

MWFSX : ER is a turn off for me. Wavier will expire the end of July '21 , if I'm reading fees correctly.

I did address these, but tersely, and I concur with the concerns.
Fees: I suggested MWFSX as an alternative to EIXIX, which has a fee waiver expiring end of Oct '21. Without speculating on the relative likelihood of either waiver being extended, it does not seem to me that this is more of a concern for MWFSX than for EIXIX.
As stated, the high SEC yield comes from the low average weighted price of the holdings - under 90% of par. Think of YTM for a single bond. The greater the discount, the greater the YTM. The SEC yield of MWFSX is not coming from the coupons, which average 3.52%; that's not much more than EIXIX's 3.26%. EIXIX's SEC yield, while not as stratospheric, is above 5%, which is still rather rare outside of EM bonds and TIPS.
Long duration bonds can sell at large discounts simply because there are so many below market rate semiannual coupon payments for which the discount must compensate. But when the duration is short and there's still a significant discount, that's a strong indication that you're deep into junk. Indeed, over ¼ of MWFSX's portfolio is below B, while its duration is a modest 2.94 years.
At least I know that, because Met West (now a TCW subsidiary) is a transparent company. I know that over 60% of the portfolio securities (weighted) have durations under 1 year. I have no idea what the average credit quality or duration is of EIXIX, let alone a bar chart of credit quality or duration for its portfolio holdings. I just have to assume it's in a similar ballpark to MWFSX based on the few data points already described.

Hi @Rickrmf,
I have put a lot of time into analyzing defensive funds. My ranking system is based on seven factors applied equally to every fund. After the article last month I now apply the seven factors differently to Mixed-Asset Funds, Uncorreclated Funds, and the remainder of the stock and funds. I also apply them differently to funds by MFO Risk levels. For example, I do want good performance for the Mixed Asset Funds and Uncorrelated Funds, but momentum is not a determining factor in finding these funds.
Combining these funds can reduce volatility. You asked about GAVIX/GAVIX. It is one of my poorer performing funds in the short term but not the long term. That is the benefit of combing uncorrelated funds. Some will be up while others are down so that they do not all rise and fall at the same time. I thought about selling GAVIX, but now classify it is as an uncorrelated fund and am content with it.
I also own COTZX/CTFAX, DIVO, ARBIX and TMSRX. You may also want to look at CDC which I also classify as an uncorrelated fund. I am working on an August article which covers this topic.
We may well be in a year like 1998 or 2007 with good recent performance. However, Federal Debt to GDP is almost as high at during WWII. The federal deficit is also high. The rise in asset prices is due more to massive stimulus than growth. Even conservative Vanguard is estimating very low growth over the next decade due to high valuations.
For the past 120 years the stock market has returned 6.8% plus inflation. Limiting downside risk in this environment is likely to lead to outperformance as it did following 1998 and 2007. Stimulus has also inflated expectations. Notice how Mr. Buffett always seems to be sitting on cash when the bear market arrives.
Regards, Lynn Bolin

Great point. The FAANG stocks (Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, and Google (Alphabet)) have dominated the broader US index for the past 10 years while the value stocks trailed by sizable margin until late 2020.
As @hank suggested above, it would be a good idea to review the top 10 holdings in each funds in your portfolio on a regular basis. Case in point, the value oriented Wellington fund, VWELX, now holds: Alphabet Inc, Microsoft, Facebook and Apple among the top 10 holdings per 5/31/2021 reporting. The fund is now categorized as blend according to M*. In the same period, Wellesley Income, VWINX holds more the traditional financial, pharma and consumer staples stocks. Also Global Wellington holds only Microsoft as #4 position. Likely I will move fund away from Wellington.