Vanguard International total bond index fund, VTABX, is often part of Vanguard 's target date funds. Low volatility but also low yield.
I agree EM debt is perhaps a better option for income investor. So what is so unique of VEMBX? This is a EM local currency fund and this category has not done well in recent years.

Next, Forsyth bemoans that [] honors have been denied baseball legend[] Pete Rose (for betting on games he was managing).
I think he's getting the problem backward. It's not that Rose might leverage nonpublic knowledge, say that some teammates were playing with hidden injuries, to make profitable bets. It's that Rose had the power and ability to change conditions so that bets he had made would pay off. He wasn't managing that many years after the Black Sox.
Okay, so trading/betting on nonpublic information is also a concern. The major problem though is not that someone makes a few bucks (or a few million bucks) off of public information, but that someone is motivated to manipulate the entire system.
Imagine if Powell had made sizeable investments that would pay off if interest rates rose - not based on private information - just public data that the economy was improving, inflation increasing, etc. Now suppose the economy goes into a tailspin, say Covid μ turns out to be more virulent, more resistant to current vaccines than currently believed. He would be tempted to, and likely have the power to raise interest rates anyway.
That's the bigger problem. Market manipulation rather than insider trading. The insider trading rules allow an exception for selling according to a predefined schedule. That protects against someone making use of insider information. But it doesn't protect against someone manipulating the system, knowing what is scheduled to be sold and when.

@Derf, I don’t have good track record on EM bond funds. Last ones I held were PImco from 2008 and their funds took over several years to recover. To compound the mistake, I bought too much at once instead building the position over 3-6 months.

The underperformance unfortunately goes beyond 2015-16. Prior to this year in which the fund is winning, Sequoia has underperformed its Morningstar Large-Cap Growth fund category peers for seven straight calendar years. Admittedly, one could argue it is miscategorized as large-growth. I wonder how it would hold up versus say the large-blend category. But 2021 so far has been a good year for this fund.

Yes, sometimes managers make comments outside SEC disclosures about their direct economic participation. I was asking folks to share if they are aware of such information.
I read this AM the M* analyst report for this fund. M* gives a Neutral rating, only one level above Negative, but gushes over with "[Managers] invest heavily in the strategy alongside fundholders." Who knows what the "heavily" means but hopefully not just the over $1M disclosed in the SAI (SEC filing).
Evidently, the current four managers have been with this fund for at least 10 years, which includes 2015-16.
The above is just an FYI.

That makes sense, David.
Since there seems to be keen interest in this fund on this board, do we know what is the max any current manager has invested in the fund? M* says more than a million dollars, which does not impress me as I think that would be less than 1 yr of compensation for each of the managers. M* reports from SAI. I would like to see 3-5 yrs of annual compensation before putting any positive weight on managers’ economic participation. I get that having too much of managers’ wealth could be a detriment too but 3-5 years of annual comp is not too much, given a lot investors put 5-10% of their wealth in a fund.
P.S.: I have never invested in this fund but am open to investing in it, not withstanding its misadventures in 2015-16.

One thing I question is the assumption that an ETF can’t close to investors. They have in the past I believe but for bad non-capacity issues, like liquidity issues with the underlying securities. After closing, the ETF would effectively become a closed-end fund trading at a premium or discount to its underlying portfolio value. But in the example we’re discussing where the ETF attracts many billions of assets because of strong performance if it closed it would almost certainly trade at a premium for a while as investors would still want access to a high performing fund. This premium would be to the advantage of existing shareholders as they could sell their shares for more than they really should be worth. It would be a disadvantage to new investors paying the premium. But as has already been mentioned, that’s a nice problem for a fund to have as it would mean the fund has been very successful. I doubt that will be the problem here and if it is, not for some years.

If anybody feels knowledgeable enough, I’d appreciate your explanation / opinions on the “liquidity” issue Randall Forsyth mentions briefly in the Sept. 13 Barron’s. The debt part I understand. But the liquidity part is what I’m not fully reeling in.
Here’s Forsyth’s final paragraph:
“As a result of the past 20 years’ policies, America's public debt is one-quarter larger than the economy, versus a little more than half of gross domestic product in the third quarter of 2001. At the same time, the Fed's assets—mainly U.S. Treasury securities—have grown more than 11-fold, to over $8.3 trillion. As a result, the financial system has become so overstuffed with liquidity that more than $1.1 trillion is parked at the Fed's overnight reverse-repurchase facility. Who could have foreseen this two decades ago?”
-
As investors, we like to have liquidity. It allows us to move from one position to another easily or take advantage of opportunities that arise. No? So why is having too much of it dangerous to the economy?

Like series I savings bonds, series EE savings bonds cannot be redeemed until a year after purchase. Between one and five years, you lose the last three months of interest if you cash out. No penalty after five years.
https://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/research/indepth/ebonds/res_e_bonds_eeredeem.htm#when
With EE series savings bonds, there's another implicit penalty. For savings bonds held 20 years, the value of the bond is adjusted to twice its purchase price. Using the rule of 72, that's an annual rate of approximately 72/20 = 3.6%.
But if you cash out earlier, you'll earn just the stated rate on the savings bonds. For newly purchased EE savings bonds, that's a piddly 0.10%. So you "lose" 3.5% in interest annually if you sell before waiting 20 years.
https://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/research/indepth/ebonds/res_e_bonds_eeratesandterms_eebondsissued052005andafer.htm#buy

It is a large cap growth fund with $5B AUM. It can grow 10 fold before I would worry about capacity constraints. It has had net outflows for each of the past 9 years. If it reaches capacity constraints in the next 10 years means the fund becomes enormously successful, a good problem to have.

From SPGlobal.com -
"The S&P U.S. Dividend Growers Index is designed to measure the performance of U.S. companies that have followed a policy of consistently increasing dividends every year for at least 10 consecutive years. The index excludes the top 25% highest-yielding eligible companies from the index."
The benchmark index used prior to the change to SPGlobal does not appear to have such an exclusion. https://indexes.nasdaqomx.com/docs/Methodology_DVG.pdf
https://indexes.nasdaqomx.com/Index/Overview/DVG
I wondered how the differences in methodologies might effect the composition of the fund as a result of the change. The median market cap appear to go from $169B (Vanguard Portfolio page) to $13B - that is way too drastic change and I wish somebody checks me on this to make sure I have not goofed up. Weight of top 10 components does not change much (goes down from 31.5% to 30.5%) - i.e., well diversified (expect that from Vanguard). Dividend yield does not appear to change much - goes from 1.85% (M* info) to 1.74% - there are probably calc differences to call the 11 basis points a material difference, without digging in further.
VDADX short term and long term total return performances appear not impressive. There seem to be large blend funds from Vanguard that have much better performance and not attracted as much AUM as VDADX ($64B). What is the attraction of VDADX as a large blend fund? Can not possibly be the current dividend yield of 1.75%.

Baird is not a fund company that comes to mind when looking for equity funds. It is replacing the manager for these two funds with (as noted above) an affiliate of Baird (which owns 75%-100%).
Here's what little I can find on Greenhouse - it's indirectly owned by Baird (via ownership by Joseph M and Kirsten T Milano). It does not manage any OEFs, but manages $628M for eight clients including three hedge funds.
https://wallmine.com/adviser/235960/greenhouse-funds-lllp
About seven years ago, Baird floated the idea of a microcap fund managed by Greenhouse. It would own 50-100 companies, compared with 25-50 here.
https://mutualfundobserver.com/discuss/discussion/20043/greenhouse-microcap-discovery-fund-bcdsx
What caught my eye in that prospectus is that Joseph Milano had been manager of T. Rowe Price New America Growth Fund (now All Cap Opportunities Fund) PRWAX for a decade.

Like @Griffin, I am a longtime follower, but first-time poster. I felt compelled to chime in on this thread because it concerns two of my very favorite funds. I have held substantial positions in both AKRIX and EGFIX for several years and am very pleased with both. I wish the expense ratios were lower, but that is my only complaint and I was able to access the institutional shares at Fidelity so they are 1.05 and 1.00, respectively.
I tend to prefer high active share, concentrated funds, which led me to the aforementioned pair, as well as the somewhat tamer PRBLX and JENSX.
I am not at all concerned about Chuck Akre’s retirement because I have faith that the portfolio managers John Neff and Chris Cerrone have learned a lot from their mentor. And the fact the fund has such a low turnover rate means they will not be called upon to do a lot of trading, anyways. If you are looking for high active share and low downside capture, you will be hard pressed to find a better fund.
I first learned of Edgewood Growth when I saw it listed as one of the top performing large growth funds over the past 5 and 10 years in a table posted online by Kiplinger’s. The thing that stood out to me was that out of the 10 funds listed in each of the tables it was the only one listed that did not have a volatility ranking of 9 or 10. (It was a 5).
I like the fact this fund is not discussed too much on these kinds of forums. It keeps it a sort of hidden gem. But with total assets of more than $35 billion, it has obviously caught the attention of a lot of (I think smart) investors.

Concerning AKREX less financials and more tech, this statement was taken from M* analysis of November 2020. Unlike many computer generated summaries, this was a real analysis of changes there. I invest in this fund for many years, and I am very happy about it, but yes indeed it is more slow now.

There are lots of ETFs that try to move counter to the market ( SH) , or provide a floor under losses ( take your pick 5 9 13 % or higher BUFF) or buy puts ( TAIL) These should all do well during a correction.
Inverse funds unfortunately drop to a smaller and smaller portion of your portfolio as the market moves higher. lowering their impact. It is unclear to me what an ETF that is structured to buffer a 5 to 15% loss will do in a 20% correction.
Puts might be your best bet, as you know ahead of time how much you stand to give up, although you have to constantly maintain a position to continue the "protection".
Usual advice is don't put money into the market you can't afford to loose. I am afraid this may also apply to the Bond Market now
While conservative equities with a "margin of safety" are likely to eventually reclaim any significant correction, the P/Es on a number of high flyers may take years. I assume it would take an equally long time for a 1.5% coupon bond to recover, if ever.

Several emerging market and currency bets went wrong over the years.
Maintaining a low overall duration also didn't help.
As was mentioned, Mr. Hasenstab could be stubborn in holding losing positions for too long.

Same here - I had TGBAX and GIM off and on over the years but not held any of them in quite a long time. Just goes to show that even darling fund managers aren't forever regardless of who likes them .... which is a reality of life totally lost on the SA editorial team as it continues fawning over Cathie Wood at ARK, I might add.

TMSRX only concern is that expense ratio is 1.29.

You’re being generous if that’s your only concern. Some of that “fee” isn’t really related to management of the fund, but simply reflects some of the expenses peculiar to short selling. For many years they weren’t included in the ER. I’ll guess on the date. But I think it was around 2000 that the SEC began requiring these costs be disclosed in the ER and, as a result, the stated fees on such funds jumped.
This article explains those costs - which simply stated are (1) Dividend expenses on short sales and (2) Interest expense on short sales
Price’s ER is in line with similar funds and I’d expect the 1.29 ER to be lower in a few more years as assets increase. The fund (perhaps deservedly) has been subject to some brickbats. However, when it rains out (and equities nose dive) it holds up very well - a haven of sorts from the storm.
I’m not trying to sell it. My own commitment is in the area of only 14-15% of portfolio.

Yes-I invested in TPINX TGTRX and TBOAX years ago. I sold like you did. I liked the funds and never found a really good substitute!

The September 2021 Morningstar Fund Investor newsletter indicates that Templeton Global Bond (TPINX) was downgraded from Silver to Neutral.
"This fund has stuck to Its guns, and that means it has
been wrong for a long time. Manager Michael
Hasenstab has been bullish on emerging markets and
bearish on U.S. bonds. The fund kept duration near
zero while maintaining outsize bets on Ukraine and
other emerging markets. We stayed positive on the
fund given Hasenstab’s past record, but eventually we
have to conclude that he’s not as good as we thought."
TPINX was one of the premier funds in the World Bond category years ago.
Templeton Global Bond was different from most World Bond funds due to substantial emerging markets exposure and its currency bets. As of 01/31/16, the fund generated top 1% / top 2% category returns for the respective 10 Yr and 15 Yr trailing periods.
Michael Hasenstab (M* 2010 Fixed-Income Manager of the Year) started co-managing TPINX on 12/31/2001.
Several fund managers have come and gone since then.
Templeton Global Bond was moved to the Nontraditional Bond category in 2019.
I remember purchasing Templeton Global Income (GIM - CEF version of TPINX) in late 2013.
GIM was trading with an attractive discount and it had a lower expense ratio than TPINX.
Unfortunately, the discount widened and Mr. Hasenstab lost his mojo.
I sold the CEF approximately five years later booking a small profit.