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Bob, I think you might be a bit too literal here. While John (and jerry) referred to "core bond", they (or at least John) were speaking in terms of their portfolio (i.e. their "main" or "anchor" holding), and not literally in terms of the type of fund ("core bond fund").I would be cautious about owning core bond funds when we are in a period of rising interest rates. Flat-to-lower rates are ideal for core bonds, ... Then again, the definition of what a core bond fund is. VBMFX, for example, has not lived through a period of rising rates. It has been stellar in the past, but none of us knows what will happen.
This brings us to another point, and one which makes me less sanguine about funds that tilt toward MBSs.Duration is one way to measure potential risk, with this fund having a probability of losing 5.6% of its value for every 1% increase in interest rates.
The periodic moment to cash of YAFFX is why I have bought and held it for years :)@willmatt72, I wondered about that myself as I saw the charts of these two side by side. It looked like YAFFX took just as big of a hit as the other too but it would be hard to determine their holdings at that time period.
I think you are exactly correct. People invested in FAIRX because of Bruce Berkowitz and his superb stock managerial skills. Investors in FAIRX did not feel they needed to scour the portfolio and second guess the manager. Then out of the blue one day it's, "What, 50% of my investment is in AIG, common stock plus warrants"? 15% in BAC. Sears....ahhh. St. Joe, another risky stock. Then Freddie and Fannie, whose very existence depends on court cases, super high risk. Add it all up..... All of a sudden, this is not the guy who for years said, "Rule number one, don't lose money"....Rule number 2, don't forget rule number 1". Any FAIRX investor can handle a large weighting in Berkshire Hathaway, because most FAIRX investors are very well disposed towards value and towards Warren Buffett. I sold all my FAIRX at the end of 2013 and first week of 2014. It was the accumulated risk that the portfolio had taken on, and concomitant loss of faith that BB was really following Rule number 1 and Rule number 2, as he had promised.I had not heard of Fairholme before I came here but it sounds like the fund slowly condensed like cooking on the stove. A lot of shareholders may not have realized what was happening until it was too late.
I'm sure many FAIRX shareholders sold this week. The below was posted on another message board just yesterday:Until I sold FAIRX a couple of days ago I had owned it for over 10 years. Over the years BB drifted from being a deep value focused manager to a swing for the fences style.


Yeah, it's always been BB's first and second rule. He's expressed it many times, as ValueSeeker says. Here's some documentation. But I certainly agree with you, lately he has taken to anything resembling TBTF, systemically important companies, etc.To me the key is that the manger's investments be consistent with the fund's stated goal that caused us to invest in it in the first place. BB repeatedly says his first rule is not lose money. Digging a huge hole every couple of years and then taking big risks to get out of it is not consistent with his first rule
@ValueSeeker, you have a very good point about BB's emphasis of his first rule. And his second rule is don't forget the first rule. .
Wasn't that Buffett's "rule".Not sure I ever heard/read Berkowitz say it. Berkowitz's thing has always been "ignoring the crowd" (sometimes the crowd is right) and lately, he seems to have taken to anything resembling something TBTF.
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