Hi Guys,
Our recent MFO discussions that center more on the originality of the market commentary and observations tend to detract from the main themes of the subject works. That’s a wasteful distraction.
Original thinking on any subject is rare. If the communication requirement is originality, a room filled with clients would be mostly silent; a written report to clients would be mostly a blank sheet of paper.
Originality is nice and in some instances is necessary, but it surely is not a prerequisite when communicating for informational or even for persuasive purposes. Sure things change, but not that rapidly. What has happened in the past (history), and what has worked in the past provide a firm basis for what is likely to happen in the future. At a minimum, it is an excellent point of departure for planning purposes.
The key point here is that the referenced James Saft article emphasizes the shortfall of return’s volatility as a total measure of investment risk. That shortfall has been recognized within the investment community ever since it was proposed as a partial risk measurement back in the 1960s (Harry Markowitz and others). It definitely is not original stuff.
Note that no expert suggests a total discarding of volatility as a risk component; they merely argue that it is incomplete in that it does not capture all the interactive elements of it. Risk is a complex, multilayered phenomena, and is likely dissimilar for different folks.
The Saft article was okay; it did draw heavily from an Oaktree clients report written by Howard Marks very recently. The Marks report is excellent and develops a risk assessment concept much more completely than does Saft. If you enjoyed an/or learned from the Saft piece, I suggest you access the Marks document at:
http://www.oaktreecapital.com/memo.aspxThe arguments assembled by Marks are not new or even novel. These things evolve over time. However, in the Marks paper, they are cobbled together in a way that just might provide an improved risk guidance for your portfolio investment goals.
In the middle of the report, the graph that depicts the risk/reward tradeoffs yields a particularly useful picture at how the statistical distribution of expected returns more correctly overlays the reality of that tradeoff. Please take especial note of it.
The more careful collection of the data, the interpretations of that data, and the extrapolation (the most dangerous aspect of the entire process) of these interpretations (dare I say a model?) make revisiting the data and some recent analyses worthwhile. Since our recall is imperfect, and since our needs change over time, this revisiting is necessary and sometimes even profitable for investment decision-making. None of this probably qualifies as highly original thinking. That doesn’t trouble me whatsoever.
Care and precision must always be exercised when presenting data or an argument based on that data. Definitions are critical. The risk debate effectively illustrates the requirement for meticulous definitions. Along those lines, Morgan Housel recently published a list of “Things You Should Know the Difference Between”; these items do make a difference. Here is a Link to it:
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/09/09/things-you-should-know-the-difference-between.aspx?source=iaasitlnk0000003These days, it seems we are all fretting over the next looming market decline. The known unknowable is that it will surely happen; the unknown unknowable is its magnitude and when that will happen. Market decline history provides guidance in this arena. There is certainly no originality buried in these data, but they do directly bear on the downturn frequency. From a statistical perspective, these data establish a base-rate.
The data I quote come from the American Funds and includes the timeframe from 1900 to 2013.
A 5% downturn blip has occurred about 3 times a year; a 10% correction about once a year; a 15% downdraft about once every two
years, a 20% Bear market approximately once every 3.5
years; and a 30% panic about once per decade.
These are all merely averages so beware the distribution element. These negative outcome stats do yield an overall context. Over short periods, the spacing and durations are somewhat haphazard, so money reserves are needed. That too is not original advice since it dates back to the Talmud as I reported in an earlier post.
I hope you guys enjoy and profit from the references. It’s far less important that you enjoyed my submittal which contains no original thoughts. I offer no apologizes for my lack of originality. Good luck to all.
Best Regards.