No additional comment; as I'll let the total return chart do the talking.
AOK vs VWINX chart beginning November, 2008.
Regards,
Catch

near the 30% low end of the 30-50% category
"near" is good. It allows for fuzziness and the possibility of bouncing around the figure in a way that "on" 30% and "holding" 30% don't.
holds 30% equity
sitting on the lowest edge of 30-50% category
The iShares AOK website shows the benchmark index is S&P Target Risk Conservative Index. This Index construction shows a 30% equity allocation (2020 prospectus p. S-2)
Quoting from that section of the prospectus:

As of July 31, 2020, the Underlying Index included a fixed allocation of 30% of its assets in Underlying Funds that invest primarily in equity securities and 70% of its assets in Underlying Funds that invest primarily in bonds. As of July 31, 2020, the Fund invested approximately 32.27% of its assets in Underlying Funds that invest primarily in equity securities, 66.98% of its assets in Underlying Funds that invest primarily in bonds and the remainder of its assets in Underlying Funds that invest primarily in money market instruments.

Actually that isn't quite correct with respect to the index holdings. The Underlying Index did not have a fixed allocation of 30% of its assets in ... equity securities as of July 31, 2020
As with anything else, if you want an authoritative definition, go to the source. According to S&P, the index had a 30% allocation in equities as of April 30, 2020. It rebalances only semiannually, at the end of April and at the end of October.
Equities tend to outperform bonds. So between semi-annual rebalancing dates, statistically equities will be above the target allocation (and bonds below) on more dates than the opposite. Of course that wasn't true during the GFC, hence the low equity numbers for 2009-2010. Since then (a lot more years), equities have outperformed.
Regarding the annual statements - it would help if you would provide links to validate your figures. As it turns out, your "equity" figures in the early years are off because you didn't count real estate securities. For example, in the 2009 annual statement, instead of looking at the Management's Discussions section (p. 3) you could look at the actual details of the holdings in the Schedule of Investments for the fund (p. 16).
That shows iShares Cohen & Steers Realty Major Index Fund grouped under Domestic Equity (17.86%). Add in the International Equity holdings (5.81%), and one gets 24% equity. Still a far cry from 30%, but enough to illustrate why all figures are subject to verification.
(M* also considers real estate to be equity; it says that VGSIX is virtually 100% U.S. equity.)
Look at 2018. While M* may say that only 28% of the fund was in equity that year, the SEC filings tell a different story. The 2018 Annual Report says that equities amounted to 30% of the fund as of July 31. And the Semiannual Report says that equities came to 32% of the fund.
As I've explained above, the first year or so of this fund are outliers because bonds outperformed the equity market. (Also the fund was tinkering with its allocations as evidenced by the fact that it invested in real estate back then.) Likewise, you have implicitly labeled these years as outliers. Whether it's because they're not "near" 30% equity or they're not "on" the 30% edge, they're outside of your normal historical range.
Finally, as to the point that funds that bop around a boundary between categories could show up in a different category from what you're expecting: sure, I explained that in my first response. That goes for global vs. domestic, value vs. blend, etc. One can even use this to one's advantage as I illustrated in another thread. In looking for value funds near the value/blend boundary, one might search for value funds with a current blend portfolio style and for blend funds with a current value portfolio style. This doesn't catch all funds, but it's a good start.

Absolutely delightful and informative morning session with Lynn and friends!
As promised, here is link to chart deck. Will post video shortly.
Afternoon overview session starts in abut 30 minutes. Can still register here.

Investing related I think because if they're having trouble modeling it how do money managers and investors?
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-its-so-freaking-hard-to-make-a-good-covid-19-model/

M* Historical stock style for AOK shows:
2020 30% equity allocation
2019 30%
2018 27%
2017 28%
2016 29%
More samples:
2015 31% Form N-CSR p.7 SEC filing
2013 30% Form N-CSR p.4
2010 22% Form N-CSR p.3
2009 21% Form N-CSR p.3
AOK clearly sits historically near the 30% low end of the 30-50% category.
The iShares AOK website shows the benchmark index is S&P Target Risk Conservative Index. This Index construction shows a 30% equity allocation (2020 prospectus p. S-2). M* places it in the 30-50% category. Takeaway: keep your eye out for funds historically near the category weighting limits as it might still be within your risk tolerance and more importantly possibly could provide good performance metrics you are seeking.

Low Interest Rates are here to Stay (thru 2021):
Some Quotes from the article (linked):

The economy is poised for a robust recovery in 2021, particularly in the latter half, but Bloomberg Economics does not expect quantitative easing to be scaled back until 2022, leaving interest rate liftoff closer to 2025.

How Central banks are planning for the year ahead:
ultra-low-interest-rates-here-to-stay-2021-central-bank-guide

For those with an interest....Grantham's "epic bubble" market call and current investment suggestions...

The long, long bull market since 2009 has finally matured into a fully-fledged epic bubble. Featuring extreme overvaluation, explosive price increases, frenzied issuance, and hysterically speculative investor behavior, I believe this event will be recorded as one of the great bubbles of financial history, right along with the South Sea bubble, 1929, and 2000.
Today the P/E ratio of the market is in the top few percent of the historical range and the economy is in the worst few percent. This is completely without precedent and may even be a better measure of speculative intensity than any SPAC.
investors are relying on accommodative monetary conditions and zero real rates extrapolated indefinitely.
This has in theory a similar effect to assuming peak economic performance forever: it can be used to justify much lower yields on all assets and therefore correspondingly higher asset prices. But neither perfect economic conditions nor perfect financial conditions can last forever, and there’s the rub.
I expect once again for my bubble call to meet my modest definition of success: at some future date, whenever that may be, it will have paid for you to have ducked from midsummer of 2020. But few professional or individual investors will have been able to have ducked.....we believe it is in the overlap of these two ideas, Value and Emerging, that your relative bets should go, along with the greatest avoidance of U.S. Growth stocks that your career and business risk will allow.

https://gmo.com/americas/research-library/waiting-for-the-last-dance/

Pretty good reminder of what we have forgotten:
inflation-truthers

Per their crystal ball....

We expect a nearly complete recovery in crude demand as the pandemic subsides in 2021.
Energy remains the most undervalued sector, trading at a 22% discount compared with a 6% premium for the overall market.
higher prices are necessary. And if firms are unwilling to invest enough capital at midcycle prices ($55/bbl West Texas Intermediate, $60 Brent), we wouldn't rule out prices temporarily rising even higher.

https://morningstar.com/articles/1016129/energy-remains-the-most-undervalued-sector

I didn't see that other thread, so I guess i stand semi-corrected? (thanks!)

Not quite that good. It would be adding a fee on the fund of fund where none currently exists. So virtually no change in total expenses. Here's my comment from the thread where Shadow originally posted the proposed change:
https://mutualfundobserver.com/discuss/discussion/comment/132712/#Comment_132712
Current 0% ER (excluding acquired fund expenses):
https://www.morningstar.com/funds/xnas/rpsix/price

Not quite that good. It would be adding a fee on the fund of fund where none currently exists. So virtually no change in total expenses. Here's my comment from the thread where Shadow originally posted the proposed change:
https://mutualfundobserver.com/discuss/discussion/comment/132712/#Comment_132712
Current 0% ER (excluding acquired fund expenses):
https://www.morningstar.com/funds/xnas/rpsix/price

Cheap money and those investing on margin..... I don't have any data about how much hot money is in the market place; using margin or otherwise.

"Margin debt—the amount of money borrowed against stockholdings to play the market—hit a record $722 billion in November, its first record high in two years. That sounds scary. But margin debt often hits record highs as the stock market rises, making it a notoriously bad timing tool. What’s more, margin debt as a percentage of the overall value of the market is now near a 15-year low, which suggests that investors aren’t overextended just yet. What has changed is the pace at which investors are adding to their debt. It’s up about 50% from its spring low, and that kind of surge has happened only six times since 1960."
From a Barron's article last week.
I was able to read this without a subscription. Link

https://www.proxy-direct.com/MeetingDocuments/31551/Spectrum Proxy_OK.pdf
T. Rowe Price Spectrum Diversified Equity Fund
T. Rowe Price Spectrum Income Fund
T. Rowe Price Spectrum International Equity Fund
"...The purpose of the Shareholder Meeting is for Fund shareholders to vote on a proposal that was approved by the Funds’ Board of Directors to amend and restate each Fund’s investment management agreement. The purpose of the proposal is to change each Fund’s overall expense structure. Under the proposal, the amended and restated investment management agreement would provide for the payment of an “all-inclusive” management fee by each Fund and the elimination of the pass-through of operating expenses to the underlying funds in which the Fund invests. The Board of Directors of the Funds recommends that you vote in favor of the proposal with respect to your Fund. If the proposal is approved by a Fund’s shareholders, the Fund would invest in Z Classes of its underlying funds, which is anticipated to result in lower total expense ratios at the time of the expense restructure. The change to the expense structure would also accommodate the future addition of a new share class for the Funds—the I Class—which is designed for institutional and other larger investors and has lower overall shareholder servicing costs than the Funds’ Investor Class. The addition of the I Class could attract larger and more diverse investors to help the Funds further grow in the future...."
I understand the WORDS, but what does it MEAN? (I own RPSIX. )

The fact that AOK has dipped as low as 27% does not mean that historically its equity allocation has been under 30%. You seem to be conflating single moments in time with "historical" positions.
What does "historical" mean anyway? "the last 5 years" is a minority of the lifetime of this fund that's been around since 2008.
I have reclassified on my watch list as 15-30%.
It's currently at 31.75% equity (as of Dec 31), and rose as high as 32.5% equity as of July 31, according to its most recent annual statement.
There are always going to be problems running screens with "hard filters". I've posted on more than one occasion that IMHO it makes little sense to screen for funds that have never had a losing year. Which would you prefer: a fund that lost 0.1% in one year and made 10% or better in all its other years, or a fund that made 3% year in, year out? That's an example of a problem with any hard filter.
As far as AOK goes, according to Lipper there are only a total of 10 ETFs including both
"Mixed-Asset Target Allocation Moderate" and "Mixed-Asset Target Allocation Conservative" categories. So it's no big deal to watch all these funds.
http://www.funds.reuters.wallst.com/us/screener/screener.asp

+1.

The obvious problem being that there are funds that sit on 30% equity historically. Basic only allows a hard filter for either 30-50 or 15-30 screens. An investor searching for 15-30% equity may find a suitable fund sitting on the lowest edge of 30-50% category that gets screened out in basic. AOK is an example. In the last 5 years they dipped as low as 27% equity but classified today as 30-50% by M*. I have reclassified on my watch list as 15-30%. AOK is a good fund IMO. Seems to me this would affect the funds performance reputation as M* is quoted often. There is no perfect world, just worth noting. I am sure also applies to 50-70%. I will pay more attention going forward.

There's hysteresis built into the classification system. That is, if a fund has been holding 25% equity and moves to 35% equity, M* does not immediately change its category. It waits (three years or more) to see how permanent and how significant the change is.
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/306244/why-is-my-funds-style-box-different-from-its-categ
(This talks about style drift but it could just as easily been talking about a fund changing stock/bond allocations as changing large cap/small cap allocations.)
The point here is that one can't look at an average over time and determine how the fund is classified. The classification is "path dependent" - it depends on how it got there. A fund that hit 30% from 25% and stuck there would likely remain in its 15% to 30% category, while a fund that hit 30% from 35% and stuck there would likely remain in its 30% to 50% category.
If the fund is bouncing back and forth between a tad under and a tad over 30%, there would be no reason to change its category. Even if those oscillations miraculously averaged exactly 30% equity.

They introduced new Balanced Fund categories a few years ago. You can find the above under
Allocation Funds - 15 to 30% Equity
Allocation Funds - 30% to 50% Equity

What category is assigned to a balanced fund that holds 30% equity historically? 15-30% or 30-50%?

juice futures! the bitcoin of 2021!