In response to an emailed question, here are the US equity funds with the highest Martin ratios over the full market cycle that began in October 2007:
Reynolds Blue Chip Growth (RBCGX), 1.75
Intrepid Endurance (ICMAX), 1.67 (which I own shares of, fyi)
Yacktman Focused (YAFFX), 1.31
Eaton Vance Atlanta Capital SMID-Cap (EISMX),1.25, also a Great Owl
Parnassus Endeavor (PARWX), 1.20, Great Owl
Madison Dividend Income (BHBFX), 1.15, Great Owl
AMG Yacktman (YACKX), 1.14
Monetta Young Investor (MYIFX), 1.12
Brown Capital Mgt Small Cap (BCSIX), 1.11, Great Owl
Prospector Opportunity (POPFX), 1.08, Great Owl
Charles's "Great Owl" designation tracks the consistency with which a fund posts outstanding risk-adjusted returns. Technically, they are "top qunitile funds in their categories based on Martin for periods of 20, 10, 5 and 3 years, as applicable." All of the funds above have records of 10 or more years.
For what interest that holds,
David

An alternative to 403(b) investing might be found right under the noses of the (K-12) educator who contributes through payroll deductions to fund their very own state pension. State systems often have what are referred to as "voluntary accounts" for their teacher members.
The IRS identifies these accounts as 401(a) accounts (the public sector's equivalent to a private sector's 401(k)). They are contributed to with after tax contributions that have unique features such as being invested in the same manner as the state pension fund.
The one I had access to had no fees and a "10 year smoothing average" was applied to the account once a year based on the last 10 year's performance of the state pension fund. Subsequently the smoothing average method was replaced with year to year returns for the 401(a) voluntary accounts.
At retirement, the "growth" in this account was available to be rolled over to T. IRA and the after tax contributions qualified to be rolled over to an individual Roth IRA according the pre-tax "cost basis" of the account.
Here's a link to the CTRB website describing the 401(a) option for CT members:
How do I initiate an Active Teacher Voluntary Account with CTRB?
Ask your teacher pension administrator if this 401(a) option exists and how you can contribute voluntarily.
Zacks has few articles on the 401(a):
Can-401a-403b-plans be rolled over?
How are 401a-different-401k?

FYI: (Click On Article Title At Top Of Google Search)
Financial incentives and poor products run rampant in the non-ERISA 403(b) realm, especially for educators teaching kindergarten through 12th grade, according to advisers
Regards,
Ted
https://www.google.com/search?source=hp&ei=s-UTWt_TGo6hggfkwLvACA&q=investment+news+403(b)+advisers+disappointed+with+TIAA,+but+say+other+providers+are+'way+worse'&oq=investment+news+403(b)+advisers+disappointed+with+TIAA,+but+say+other+providers+are+'way+worse'&gs_l=psy-ab.3...1393.10457.0.11599.18.18.0.0.0.0.160.1451.16j1.18.0....0...1c.1j2.64.psy-ab..0.17.1462.6..0j35i39k1j0i131k1j0i67k1j0i131i20i264k1j0i20i264k1j0i131i67k1.106.QF6dDvM8oYQ

We thought we’d continue catching up with the 130 U.S. equity funds which have passed their second anniversary but have not yet reached their third, which is when conventional trackers such as Morningstar and Lipper pick them up. (Technically, they're in the 1.9 year to 2.9 year age bracket.) As Charles has repeatedly demonstrated, the screener at MFO Premium allows you to answer odd and interesting questions. Our screeners are unusually risk-sensitive. That’s because the easiest way to make money, in the long term, is not to lose money in the short-term. The default risk measure in our ratings is the Martin Ratio, which is exceedingly sensitive to downside risk. (Charles can share the details, if you'd like.)
Here's the most disturbing finding of our search for the most risk-sensitive two-year-old funds: they're ETFs. At the very least, all of the ten best funds, measured by Martin Ratio, are ETFs. Here they are, from the safest young equity fund to the 10th safest:
State Street SPDR S&P 500 High Dividend ETF SPYD (Equity Income)
JPMorgan Diversified Return US Equity ETF JPUS (Multi-Cap Core)
ProShares S&P 500 Ex-Financials ETF SPXN (Large-Cap Core)
ProShares S&P 500 Ex-Energy ETF SPXE (Large-Cap Core)
ProShares S&P 500 Ex-Health Care ETF SPXV (Large-Cap Core)
ProShares Russell 2000 Dividend Growers ETF SMDV (Small-Cap Core)
Goldman Sachs ActiveBeta US Large Cap Equity ETF GSLC (Multi-Cap Core)
VictoryShares US Large Cap High Div Volatility Wtd Index ETF CDL (Large-Cap Growth)
Invesco PowerShares S&P 500 Momentum Portfolio SPMO (Large-Cap Core)
Xtrackers Russell 1000 Comprehensive Factor ETF DEUS (Multi-Cap Core)
Likewise, 9 of the best 10 funds measured by Sharpe ratio are ETFs.
Why's that disturbing? Because market-tracking products should have market-like risk, not vastly lower-than-market risk. So, what gives? As Charles pointed out in his September essay, there simply is no downside volatility being manifested in the market now which means that our screener has hundreds of US equity funds (rather more than 300) with incalculably high Martin ratios. In a normal market, a Martin Ratio of "3" is virtually unattainable; no U.S. equity fund has a 10- or 20-year Martin ratio that high. The best record for a fund that's been around at least 5 years is AQR Large Cap Defensive Style (AUEIX) with a lifetime Sharpe ratio of 11. To recap: in the long term, no US equity fund is capable of a Martin ratio of 3 (or even 2) and, in the medium term, 11 is incredibly high.
What about today? The highest calculable one-year Martin ratio we currently have is Calamos Dividend Growth (CIDVX) at 202,363. The fund's long term Martin ratio is 3.06.
As Charles noted in a recent tweet, the deception gets worse this month as the worst drawdowns from the 2007-09 crash disappear from funds' 10-year records.
Bottom line: common risk metrics, which focus on three year periods, are probably unreliable guides just now. You need to understand a potential investment's risk by (a) looking at the manager's risk-management discussions (if he doesn't have one, run away!) and (b) taking most seriously the risk characteristics in the two recent down markets (2000-02 and 2007-09) or across the whole market cycle, rather than getting lured in by shiny short-term numbers. We'll continue to try to do both for you; that is, we'll take the qualitative and long term quantitative together as we try to make sense of what's on offer.

@MikeM, I hear you about the alt categories' shortcomings, but I also think 4+ years is more than a brief moment. They're both closed to new investors now, so aren't that plugged up with assets.
(As usual, I reserve the right to change my mind and sell at any time. Which I tend to do not all that infrequently.)
Cheers - AJ
P.S. @davidmoran, QM's neutral and QL is the same neutral strategy + up to 50% long as an addon. QM usually runs at sort of a bond-ish level of volatility (M* compares the up-down capture to the AGG), and it tends to pick up the slack when both stx and most bonds take a hit.

Yeah, I noticed that, as I was charting them ($10k growth) vs DSENX, which tripled SP500 that year --- but nothing like those two.
For the next year (last year), it was a rather different story, with DSENX near to doubling SP500, QLENX close to equaling SP500 and QMNNX about only half.
Wonder what happened in 2015.
Wish I could put some money in them. Sure are not a lot of articles.

@catch22 , I agree with you. Not my cup of tea either. I don't see how these funds can do anything but stunt the growth of an already well diversified portfolio. But on the other hand, building a portfolio is a personal thing and if they bring more risk-level comfort to some, then that's the AQR buyers market.

As I wrote above, Mike, you might want to check QL and QM in the near-zero return year of 2015 if you think comfort is all those funds can do:
VFIAX (S&P 500): +1.36
VBMFX (core FI): +0.30
VWEHX (hy FI): -1.40
QLENX +16.79
QMNNX +17.43
Since inception in mid-2013: $10k = $18,815 QLENX, $16,764 VFIAX, with QLENX holding on average about 50-60% long exposure to the equity market.
None of this of course means that all of their funds will do well; my point is that dismissing them only on the basis of what people think they are and do is potentially a mistake.

What I look at first (and I figure pretty much everyone looks at first) is what index is being tracked. "Similar" is a vague term. I wouldn't call the S&P 1500 "similar" to the S&P 500, or VOO "similar" to VTI. Likewise, I wouldn't call the EAFE index (900+ stocks, $16B mean average cap) similar to the EAFE IMI index (3,000+ stocks, $5B mean average cap). But those are what the article says are similar.
After figuring out which index I want, I look at costs, all costs. That includes spreads, expense ratios, and to a lesser extent tracking error. Spreads relate to liquidity, but liquidity of an ETF is more than just the volume (in number of shares) traded daily identified in the article.
Vanguard, "Understanding ETF Liquidity and Trading: Average daily trading volume is only a small part of an ETF’s total liquidity profile."
The article says that "Well-known funds such as SPDR S&P 500 (SPY) and SPDR S&P MidCap 400 ETF (MDY) weren't changed for the same reasons EEM still exists."
Maybe. But with these funds, there's more to the story. S&P 500 index funds exist not only for traders and institutional investors (the target audience given for EEM hanging around), but because retail investors buy the sizzle, the familiar name.
About a decade ago, Vanguard worked with MCSI in designing indexes that could be tracked better, with lower turnover and better tax efficiency. Vanguard promoted funds based on these indexes, including VLACX / VV . Yet it kept VFINX around. When I questioned a Vanguard financial planner why he recommended VFINX over VLACX, I didn't seem to get an answer much beyond a couple of basis point difference in costs. The main reason appeared to be familiarity, i.e. sizzle.
There's yet another reason why SPY and MDY won't be changed. They use an archaic unit investment trust structure. This has the cost disadvantage of cash drag (underling dividends cannot be invested by the fund but must be distributed quarterly to investors). Given their structural disadvantage, they're not good candidates for cost reductions.
Vanguard: What are the Five Etf Structures?

I'll stay with the 3 funds listed previous for a 3 time periods view. We don't have any money directed to this area (AQR offerings); but an interesting study, none the less.
--- Jan. 2010 - Jan. 2012. Brief background. Euro/Japan still attempting to define and refine monetary adjustments after the market melt. Many whipsaws in Euro markets (you didn't forget Greece did you?). The BIG one (albeit short lived reactions) was the downgrade by S&P of the debt quality of the U.S. in July, 2011. The equity sector(s) hit in July, 2011can be observed here, too; represented by FSPHX.
http://stockcharts.com/freecharts/perf.php?AQMIX,FSPHX,EDV&l=0&r=505&O=011000
--- 2015, year. Bond farts in this year, particular late spring through the summer.
http://stockcharts.com/freecharts/perf.php?AQMIX,FSPHX,EDV&l=1254&r=1501&O=011000
--- 1 year chart to date
http://stockcharts.com/freecharts/perf.php?AQMIX,FSPHX,EDV&n=248&O=011000
At least with AQMIX, I do not find an advantage for their methods and a 1.8% E.R.
Okay, got to get to chores while the sun is still shining through.
Catch

Here's a comparison of fund family stats for AQR and Vanguard, keying on Mr. Rekenthaler's recent article ... AQR has fared pretty well since inception, especially given most of its funds are non-index (click image to enlarge, ASC means All Share Classes, OSC means Oldest Share Class):

Appears that many of the AQR funds are more suited to a down or bear market function.
Take care,
Catch

@Catch, or a flat market, or just generally going for the worthy objective of good risk-adjusted return. I've held the long-short and market-neutral equity funds (QLENX and QMNNX, both closed to new investors now) at some level for ~ 2.5y, and for the most part, they've worked on a risk-adjusted return basis. But, I can never predict with any certainty what they're doing and why any given day, week, or month.
Look at those two in calendar 2015 for the best example of what they can do for the portfolio.
Re: AQMIX, I dunno if there's any managed futures strategy I'd ever try out again.
Cheers, AJ
P.S. Not sure about the funds that are still open, but the two I own had low initial minimums at Fido in retirement accounts.

FYI: In 1989, Morningstar, Inc., an advisory service, issued a strongly worded and unusual recommendation to its clients who had placed money with a firm then called the Steadman Funds (later known as the Ameritor Funds). “We urge you to cut your losses and get out,” Morningstar counseled. Doubtless, some investors heeded this advice. Many couldn’t, though, because they were dead
Regards,
Ted
https://longreads.com/2017/11/09/ameritor-dead-mans-fund-charles-steadman/
LA Times 1/4/98 Chuck Jaffe Article
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/jan/04/business/fi-4852
Forbes 8/23/99 Article:
https://www.forbes.com/forbes/1999/0823/6404124a/

Ben. Just for record, we addressed your ZEOIX comment above here:
https://www.mutualfundobserver.com/discuss/discussion/comment/95497/#Comment_95497

Just added metrics to screen for "Out of Step Twos" with MFO Premium MultiSearch tool (click to enlarge)...

Just added metrics to screen for "Terrific Twos" with MFO Premium MultiSearch tool (click to enlarge)...

The Morningstar link (when I click on the funds) appears briefly, then I get an "error" message. Same thing happens when I try to look at the "quote" pages directly from Morningstar. Poop! ...Just looked at them via Google Finance. They want a $50,000.00 minimum to get in. They're not operating that fund for the likes of me.

It's the quality of the business much more than covenants that provide protection to bond holders. You're already giving up lots of protection by investing in junk - the entire company may be shaky, or these may simply be very junior bonds, the first to default if the company later develops problems.
Here's a background paper by Loomis Sayles (admittedly written at the tail end of that 33% covenant-lite junk bond period, as opposed to the current 70% environment). Its headline states clearly that what matters is credit quality. The text goes on to explain what covenants can and cannot do in terms of protection.
https://www.loomissayles.com/internet/InternetData.nsf/0/0BF67A378755F21085257B5000566A43/$FILE/CovenantLitePaper.pdf
(Remember too, that Meridith Whitney predicted a massive run of defaults in munis, which she later clarified to include "technical defaults", i.e. minor breaches of covenants; for the most part real money wasn't affected.)
LS writes that "As it turned out, covenant-lite loans did relatively well versus covenant heavy loans over the course of the global financial crisis [see graphic data in paper]. In fact, the [ratings] agencies admitted as much, but could not let go of the concern and warned that maybe next time it will be worse. Maybe, maybe not."
Gundlach continues to push his sector of the market (mortgage backed securities) without explaining the specific risks associated with the asset class that relate directly to changing interest rates:

“Buy things that people foolishly don’t understand, like mortgaged-backed bonds,” Gundlach advised.
“Get out of things, like investment-grade bonds, that people don’t understand ..."

Say what?

Let me take an "espresso shot" at this by sharing the research of Russel Napier. The last few minutes of this interview explains the historical problem of chasing yield, especially EM corporate debt (High Yield).
My paraphrasing his words:
When open ended funds, seeking a 5% yield for their client (the pensioner), invest in HY debt and that HY bond defaults on its obligation, the manager ends up having to sell something else to meet redemptions and/or cover the bad debt, the risk here is contagion (where a bad asset impacts and spreads to "less bad" assets). Something small can have a very big impact on the larger whole.

I will also link a longer presentation that is a bit "noisy" at the start of the video so fast forward through the introduction to the start of his presentation.
Much like we have come to know words like "Quantitative Easing" and "Austerity", Mr Napier discusses the next possible financial tools still left in the tool box such as "Financial Repression" and "Macro-prudential Regulation".

The subject here reads like Goldilocks test results. The overall thought here is related to the MFO junk bond link in PART 2.
PART 1: Once upon a time, there was a little girl named Goldilocks. She went for a walk in the forest. Pretty soon, she came upon a house. She knocked and, when no one answered, she walked right in.
At the table in the kitchen, there were three bowls of porridge. Goldilocks was hungry. She tasted the porridge from the first bowl.
"This porridge is too hot!" she exclaimed.
So, she tasted the porridge from the second bowl.
"This porridge is too cold," she said
So, she tasted the last bowl of porridge.
"Ahhh, this porridge is just right," she said happily and she ate it all up.
How can we trust Goldilock's assessment of hot, cold and just right? What is the baseline, how does she compare with a peer group of porridge temperature testers?
PART 2: Now. A recent link here (not directed at you @Ted , but the article author)
https://www.mutualfundobserver.com/discuss/discussion/36721/u-s-junk-bond-funds-post-4th-biggest-week-of-outflows-ever
--- relative to the article:
.....would be nice if these data folks related the money values relative to 1992 or whatever time frame they choose to a "percentage" of total values involved; as to have a reference point for now.
What is this $4.4 billion withdrawal in terms of total monies in the HY sector? And how does this relate to 1992 values?
Oh, well; reader beware, eh?
GOSH, couldn't resist: All data believed accurate.
---U.S. high yield bonds outstanding value, July, 2017
$1.5 Trillion
So, HY outflows at $4.4 billion were .29% of total value, yes? Is this going to blow up the HY bond area and take equities with it.......???
PART 3: As to the .29% sell off/withdrawals in the HY sector; this could be similar to my telling the lady down the street who was born in 1925, that the St.Gaudens,1925-D, $20 gold piece presented to her on her birth day, by an uncle, recently declined in value by .29%; but that she should not be too concerned, as the worth of the coin was still acceptable.
https://www.ebay.com/itm/1925-D-ST-GAUDENS-20-NGC-MS-65/172873495315?hash=item2840103313:g:CvQAAOSwIdpZwVnz
NOTE: By reading this far into this write, you have electronically signed my "hold harmless" agreement regarding content and accuracy; as this document was formalized while under the influence of OTC head cold medicine.
Comments, corrections or suggestions wholly accepted.
Summary: I'm just asking for a bit of proper reporting, i.e.; junk bond outflows.
End of whine !!!
Thank you.
Catch

Thank you David. You highlighted Alambic Small Cap Value Plus Fund ALAMX. Alambic is another California-based shop. A quant shop. Each of its four young funds have outperformed out of the gate (click image to enlarge) ...