My family's never lost money in a MMF either, though my father was an early adopter of Reserve Fund when it was the only game in town.
At the same time, I remain cognizant of the risks (small but nonzero), which is why I expect compensation for the risk. That's why I've suggested keeping taxable cash in 1% bank accounts until MMF yields improve.
But for brokerage- or fund-based IRAs, where moving money to and from bank accounts is problematic, I've pointed to VMMXX and FZDXX. They hit a reasonable balance between risk (small, nonzero), yield (about 0.5%), and convenience. Especially for IRAs where one likely keeps little in cash.

Wow, Hancock Horizon Funds - never heard of them, I'm impressed!
I do think that the heyday of the regional funds was the late 90s or so (the era from which my links came). "Regional stock funds are becoming more popular in the mutual fund industry." Washington Post, March 2, 1998.
If you thought the Golden Gate Fund (focused on the Bay Area) was a bit too narrow, how about Gateway Cincinnati Fund (closed 2003)? P&G and what else?
The funds that hung around for some time did so by broadening their mandates - Franklin Calif. Growth reduced its regional exposure from 80% to 50% before getting rid of it. Safeco NW played games to keep Boeing after it moved its headquarters to Chicago (which I guess makes it fair game for Mairs & Power).
So finding any fund actually focuses on regional companies (as opposed to giving brownie points, i.e. "some emphasis") these days really does impress.
That said, I think that NY Ventures is stretching it a bit - it's more NY because of its name than its portfolio.
Looking at NYVTX (it holds only 57 stocks), the ones in the Northeast I see are :
#5 JPM (Chase)
#8 UTX (United Tech. CT)
#10 AXP (Amex)
#11 BK (Bank of NY Mellon)
#18 PX (Praxair CT)
#31 CB (Chubb NJ)
#32 TYC (Tyco Int'l - US operations HQ in NJ)
#32 DGX (Quest Diagnostics NJ)
#33 CFG (Citizens Financial Group, RI)
#36 PCLN (Priceline CT)
#40 (L Loews)
#43 MCO (Moody's).
Even if I missed a couple, it's hard to consider this a northeast fund.
Kudos on Hancock Horizon, A for effort on the rest.

Separate discussions --- whether the feel of the Midwest starts a few miles east of the Ohio border, and what if anything accounts for M&P performance deltas, such as they are.
Of course start points matter. From beginning of 1980 MAPOX underperforms DODBX and FPURX while outperforming (significantly) 50-70% equity allocation criterion, while beginning at the end of 1980 makes it closer to a tie.
As an owner I read their prospectus many times, and yes, including ND. The 'better idea' thing was always leaned on pretty lightly. (The way other fund families like to talk about being sort of out of it [GLRBX].)
My bond query was at least partly tongue in cheek, but I did figure you might well do the digging.
Jack Kennedy often quipped that WDC was a city of 'Southern efficiency and Northern charm.'

This exchange about what constitutes the midwest is sort of humorous, given that funds invest based on economics, not political lines. The midwest is whatever the fund says it is, no more, no less.
M&P doesn't even say it focuses on the midwest. It says "some emphasis is given to the ... Upper Midwest, ... which the Adviser "considers to be the states of Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota and Wisconsin". Not even Indiana. As always, read the fine, um, prospectus.
As far as the Census Bureau's definition of regions goes (which seems to be what some people here are alluding to), this is the same definition that calls Maryland a southern state. That's not what I was taught in school (i.e. that DC was situated between the northern states and the southern states), nor does it match what most people think, according to a (not too scientific) 538 poll. Only 6% of self-identified Southerners agreed that MD is part of the south.
Regarding the performance of MAPOX: What explains the difference in decades long performance (relative to respective categories) between MAPOX and MPGFX? Keep in mind that these funds were ostensibly managed by the same people. Were they keeping their best equity ideas for the balanced fund (that doesn't seem likely, but I haven't researched), or was the relatively better performance of MAPOX due to its bond sleeve?
Assuming the latter (IMHO a good assumption until justifiably questioned), it's fair to look to that bond portfolio. There are two issues here: (1) how regional is this part of the portfolio really, and (2) how has the fund performed in different bond markets.
To the first question: while MAPOX is currently heavily into corporates, that waxes and wanes. M* writes: " On the fixed-income side, the managers own a mix of U.S. government agency debentures and investment-grade corporate bonds. The allocation has varied over time." In 2006 (per annual report) 59% of its bonds were US bonds (mostly Fannie Mae), not regional. Even today (semi-annual report released this week), with 90% of its debt in corporates, there doesn't seem to be a disproportionate amount in the states named by the fund.
Sure, lots of FoMoCo debt (about 1.4% of the corporates). But 40% of the corporate debt is in financials, and you'd be hard pressed to find a M&P regional company there. Okay, there's Kemper (Ill.) with a tad under 1% of the corporates. Berkshire Hathaway hails from Nebraska, not part of the fund's regional focus. Then you have more financials listed under industrials, like GE Capital (also sold recently), and Dun and Bradstreet (NJ). Big IT creditors include Intel (bigger than FoMoCo), Symantec, Autodesk, Fidelity Nat. Info Services (Fla.) and Western Union, all about 0.8% of corporate debt. Then there's midwest Motorola, with about 0.6%.
To the second question - how did the fund perform if we decompose by bond market? Using 1/1/80 as a starting point for the bond bull (rounding to decades), MAPOX underperformed DODBX by 13% cumulative. Perhaps with the expected return of a bond bear market, MAPOX will once again outperform. Maybe not, since those pre-1980 managers are long gone. As Dan Fuss notes, he's one of the few bond managers around who's had experience in rising interest rate markets.
In short, it doesn't appear that M&P gets any particular benefit on the equity side from its narrow (6 state) regional bias. On the bond side, it's hard to see that there even is a regional bias. Regardless, it hasn't outperformed your reference fund of choice since the 70s, when the bond market was very different. None of this detracts from M&P; it just doesn't support the theory that M&P (like Ford) has a better idea.

Like other active portfolio managers, Artisan Partners Asset Management has suffered: Money has flowed out of its funds, earnings have declined, and its stock has fallen 26% this year, to a recent $26, sharply below its 2014 high of $70. That has given Artisan shares a fat yield of 9% but has also raised questions about whether it can sustain its dividend.
Founded in 1995, Artisan (ticker: APAM) went public in 2013. Today, it has 14 mutual funds investing in U.S. and foreign stocks and bonds. Ten funds have a coveted...
https://google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=Finding+9%25+Yields+in+a+Beaten-Down+Asset+Manager

I was thinking about buying this fund early in the year. Fortunately, I never pulled the trigger. YTD performance is in the 98th percentile (only up 0.26% compared to S&P 500 up 8.27%), 1 year performance is in the 95th percentile, and 3 year performance has fallen to the 66th percentile. Prior to 2016, this fund had stellar returns. Since 2011, the fund beat the S&P 500 every year and was at or near top percentile wise for each year. It's value or contrarian style has hurt it lately.
My question is: would this actually be the right time to buy this fund? It holds stocks that as a whole have not gone up with the rest of the market this year, so should be undervalued and may be more likely to outperform if the market is deemed to be expensive or remains flat and people look for bargains. The fund has had an excellent history prior to this year, so surely the managers know what they are doing and have just run into a rough patch. Or is this a case where one should stay away from this fund, as it has finally lost its magic and might not get it back, like other funds have in the past.
I'm also curious if any current SMVLX owners have become frustrated with this fund and are thinking of selling it, or if anyone has recently sold it because of it's poor performance over the last year.

Gosh, I don't know. Does the following go your case's way, since it includes bonds?
From 1961 inception to 1/1/2000, MAPOX beats DODBX in $10k growth by $59k, $446k+ to $387k+. 15% cumulative, maybe not a lot for almost 40y, but not nothing.
So regional bonds too, not just stocks?
From inception to date, almost 55y, it's been 8% edge to MAPOX (cume).
Somehow I don't think anyone has ever thought of M&P like Safeco or Golden Gate. Maybe they shoulda.

Because of, or in spite of, localization?
From M, via SFGate: The main argument for regional funds is that managers gain an edge by being close to the companies they own.
But from CS Monitor (1998): Many years ago, regional investing might have made sense. ... But with the proliferation of data sources and telecommunication, I can be just as close to a company in California as I can to one down the street.
It went on to observe that out of thousands of stock funds, there were only "about two dozen [regional funds] (whose combined assets total $3.3 billion)" . At least back then I could name a handful of those two dozen - Safeco NW, Franklin Calif. Growth, M&P Growth, and Golden Gate Fund GGFDX (SF Bay Area). Name any regional fund management company today other than M&P. I can't (which doesn't mean they don't exist).
All these regional funds falling by the wayside. I think that qualifies as odds stacked against the genre. Which brings me back to my lead sentence - is M&P doing well because of, or in spite of, its regional focus?
Most might indeed agree that M&P trounced the odds decade after decade. I suppose it did in the sense that it managed to survive while most regionals didn't. But in terms of performance, it was decidedly mediocre for the three decades between 1970 and 2000. (From 1/1/70 to 12/31/99, a $10K investment in MPGFX grew to $349K, compared to $345K for the average LCBlend fund, and $513K for the S&P 500.)
This lends credibility to the thesis that it is the fund's management and not its regionality that had given it more recent success.

no, it's crap:
https://azizonomics.com/2013/06/01/the-trouble-with-shadowstats/
or just google
shadowstats bullshit
and read the next several hits
also
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/19/always-inflation-somewhere/
Whatever you "used", just doublecheck this:
What $10k bought in 1979 costs $33k today, $29k if you start in 1980. Say in your own case inflation was higher, so $10k from whatever start point you like is now $40k. VOO growth with divs reinvested went from $10k at the end of 1979 to $512k --- well over a half-mil.

Here are the inflation adjusted returns for VFINX since 1986 (last column):

I used this.
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=27&year1=1988&year2=2016
If VFINX was $27 in '88 it's 2016 value would be 54.92 and now it is 201. So it increased 4X in CPI adjusted number. But if you used the $27 it looks like 8X.
Maybe the official CPI is low. Should it be double?
http://www.shadowstats.com/alternate_data/inflation-charts

IMHO it's all about culture and attitudes, not state lines. How do people act, vote, shop? By these metrics, I tend to view cities like Buffalo and Pittsburgh as midwestern cities. And then there's how people talk:
Pop vs. Soda (vs. Coke): http://www.popvssoda.com/
More to the point on regional funds: Who remembers Franklin California Growth Company (still FKCAX)? It gave up its 80% California growth mandate in 2002 (reducing it to 50%, i.e. majority), and then in Oct 2004 dropped California from its mandate altogether.
I figure if a growth fund can't make it in tech-rich, large economy, California (note that Franklin Templeton is based in California), then the odds are stacked pretty high against funds in smaller regions.
Northwest-focused funds gave up the ghost also around the same time. I was familiar with Safeco Northwest, which expanded into Canada (BC) in 2002, and gave up the regional focus entirely Oct. 2003.

@Paul_Katseff, thanks for the contributions! It appears both articles are pushing IBD's Comp rating so I wondered if you have any statistics about how well those ratings have done over time and in different markets? The articles say one should look for stocks with a rating of 95 or higher. If someone had bought all stocks that reached that rating how would they have done? What's the expected holding period or the trigger to sell?
I'd also suggest being careful with data from Morningstar. In the second linked article your table includes the top 10 funds since the June 27th lows but it doesn't include Primecap Odyssey Aggressive Growth (POAGX), which I believe had a 17.5% return from 6/27-8/28, or Primecap Odyssey Growth (POGRX), which I believe had a 16.1% return during that period. I only checked 5 or 6 funds that I own or keep track of and know have done well so I wouldn't be totally surprised if M* left out a few others too but who knows, maybe I just got lucky.

A chart comparing an investment starting in 1980, for example, should have an inflation component to it to reflect the decline in purchasing power.

Here are the inflation adjusted returns for VFINX since 1986 (last column):

@DanHardy
>> A chart comparing an investment starting in 1980, for example, should have an inflation component to it to reflect the decline in purchasing power.
Not quite following the point. Inflation "applies" to all investments. What $10k bought in 1979 costs $33k today, $29k if you start in 1980.
While VOO went from $10k at the end of 1979 to $512k --- well over a half-mil.
That's why we all invest.

Look back at the last 5y of, say, DVY or TWEIX and check both the size and the number of the "corrections."
You can wait a long unprofitable time waiting for a supposedly better moment to invest.

I always keep the Japanese experience in the back of my mind. And many charts do not take into account inflation. A chart comparing an investment starting in 1980, for example, should have an inflation component to it to reflect the decline in purchasing power.
http://finance.yahoo.com/quote/^N225/?p=^N225

Look back at the last 5y of, say, DVY or TWEIX and check both the size and the number of the "corrections."
You can wait a long unprofitable time waiting for a supposedly better moment to invest.

I like MCRDX for bonds and VMVFX for stocks. Both reviewed here in past issues. Read the analysis and do as you wish. I did buy PONDX recently, however, which many would view as a "sell" signal.
If you are in your early sixties, unless you have serious health issues, your life expectancy is probably over 25 yr (if you exercise regularly). Send your nephews and nieces clever cards for their birthdays and hold on to your money.

"If a shareholder closes an account in the Fund due to redemption or exchange, the shareholder will no longer be able to make additional investments in the Fund."
If I have two accounts in the fund (say an IRA and a taxable account) and I close the taxable account, I should still be able to add investments to the IRA - even though I was a shareholder who closed an account.
The more interesting question is whether I could take then a distribution in kind from that IRA and open up a new taxable account with those shares. Likewise, could I do a Roth conversion in kind, if I originally had no Seafarer Roth IRA?
These are not merely hypotheticals. I've gone through these exercises with Vanguard and with T. Rowe Price. At Vanguard, no new account means no new account, even for in-kind transfers. T. Rowe Price is happy to move shares around for you, even if it means opening new accounts for a closed fund.
I've even had problems (ultimately resolved) converting from investor shares to institutional shares in a third family's closed fund. Also relevant here, since Seafarer just dropped the min on its institutional class shares from $100K to $25K.

The closing was hidden in the Summary Prospectus:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/915802/000139834416017861/fp0021369_497k.htm
Excerpt:
Purchase and Sale of Fund Shares
The Fund offers two classes of shares, an Investor Class and an Institutional Class, each of which is offered by this Prospectus. The minimum initial investment for the Investor Class is $2,500 for all accounts, except that the minimum initial investment is $1,000 for retirement and education savings accounts and $1,500 for automatic investment plan accounts. The minimum initial investment for the Institutional Class is $25,000 for all accounts. Investors generally may meet the minimum initial investment for the Institutional Class by aggregating multiple accounts within the Fund. If a shareholder invests in the Fund through a financial adviser or intermediary, the minimum initial investment for the Institutional Class may be met if that financial adviser or intermediary aggregates investments of multiple clients to meet the minimum. The minimum investment for subsequent purchases is $100 for both share classes.
Effective immediately after market closing on September 30, 2016, the Fund will close to most new investors. The Fund will be available for purchase only by the following investors:
· Existing shareholders of the Fund;
· Financial advisors, consultants and discretionary programs with existing clients in the Fund (i.e., they can continue to add new clients in the Fund);
· Retirement plans or platforms with participants who currently invest in the Fund;
· Model-based programs with existing accounts in the Fund; and
· Employees of Seafarer and their families.
Please note that some intermediaries may not be able to accommodate the conditions set out above.
If a shareholder closes an account in the Fund due to redemption or exchange, the shareholder will no longer be able to make additional investments in the Fund.
The Fund reserves the right to make exceptions to any action taken to close the Fund, or limit inflows into the Fund, and delegates such authority to Seafarer.

@MFO Members: For those of you who missed Chuck Jaffe's interview of Andrew Foster, on Auguat 25. 2016.
Regards,
Ted
Scroll & Click On Download)
http://moneylifeshow.com/highlights.asp