>> Small caps are wildly overvalued and will likely lead the next decline. I would never advise initiating or adding to SC exposure here.
I have been reading this every six months or so for the last several years. Just graphed PENNX, FSCRX, WEMMX, and GABSX 10/9/8/7/6/5/4/3/2/1y to calm myself down.

Hi Guys,
Based on my earlier posts, I’m sure many of you recognize that I’m extremely skeptical about market forecasting. There are too many moving parts and unknown interactions.
When Alfred Cowles 3rd asked the question in 1932 “Can Stock Market Forecasters Forecast ?” he answered in the negative. I share similar doubts. My doubts magnify as the forecasting time horizon expands.
So I don’t respond too aggressively when a market wizard projects returns for next year. Barron’s annual roundtable forecasting party amply demonstrates the popularity of the ritual. It’s reliability is highly suspect. Here is a Link to an article that addresses “Forecast Fatigue”:
http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2012/01/12/forecast-fatigue-whats-the-value-of-annual-market-predictions/
As you know, Jeremy Grantham has been a member of the forecasting crowd since about 2000. Unlike most everyone else, he makes a forecast for a 7 year period. His original forecasts were for a 10 year time horizon so he has shortened his foresight timeframe.
His most recent projections are scary indeed for US equities. If you believe he possesses the Wisdom of Solomon you might completely abandon the US equity marketplace and embrace foreign holdings. Here’s a Link that provides a summary chart:
http://www.gurufocus.com/news/248085/gmo-7year-asset-class-forecast--getting-bullish-on-emerging-markets-january-2014
Most folks consider Grantham to be the gold standard in terms of forecasters. I’m likely swimming against the prevailing strong tide, but I’m not convinced.
He did not generate especially sterling results for the 7 year period just ending. I completed specific analyses as an acid test. Way back in July 2007, he projected real negative returns for both large cap and small cap US stocks similar to today’s predictions.
Adjusting for inflation (Grantham makes real return estimates), his 2007 projections for June 30, 2014 become marginally positive, but well below US Treasury expectations. His forecasts were definitely off-target. Stocks outperformed bonds in this 7 year period by a considerable percentage, and small caps marginally outperformed large caps which also contradict the 7-year predictions. Yes, forecasting is certainly hazardous to a reputation.
Although in this instance I take issue with the trustworthiness of his specific long range projections, I do admire the process embedded within Grantham’s work, his meta-market modeling approach, his work ethic, and the man himself. He is both smart and humble, a rare set of qualities in the investment guru world.
Allow me to take liberties with Shakespeare and reverse a few key words: “I have come here to (praise) Caesar, not to (bury) him”. I write to praise Jeremy Grantham, not to criticize him. He is a true giant and superstar in the investment community. When he speaks, I respectfully and intensely listen. A few times we part ways.
I am particularly fond of Grantham’s “10 Shakespearian Rules of Investing”. Here is a Link to a short summary of his rules followed by a Link to a quarterly Grantham letter that details them in the first 3 pages of his long letter:
http://www.businessinsider.com/jeremy-grantham-gmo-quarterly-letter-polonius-2012-2?op=1
http://www.gurufocus.com/news/163788/jeremy-granthams-q4-longest-quarterly-letter-ever
Jeremy Grantham is a true believer in the investment iron law of a regression-to-the-mean. So am I.
I especially like the closing section of his tenth rule, so I’ll repeat it here:
……..“On the other hand, if you have patience, a decent pain threshold, an ability to withstand herd mentality, perhaps one credit of college level math, and a reputation for common sense, then go for it. In my opinion, you hold enough cards and will beat most professionals (which is sadly, but realistically, a relatively modest hurdle) and may even do very well indeed.”
I believe many MFO members easily qualify by satisfying the attributes Grantham cited.
Good luck and Best Regards to all. Have a great summer.

I call " bullsh@t" on the claimed forward PE of the Vanguard offering. Small caps are wildly overvalued and will likely lead the next decline. I would never advise initiating or adding to SC exposure here.

@MarkM: Let's make a distinction between small cap overall, and small cap value.
When you say "Small caps are wildly overvalued", you may be referring to small cap stocks as a group, or especially small cap growth. iShares Russell 2000 IWM has a forward P/E of 19.63, versus the S&P 500 forward P/E of 17.01, per Morningstar. Vanguard S&P Small-Cap 600 Index etf VIOO has a forward P/E of 20.39. Vanguard Small Cap Growth etf VBK has a forward P/E of 25.09. Is that what you are referring to? iShares S&P Small-Cap 600 Value IJS has a forward P/E of 18.75.
iShares Russell 2000 Value IWN has a P/E of 17.51. That doesn't seem "wildly overvalued" compared to the stock market overall. iShares Russell 2000 Growth IWO has a P/E of 22.54. iShares Core S&P Total US Stock Mkt ITOT P/E 17.33
The Wall Street Journal lists the forward P/E of the Russell 2000 as 19.6; the S&P 500 as 16.58; and the Dow as 15.05. @MarkM: perhaps the Dow 30 suits you better, with a P/E of 15.05. Seems like a very reasonable P/E to me, and perhaps a place to put some money, on the eft DIA
Summary:
1. The overall stock market, the total market, has a forward P/E of roughly 17.3 to 17.4
2. Small cap growth has a forward P/E of roughly 22.5 to 25
3. Small cap overall (value plus growth) has a P/E of roughly 19.6 to 20.4
4. Small cap value has a P/E of roughly 16.65 to 17.5 to 18.75, depending on the source of the information. Don't have a great consensus on that one. Would need to study this more to get a better handle on why the figures vary so much.

What is going on at Third Avenue Value Fund does not inspire confidence. The old manager, Ian Lapey, is out with still no explanation or information. The new manager's start date I believe, was June 10th. Not much to go on. (Why does Jang Sung-taek keep coming to mind?)
The new manager, Chip Rewey, is new to Third Avenue. Who knows? One can only surmise, guess and assume.
My guess is simply that Ian Lapey got fired because Marty Whitman was disappointed in him or his performance, for some unknown reason or reasons. If Marty still makes these decisions, that is. Do we know?
I certainly have no criticism for anyone who decides to cut and run right now.
This is how I am handling it, and why.....
TAVFX is now on the shortest of short leashes. Currently, its YTD gain of 7.82% puts it in the 17th percentile in M*'s World Stock category, and it is in the 72nd percentile for the past 12 months. If and when the YTD percentile number becomes 51% or greater, I sell. On January 1, 2015 I switch to the 12 month percentile number.
That's the what. Here's my "why".
1. Inaction is always to be preferred over action, so it's time to just calm down and wait a little.
2. I have had this fund for many years, enjoy reading Marty's letters, and believe it offers a unique strategy that adds both safety and diversification (recent 70% peak to trough decline duly noted)
3. I learned from Janus Contrarian (JSVAX) that sometimes sudden management changes can lead to great results. The old manager the left for a bigger better deal I guess. It was disgusting at the time, but since the new manager started he has been absolutely kicking butt and taking names.
4. I asked rhetorically on M* board a while back "If I hold TAVFX until its 15-year percentile rank is below average, do you reckon I'll ever sell it?". Of course I don't know the answer to that question, and neither does anyone else. I hate to sell a fund that might end up being exactly what I am looking for in a fund -- above average over the long term.

@rjb112 Here is a GMO "white paper" on quality. If you can't open it (I have a registration at GMO.com) try googling 'Profits for the Long Run: Affirming the Case for Quality' by Chuck Joyce and Kimball Mayer. They lean towards corporate profitability, which they claim is predictable and safe. You could probably throw in cash flow and ROE as good proxy measures.

We believe, and have to date demonstrated, that the best ex-ante indicator of low forward absolute risk is found not by studying historical market price data, but through the study of corporate profits. This harks back to the way in which Ben Graham talked of risk. He argued that real risk was “the danger of a loss of quality and earnings power through economic changes or deterioration in management.”
Following this logic would argue for a portfolio constructed of companies with high and stable profits, which should, by controlling “real risk,” result in low and stable “price risk.” Hence one needs a framework for identifying future corporate profitability.
...
Standard orthodoxy such as the positive relationship between leverage and profitability is demonstrably backwards. Contrary to modern corporate finance theory, higher returns to corporations and equity holders result from unassailable corporate moats, not from corporate leverage. This is the world as described by Warren Buffett, not Modigliani-Miller.
At the end of the day, the returns (or lack thereof) earned by stock investors are entirely a function of the underlying corporate profits of the stocks held in a portfolio. The exchanges offer no more than a pass-through of earnings to investors. In the absence of earnings, there will eventually be abysmal returns and no dividends. If there are earnings, any price volatility will ultimately net out, delivering those earnings to investors with a long-term time horizon.
This argues strongly for a risk and investing framework focused on the survivability of corporate profits under any scenario. Companies with high and stable profits do not go bankrupt. Companies with exceptional profitability generate exceptional returns. Likewise, those with low profits will fare poorly

To take this back to the SCV discussion, because it wraps up the distinctions in the positions very neatly, compare this quote with MJG's last post:

Small size often makes the company more vulnerable to unexpected perturbations. Typically their product line is more focused and not as diverse as a Large firm. Another risk factor is that growing businesses are often not geography dispersed. Their marketing is regional, not international, so localized disturbances more directly impact their sales.
The accessible funding line for these smaller outfits is more fragile with lower reserves and less access to loans and at higher interest rates when they can be secured. Large companies have survived their growing phase and are more stable; smaller firms are more subject to business model failures and exogenous disruptions (a new competitor or invention) with bankruptcy a higher probability.

See how these two theories of outperformance are saying exactly opposite things?
VISVX has outperformed VFINX since inception. But small caps haven't over longer time frames (1979-present), and especially in the period from 1984-1999. They also fell much harder in 2008. I'm agnostic to why, but there is another side to this from what the financial orthodoxy says that is very compelling.
As to "quality" funds, I would suspect that the usual suspects are in play: VIG, MOAT, USMV, SPLV, VDIGX, SEQUX, PRBLX (I own), LEXCX, and BRK.B. I think some of the smart-beta folks might be coming up with "quality" oriented small cap funds. There are some small cap OEFs that seem to try to do this as well, like VVPSX, MSCFX, and Walthausen.
Thanks for the chance to ramble in this thread. I enjoyed it. Now back to Series 7 land.

FYI: This is a three page article, unfortunately the printer-friendly version of SFGate has not worked for some time.
Regards,
Ted
http://www.sfgate.com/business/networth/article/Motif-aims-to-disrupt-discount-brokers-mutual-5587094.php
Previous MFO Discussions Of Motif:
http://www.mutualfundobserver.com/discuss/search?Search=motif

FWIW, here the newest GMO 7 year forecast has U.S. Quality @ 2.3%, U.S. large cap @ -1.5%, and U.S. Small Cap @ -4.5% annual after inflation.
I'm also dubious of M*'s Vanguard figures because they only update by the quarter. IJS, which is updated daily lists a P/E of 18.75 vs. ITOT which has a P/E of 17.33.
Take with whatever grains of salt you like.

@mrdarcy or anyone else who knows: Can we get a clear, unambiguous definition of what GMO means by "U.S. Quality"? What mutual funds and exchange traded funds are there that focus on what GMO calls "U.S. Quality"? Note from above that U.S. Quality is not the same as U.S. large cap.
Also, I think GMO may be using the Shiller CAPE 10 price to earnings ratio to determine these expected 7-year returns. There are exchange traded funds and one mutual fund that specifically choose low Shiller CAPE 10 ratios. For example, Barclays ETN+ Shiller CAPE ETN CAPE ; also the exchange traded fund GVAL specifically chooses only countries that have low Shiller P/E ratios, and currently the portfolio has a P/E of 11.5 per Morningstar. Also DoubleLine Shiller Enhanced CAPE N DSENX

Some other views.
http://www.bogleheads.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=10&t=141809&newpost=2105689
Mona

There is an article in Pension Partners that examined trends and performance in Long/Short strategies over the past several decades and concludes that L/S strategies are a thing of the past. I've wondered that myself after viewing MFLDX's performance lately. I've cut and pasted the author's conclusions. If you are interested in reading the entire article, follow the link below.
http://pensionpartners.com/blog/?p=439
Author's conclusions:
1) The alpha-generating long/short equity strategy of the 1990’s and early 2000’s appears to be a thing of the past.
2) This is likely a function of increased competition in the space and an increase in correlation and lack of differentiation among individual equity securities.
3) Over time, the long/short strategy has essentially morphed into a lower beta, long-only product that has actually delivered negative alpha in recent years and shown an inability to protect capital during market declines.
4) While widely considered an “alternative” strategy because of the short side, investors should be questioning this label as long/short funds are behaving more and more like traditional equity investments. With a rolling correlation of over .90, it is hard to argue that they are providing any “alternative” other than a lower beta version of the S&P 500.
5) The increase in correlation to the S&P 500 over the years is likely due to herding and career risk as long/short managers appear unwilling to incur the risk of not participating in an up market. The lack of volatility and historic advance over the past two years has only accentuated this issue, with the now widespread belief that the only way to perform is with higher exposure to the market.
6) While many investors appear to be happy paying 2 and 20 for lower beta exposure, this would appear to be irrational behavior considering the relative ease at which one could replicate such an exposure at a reduced cost.
7) One such replication, consisting of a 50/50 portfolio of Utilities and Staples, has widely outperformed the long/short strategy in recent years with equivalent risk and a lower correlation to the market. While not nearly as exciting as a long/short fund with a story for each individual stock in their portfolio, this would appear to be a better option for many investors if what they seek is simply lower beta.
This analysis represents average performance and some might argue that there are still many long/short funds that have generated positive alpha over the years. I would agree that this is certainly true but would question the ability of most investors to pick such funds. Also, given the poor performance of long/short equity fund of funds in recent years, it does not appear that even professional investors have been successful in separating the wheat from the chaff.
After a 200+% gain for the S&P 500 from the March 2009 low, many long/short equity managers have naturally benefited with sizable gains. Before assigning credit to these managers for any “stock-picking” prowess, I would encourage investors to compare their results with a simple ETF portfolio of Utilities and Staples (the “Utilities/Staples Test”). The results may surprise you.
Happy investing,
Mike_E

FWIW, here the newest GMO 7 year forecast has U.S. Quality @ 2.3%, U.S. large cap @ -1.5%, and U.S. Small Cap @ -4.5% annual after inflation.
I'm also dubious of M*'s Vanguard figures because they only update by the quarter. IJS, which is updated daily lists a P/E of 18.75 vs. ITOT which has a P/E of 17.33.
Take with whatever grains of salt you like.

Everyone, many thanks for the wise words.
@heezsafe, you have steadied my wavering resolve. Yes, perhaps the glorious past returns wowed me and I hoped to get those, soon, but my rational reasons for buying it were not a dividend stream (I don't need that) but the opportunistic approach plus the visceral dislike for losing money. I think your approach is wise and I intend to imitate it: since I'm low on cash, I won't add more for now, but if the 10y tsy indeed goes to 2.25%, I'll add to SUBFX.
@rjb112, I have looked at FPNIX, and it seems like a fund that successfully delivers what it promises, but my hope with SUBFX is that it will not lose money even when the market moves against it, but that when it gets it right, it will have a higher upside than FPNIX. So far, as heezsafe pointed out, it has at least fulfilled the first half of its promise.
@STB65 If I understand RSIVX right, the manager does expect to be made whole at maturity, but since he goes as far out as 5 years, he may be down in a given year. I think it's a great fund, I've got a toehold in it, but since I want to be able to tap my bond funds for fresh cash in case of a stock market dip, RSIVX is probably not as good for me as SUBFX or FPNIX.

Hard to beat Bruce (BRUFX).

We should not hijack threads. Especially we shouldn't rub salt into the wounds of old bald farts in Texas who were not able to buy this fund and been rueing their fate for last 15 years

@Ted: Thanks for posting. I often get "locked out" when I try to access WSJ articles. The secret is finding the correct URL that allows access!
@kanmani: I subscribed to Hulbert's Financial Digest for many years, and followed the performance of a bunch of newsletters for a long period, including the one you are interested in.
NoLoad FundX was one of THE VERY best performers "forever". It was always on Hulbert's list of "The Best Performers" over 1 year, 3 years, 5 years, 10 years, 20 years, etc. It could do no wrong.
Then, as I posted above, the writers of the newsletter, Janet Brown 'and company', decided to carry out their strategy in a mutual fund, FUNDX....and I posted that FUNDX has lagged the S&P 500 over the past 10 years, 5 years, 3 years, 1 year!!
Success is fickle! You said you are "considering jumping into this."
You CANNOT know in advance if this newsletter is going to outperform or underperform the market. Repeat: You CANNOT know in advance........
That's the bottom line. The newsletter has enjoyed long periods of outperformance and long periods of underperformance. You might as well toss a coin........
I wouldn't bet the farm on this, unless you enjoy betting.
But the same can be said about any active mutual fund: You cannot know in advance if it will outperform or underperform the market.
What you CAN know is that a properly run index fund will come very close to the market return. Examples include VTSMX, VTI (the exchange traded counterpart), VXUS, Vanguard Total Intl Stock Index Inv VGTSX.
The WSJ article stated that "each of the three winners lagged behind the S&P 500 in more than half of the five-year periods since 1980."
So examine in advance what you would do if you went with the newsletter and invested according to it, and then went the next 5 years lagging behind the S&P 500. Most people would not have the 'faith' to continue with the newsletter and strategy. Most mere mortals would throw in the towel and find another investing methodology.
By the way, another of the 3 winning newsletters mentioned by Hulbert was the Prudent Speculator, edited by John Buckingham. He also has 2 mutual funds, VALUX and VALDX.
I see that while I have been typing, Charles has posted to this thread.
Have no idea what he said. I'm just going to hit "Post Comment" and find out afterwards.

Can you provide a link to the article? ("featured by Hulbert in today's Wall Street Journal"), or a copy and paste of the article.
I think you can learn a lot about the newsletter by studying FundX Upgrader, FUNDX.
The portfolio managers of the fund are the same people who write the newsletter in question, e.g., Janet Brown. The mutual fund carries out the strategy of the newsletter.
With FUNDX you are paying an extra 1.1% to have the newsletter writers enact their portfolio based on their newsletter. Plus you pay the individual funds' expense ratios, which you would pay anyway if you carried out the strategy on your own, by subscribing to the newsletter and not purchasing FUNDX. So Morningstar shows the expense ratio to be about 1.91%, but consider 1.1% to be the fee you pay the managers plus administration of the fund, and the rest is the expense ratios of the funds themselves.
I can share one bit of experience about the newsletter. Although I've never subscribed, years ago I came across a few issues of it. There are a lot of 'transactions', buys and sells. I think it would be relatively uncommon to have a month or two with no transactions. It is a very active portfolio of mutual funds. The strategy of the newsletter is to always be in the funds with the best momentum. When a fund in the newsletter performs poorly, they don't hang around and wait for that fund to turn around and rebound. After a certain period of time, it will be kicked out and replaced by a fund with good performance momentum.
The strategy is something to the effect of [don't quote me on this, I'm just giving you an estimate] ranking the performance of mutual funds over different time periods, such as 1 year, 9 months, 6 months, 3 months, 1 month. They have a weighting system to overweight more recent performance vs. 12 month performance.
I believe the newsletter had awesome returns [consistently beat the market] for many years quite some time ago. I also believe that the returns in more recent years has not been very good, underperforming the market.
I can tell you without a doubt that FUNDX had excellent returns on inception and for some time after that, and has had subpar returns for the past 5 and 10 years. FUNDX has underperformed the S&P 500 by 0.5% annualized for 10 years, and by 3.5% annualized for 5 years. Actually, FUNDX has underperformed the S&P 500 for the past 1, 3, 5 and 10 years, per Morningstar.
That also means the newsletter in question has also underperformed for those periods, because as I mentioned, the authors of the newsletter carry out the newsletter's strategy in this mutual fund.
Hope that helps.

@Ted He who hunts with the same dogs, and the same strategy, day after day, year after year, who becomes oblivious to changes in terrain and flora (and, more significantly, to changes in fauna), may one day be on safari and find he is no longer the hunter, but the prey. Good luck, Big Dog--- you know what they used to feed to the lions in the zoos, dontcha?
@expats I too entered into SUBFX last yr, in January, with a smallish sum, and have been feeding it as it moves around. To steady your wavering resolve, it might be helpful to revisit why you invested in this fund in the first place (do you remember?). Has it been managed as promised? Did you invest in it because it had an opportunistic approach + a visceral dislike for losing principle, or did you invest in it as an aggressive momentum play, that didn't play (it didn't promise the latter)? At some point, I'll stop feeding it and wait for it to pop again before feeding it further; or, if the 10y T goes to 2-2.25%, it's a buying op with its Treasury short. Otherwise, remember it is a total return bond fund, with few constrains on what it can/cannot hold, and what it can/cannot do to achieve this objective. It is not an income fund, they never promised us a dvd stream. Also, remember what it did last yr relative to others; it did o.k. So where's the beef?
p.s. re. RSIVX: if the stock market corrects in a major way, you are not under the impression that Sherman's HY bonds will not decline as well, simply because they are of shorter duration, are you?

@MJG: Very nice; thanks.
The forward P/E of the Vanguard Small Cap Value fund is 16.65
For the S&P 500 Index fund, it is 17.01
In terms of predicting the relative future performance, I guess that gives the small cap value index a slight edge. Of course there are a lot of other factors besides the forward P/E ratio, not the least of which is the accuracy of those forward earnings forecasts.
For me the bigger factor is that I have been fully invested for a long time. For me to invest in small cap value, I would have to sell current holdings to make the switch, and that involves both Federal capital gains tax, and a State tax in a tax-unfriendly State.
If you do the math, it's a difficult hurdle. $100 invested today becomes much less than $100 after both Federal and State taxes on the gains are removed. Then, even if the new investment has a higher percentage return than the old, that higher percentage is applied to a lower principal amount. Selling a total market index fund in order to purchase a small cap value fund is a dicey proposition, as is selling another mutual fund to do the same.

Checked with Yahoo finance. PRWCX appears to be the winner over the last (10 yrs.) It beat BUFBX by 12.75 % !! Will it's performance continue over the next 10 years? Your guess is as good as anybody.
Have a good weekend & lets move on.., Derf

From Multi-Search Tool...
Three conservative (VWINX, BERIX, GLRBX):

Three moderate (VWELX, PRWCX, MAPOX):

Seriously.
You're not seeing any of this?

If you're doing well, you're definitely doing well.
Do I think there's another 2008 tomorrow? No, but you see some overbuilding in things like hotels. There were a whole lot of hotel projects in major cities in 2007,too and many of them never happened.
You also had instances of hotels refinancing/taking on additional debt at the peak who got into issues in the years after when cash inflows could not service the debt. It's remarkable how many hotel projects there are in some major cities at this point. It's not people taking advantage after the bust, it's years later and you're seeing the rush. Maybe it's not Blackstone buying Hilton at the top, but feels a little like that.
Feels like the hotel industry is one big "Whocouldaknown?" Was there one hotel REIT that didn't drop (wholly or completely) the dividend in 2008?
This is a lovely chart:
http://finance.yahoo.com/echarts?s=BEE+Interactive#symbol=BEE;range=my
(nearly $25 in mid-2007 and dropped to less than a buck by early 2009. Has it come back? Absolutely, but still less than half the highs.)
"Go clean.
Go green."
Until the next downturn. No one has any long-term vision. Green does well with oil where it is. Oil drops, people forget about it.
"Everybody owns an i-something."
I wouldn't necessarily say that's a good thing. "Chicken in every pot, Iphone in every hand?"
"Innovations in health."
Any that are going to bring soaring costs down?
" even HELOCs."
Oh, good. Because there's evidence that people used those sensibly before.
Or, if you will, a gif response about HELOCs coming back:

"Refurbished bridges."
Maybe where you're living. I'd say the country as a whole wasted a huge opportunity during this period to focus on infrastructure.
"Packed stadiums"
http://msn.foxsports.com/mlb/story/attendance-down-not-just-at-miami-marlins-games-060513
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=87981
Concert ticket prices rise, sales fall.
"Construction of new homes."
Yet, first time buyers aren't there and what's primarily selling seems to be the higher end homes (Again, if you're doing well, you're doing very well.).
Stats on % change by price
http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user5/imageroot/2014/06/Schizo housing recovery May.jpg
Also, interesting that years ago people were scrambling to convert rentals into condos for sale at the top. Now, you have the reverse: people scrambling to convert condos into rentals. Story on CNBC the other day about a Florida situation where investors bought up the majority of a condo property, to the point where they could force a buyout of the remaining owners, many of whom bought at the top and would now be accepting less than half. You have rents soaring, because so many people can't buy for various reasons.
Again, I'm not saying another 2008 is around the corner. I'm simply saying, there's the feeling that when things do turn, it'll just be history repeating itself. Easy money boom, easy money bust and, to some degree, back at square one. It's not about creating anything sustainable, it's all about consumption. It's the easiest monetary policy in history and I'm not looking forward to when things eventually turn. I have the feeling that when the next crisis happens, it will be evident that few people learned anything from the last one.

@expatsp:Hi Ted, I'm very aggressive right now: about 85% equities, 10% bonds, 5% cash. Welcome to get off the porch and hunt with the big dogs.
Regards,
Ted