FKUTX +10.52%
FPPTX +3.91%
NEFZX +3.56%
Archaic

FKINX +5.04%
VGHCX +4.78%
MAPTX +3.92%
Sector rotation has been very interesting.

Hello,
My top three mutual funds (win, place & show) year-to-date (total return) are as follows:
JCRAX +7.21% … TOLLX +6.85% … and, FRINX +5.86%
My top three fixed income funds y-t-d (total return) are as follows:
NEFZX +3.56% … TSIAX +3.00% … and, LBNDX +2.98%
My top three equity funds y-t-d (total return) are as follows:
SVAAX +5.61% ... NBHAX +5.11% ... and, THOAX +4.36%
My top three hybrid funds y-t-d (total return) are as follows:
FKINX +5.04% ... PGBAX +5.00% ... and, HWIAX + 4.15%
My three worst performers are as follows:
CCMAX -4.52% ... MFADX -3.09% ... and, SPECX -1.88%
"These are mostly growth orienated type funds."
Portfolio y-t-d (total return) +2.40% (Lipper Balanced Index +1.32%)
Old_Skeet

I had some issues accessing the sight last night from about 11:50pm to 12:20am Pacific. Kept getting one of those cloudflare pages.

@Ted. Really good!
At heart of ragging debate these days, seems like.
Been going on for a while now...since probably 2011 until November. Resumed in 2012. And, of course, all the CAPE_Crusaders would have missed 2013 run up in US stock market, if they had timed their allocation based on P/E valuations.
I suspect CAPE_Crusaders would argue P/E valuation predictions are longer-term, based on following five-ten year returns. So, 2013 is just a blip here.
Another thing is that looking back at all the P/E plots, like Exhibit 1 below from Mr. Montier's paper, there have been many continuous years of "inflated" P/Es, like 50-60s and 80-90s. Would really hate to miss those years.

That said, though we've had pull backs, it's been a while since we had sustained period of "cheap" P/E, like the painful '70.
The conclusion then from all these folks is low expectations for real returns in foreseeable future, as summarized in GMO's latest forecast. (Site requires registration, but it is free...and void of pop-ups, etc...I highly recommend it.)

Hello Jed,
You might wish to take a look at FEBAX. I have linked it's M* report for your easy reference. It is a fund I have under review for number 52 in my portfolio and I favor it over SGENX due to its wider asset base and higher yield. I don't think you'll go wrong with the three that you have selected either. And, there is CAIBX by American Funds that might be a good choice too. And, check and see if TIBAX is available at Schwab.
http://quotes.morningstar.com/fund/f?t=febax&region=USA
Old_Skeet

Sorry for the late addition. Looks like the thread was closed by mutual consent of the participants. Inasmuch as conflict and vitriol often attract attention, I've skimmed the lengthy proceedings and can't help offering a couple thoughts - but hope to shy away from the divisive elements.
1. One comments: "These statistics strongly demonstrate the asymmetric upward bias to positive market rewards." Hmm ... I doubt we need to resort to statistical analysis for this audience to appreciate that point. Seems to me it's pretty much a given that over longer periods of time ownership of productive assets, including (but not limited to) equities, does provide better rewards to participants than will investments in fixed income - or for that matter hybrid investments with both equity-like and fixed income-like characteristics. (I hope I haven't muddied the original premise too much.) Suspect most of us first learned this important economic concept somewhere during our junior high school years, along with a strong indoctrination in all the other finer attributes of the "Capitalist" system. In its simplest form, it was explained to me thru the provocative question: "Would you rather own a company or lend your money to those who do?"
2. My own belief is that the increasing concentration of wealth in the hands of the very rich in this country and a string of Supreme Court rulings which will serve to strengthen their influence on the levers of government will likely assure for the foreseeable future the advantages accruing to the wealthiest, namely those who own and control what may loosely be termed "the means of production" (accomplished in a variety of subtle and not so subtle ways, including through bias embedded in tax codes, lax government "oversight" of corporations, labor laws and regulation, and retrenchment on "entitlement" spending). As investors, I think that's a salient point - regardless of political persuasion.
3. I have never understood the importance some place on distinguishing between income-producing assets and more growth oriented ones within the context of long term financial planning. The goal is grow our money at a steady and reasonably predictable rate. Right? While no plan is foolproof, I suspect that a well diversified portfolio containing growth stocks, income-producing ones, fixed income investments of varying duration and credit quality and some hard assets, including real estate, should do just fine over most time frames and likely provide a slightly higher rate of return which is not much more volatile than a strategy fully invested in income producing stocks. (Of course, for time frames shorter than 5-10 years, one should avoid most investments riskier than cash or cash equivalents.)
Thanks for the opportunity to comment on the above deliberations at such a late time. Regards

@JedClampett: I would go with SGENX, ranked #5 among world allocation funds by U.S. News & World Report.
Regards,
Ted
http://money.usnews.com/funds/mutual-funds/world-allocation/first-eagle-global-fund/sgenx
And of course Jed you know what's next. !
Ballad Of Jed Clampett: Flat & Scruggs:

chrisblade, I did exactly what you are thinking of doing. After performing my DD I decided it was a prudent thing to do. I know many people might think this is MF "collecting", but I view it as adding a little diversification to an area of the EM market that is, among other things, a little bit of the unknown.
I'm not sure how much you have invested in WAFMX (in % of portfolio terms) but currently have 3% in each WAFMX and MFMPX (LW) which is my absolute minimum % to invest in any given fund. I usually shoot for a 5% minimum, but the FM arena is a different animal.
I am comfortable with my 6% in FM and may add a couple of percent in the not-too-distant future; many might considers this aggressive and unwise, that is something only you can decide.
Good luck and profitable investing,
Matt

They didn't do a very good job with this list.
They left off VOO, the Vanguard S&P 500 ETF, with an expense ratio of 0.05%.
They also left off VTI, the Vanguard Total US Stock Market ETF, also with an expense ratio of .05%, even though they included the iShares Total US Stock Market ETF.
Schwab has really stepped up to the plate with some very low cost ETFs.
Looks like Schwab and Vanguard are the clear leaders in very low cost ETFs.

FYI: Copy & Paste 4/19/14: Beverly Goodman Barron's
Regards,
Ted
Investors have been wandering the fixed-income desert in search of yield for more than five years. While that time frame doesn't quite meet Biblical standards for long journeys, it still has taken people into risky territory. For investors in some high-yield bond funds, those risks could present quite a surprise.
High yield has been seen as a safe harbor for years. Default rates are at 1.7%, a five-year low. High-yield bonds are also often seen as immune to interest-rate risk: Rising interest rates typically signal a strengthening economy, which provides a better environment for companies with troublesome credit ratings. Yet, as my colleague Mike Aneiro points out in this issue's Current Yield column ("Managers Junk High-Yield Bonds"), many fund chiefs are dumping their high-yield bonds. Better to get out early than stick around until it's too late, they say. Should investors follow their cue?
Possibly. Investors in low-duration, high-yield bond funds might have taken on more risk than they realize. Duration is a complicated metric that measures a bond's sensitivity to interest-rate risk. Not to be confused with maturity—the point at which a bond comes due—duration is also expressed in years. The shorter a bond's duration (or the shorter a fund's average duration), the less its price will fall as rates rise.
Low-duration high-yield funds have been touted as the best of all worlds in recent years. There are 113 such funds, with $206 billion in assets. More than a quarter of that, $59 billion, has poured in over the past five years, from investors looking for yield, but hoping to minimize interest-rate risk.
But now these funds could have more interest-rate risk and even credit risk than investors realize.
Most high-yield bonds have a maturity of 10 years, but are callable in five. A company will call a bond—pay the debt in full—if it can issue new bonds with a lower coupon; perhaps its credit profile has improved, or interest rates have dropped. It's the corporate equivalent of refinancing your home when mortgage rates drop, or when your credit score improves enough to warrant a lower rate.
But as rates rise, issuers are less likely to call their bonds. And high-yield bonds are generally priced with the assumption that they'll be called. If they're not, and the issuer lets the bonds stay on the market until maturity, their duration increases significantly, making them more sensitive to future interest-rate increases, as well as some other problems, says Matt Conti, who manages the high-yield sleeve of Fidelity Total Bond fund (ticker: FTBFX). "Folks say there's not a lot of interest-rate risk, but anything that causes the market to go down could cause a problem," Conti observes. The benchmark Bank of American Merrill Lynch High Yield Master Index, he points out, currently has a duration of 3½ years, and yields 5%. If priced to maturity, instead of call date, the index's yield increases to 6%, and its duration extends significantly—to five years.
So a longer duration means prices are more likely to fall as rates rise. That's a problem for fund investors on two fronts: First, managers don't typically hold bonds to maturity; they're buying and selling constantly, which means their funds can lose money as prices fall. What's more, as bond prices slide, fund investors usually head to the exits, forcing managers to sell even more bonds at lower and lower prices. Funding redemptions also leaves managers short on cash they could otherwise use to pick up bargains as they materialize, or purchase newer bonds with higher coupons. "It forces a lot of selling at the worst possible time," says Bonnie Baha, manager of the DoubleLine Low Duration Bond fund (DBLSX), which has about 20% of its portfolio in junk bonds.
LONGER DURATION ALSO MEANS more credit risk, so whether you're in a dedicated high-yield fund or a general low-duration fund, look at the average credit quality and make sure the fund isn't overreaching. "A lot of funds stuff with junky, high-yield credits, thinking: 'What can go wrong? Default rates are low,' " Baha says. And while default rates are indeed low, the longer a bond's duration, the more time there is for something to go wrong. Baha looks for high-quality bonds that are teetering on the edge of investment grade; the fund has 26% of its $1.9 billion in assets in BBB-rated bonds, twice the category average.
Another clue that you may be facing a surprise: "If a fund's duration looks extremely low, say, one year, it's likely all bonds are being priced to call," Conti warns. "If rates rise, those durations will likely extend out."
Two good bets for investors focused on high-yield funds with shorter durations: The $14.2 billion BlackRock High Yield Bond (BHYAX), which yields 4.69% and has an average duration of 3½ years, and the $6.4 billion AllianceBernstein High Income (AGDAX), which yields 4.26% and has an average duration of 4¼ years. The latter is a multisector fund, which means that it can—and does—invest in bank loans, emerging-market debt, and other areas; 76% is in high-yield corporate bonds.

Even before fees ... the Foreign Large Cap group’s Median performance is negative relative to their appropriate benchmarks.

Except...
iijournals.com/doi/abs/10.3905/joi.2013.22.2.055#sthash.CZYMcp5y.q6D2AXaq.dpbs

This study finds that active management does possess selectivity skills. On the basis of risk-adjusted performance, the majority of international funds outperform their passive benchmarks. Persistence of performance is observed in few categories of international funds, and there are a number of categories where investors can earn superior returns by following contrarian strategies.

And just for @cman (as long as he's willing to pay for the article ;)):

Finally, this study offers trading strategies to retail investors who seek to invest in international funds.

I certainly appreciate MJG's posts for their value added, and I have thoughts on why indices are outperforming recently and what a proper "long period of time is", but at this point I feel like there is little point in this argument, when the research itself is contradictory and every side just claims "Truth."
Far better to return to process, imo.

Hi Guys,
The Meketa Investment Group (MIG) does first-class internal financial research. That’s not exactly unique but allowing individuals free access to this fine work sets them somewhat apart. Thank you MIG for entrée to your many informative White Papers.
Here is the generic Link to the MIG website immediately followed by a direct Link to their White Paper listing:
http://www.meketagroup.com/
http://www.meketagroup.com/investment-research-white-papers.asp
In this instance, I direct your attention to their most recent addition titled “ Active Manager Performance: Alpha and Persistence”. MIG only releases a few of these reports annually; it reflects the care that is exercised in their preparation.
Please examine this active fund manager update. The MIG team made a special effort to identify a complete listing including defunct entities, to cull that expanded database, to properly classify funds into their real categories, and to meticulously evaluate their Alpha/Persistence performance metrics.
The MIG team made a valiant effort to establish Alpha winners and the persistency characteristics of these rare winners for 6 fund classifications: core bonds, high yield bonds, domestic large cap equities, domestic small cap equities, foreign large cap equities, and emerging market stocks.
The findings are not shocking. I’ll summarize the most pertinent findings without further comment. In general, results are presented as each groups Median (not average) performance against a relevant benchmark. Here are MIG’s primary conclusions.
Even before fees, the core bond and the Foreign Large Cap group’s Median performance is negative relative to their appropriate benchmarks.
After fees are subtracted, the “median level of fees negated any (stock picking) advantage” for all 6 categories.
In an expansion of the US large and small cap groups into growth and value classes, small cap value equity managers made a statistically significant positive stock picking contribution.
The data were examined as a function of time. In some categories, active management made a positive difference during market meltdown plunges.
More recently, active managers have found it more challenging to outdistance benchmarks. The competition is more evenly matched and active manager investment edges are disappearing
Performance persistence among active fund managers is nonexistent. MIG concluded that “managers who outperformed over a 5-year period were no more likely to outperform over the next 5-year period than any other manager selected at random”.
The overarching final MIG conclusion is that “identifying managers that will perform ex-ante by relying on past performance alone will prove to be a fool’s errand”.
These findings need not be the death knell for active fund management. The inclusion of the word “alone” in the final conclusion is a critical qualifier. Other factors do enter into the fund manager selection equation. Keeping costs down will surely increase the outperformance odds. Situational awareness can also improve the odds of a successful selection process.
The referenced article has a pile of useful historical data and charts (especially in the appendix section). There are many lessons to be learned from this work Once again, please read the White Paper.
Best Regards and Happy Easter.

After a little investigation (emphasis on little) I have come up with a short list of low turnover equity funds:
Most Index Funds
Equity-centric Funds with less than 25% turnover:
LEXCX (0% turnover)
FAIRX(16%)
FLPSX(11%)
LCEIX(9%)
USAWX(16%)
VGHCX (21%)
ROGSX(15%)
TWEBX(8%)
FRUAX(5%)
DDVIX(6%)
NSEIX (22%)
ACSDX (12%)
LMPFX (2%)
Concentrated Funds with low turnover:
FAIRX
BCIFX
FPPFX
JENSX
and,
SHRAX - Clearbridge Investments portfolio manager Richie Freeman explains his brand of long-term investing:
Article:
Richie Freeman

There is a "gross expense ratio" of 5.27%.
Definitely would want to explore that to understand what's it's all about.
The .pdf lists 3 expense ratios: Capped, Total, and Gross.
The capped and total are clear.
How well can a fund do longer term with a "gross expense ratio" of 5.27%?

Hi Guys,
I am very pleased with the extensive response to my “Worry? Not Me” posting. You took the topic in many unanticipated directions that truly enhanced the usefulness of the exchange. Your postings contributed insightful and sometimes novel ways to explore and interpret the marketplace. I hope you profited from it as much as I did.
With so many contributors and their sub-topic interchanges, the submittals have become too cluttered, too messy. Therefore, I propose this Redux segment. It’s at least a clean sheet.
Overwhelmingly the submittals were information-based, well constructed, and generous to those taking an opposite position. We should all expect and tolerate no less. Trading markets accommodate disparate viewpoints and goals.
Unfortunately, a minority membership did not resist the temptation to toss a few ad hominem, hurtful personal bombs. Typically, these gratuitous bombs are unsupported assertions that reflect biases that are devoid of any investment wisdom or merit. Their misguided purpose is to discredit their target. They fail to focus on substance, but they do senselessly highlight personal traits and style.
Here is one blatant example that quoted George Bernard Shaw as follows: “I learned long ago, never to wrestle with a pig. You get dirty, and besides, the pig likes it." Was this really necessary?
This saying was obliquely directed at an MFOer whose opinion conflicted from that of the writer. It’s shameful if divergent investment interpretations and opinions are not tolerated without prejudice on this website. There are a few other examples that are a little less obvious but just as uncouth. Investing is never fully black or white, otherwise markets would not exist.
In many instances the root causes for these weary and unwarranted remarks are inspired by political and/or environmental ideological differences, not investment matters. That’s a fundamental mistake. Not only does it destroy relationships, but it also compromises trust and can do portfolio damage.
There is no call for such personal abuse of their targets or the misuse of the good resources of this website. It is hateful and ultimately harmful to good investment practices. Emotional behavior erodes investment performance. There is substantial academic and industry research that documents its negative impact.
Often, the personal attacks are prompted by a careless reading of the original post or a misinterpretation of its content. Alan Greenspan observed that “ I know you think you understand what you thought I said but I’m not sure you realize that what you heard is not what I meant”. Accurate communications can be troublesome, especially when Greenspan is part of the interaction.
That Greenspan quote was extracted from a Blackrock behavioral investing paper researched by Nelli Oster. I suggest that you review the following Link:
http://us.ishares.com/content/en_us/repository/resource/market_perspectives_feb_2013.pdf
This is a short 10-page report that is excellent. It provides pertinent observations and actionable options that just might improve your investing outcomes. Please take time to access it.
In March, I introduced the Army’s “Situational Awareness” concept as a positive potential investment performance enhancer when exploring the influence of Luck on investment performance. I still believe that is a worthwhile field for research. Like all resources and concepts it can be overemphasized. Too much of a good thing can do damage. The referenced Blackrock paper addresses that issue in a logical manner.
In thinking back to my March submittals (3 or 4 in number), I recalled that I did not provide a reference to an Army situational awareness document. I believe this is a peripheral issue, but for completeness, here is a Link to one of my March MFO postings, and followed by a Link to an introductory Army Field manual summary of situational awareness:
http://www.mutualfundobserver.com:80/discuss/discussion/11899/process-and-luck-over-outcome#latest
https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog/view/100.ATSC/6C01FFE5-0DF6-415F-A13C-92ED36A708CA-1303039189337/1-02/intro.htm
Behavioral economics is now a hot subject, and much research is pursuing its impact on individual investor decision making. Here is an academic reference that was partially generated by authors who popularized the saying that “Trading is Hazardous to Your Wealth”.
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/odean/papers/Repurchases/Once burned JMR.pdf
This too is a fine paper with loads of investor performance data integrated into an analysis that demonstrates investors are often too emotionally attached to earlier outcomes. These earlier outcomes either brought lasting pleasure when profitable or residual pain when nonproductive. These earlier results strongly influence our current investment decision making in a negative way. Again, please examine this recent study.
I anticipate that this post will excite and energize a few MFO contributors. Good. I welcome your continued involvement.
Best Regards.

This question is being pursued on an M* forum:
http://socialize.morningstar.com/NewSocialize/forums/p/337599/3534999.aspx#3534999
So far, no on Fidelity platform, no on Scottrade, yes on TRP. Note, some of these are untested responses. That is, to continue investing after closed to new accounts (unspecified as to AIP or other). AFAIK, "hard close" means no additional investments from anyone. So the platform and method wouldn't matter.

@expatsp.
Yes sir. Total Return. If you use only Price Return, the drawdown is -86% and does not recover until Aug 1954! Or, 25 years later...

I used same database here as was done for article published in David's July 2013 commentary "Timing Method Performance Over Ten Decades".

I don’t own this fund; but, I have looked at it and studied it in the past.
I have linked below its fact sheet which provides a good bit of information about it. I find it an interesting fund and one that I might position into sometime in the future. For me, the major deciding factor is to determine what it will bring to my portfolio that I don’t already have. Although I am looking for fund number fifty two I am in no hurray to tuck a fund into the portfolio just to reach this targeted number. However, this fund does interest me and if I were to purchase it, it would become the sixth member of my specialty fund sleeve. In addition, I would not put more than one percent of my overall portfolio into it as my specialty sleeve now accounts for about five percent of my overall portfolio.
Here is it’s fact sheet. Notice that it can take short positions and invest in most anything it chooses. In addition, in studing this fund through Xray I am finding that it is a fund that changes it's holdings often as it has a turnover ratio of 187% with a current listed forward p/e ratio of 12.9 ... and, it kicks off a "probally engineered" high yield at 8.5% which M* shows is paid out annually.
If you are the venturing type but don't like to trade your portfolio then this fund will do it for you. It's fact sheet says ... It strives to be in the right places and at the right times.
http://www.nb.com/documents/public/en-us/l0080_mf_global_allocation_fs.pdf
http://quotes.morningstar.com/fund/f?t=NGLAX&region=USA
Old_Skeet

I prefer a fund with a small asset base (58 mil), especially given the sudden in-flows into RWGFX. RWGFX is very concentrated.

I don't think asset base is as much of an issue for large cap funds. According to Morningstar, RWGFX has $1.5 billion under management, concentrated in around 20 stocks, meaning they put an average of $75 million in each holding.
That might sound like a lot, but consider that the average market cap of their holdings is over $58 billion. That means that if they put $75 million in each of their 20 holdings, each one would represents only an average of 0.1% of that company's outstanding stock. That doesn't seem too much that it significantly move the needle, given the huge size and trading volume of these companies.
By contrast, FAIRX has over $8 billion under management, spread over only 9 holdings. Now that might be a little scary.