http://portfolios.morningstar.com/fund/summary?t=RPGAX
RPGAX :)

Hi, Sandra.
The panic of 1837 was one of the major financial events of the 19th century, at least as far as the emerging U.S. economy was concerned; about a hundred actors were moving simultaneously and independently, and we have terrible documentation concerning most of them. (It's the sort of story that I love playing out when I'm teaching the research course on Historiography.)
The 2nd Bank of the U.S., indeed, had a 20 year charter. It served, literally, as the bank of the United State. The federal government deposited its cash into, and paid its bills out of, the bank. As a result, the bank had substantial (huge, for the day) cash reserves that it could lend out to other banks. By controlling that lending, the Bank of the U.S. served to discipline the rest; "get crazy and we cut you off." Jackson was pissed, in part, because the Bank of the U.S. discriminated, in his judgment, against frontier financial institutions. When he became president he took two sets of actions against the bank. He refused to renew its charter (effectively breaking its monopoly power) and he withdrew the federal reserves from the Bank of the U.S. and deposited them in other banks that he thought would be more pro-growth. (Or, his critics charged, would lend to speculators.) In particular, that moved hard currency away from the more established banks in New York City, our emerging financial center, and into the hands of folks in ... say, Louisville or St. Louis.
The net effect was to remove one brake on the system and add fuel to it.
Then other stuff happened. Reduced liquidity in the central banks. Minor British banking crisis which led them to demand specie for US banks. Land and financial speculation. Jackson's demand that bills owed to the federal government be paid in gold or silver (technically, "specie") as a way to check land speculation.
One of the dullest, but most careful, bits of economic historical scholarship is Peter Rousseau's essay for the National Bureau of Economic Research, entitled "Jacksonian Monetary Policy, Specie Flows, and the Panic Of 1837" (2011). After 40 numbingly careful pages of financial flow analyses, he concludes:

The Panic of 1837 was the culmination of a series of policy shifts and unanticipated disturbances that shook the young U.S. economy at the core of its financial structure -- the banks of New York City. Over the nine months leading up to the crisis, the specie reserves of these banks came under increasing strain as they reacted to legislation designed to achieve a “political” distribution of the surplus balances among the states and an executive order allegedly aimed at ending speculation in the public lands. With much of the nation’s specie diverted from its commercial center, the prospect of shifts in specie demand both domestically and from abroad combined with a break in land prices to render the panic inevitable.

So, not the refusal to recharter the Bank per se but the effects of defunding it?
And I certainly agree that the test for Mr. Trump, as for Mr. Carter before him, is the sticking power of his initiatives. That, in part, might be driven by whether he can drive the election of a lot of like-minded persons in the Congressional elections of 2018.
For what that's worth,
David

VF, at Fidelity the minimum is $2500 for the inicial purchase of F1 shares. Maybe you need to investigate what the minimum is at your brokerage?