Since we are discussing about the future, I figured I would post it here.
Byron Wien's Ten surprises for 2022 -
https://www.yahoo.com/now/byron-wien-joe-zidle-announce-170000559.html

Let’s start with the assumption that the individual investor designs a portfolio (allocation model) that meets his needs and which he or she deems appropriate for his or her situation. He or she decides X amount will be allocated to fixed income; X amount to equities; X amount to commodities or alternatives or hedge funds or whatever he or she decides.
Is it the view of @MikeM that the very investor who designed the portfolio to begin with is somehow engaging in risky or foolish behavior to alter, modify or embellish his original plan based on new information or perhaps a different “playing field” than on the day he drew that plan up?
Let’s say he had 50% nominally allocated to equities before a 30% market sell-off. Would the investor not be wise to increase his equity exposure - upping the allocation to 55 or 60% afterward? Or, in the case of extraordinarily narrow high yield credit spreads developing, would it not be prudent to shift some HY holdings into investment grade bonds or cash? Should deep value or EM stocks look cheap after years of underperformance, would you fault someone who had earlier avoided them for adding some to their portfolio?
There are allocation funds, as some have observed, who do this for you. That’s a good alternative. But these tend to have very large asset bases and need to deal with ever changing inflows and outflows . Changing allocations for them is a bit like changing course for an oil tanker. The individual investor is far more nimble. Not to say one approach is better than the other - just that they are different.

@LewisBraham has a piece in Barron's on this. My summary (advance preview):
"FUNDS. Post-Financial-Crisis reforms are not working for some MONEY-MARKET FUNDS. GOVERNMENT money-market funds are doing fine (AUM grew to $4.1 trillion). But PRIME money-market funds have shrunk to $831 billion. These invest in commercial paper and CDs, can have redemption fees and/or gates and/or floating NAVs (institutional prime). When issues developed in 2020, these prime money market funds were reluctant to use their available tools and the FED had to step in with some liquidity backstops. So, now, the SEC has proposed new rules that will ditch redemption fees and gates in favor of SWING-PRICING (a form of floating NAV related to redemption level). The fund industry is opposing these new rules (Fido, Federated Hermes, Blackstone, BNY/Mellon, etc)."
https://www.barrons.com/articles/money-market-funds-sec-regulations-51642183815?mod=hp_DAY_9

Without analyzing the market cap and liquidity of the stocks Wood was invested in, this asset-size analysis seems incomplete to me. It think the speculative nature of the companies the ETF invests in and their extraordinarily high valuations may have been more to blame. This from a different Zweig article is significant however from a liquidity perspective though:

ARK is already a big owner of some small stocks. At Israeli biotech company Pluristem Therapeutics Inc., with a total stock-market value of $219 million, ARK holds 15.5% of the shares outstanding. That’s three times as much as all other institutional owners combined. At a French biotech, Cellectis S.A. , with a $900 million market value, ARK owns 11.5%—more than the next 11 largest holders combined.
Although those two positions make up barely 0.5% of ARK’s total assets, they reflect the firm’s style.

But I wonder if investors still could've gotten burned pretty badly buying the same stocks in a smaller fund at 2021's speculative peak.

If you're not a WSJ subscriber Mark's link may not work. If not, try this one:
Link to Article

IMO, mistakes with TAA are not disastrous. In retirement, I try to maintain 40-60% effective-equity with TAA. And I have made mistakes in these markets - should have had 60% when had 40%, and vice-versa. But still, I did OK vs pure market-timers (100% or 0% equity). I guess I could just leave it in the middle at 50% but that wouldn't be as much fun.

* May be pay-walled.
By Jason Zweig, The Intelligent Investor at the WSJ.
"The ARK Innovation ETF posted big returns, and big money followed. Now it’s the latest example of what happens when a fund becomes too large for its own good."
Read Article

Here is the summary prospectus and the prospectus:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1614370/000119312522007437/d229344d497k.htm (summary prospectus)
https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/1614370/000119312522007433/d229344d485bpos.htm (prospectus)

Pure timers are completely in or out based on signals.
On the other hand, tactical asset allocation (TAA) involves changing allocations suitably according to market assessments, and rebalancing simply adjusting to strategic/fixed asset allocation.

Thank you @yogibearbull
Makes sense. I added a 5-10% “Speculative” sleeve several months ago. It’s currently just under 8% of my holdings. Others might call that a tactical position. It’s a place where my overall assessment of where various markets are can be counted into the otherwise static allocation format. I realize this is not for everyone and all circumstances.

@msf yes you raise some excellent points. I went through that same analysis that you describe above and evaluated both funds 2 years ago. Long term they both have similar track records. But MFAPX gets there with much less volatility. MIOPX actually held up quite well in the March 2020 selloff -- only dropping about 15% in comparison to 19% for its category. But things really turned south for MIOPX and other funds with large emerging markets exposure when China cracked down on its technology industry last year. I think you can trace its underperformance starting then. I might return to MFAPX at some point but am looking for more of a large cap blend. I find selecting an international fund to be quite difficult because they have underperformed the U.S. for so long. This year to date foreign value is doing quite well with funds like Dodge and Cox International up over 6% YTD but I wonder if this is a short term thing. Their long term track record is pretty poor. Again international is real conundrum.
@carew388 It's funny you mention MSFBX because that one has come up on my screens too. I really like that funds defensive posture with about 30% in consumer staples. Unfortunately it also has a 20% allocation to tech so if tech continues to get hit as I believe will happen -- you won't be safe in the fund. YAFFX is intriguing with a great long term track record -- also more of a global fund. It is one fund I'm looking at also. I think this is going to be a difficult year to make money though.

This will be a bit painful to do but I will be selling most of my position in MIOPX. I really like the manager -- Kristian Heugh. But there is too much downside risk in his portfolio.

If you like the manager and want to dial down the risk a bit, you could consider MFAPX. The difference between the MS summaries is that MIOPX includes emerging companies, while MFAPX is primarily focused on established companies.
Morgan Stanley MIOPX page
Morgan Stanley MFAPX page
Obviously they have a lot of overlap, but their figures are significantly different.
Portfolio Visualizer comparison
Close performance over 3, 5, 10 years (through year end 2021). A notable distinction is that from 2Q2020 on, MIOPX rose and fell faster. For example, YTD (2022), MIOPX dropped 9.23% and MFAPX dropped 2.83%. PV shows other significant differences (better figures are MAFPX):
std dev: 16.58% vs. 12.99%
max drawdown: 26.18% vs. 17.26%
Sharpe ratio: 0.77 vs. 1.00
Sortino ratio: 1.27 vs 1.71
As one might expect with its higher volatility MIOPX had a much better best year (55.06% vs. 44.18%) and a much worse worst year (down 12.36% vs down 5.48%).
According to M*, the best fit index for MIOPX is US Convertible Bonds!
http://performance.morningstar.com/fund/ratings-risk.action?t=MIOPX
From inception through 2016 MIOPX tracked FISCX pretty closely. (MIOPX even returned less over this period). Then it became more volatile and returned more. But it wasn't until 2020 that it took off like a rocket. And then fell like a stone. In that same period, MFAPX also rose with MIOPX, but not as quickly and with much gentler spikes.

I don’t own. Play with DKNG - one of her holdings. Buy at $23-24 and sell at $26-27. Kinda scary though, Might drop thru the floor one of these days. Think I’ll swear off.
DKNG -7% today @ $24.24
ARKK Today -5.42%
ARKK looks to be down about 15% YTD / Takes some perseverance to hold on to something like that!

DODBX at $15B is very small compared to VWELX, PRWCX, & FBALX to name a few. It had outflows consistently in the past 10 yrs per M*, even though some of those years performance was quite good. Any comment on the outflows? Not sure if it is the Value style. VWELX gave up its Value style recently.

Good question. Money today is fickle.To the extent money has fled DODBX in recent years, here’s some possible reasons:
- Dodge & Cox equity funds (including DODBX) faired poorly in 2008. They got caught leaning the wrong way on some financials early on and never recovered. DODBX lost 33.5% that year. (By contrast, PRWCX lost 27% in 2008.) Prior to that, D&C had been a board favorite and had seen steady inflows. It’s the old saw about reputations, like china, being easily damaged and hard to mend.
- There’s a long held perception that DODBX is bloated. Gained traction during the ‘07-‘09 bear market. While accurate, investors seem to overlook that PRWCX has greatly outdistanced it in AUM over the last decade.
- There’s an aversion nowadays to typical 60/40 “balanced” funds owing to low interest rates and a belief (true to some extent) that bonds no longer offer protection. This weighs against DODBX in investors’ eyes. Overlooked is that DODBX is actually more of a 70/30 fund. And perhaps unknown to some, it’s been holding a 5% short position against the S&P. Further, its heavier than average weighting to financials stands to benefit investors as rates rise.
- D&C underplays the significance of individual managers. Committees make the big calls, as I’ve understood them. Given the choice between investing with a bland committee or a well known figure with the aura of a David Giroux*, the latter likely wins out among today’s investors.
- D&C does not make their funds available NTF at brokerage houses. That has to hurt inflows and may lead to outflows.
* Not pertinent to the question, but I should note the performance of DODBX and PRWCX are quite similar. Over the past year DODBX led, gaining 18.9% to PRWCX’s 16%. Over 10 years, PRWCX wins at 13.36% compared to 11.91% for DODBX.

DODBX at $15B is very small compared to VWELX, PRWCX, & FBALX to name a few. It had outflows consistently in the past 10 yrs per M*, even though some of those years total return performance was quite good. Any comment on the outflows? Not sure if it is the Value style. VWELX gave up its Value style recently.

Wealthtrack interviews with BM:
wealthtrack-weekly-investment-show#latest

Tom Keen chat with Barry Ritholtz. Mr. R reminds folks at all skill levels about market timing ability. Well done, Mr. R.

Barry Rithholtz, 5 minute video, Jan. 11, Bloomberg
Remain curious,
Catch

Vanguard "simplified" (VG marketing spin) online TF mutual fund transactions fees as of January 25, 2021.
These fees apply to investors who are not Flagship ($1M - $5M*) or Flagship Select ($5M+*) investors.
The TF mutual fund fee is now a uniform $20 per transaction.
Voyager Select ($500K - $1M*) investors previously paid $8 per transaction.
Ahhh, to live the simple life...
*in qualifying Vanguard assets

Sounds like an acknowledgment by D&C that the typical 60:40 equity:bonds portfolio just isn't going to cut it anymore. They may be having PRWCX envie, maybe?

Correct.
Let’s hope their “cure” isn’t worse than the disease. I’ve been scaling out of DODBX as it’s risen the past couple years. Still hold a bit. In the event of a big market selloff, I’d probably buy into one of their equity funds.
One year performance (from Lipper): DODBX +17.85% / PRWCX +15.08%. However, at 3 & 5 years out PRWCX holds a slight edge. This is a radical move from a very conservative house. What comes next? Maybe D&C funds NTF at Fido, Schwab, etc.?
If you haven’t read Ed Studzinski’s column in the January Observer you might. He mentions “firms in the San Francisco Bay Area which face a problem of unaffordable housing costs for junior professional staff.” He mentions these employees having to commute long distances to work or reside in crime ridden areas. D&C is headquartered in SF - so I’d guess they’re one of the referenced here - but there’s a chance I’m wrong. In any event, read for yourself.

Sounds like an acknowledgment by D&C that the typical 60:40 equity:bonds portfolio just isn't going to cut it anymore. They may be having PRWCX envie, maybe?
Here is an interview with David Giroux from last July that was posted here by poster teapot. See what he has to say about the traditional 60:40 balanced fund. Listen closely around the 12 minute mark.
PRWCX
Giroux was interviewed in Barron podcast this July.
https://www.barrons.com/podcasts/barrons-live/stocks-to-watch-investing-with-t-rowe-price-david-giroux/97b452aa-8887-4cde-84fb-06aa9bb07880?page=1
teapot December 2021 in Fund Discussions

From DODBX prospectus:
Under normal circumstances no less than 25% and
no more than 75% of the Fund’s total assets will be invested in
equity securities. The Fund may invest up to 20% of its total assets
in U.S. dollar-denominated equity or debt securities of
non-U.S. issuers traded in the United States that are not in the S&P
500 Index. Asset allocation between equity and debt securities is
based on Dodge & Cox’s assessment of the potential risks and
returns for each asset class over a three- to five-year horizon.
Factors used to estimate the range of potential returns include:
future earnings growth, the outlook for the economy, inflation and
interest rate trends, and current valuations relative to historical
ranges.
Excerpt from The Intelligent Investor:
We recommend that the investor divide his holdings between high-grade bonds and leading common stocks; that the proportion held in bonds be never less than 25% or more than 75%, with the converse being true for the common-stock component; that his simplest choice would be to maintain a 50-50 proportion between the two, with adjustments to restore the equality when market developments had disturbed it by as much as say 5%.