To put this in perspective, the new DOL regs for fiduciaries allow different levels of compensation for selling different categories of products, up to a certain level.
BICE allows higher compensation for selling complex products that require more work to explain to the customers. (
DOL FAQ: "variation [in commission] is permitted ... based on neutral factors, such as the time and complexity associated with recommending investments".) This arises from the reasonable compensation rule.
At the same time, BICE forbids the additional compensation to be so high as to create an incentive to push these products. More generally (again from DOL FAQ) "financial institutions cannot 'use or rely upon quotas, appraisals, performance or personnel actions, bonuses, contests, special awards, differential compensation or other actions or incentives that are intended or would reasonably be expected to cause Advisers to make recommendations that are not in the Best Interest of the
Retirement Investor.'"
If it takes someone twice as much time and effort to sell product A as product B, and compensation is equal, that person has a disincentive to sell (or "push", as Ms. Morgenson wrote) product A. That is true regardless of how much more or less profitable one product or the other is for the company. Unequal compensation for different products can be reasonable. Whether the differences merely equalize the sales incentives for different products or bias them (presumably toward the more profitable product) is a matter of the magnitude of the differences in compensation.
According to the DOL, the mere existence of compensation differences does not automatically create an incentive to sell one over the other, Ms. Morgenson aside. Yet she leaps immediately to the conclusion that it must, with no numbers, no explanation.
The TIAA Form ADV Part 2A that she cited mirrors the DOL regs: "TIAA’s compensation philosophy aims to reward Advisors with appropriate compensation, recognizing the degree of effort generally required of the Advisor in gathering and retaining client assets in appropriate TIAA accounts, products and services offered by TIAA affiliates."
Ms. Morgenson also leaps from writing about "advisers" in the first paragraph (who are bound by fiduciary duty, BICE, etc. not to be incentivized to "push" higher profit products) to "sales representatives" in the second paragraph, who are under no such constraints. Which one is it? Is the undisclosed complaint talking about sales reps or advisers?
That matters because, as I stated before, while this doesn't help TIAA's reputation, it doesn't paint them as an exceptionally bad actor. I've written before about Fidelity's reps having similar compensation schedules. Here's Fidelity's 2017
Introduction to Representatives’ Compensation."Certain representatives also receive differing compensation for different product types, for example, managed account and insurance product sales, which require more in-depth engagement with clients, provide more compensation than products such as money market funds." For example, Fidelity reps get quarterly compensation of 1 basis point for investments in MMFs, while10 basis points for investments in Fidelity's Portfolio Advisory Services and/or insurance products.
For anyone who's suggested going to a brokerage to discuss ideas "for free", tell me again how great a bargain that is.