Reply to @Charles:
Hi Charles. The 10% is a self-imposed limit that I learned the hard way. I overextended during the dot.com bubble and leading up to the financial crisis of 08-09. I got badly burned by investing to heavily in specific fund managers. Therefore, for the sake of my personal sanity, I limit my fund manager risk to no more than 10% of my portfolio.
I agree with you that a 4-5 fund portfolio is adequate for diversification. But it may not be adequate enough to diversify away manager risk, IMHO. Just look at Bill Miller, Ken Heebner, etc...
P.S. Charles, I greatly enjoying reading your comments. Your insights and analysis are spectacular. You are an asset to this forum.
Mike_E

Remainder of fund family list:
Nationwide
Natixis Funds
Needham
Neiman Funds
Neuberger Berman
New Alternatives
New Century Portfolios
New Covenant
NEW Path Capital Advisors
Nicholas
Niemann
Nile Capital Investment Trust
Nomura Partners Funds
North Country Funds
North Star Investment Management Corp.
NorthCoast
Northeast Investors
Northern Funds
Northern Lights Fund Tr (Criticalmath)
Northern Lights Fund Trust
Northern Lights Fund Trust (GPS)
Northern Lights Fund Trust (SCA)
Northern Lights Fund Trust(Giralda)
Northern Trust
Northquest Capital Fund Inc
Nottingham
Nuance Communications
Nuance Investments, LLC
Nuveen
Nuveen Investments
Nysa
Oak Associates
Oakmark
Oberweis
Oceanstone
OCM
Old Mutual Investment Funds
Old Westbury
Olstein
OppenheimerFunds
Oracle
Orinda Asset Management, LLC
O'Shaughnessy Mutual Funds
Osterweis
Osterweis Capital Management
OutfitterFunds
Pacific Advisors Funds
Pacific Capital
Pacific Financial
Pacific LifeFunds
Palmer Square Capital Management LLC
Papp
Paradigm Funds
Parnassus
Pathway Advisors
Patriot
Pax World
Paydenfunds
Payson Funds
Pear Tree Funds
Pennant
Perimeter Capital
Perkins
Permanent Portfolio
Perritt
Philadelphia Invmt Ptnrs New Generation
Phocas
PIA Mutual Funds
Piedmont
PIMCO
Pinnacle
Pinnacle Capital Management
Pioneer Investments
Plainsboro Funds
Plan Investment Fund
PMC Funds
PNC Funds
Polaris Funds
Polen Capital Management Inc
Pope Family Of Funds
Poplar Forest Capital
Portfolio 21
Portfolio Strategies Inc
Potkul Funds
Power Income Fund
PowerShares
Prasad Series Trust
Precidian Funds LLC
Preservation Trust Advisors
Presidio Funds
Primary Trend
PRIMECAP Odyssey Funds
Princeton
Principal Funds
Private Capital Management
Profit Funds Investment
ProFunds
ProShares
Prospector Funds
Prudential Investments
Purisima Funds
Putnam
Pyxis Funds
Quaker
Quantitative Services Group LLC (QSG)
QuantShares
Queens Road Funds
Rainier
Ramius
Ranger Funds Investment Trust
RBB Funds
RBC Global Asset Management (U.S.) Inc.
Reaves Select Research
Redmont
Reich & Tang
Reinhartfunds
Renaissance Capital Greenwich Funds
Reynolds
Rice Hall James
RidgeWorth
Risk Paradigm Group, LLC
River Park Funds
RiverNorth Funds
RNC Genter Capital Management
Robeco Investment Funds
Robeco Investment Management, Inc.
Rochdale
Rocky Peak Capital
Roge Partners Fund
Roosevelt
Roxbury Funds
Royal Bank of Scotland NV
Royce
RS Funds
Russell
S1 Fund
SA Funds
Salient Funds
Samson
Sandalwood
Sands Capital
Saratoga
Satuit Capital Management Trust
Saturna Capital
Scharf Investments (California)
Schneider Funds
Schooner Funds
Schroder
Schwab Funds
Schwartz
Scout
Seafarer
SEI
Selected Funds
Sentinel
Sequoia
Shelton Capital Management
Shenkman Capital Management, Inc.
Sierra Trust
SignalPoint
Sit
Smead Funds
SMH Capital Advisors
Smith Barney
Snow Capital Management L.P.
Sound Mind
Sound Shore
SouthernSunFunds
Sparrow
Spirit of America
STAAR Investment Trust
Stadion Funds
State Farm
State Street Global Advisors
State Street Master Funds
SteelPath
Sterling Capital Funds
Stewart Capital
Stone Harbor
Stonebridge
Stralem Fund
Strategic
Strategic Income Management, LLC
Stratton
Stratus Fund
Stream Exchange Traded Trust
STW Fixed Income Management LLC
Summit Global Investments
SunAmerica
Sustainable Growth Advisers
Swan
Swank
Swedish Export Credit Corporation
Symons
T. Rowe Price
TacticalShares
Tanaka
Target Program
Tatro Capital, LLC
Taylor
TCM Funds
TCW
TD Asset Management
TEAM
Teberg
Teucrium
TFS Capital Funds
TheCollarFund
Thesis
Third Avenue
Thomas White Funds
Thompson IM Funds, Inc.
Thomson Horstmann & Bryant, Inc.
Thornburg
Thrivent
TIAA-CREF Mutual Funds
Tiedemann Wealth Management, LLC
Tilson Funds
Timberline Asset Management LLC
Timothy Plan
Tocqueville
Toews Funds
Toreador
Torray
Tortoise Capital Advisors, L.L.C.
Touchstone
Towle & Co
Transamerica
Transparent Value Funds
Transparent Value Trust
Tributary Funds
Trust for Credit Unions
Trust for Professional Mgrs(PTIA)
TS&W Funds
Turner Funds
Tweedy Browne
Two Oaks Investment Management, Inc.
U.S. Global Investors
UBS
UBS AG
UCM
United Association Funds
United States Commodity Funds LLC
Upright Investments Trust
USA Mutuals
USAA
VALIC
Valley Forge
Value Line
Van Eck
Van Hulzen Asset Management, LLC
Vanguard
Vantagepoint Funds
Vericimetry Funds
VFM
Victoria1522
Victory
Viking
Villere
Virtus
Volumetric
VRM Funds
VTL Associates, LLC
Vulcan Value Partners
W.P. Stewart
Waddell & Reed
Wade Financial
Wakefield Asset Management LLLP
Wall Street
Wall Street EWM Funds Trust
Walthausen Funds
Wanger
Wasatch
WBI FUNDS
WCM Investment Management
Wegener
Weitz
Wells Fargo Advantage
Wentworth, Hauser and Violich
WesMark
Westcore
Westfield Capital Management Company, LP
Westport Funds
Westwood
Whitebox Advisors, LLC
Whitebox Mutual Funds
William Blair
Williamsburg Investment Trust
Wilmington Funds
Wilshire Mutual Funds
Wintergreen Funds
Wireless
Wisconsin Capital Management
WisdomTree
WOA
World Funds
World Funds, Inc
WorldCommodity Funds
Wright
Zacks WMG
Zeo
Ziegler Lotsoff Capital Management Inv

Reply to @David_Snowball: Yes indeed.
For the record, here are all 767 families...in two posts (1-M, N-Z)
13D Management
1492 Capital Management, LLC
361 Funds
AAM
Aberdeen
Absolute Strategies
AC ONE
Academy
Acadian Funds
Adams Harkness Funds
Adirondack Funds
Advance Capital I
Advantus
AdvisorOne Funds
Advisors' Inner Circle (Chartwell)
ADVISORS SERIES TRUST(Davidson)
AdvisorShares
Advisory Research
Aegis
AIS Capital Management LLC
Akre
Al Frank
Alger
AllianceBernstein
Allianz Funds
Allianz Global Investors
Allied Asset
Alpha Capital Funds
AlphaClone
AlphaMark
AlphaOne Investment Services, LLC
Alpine
ALPS
Altegris
AmericaFirst Funds
American Beacon
American Century Investments
American Funds
American Growth
American Independence
American Money Management
American Pension Investors
American Trust
Ameristock
AMF
AMIDEX
Ancora
Angel Oak Capital Advisors, LLC
Apex Capital Management
Appleseed Fund
Appleton
AQR Funds
Aquila
Arbitrage Fund
Archer
Arden Asset Management LLC
Ariel Investments, LLC
Aristotle
Armstrong Associates
Arrow
ArrowShares
Artio Global
Artisan
Ascendant
Ascentia Capital Partners
Ashmore
Aston
Astor
ATAC Fund
Auer
Auxier Funds
Ave Maria Mutual Funds
Avenue Capital Group
Aviemore Funds
Azzad Fund
Baird
Bandon Capital Management, LLC
Bank of America Corp
Barclays Funds
Baron Capital Group
Barrett
BBH
Bearly Bullish Fund
Beck, Mack & Oliver
Becker
Beech Hill
BeeHive
Bennett Group Master Funds
Berkshire
Bernzott Capital Advisors
Berwyn
Biondo Investment Advisor
Birmiwal
Bishop Street
BlackRock
Blue Chip Investor Fund
BMO Funds
BNY Mellon Funds
Bogle
Boston Advisors Trust
Boston Common Asset Management, LLC
Boston Trust & Walden Funds
Boyar Value Fund
BPV Family of Funds
Brandes
Brandywine
Braver Wealth Mangaement, LLC
Bretton Fund
Bridgehampton
Bridges
Bridgeway
Bright Rock
Brookfield Investment Management Inc.
Brown Advisory Funds
Brown Capital Management
Bruce
BTS
Buffalo
Burnham
Bushido
Calamos
Caldwell & Orkin
Calvert Investments, Inc.
Cambiar Funds
CAMCo
Camelot Portfolios, LLC
Capital Advisors
Capital Guardian Trust Company
Capital Innovations, LLC
Capital Management
Capstone
Caritas Capital LLC
Carne
Castle Investment Management
Catalyst Mutual Funds
Causeway
Cavanal Hill funds
CBRE Clarion Securities LLC
Center Coast Capital Advisers LP
Century Funds
CGM
Chaconia Funds
Chadwick & D'Amato
Champlain Funds
Changing Parameters, LLC
Chase
Chesapeake
Cheswold Lane Asset Management
Chou America
Christopher Weil & Company, Inc.
Cincinnati Asset Management Funds
Citigroup
Clarity Fund
Clark Capital Management Group, Inc.
Clark Fork Trust
Clear River
Clipper Fund
Cloud Capital
CM Advisors
CMG
CNI Charter
Cohen & Steers
Coldstream
Collins Capital Investments, LLC
Columbia
Commerce
Commonwealth Intl Series Tr
Compak
Compass EMP
Concorde
Conestoga Capital Advisors
Congress
Congressional Effect Family
Contravisory Investment Management, Inc.
Convergence
Cook & Bynum Capital Management, LLC
Copeland Capital Management
Copley
CornerCap
Cornerstone
Cortina Funds, Inc.
Country
Cove Street Capital
CRAFund
Crawford
Credit Suisse (New York, NY)
Credit Suisse AG
CRM
Croft
Crow Point Partners, LLC
Cullen Funds Trust
Cushing
Cutler
Cutwater Asset Management Corp.
CWC
Davidson Mutual Funds
Davis Funds
Davlin Philanthropic Fund
Day Hagan
Dean Fund
Delaware Investments
Destra
Deutsche Bank
DF Dent Funds
DGHM
DGI
Diamond Hill Funds
Dimensional Fund Advisors
Direxion Funds
DMS FUNDS
Dodge & Cox
Domini
DoubleLine
Dreman
Drexel Hamilton Investment Partners, LLC
Dreyfus
Driehaus
DSM
DundeeWealth Funds
Dunham Funds
DuPont
Dupree
DWS Investments
E.I.I.
Eagle
Eagle Funds
EAS Genesis
Eaton Vance
Edgar Lomax
Edgewood
Elessar Investment Management
Emerald
Emerging Global Advisors
Empire Builder
Empiric Funds
Encompass Fund
EntrepreneurShares
Epiphany Funds
Equinox Funds Trust
Equity Investment Corp
Estabrook
ETF Securities Ltd
Euro Pacific Asset Management
Euro Pacific Halter Asia Management, Inc
Eventide Funds
Evermore
Exchange Traded Concepts, LLC
Factor Capital Management, LLC
Fairfax
Fairholme
FAM
FAM Funds
FCI Funds
FDP Series Funds
Federated
Fidelity Investments
Fiduciary Asset Management, LLC
Financial Investors Trust (Aspen)
Financial Investors Trust (Grandeur)
First American
First Eagle
First Investors
First Trust
First Western Capital Mgt
Firsthand Funds
Flex-funds
FMC Funds
FMI Funds
FolioMetrix
Forester
Formula Investing, LLC
Fort Pitt Capital Funds
Forward Funds
Fountainhead Funds
FPA
Frank Funds
Franklin Templeton Investment Funds
Freedom Funds
Frontegra Asset Management Inc
Frontegra Funds
Frost Funds
Fund X
FX Strategy Fund
Gabelli
GaveKal
GE Asset Management
Geier Funds
Geneva Funds
Gerstein Fisher
Giant 5 Funds
Ginkgo
Glenmede
GLG Inc
Global X Funds
GMG
GMO
Golden Capital Funds
Goldman Sachs
Golub
GoodHaven
Gotham
Granite Investment Advisors, Inc.
Grant Park
Great Lakes Funds
Great-West Funds
Green Century
GreenHaven
Greenspring
GRT
Guggenheim Investments
GuideMark
GuidePath
GuideStone Funds
Guinness Atkinson
Hagin Capital, LLC
Hamlin Capital Mgt LLC
Hancock Horizon
Hancock Horizon Funds
Hansberger Funds
Harbor
Harding Loevner
Hart Group, Ltd.
Hartford Mutual Funds
Hatteras Alternative Mutual Funds Trust
Haverford
Heartland
Henderson Global
Hennessy
Henssler Funds
HighMark
Hillman Capital Management
HNP Capital LLC
Hodges
Holland Series Trust
Homestead
Hotchkis and Wiley
HSBC
Huber Funds
Hundredfold
Huntington
Huntington Strategy Shares
Hussman Funds
ICM Series Trust
ICON Funds
Iknetics Capital Partners, LLC
IMS
IndexIQ
ING Funds
ING Retirement Funds
Innealta Capital
Institutional Advisors LLC
Institutional Investors
Integrity
International Securites Exchange
Intrepid Funds
Invesco
Investment House LLC
Investment Partners
Iron Funds
IronBridge Funds, Inc.
Ironclad Funds
iShares
ISI Funds
IVA Funds
Ivy Funds
Jacob
Jacobs Broel
JAG Advisors
James Advantage
Janus
Jensen
John Hancock
Johnson Mutual Funds
Jordan Funds
JPMorgan
JPMorgan Asset Mgmt (Europe) S.a.r.l.
JPMorgan Funds
Jubak
Kalmar Pooled Investment Trust
KCM
Keeley
Kellner
Keystone
Kinetics
Kirr Marbach Partners
KKR
Kottke
Kovitz Investment Group, LLC
Lacerte Capital
Lateef Investment Management, L.p.
Laudus Funds
Lawson Kroeker Investment Management Inc
Lazard
LEADER
Leavell
Lee Financial Group Inc
Leeb
Legg Mason
Legg Mason/Western
Leuthold
Liberty Street
Lifetime Achievement Fund Inc
Lincoln Financial Group
Linde, Hansen & Co., LLC
Litman Gregory Masters Funds
LKCM
LoCorr Fund Management, LLC
Logan Capital
Long Short
Longboard
Longleaf Partners
LongView Capital Management LLC
Loomis Sayles Funds
Lord Abbett
LSV Fund
M.D. Sass Investors Services, Inc.
Madison Mosaic
MAI
MainGate Trust
MainStay
Mairs & Power
Makefield
Managed Futures Solutions Fund
Managers Funds
Manning & Napier
Manor Investment Funds
Marathon Funds
Mariner Fund Group
Marketocracy Funds
Marsico Investment Fund
Martin Capital Management LLP
MassMutual
Matrix/LMH
Matthew 25
Matthews Asia Funds
McKee Funds
Meehan Focus
MEMBERS
Merger
Meridian
Merk Funds
Merrill Lynch
Metropolitan West Funds
MFS
MH Elite
Midas
Milestone
Miller Investment
Milliman
Mirae Asset Global Investments (USA) LLC
MMA Praxis
Monetta
Monteagle Funds
Morgan Dempsey Capital Management, LLC
Morgan Stanley
Morgan Stanley & Co
Morgan Stanley (New York)
Motley Fool
MP 63
Muhlenkamp
Munder
Mundoval Funds
Mutual of America
Mutualhedge
Muzinich

Reply to @Charles: As for people who got out of stocks and/or who haven't gotten in and or who have fleed to bonds entirely, I think it's unfortunate that there's no exploration of the psychology after you have three years of almost consistent outflows of stocks and visibly less interest in investing (if measured by searches, business channel ratings, outflows etc.)
Maybe not "faux wealth", but people act as if it's a free lunch. As David Einhorn noted on CNBC a couple of years ago: "I think you can argue that, because we have gotten to the point where the transmission method is broken. You are trying to create a wealth effect which is another asset-based economy thing, it's very questionable whether higher stock prices cause lots of incremental demand, and you have the cost of food and energy which are real things that people have to pay for. And if you have to pay $3, $4 or $5 for gas, you have less money to go out to eat."
Commodity prices, highlighting Bernanke's time period:
http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user3303/imageroot/2013/02/20130227_Bernanke.jpg
Meanwhile, prices for many common needs continue to rise noticeably. Meanwhile, what % of people own what % of stocks in this country, while much of the rest just sees higher prices as the effect? The Fed has admitted that they are trying for a "wealth effect", and it's troubling that blowing one asset bubble after another would appear to be the only idea that government has. That's not a solid foundation or sustainable without continued stimulus. I agree with what Seth Klarman said the other day: "(The) underpinnings of our economy and financial system are so precarious that the un-abating risks of collapse dwarf all other factors."
Collapse? I don't think so, but I see big picture problems that aren't being addressed at all (not surprising, given you have a government unable to work together) and worry about social instability if the gap in this country between the haves and have nots continues to get wider. I remain curious about the continued ability to blow one asset bubble after another - if we go into recession, we already have ZIRP and QE.
Not saying anything against stocks, I think people have to own stocks because you have a government who has effectively given up decision making and told the Fed to (as Senator Schumer told Bernanke) "Get to work." They've been working with ZIRP and QE for the majority of the last four-five years, and I think they'll continue to until the next election.
While I'm not going to debate valuation, I do think this chart showing margin correlation to the markets is rather interesting:
http://www.zerohedge.com/sites/default/files/images/user3303/imageroot/2013/03/20130301_indu.jpg

Reply to @scott:
Thanks Scott for the reply.I personally do not consider the Koch brothers infamous but they certainly have been characterized as that or worse by the same people who will continue to extol wind and solar as the best(only?) alternatives for future energy needs.The engineers employed by the Koch Bros. will continue to be more positive for everyday life for many more people than the financial engineers in George Soro's employ for the elite.
Here is what I could find concerning Cheung Kong Infrastructure.This is a very large Co.and as you said, with worldwide assets. Great 10 year stock chart,but like many Chinese Co.'s,has flattened out a bit since '08. BIP has performed much better in the past 5 yrs and I feel has a wider asset base including the ports,airports,and roads you have previously mentioned.
https://www.google.com/finance?q=HKG:1038&ed=us&ei=Qc0yUbjdPIOvqQGAJw
Here is another example of how liberally a supposedly narrow investment sleeve can be interpreted by a good manager.I finally discovered this fund late last year and would recommend it to expand one's real estate investments.You don't get the the dividends with a pure REIT fund holder but probably a better chance at growth as exemplified by the record.
http://www.baronfunds.com/mutual-funds/baron-real-estate-fund/brefx/?tab=Holdings#portfolioHoldings
The pipelines are probably a safer way to play the shale play.Talk about volatility,the explorers are not a game I want to play.Bought some CESDF on Fri on some slight weakness.6.29% dividend paid monthly.For now that's my play in the oil patch.Waiting for some weakness in INF.
Good primer on shale and energy here:
http://seekingalpha.com/article/1238721-shale-we-dance-how-best-to-profit-now-from-energy-investments?source=email_alternative_energy_investing&ifp=0
Thanks for your involvement and your non-condescending approach.

In the article one firm was allocating more industrial metals as alternative investment. Ironically the demand for industrial metals and most commodities are up when economy is in good shape in which case stocks will probably do well as well. I suspect when next crisis hits these alternative investments will fall short.
They are pushed to unsuspecting investors because of the fear of stocks and so-called alternative investments have become the way for these investment firms to replace the fees they had been collecting from stock investors prior to last financial crisis. Now bonds did not provide enough fees so they had to find and alternative for themselves. Not really for the clients.

Hi Investor, Hi Greg,
Thank you guys for taking time to reply to my post. Both your responses were thoughtful and thought provoking. They both added to the scope and utility of my original submittal.
Investor, the articles that you suggested greatly expand the usefulness of my posting by identifying two strategies that focus on the execution of retirement portfolio maintenance. Retirees and near-retirees will benefit from exposure to these two excellent summary articles.
Also, I was not aware that the author of the article I referenced was part of Paul Merriman’s FundAdvice staff. I did not recognize the potential conflict of interest. I like Merriman, but he has special incentives because of his financial relationships with DFA. There’s the possibilities of some biased opinions because of that relationship. Thanks for the heads-up. In this instance, I am not overly concerned of any major distortions or misrepresentations because I trust Merriman and I trust the DFA organization. Both do yeoman work.
Greg, your interpretations of the reported work, and your intuitions on possible outcomes for the scenarios that you postulated are spot-on-target.
Even today, for Monte Carlo codes that nominally adjust drawdown rates to reflect inflation rate changes, the Monte Carlo tools can be effectively used to examine the constant drawdown case you proposed. That’s simply done by setting inflation rate and it variability to zero in the inputs. The very first Monte Carlo code that I developed did not include an inflation adjustment. As you correctly perceived, the general contour, in terms of an optimum asset allocation distribution, are about the same both with and without inflation considerations. Portfolio failure rates are obviously impacted, but your excellent Bath-tube description as a function of equity percentages is still valid.
Indeed, being ultra-conservative by including too few equities in a portfolio is a risky proposition in a retirement portfolio, especially these days with extremely low fixed-income yields. Remember that fixed-income products also have a returns volatility aspect. That variability essentially means that any drawdown schedule from most fixed-income dominated portfolios must be lower than the expected overall average return from that portfolio because of that lowered, but still non-zero, volatility. In the end, that translates into either a very low permissible (and not acceptable) withdrawal rate or an unrealistically gigantic portfolio size.
Once again, thank you guys for your perceptive and useful inputs.
Best Wishes.

Aberdeen’s Bruce Stout, manager of the £1.4bn Murray International trust, has urged investors to diversify out of bonds to avoid heavy losses when central banks stop the printing presses.
Stout, speaking to shareholders as the trust reported its annual results today, said investors are underestimating the potential consequences of unprecedented central bank stimulus.
"A lethal cocktail of unparalleled levels of global debt and unparalleled global money printing, shaken and stirred by numerous financial indicators at multi-century highs/lows, suggests a global fixed income hangover is fast approaching," he said.
"There is no precedent within fixed income history to assess the likely damage, but significant sums of money will be lost."
Stout's fixed income pessimism is shared by Robin Geffen, CEO of Neptune Investment Management, who in December warned bond investors should brace themselves for severe losses when the interest rate cycle turns.
Geffen argues the long end of the bond market will fall between 30% and 40% when interest rates and inflation normalise.
http://www.investmentweek.co.uk/investment-week/news/2251064/shaken-and-stirred-how-to-beat-the-fixed-income-hangover
Citi strategist Matt King, who sent us this chart in December, put it this way: "Since 2007, credit mutual fund assets have doubled, while dealers' corporate bond inventories have halved. So while in 2007, it would have taken a 50% outflow from mutual funds to double the size of the street's inventory, now if there were to be a 5% outflow it would double the size of the inventory."
In other words, the "buffer" of higher inventories on bank balance sheets provided the market with liquidity.
Now, that buffer is gone.
http://www.businessinsider.com/citi-bond-funds-to-spark-next-crisis-2013-2

Very nice @MJG.
Larry Katz is the Director of Research at Merriman Inc., a Seattle Based Financial Advisor. These folks also ran FundAdvice.com which provided educational material although with the retirement of founder Paul Merriman last year, FundAdvice.com has lost some of its previous content that I used to refer to. (Update: The article you posted in available in perhaps a bit better format at here)
Two of my favorite articles are "Fine Tuning Your Asset Allocation" and "Ultimate Buy and Hold Strategy".
Fine Tuning Article contained a table that provided the performance, risk and max drawdown information for various equity and bond mixes. Armed with that information an investor could make a more intelligent choice what risk/return level he/she is comfortable with and the what sort of downside could be expected at the portfolio level. Here is the 2011 Update that I can find. They used to update this article with each new year data. If it is updated since 2011, it is not publicly exposed anymore. :( I'll try to ping them to see if they will continue to update this one.
For the other article they continue to provide year to year updates to numbers. There is now a 2013 Update to Ultimate Buy-and-Hold Strategy article. Direct link is here.
The article you have linked and these two provide a good set of educational material.

http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/814232/000119312513077549/d491498d497.htm
497 1 d491498d497.htm RS GLOBAL NATURAL RESOURCES FUND
Filed pursuant to Rule 497(e)
File Nos. 033-16439 and 811-05159
RS INVESTMENT TRUST
Supplement to Summary Prospectuses for RS Global Natural Resources Fund
(Class A, C, K, and Y shares) Dated May 1, 2012
Before you invest, you may want to review the Fund’s prospectus, which contains more information about the Fund and its risks. You can find the Fund’s prospectus and other information about the Fund, including the Fund’s Statement of Additional Information (SAI) and most recent reports to shareholders, online at www.RSinvestments.com/prospectus. You can also get this information at no cost by calling 800-766-3863 or by sending an e-mail request to [email protected]. You can also get this information from your financial intermediary. The Summary Prospectus incorporates by reference the Fund’s Prospectus, dated May 1, 2012, as supplemented February 26, 2013, and SAI, dated May 1, 2012, as revised December 12, 2012, and the financial statements included in the Fund’s annual report to shareholders, dated December 31, 2011.
Effective March 15, 2013, the following is added to the section titled “Purchase and Sale of Fund Shares”:
The Fund is currently offered only to certain investors.
For additional information, see “How to Purchase Shares -- Other Information About Purchasing Shares” in the supplement dated February 26, 2013, to the Fund’s Prospectus, dated May 1, 2012.
February 26, 2013

Reply to @scooter: I like real, productive assets, but I think my likes have been too specific for broader funds. Brookfield Infrastructure (BIP) remains a very large holding and which was just upgraded by Raymond James (link) I like MLPs, but own Kinder Morgan given the company's remarkable size and scale. I like the "toll road" aspect of the pipelines and while they certainly have risks (headline risk, political risk, etc), you look at a Kinder Morgan that has 180 terminals and tens of thousands of miles of pipeline and, really, who could come in and try to replicate what they've built and compete on that level? Much like the rails, the major pipeline companies (Enbridge, Kinder, Transcanada and a number of others) are in a situation where it would be extraordinarily difficult for someone else to really come in.
I will not be allocating any more to these two investments, but will let dividends reinvest, and both provide significant dividends. Brookfield is a company and has company-specific risk (as well as the added paperwork of a K-1 at tax time), but it's unique in that it's almost a fund of specific infrastructure projects - everything from ports to pipelines to toll roads - around the world, and a pure and opportunistic play on infrastructure.
I also own a couple of other pipeline companies, one of which is a smaller recent investment in Australia's APA Group, which is the largest nat gas pipeline co in Australia (although they have some other investments besides pipelines.) That yields about 5.75%.
There are a number of infrastructure funds (TOLLX is a popular example), but I personally just like specific names.
Infrastructure has done well. Some other things not so much. I own Glencore, which I like from the standpoint of the company's demonstrated skill in commodities trading, as well as the company's remarkable collection of real assets, which includes hundreds of thousands of acres of owned or leased foreign farmland. They also bought grain handler Viterra (although some of that is going to be sold to other companies) and are in the midst of merging with miner Xstrata, which turned into a long, strange trip lasting the last year. Glencore has not done well, but it's a long-term (and I think very unique) play that I still like very much.
I've noted recently that I like WP Carey, which turned into a REIT last Fall. "From the CEO: "The premise is pretty simple. We buy a company’s most important real estate, and then we lease it back to them for a long period of time, 15 to 25 years typically. During that time, the contract includes rent increase provisions, typically those would be CPI-related, but not always. Sometimes they’re fixed rental increases. So we get the benefit of that rising income over time, and that’s where you get your cycle resistance, because no matter what’s happening in a local market at a given time, if the tenant continues to pay rent as they’re expected to, then you’ll have rising income. But at the same time, because it’s a triple-net lease structure and the tenant pays the taxes, the insurance and the operating expenses, the investors are not exposed to cost inflation." The company has demonstrated - pretty consistently - success in this field.
I continue to like the Asian conglomerates. Jardine Matheson has done better than Hutchsion Whampoa, but the latter is one of the world's biggest port operators and owns one of the world's largest health and beauty retailers. Both are trading around book value, but still are certainly not without risk. Jardine is more consumer-centric, but I like it's Dairy Farm subsidiary a good deal, which has done very well and includes some exposure to familiar brands, including a few IKEA stores in Asia.
I like telecoms. I owned (and bailed, d'oh) on Vodafone after it has continued to disappoint and while I won't go as far as to call it a value trap, I don't think it's the value I initially believed it was - not a real serious mistake, but I'll admit it was a mistake on my part. I still own - and consider a long-term holding - another foreign telecom company that has fared better.
I like rail, although I think I like it from the standpoint that some are seeing benefits from oil exploration (like Buffett's Burlington Northern). However, some are seeing benefits and some have lagged, especially those who had a focus on coal.
I like some tech more than others. I like Google. I don't like MSFT. I like what I call "financial technology" a good deal. This includes investments in things like mobile banking and other advancements in payment technology (EMV, mobile payments.) I think this is a long-term story. I don't own it, but I think Fiserv is a US example of something that fits into this category (FISV). Visa and MC are as well, although I think these are still tied heavily into the strength (or not) of the consumer.
It sounds unusual for me, but I actually like Wal-Mart. The company offers some emerging markets exposure (they own 51% of Massmart in South Africa, for example); the company's scope and logistics expertise is astonishing and I think there is still a large part of the population reliant upon WMT's low prices (and probably go there for cheaper pharmacy prices). Look at today's earnings call from Dollartree that was very positive, and Target's - which wasn't so hot. Wal-Mart's attempts to integrate more technology in the shopping experience can be seen with Wal-Mart labs, and I think WMT takes more share as places like Best Buy have trouble. It's also taking away market share - I think - from some grocers. The only other retail play that I find interesting but it's not high on my list is Fast Retailing, a Japanese company whose Uniqlo subsidiary is moving into the US and trying to take on Gap.
Wal-Mart is boring, but I think that - with a portion of one's portfolio - is that boring can be beautiful. Procter and Gamble and General Mills are other examples, although are overbought - I think - at this point. However, large established brands that pay nice dividends that you don't have to babysit are something that I think should be considered.
I like yield. Every single name I own offers a yield, many of them a very nice yield. If I can like the business and get paid a very nice yield to wait, that's really optimal, that's what I'm looking for.
I like healthcare, but - with a couple of exceptions - it's something I play with a fund and would recommend owning a fund. I understand some things and some broad concepts when it comes to modern medicine, but I certainly don't have a degree in modern medicine and a lot of it I either don't feel I'm qualified by any means to analyze or it's just greek to me.
Abbott Labs, which is now heavily nutrition (Ensure, etc) and whatnot) after it split and has considerable EM exposure is another example I like. Yacktman isn't entirely a match for this, but it remains heavily in large, established brands like PG, Pepsi, Coke, J & J, etc. There's also the SPLV low volatility ETF, as well as AQR's US Defensive Equity Fund (AUENX). Yacktman, SPLV and AUENX are not going to do as well when the market is ramping, but should allow one to sleep a bit better at night, and SPLV offers monthly dividends, which of course means the appealing ability to reinvest monthly. I think given where the market is now, if someone wants to add something new (although I'd wait for a pullback, but for those who don't want to wait...), the SPLV with its monthly dividend and portfolio of very large, established names, is an appealing option.
I do not own a fixed-income specific fund, although there is fixed income within some funds, such as AQR Risk Parity and Ivy Asset Strategy.
In terms of long-term themes, I like water and agriculture (there are ETF's and an Allianz fund for water, and ETF's for ag). These are volatile.
I also continue to like funds that have greater flexibility, including funds like Marketfield. I get where people are coming from with their concerns about FPA Crescent, but I continue to strongly agree with FPA Crescent manager Steve Romick and think the fund remains a very good choice. I am also positive on First Source Wasatch Income and Parnassus Equity Income, as well as the Matthews Asian equity income funds.
Sorry I couldn't be more help on the fund side, but I think my interests have gotten lately specific to the point where I've become interested in single names.
Lastly, rather than the rally monkey that some sites post, I'll offer... well, Microsoft's Ballmer acting like a nutcase. Only, this time, this is "Ballmer: The ITunes Remix."

A fund that offers a unique point of view, has flexibility, is not heavily correlated to the market and has a demonstrated track record of success (in this case, with the company's hedge funds) is appealing. I view this fund as part of a second generation of long-short vehicles that are more flexible with the definition (this doesn't even fall into the l/s category on Morningstar, interestingly.) Funds that, despite being "long-short" funds, realize that there's going to be times where there aren't many short opportunities, and have the ability to dial up and down risk to a greater degree. I think these funds may lose more in down markets than a number of their long-short peers, but also have the potential to capture more of the upside in up markets than many of their long-short peers.
Marketfield also falls under this category, as well. These funds definitely rely on management calls (although certainly every fund does), but I believe that the flexibility offered will be positive in the years to come.
Otherwise, I've thought for a while that essentially A:) we didn't learn anything from 2008, it was just "how quickly can we throw money at the problem to reboot everything?" However, with the Fed doing what it was doing, you had to be invested. Now, as I said the other day, it's nearly 5 years later and the Fed is still doing QE and ZIRP and the training wheels have not been taken off. What if we do have a recession, or are we not going to have them anymore because they'll just be met with more QE?
Seth Klarman noted the other day that, "(The) underpinnings of our economy and financial system are so precarious that the un-abating risks of collapse dwarf all other factors."
Personally, I think, despite what markets have done, there is some degree of shakiness to the foundation because what has happened is built on what the Fed has done, but nothing more than that; there has not been real reform to the financial system to strengthen the underlying foundation.
Or, as Jacob Rothschild recently noted, "“We are living through a
period of unparalleled
complexity and
uncertainty.” These
words remain as
regrettably true today as
when I wrote them in
my report to you two
years ago. To avoid the
situation becoming even
worse, governments
continue to roll their
printing presses in one
form or another. Their
actions prevent systemic
collapse but the deeper
underlying problems
remain."
That's not to say that I think people should freak out. That's not to say that I think you should sell everything. However, I think if someone is in retirement age or near retirement age especially, take a look at what you own and realize that the markets have been very comfortable the last few years. They may remain comfortable, but realize that there remain real issues here and abroad that have not really been addressed at the core level. If the market did have a substantial downturn, would you sleep well at night? If not, this may be a point, given where markets are, where you want to address that. That's not to say that a substantial downturn would be another 2008, and there are funds that allow people to remain invested, but with less risk and volatility. There's no one path to recommend, because everyone is different and everyone has different goals, different risk tolerance, etc, but I think the general idea is to remain invested but - at this point (especially if you're towards retirement age - maybe dial down risk a bit if you believe that some of what you own may not fare well if things were to turn South at this point.
As for the Whitebox letter, I think confidence in treasuries comes down to a belief that the Fed can buy enough paper to keep rates low, but I think retail investors continue to pile into bonds because they believe that there's a level of safety in bonds that can be maintained for the foreseeable future and they're looking for yield. That "safety" can go on for longer than anyone can think it will, but eventually the Bond market will turn South. People continue to reach for yield (no surprise, given that they can't earn anything in CDs or other "risk-free return") in fixed income and REITs and MLPS, but I think personally, given the environment, I'd rather own real, productive assets and get yield from that.
Additionally, as Marc Faber noted - and I agree with, at least for the foreseeable future - "I think that in equities you will be better off because you have an ownership in a company, than by being the lenders to companies, and the lenders, especially, to governments." If the bond market really turns substantially (and possibly suddenly), I think it will be large, institutional-level sellers that do it. It's not going to be all the retail money that has gone into bonds that will be first to leave.
In terms of the even the "rosy" scenario discussed in the Whitebox letter, I think there are some fairly large transitions implied by that, and while they may just go smoothly, I tend to believe that large transitions by many people, at one point or another, tend to get disorderly. Hopefully not. I do agree with the favoring of well-established large caps and I think a Yacktman or "Yacktman-like" fund of big brands and established names an appealing place to be right now vs taking more aggressive risks.
As for the Fed and Treasury losing credibility, that will likely never happen, because the Fed is the Great and Powerful Oz. The Treasury is, well, some new guy. I tend to wonder if there was ever a real loss of credibility for the Fed if it would ever be started internally, and wonder if it would be more likely an external event. But, that's neither here nor there.
I did find the discussion of "devaluation is inevitable" if treasuries rise towards 600bps rather interesting and I would have liked the letter to go into a little more detail on that.
There have been a lot of discussions of the implications of rates even getting back to rates considered "normal" lately, and it makes me tend to believe that if that occurs sooner than later, it would be due to things getting disorderly. I also question whether we will get the growth that is needed that is discussed in the letter, and if we do, it becomes a matter of how much is that growth actually costing, and the diminishing returns on the cost of buying the appearance of growth.
Overall, I think that people should not freak out, but realize that there are real risks that have not been addressed in the financial system and real obstacles yet ahead. Things, in terms of the markets, have been very comfortable for a while. I'd say stay invested, but the time to look to reduce potential volatility and risk is not in the midst of crisis, it's when everything seems comfortable.

Dear MJG,
Thanks for joining the discussion.
From your most recent post –
”…tentative attempt to forecast market movement.”
“…composite forecasting criteria…”
“…to forecast market movement…”
I find it interesting that you attempt to forecast the market,
even though you have posted numerous times that forecasting
is an unproductive activity.
To keep this short, the single Simple Moving Average device
that we’ve been discussing is NOT a forecasting device.
It identifies and follows the major market moves.
Every financial advisor on this planet recognizes that when the market (S&P)
is above the 200-day simple moving average we’re in a bull market and when it’s
below, we’re in a bear market.
BTW, I couldn’t locate the Monday WSJ data you mentioned.
Flack

Doctor Doom's outlook is short-term bullish, long-term catastrophic:
“The risk of the end game from QE is not going to be goods inflation, it's not going to be a rout in the bond market,” Roubini says. “The risk is ... (that) ... we could create an asset bubble worse than the previous one, which could lead to another financial crisis not this year, not next year, but two or three years down the line ...."
http://finance.yahoo.com/blogs/daily-ticker/nouriel-roubini-bullish-now-mother-bubbles-begun-140143386.html

http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1406305/000119312513068397/d490156d497.htm
1 d490156d497.htm GATEWAY TRUST
GATEWAY FUND
Supplement dated February 21, 2013 to the Gateway Fund Prospectus, dated May 1, 2012, and Gateway Fund Summary Prospectus, dated May 1, 2012, as may be revised and supplemented from time to time.
Effective immediately, J. Patrick Rogers no longer serves as portfolio manager of the Gateway Fund. All references to Mr. Rogers and corresponding disclosure relating to Mr. Rogers are removed.
Effective February 21, 2013, the information in the “Portfolio Managers” sub-section within the section “Management” in the Summary Prospectus and the Prospectus is revised to include the following:
Paul R. Stewart, CFA, president and CEO of the Adviser, has served as co-portfolio manager of the Fund (including the Gateway Predecessor Fund) since 2006.
Michael T. Buckius, CFA, senior vice president and chief investment officer of the Adviser, has served as co-portfolio manager of the Fund since 2008.
Kenneth H. Toft, CFA, senior vice president and portfolio manager of the Adviser, has served as co-portfolio manager of the Fund since 2013.
Effective February 21, 2013, the reference to J. Patrick Rogers in the sub-section “Meet the Funds’ Portfolio Managers” within the section “Management Team” in the Prospectus is hereby deleted.
Effective February 21, 2013, the sub-section “Meet the Funds’ Portfolio Managers” within the section “Management Team” is revised to include the following:
Paul R. Stewart — Mr. Stewart joined the Predecessor Adviser in 1995. He served as treasurer of the Predecessor Trust through 1999 and as chief financial officer of the Predecessor Adviser through 2003. He became a senior vice president of the Predecessor Adviser and began working in the area of portfolio management in 2000. Mr. Stewart was appointed chief investment officer of the Predecessor Adviser in 2006 and president and CEO of the Adviser in 2013. He served as co-portfolio manager of the Gateway Fund since 2006. Mr. Stewart received a BBA from Ohio University in 1988. He holds the designation of Chartered Financial Analyst.
Michael T. Buckius — Mr. Buckius joined the Predecessor Adviser in 1999 and holds the positions of senior vice president and chief investment officer. He has been a co-portfolio manager of the Gateway Fund since 2008 and serves as co-portfolio manager of three funds sub-advised by Gateway. Mr. Buckius holds a B.A. and M.B.A. in Finance from Loyola College in Baltimore. He holds the designation of Chartered Financial Analyst.
Kenneth H. Toft — Mr. Toft joined the Predecessor Adviser in 1992 and holds the positions of senior vice president and portfolio manager. He has been co-portfolio manager of the Fund since 2013. Mr. Toft holds a B.A. and M.B.A. from the University of Cincinnati. He holds the designation of Chartered Financial Analyst.

I'm rather new at investing, and it has taken a while to get up to speed on some of the complexities of this endeavor. Having decided to pull the trigger on my own, I'd like to ask the many experts on this forum a couple of questions.
1. Are all segments of the M* blocks needed for a well-rounded portfolio? I have small caps and a great deal of large caps covered. Does one need mids or can I forgo this segment?
2. I have become enamored with Warren Buffett and his financial empire and would like to have some of his in a mutual fund. How do I find out which funds carry his stock? I looked at M* and found you can get a top ten or so funds, but how about the hundreds of others that are not listed?
3. I believe price plays a role in profits. Should I come up with an arbitrary number that will delineate funds for purchase or not? In other words is it acceptable to have a cut-off of, say 1.10 ER as a high end on whether to buy?
4. Finally, do you guys ever buy Transaction Fee funds through the brokers or is this a crazy thing to do?
Thanks for any comments that will help me navigate this fun and hopefully profitable project.
Mike

Dear friends,
We spent a bit over an hour talking with Andrew Foster of Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income. About 50 people phoned-in to listen. Among the highlights of the call, for me:
1. Andrew offered a rich discussion about his decision to launch the fund. The short version: early in his career, he concluded that emergent China was "the world's most under-rated opportunity" and he really wanted to be there. By late 2009, he noticed that China was structurally slowing. That is, it was slow because of features that had no "easy or obvious" solution, rather than just slowly as part of a cycle. He concluded that "China will never be the same." Long reflection and investigation led him to begin focusing on other markets, many of which were new to him, that had many of the same characteristics that made China exciting and profitable a decade earlier. Given Matthews' exclusive and principled focus on Asia, he concluded that the only way to pursue those opportunities was to leave Matthews and launch Seafarer.
2. He believes that Seafarer has three distinguishing characteristics. (1) They're obsessive about bottom-up research and don't try to make calls about currencies or regional dynamics as part of the process. They may factor such things in but only because they bear on a particular firm that interests him. (2) Their portfolio is built by a single individual, driven by individual securities, rather than by some combination of multiple overlaps, portfolio sleeves and internal corporate politics. The fact that he's "immensely afraid of failure" leads him to a carefully conceived, concentrated portfolio. (3) Their focus is on sustainable growth, with income. He tried to avoid "high concept" stocks and especially those whose success is largely dependent on the whims of politicians or bureaucrats. His preference is for more seasoned firms with slower, sustainable growth paths.
3. Income has three functions in the portfolio. (1) It serves as a check on the quality of a firm's business model. At base, you can't pay dividends if you're not generating substantial, sustained free cash flow and generating that flow is a sign of a healthy business. (2) It serves as a common metric across various markets, each of which has its own accounting schemes and regimes. (3) It provides as least a bit of a buffer in rough markets. Andrew likened it to a sea anchor, which won't immediately stop a ship caught in a gale but will slow it, steady it and eventually stop it.
4. On whole, he believes that equities are more attractively priced than are fixed-income securities, hence he's about 90% equities.
5. As markets have become a bit stretched - prices are up 30% since the recent trough but fundamentals have not much changed - he's moved at the margins from smaller names to larger, steadier firms.
6. The fund can, but generally won't, hedge its currency exposure.
7. Following Teapot's question, Andrew suggested that the devaluation of the yen bears very careful attention ("it's very much worth paying attention to"), at least in part because a falling yen was one of the precursors of the Asian financial crisis in the late 90s.

Apologies to all: at about this point, my 12-year-old discovered that I'd bought a "new" used car today and began celebrating. Part of the celebration involved snatching the phone upstairs from my study and attempting to dial friends.

8. As long as the fund is growing, yield will look low and tax efficiency will look relatively high. I hadn't thought about it before: he might receive a dividend check in September when he had $12 million in the fund but when he pays it out in December, that check gets spread across a much larger group of shareholders (there was $28 million in the fund then) so each receives less.
9. The fund instituted a second set of expense reductions, this one voluntary, that they hope to be able to make permanent but they'll have to wait until August to see what's economically possible.
10. He will not invest in firms domiciled in any country where he and his staff cannot safely travel. They need to make face-to-face encounters with management teams, in part to discover the identities and agendas of the actual "control persons," but he won't put his folks' safety at risk for the sake of an investment lead.
Bottom-line: the valuations on emerging equities look good if you've got a three-to-five year time horizon, fixed-income globally strikes him as stretched, he expects to remain fully invested, reasonably cautious and reasonably concentrated.
I'm wondering what other folks heard, too.
David

Hi Guys,
First and foremost, I want to thank each and every MFO member who visited my posting. The response was overwhelming and very satisfying to me since the goal of every single of my submittals is to educate, to inform our band of brothers.
Secondly, and no less importantly, I particularly want to extend a thank you to those members who contributed excellent commentary. You prepared outstanding viewpoints that balanced the discussion. We all benefit from these divergent standpoints. No single person understands all the fascinating machinations and mechanisms of the marketplace. Your special perspectives are always welcomed and truly appreciated.
It appears that my chosen title is somewhat controversial. Good. It was selected to capture the prospective audience’s attention, and by the readership count it performed exactly as designed. In addition, it closely and purposely mirrors the title of Peter Lynch’s famous book whose objective was to inspire individual investor participation, education, and potential profits.
I partially concur with some contributors that specifically “Beating the Street” for that singular purpose is a shallow objective for most investors. It might satisfy some egos, but it will not necessarily enhance one’s retirement comfort. Please take note of my qualifier “necessarily”. I attach a deeper, embedded purpose to that common phrase. Let’s dive into the weeds now.
I naturally anticipate that under normal circumstances a retiree with a several million dollar portfolio need not Beat the Street; he might not even need to beat inflation; his goal might just be wealth preservation. However, for most retirees a fair return in excess of inflation must be the target.
Before constructing a portfolio, a target return is estimated based largely on projected annual withdrawal rate demands and expected timeframe. There are other factors too. During the construction of that portfolio, an asset allocation determination is made to satisfy that target goal with minimum risk. In many instances, risk is defined in terms of portfolio volatility.
The commonsense logic is that only risk sufficient to meet the required portfolio drawdown rate is acceptable. I’m a total investment amateur, but a highly seasoned one; I have never earned a dime giving financial advice. But that’s how I developed my portfolio over two decades ago; I propose that some professional advisors that participate on this fine site do the same.
A guiding principle that controls much thought in cobbling together a portfolio is broad product diversification, including international components. None of this is novel stuff. I do not invent these concepts: I do deploy them. Essential elements that go into that portfolio assembly are mutual fund statistical data sets like average annual return, return standard deviations, and correlation coefficients.
The forecasted portfolio returns must be high enough to satisfy the clients projected drawdown schedule. If a client needs a 4 % drawdown rate above inflation, short term government bonds will simply not do the job. Historically these short term government bonds only generate about a 0.7 % annual reward above inflation rates. Therefore, to satisfy this hypothetical customers needs, more additional product risk (likely equities) must be introduced into his portfolio.
How much of each asset class is required to resolve the allocation issue? That depends on the expected reward profiles of each investment class candidate. What are those levels? An excellent zeroth order point of departure is the historical returns (pick your own timeframe) registered in the past. These data are precisely the Index returns that represent the marketplace overall and for various subcomponents of it.
So equaling or beating the Indices (Beating the Street) is a crucial part of both constructing and assessing (measuring) the current status of a portfolio. That portfolio was assembled with certain forward looking expectations; expectations that were basically grounded in Index returns. That portfolio is in trouble if those expectations are not realized. So Beating the Street is a measure, a benchmark of the health of a retirement portfolio.
If a portfolio continuously fails to achieve street-like rewards, most advisors will eliminate the faltering elements and select replacements. If the advisor uses Morningstar as a data source, it is highly likely that the advisor will never select a one-star fund. Denials aside, most advisors base their initial selections on recent performance in general, and specifically contrasted against an Index reference standard.
How do financial advisors gauge their success? One reasonable answer is to compare performance against a carefully constructed benchmark. Typically, the benchmarks are composed of Indices which are themselves a proxy for the marketplace. So “Beating the Street” is really just an alternate way of saying that the portfolio is doing its intended job.
Since portfolios are built using Index returns as a likely returns pattern, a failure to achieve those forecasted returns implies dire consequences for the portfolio’s survival likelihood unless changes are implemented.
Language has developed to facilitate communications. It is mostly successful, but since it has been around for so long, alternate meanings and interpretations sometimes interrupt or interfere with its goal. Such might be the case here. Language can be a tricky business.
For me, “Beating the Street” is about equivalent to “Beating the Indices”. As a retiree, “Beating the Indices” means that my portfolio is keeping its head above water insofar as my planned withdrawal schedule is being preserved. It is an embedded performance measurement tool, not an ego adventure; it functions like a calibration device.
It’s interesting to note that even Wall Street bankers did not use this simple measurement concept as late as the early 1960s. In Peter Bernstein’s superb book “Capital Ideas”, he relates a story from Bill Sharpe. When Sharpe lunched with these bankers, he questioned them about their performance relative to some relevant benchmarks. No banker could answer his question. In that period, these professional financers did not measure their performance against any reasonable standard. We have come a long way since those times.
One final clarifying point is needed.
For the record, when I use the term “guy”, I mean it as a gender neutral term. That’s the way it is used in our household; that’s the way it is in many households. Sorry if it offends some of you guys, but it makes writing much easier for me. In all ways, I respect women for their financial acumen. They run their households efficiently, and they invest wisely. I often reference studies that conclude that female investors outperform their male counterparts. That’s accomplished by trading less frequently. Good for them.
Once again, thanks for your readership, and thanks for your informed contributions. I enjoy discussing these matters with you all.
Best Wishes.

To say the least the question is flawed. Without a clearer proposition and set of terms all participants agree to, this donkey can't fly. Perhaps the OP laid out the relevant terms and definitions in his lengthy expose' --- don't know. Doesn't matter unless everybody agrees to them.
Since all will have different perspectives on relevant terms like: market, investor, investing, active and passive management and the correct time-frame for consideration, little can be accomplished to resolve such a poorly worded proposition. That's not to say the comments on both sides aren't valid. They are - as each approaches the arena (meaning "combat zone" and not necessarily "circus") from a different perspective.
The proposition - or something like it has been promulgated for years - John Bogle being a major proponent. Over very long periods (measured in multi-decades) it holds truth to this extent. (1) Since all things tend to "average-out" over the very long term, (2) And all else being equal, (3) Than financial contracts (Isn't that what ownership of an asset really constitutes?) which exact the lowest cost from the participants to construct and execute will over time prove the more profitable to the participants. The key qualifier is of course: "All else being equal." As the many responses demonstrate - they seldom are.

Reply to @scott:
1. You are amazing.
2. What a truly sad situation if your comment is true (beyond obviously exploitative shops like Edward Jones):

...to some degree it's the desire of financial companies not to have the populace (as a whole) highly educated in terms of investing.