JR writes in essence that minor discrepancies among multiple sources of data are on the same order of magnitude as the difference between multiplicative and additive calculations. So don't sweat it.
I'll decompose that because I disagree with two out of three parts:
1. Data sources will be inconsistent. While true, that's a problem that can be circumvented by using a single data source containing all the necessary data.
Shiller's data contains:
a. CPI-U by month - so one can calculate inflation over any period of time
b. Earnings (E) by month - so one can calculate earnings growth over any period of time
c. S&P price (P) by month - so one can calculate P/E by month and thus multiple expansion over any period of time
d. Dividends (D) by month, so one can calculate D/P (dividend rate) over any period of time.
(JR adds another source of discrepancy; for earnings growth he cites a source for the entire economy, not for the S&P 500.)
2. The order of magnitude of these discrepancies is roughly the same as that of percentage differences when comparing multiplicative and additive results.
That is, if one factor adds 3%/year and another factor adds 2%/year, we can combine them by adding and get a 5%/year gain, or we can multiple them to get (1+3%) x (1 + 2%) - 1 = 5.06%. It's just a small difference and comparable to differences introduced by using multiple data sources. Granted.
3. The percentages (which may be off slightly due to #2) are unchanged over time. For example, if one factor accounts for 2% of the gain in a year and another factor accounts for 3% of the gain in a year, the same will be true over 45 years. That is, compounding the returns doesn't change the factor impacts (here 40%:60%).
This is wrong, and this is the main point I've been driving at.
Consider inflation and multiplier expansion. For simplicity, we'll assume that no divs are paid and earnings don't grow.
Annualized rates are: Inflation 3.51% and multiple expansion 2.19% (from original column)
To allocate weights, we just take each value's percentage of the sum total.
Inflation accounts for 3.51/5.70 = 62% of the total, and
multiple expansion accounts for 2.19/5.70 = 38% of the total.
After 45 years, inflation has increased the price by (1.0351)^45 - 1 = 372%, and
multiple expansion has increase the price by (1.0219)^45 - 1 = 165%
Over 45 years, inflation accounts for 372/537 = 69% of the total, and
multiple expansion accounts for 165/537 = 31% of the total.
One cannot allocate percentage impacts by using annualized figures. Compounded over time, the larger factors loom ever larger while the smaller factors play less and less of a role. The reason for this is compounding, i.e. multiplying, rather than adding returns.
Worth a mention: None of these items obscure the general pattern. Tinker with them all, and inflation still comes out as the largest factor, followed by profits, then dividends, then multiple expansion
He looked at a 45 year period. But when we take the longer view, more than double that time, i.e. a century, the general pattern shifts. Dividends are more important than inflation.
Over 45+ years, annualized inflation is 3.51% and average dividend rate is 2.75% (I get 2.77%).
Over a century, annualized inflation is 2.77% and average dividend rate is 3.83%.
I won't bore you with the formulas, but I will make it easy for you to reproduce and check. Using Shiller's spreadsheet, here are the four expressions needed:
Jan 1976 - March 2021:
inflation =POWER(E1811 / E1268,1/45.25)-1
av div rate =SUMPRODUCT(C1269:C1811,1/B1269:B1811)/(45.25 * 12)
July 1921 - June 2021:
inflation =POWER(E1814/E614,12/1200)
av div rate =SUMPRODUCT(C615:C1814,1/B615:B1814)/(100 * 12)

But FIDO hopes you've at least thought about an exit strategy. I consider this thoughtful of them.
One may imagine the message you would have received from a RobinHood account.
"Don't you want to buy some more?" "You call yourself an investor?" "Looks like a pretty chicken s#*@ trade to our system."

Robinhood: "buy more! Don't you want to earn some confetti animations and more badges!"
[producer, to the director's earpiece]: "Because RH needs the order flow since 80% of quarterly revenue came from it."

WTF are badges? I've been using RH for more than 5 years and never heard of them.
I really don't get the hate on RH. People using the platform do benefit from PFOF in aggregate; I've also used Fidelity for 10+ years and have cumulatively saved less than $1 for "price improvements" because of their "better" execution.

If Vanguard has spent $1B on technology the results are thus far invisible to me, as in absolutely no difference over the past few years (except for glitches they have had to reverse).

I personally have not seen any technology updates which have improved my Vanguard experience.

Meanwhile, Fidelity’s on hiring binge.
Re TRP …
- One might attribute the poor customer support to Covid restrictions. I accepted that for nearly a year before recognizing their problems were deeper seated. I’ve tried unsuccessfully to uncover if in recent years perhaps they’ve out-sourced their phone support? I ask because 10-15 years back it was fairly easy to get kicked up to a manager. And usually that resulted in substantive results - be it a direct from the top answer about operations or resolution of some personal beef. But in recent years there seemed no continuity to the phone support operations. As others may have noted, sometimes different reps appear to be working at cross-purpose.
- The “nasties” in customer support seem apart from their outstanding investing capabilities. And their stock price has soared - up about 35% YTD by one report . If you can save $$ on the customer support, that’s extra cash in the pockets of investors in the company.

If Vanguard has spent $1B on technology the results are thus far invisible to me, as in absolutely no difference over the past few years (except for glitches they have had to reverse). Meanwhile they have been disinvesting in customer service. Backasswards is right.

Does anyone suppose that manager longevity not only relates to their performance success but also to their access to businesses and company managers they've built up over the years? I tend to think that the likes of Danoff, Tillinghast, Miller, etc., etc. might have quicker or easier access to their time and insight.
I forgot to add that I had owned Fidelitys Contrafund FCNTX since roughly 1982. I was generally always pleased with its performance and saw little reason to change until it became quite massive in AUM and returns seemed to track that of the S&P500 +/- a percent or two here and there. Two years ago I sold a good chunk and invested the proceeds into BIAWX. Since then BIAWX has returned 83.82% to 47.61% for FCNTX. It has been a reasonable exchange so far.

I don't know how one chooses.
Isn't that really the point? That one doesn't know, except in hindsight, whether one's manager will be there tomorrow, whether a fund's method is "solid" or will change, or even if it doesn't change whether it will continue to be successful over time or in the next bear market or whatever.
Sticking with an investment should involve continual evaluation. Is this a fund I would buy today? If not, then why am I holding it?
Out of curiosity, I ran a screen for funds that currently have a manager who has been there for at least two decades. Aside from five oddball funds without star ratings, the remaining 144 distinct funds break down as:
5 star: 10 funds, 7%
4 star: 30 funds, 21%
3 star: 50 funds, 35%
2 star: 34 funds, 24%
1 star: 20 funds, 14%
The M* "neutral" distribution is 10%/22.5%/35%/22.5%/10%. This is about as close to that as one would expect to get when pulling 144 funds out of a hat. Longevity would appear to count for nothing. Perhaps even less than nothing, given survival bias (funds that stay around for decades tend to be better performing ones, so these should have skewed toward more stars).
There are several funds in the list that I recognize. A couple are:
LLPFX, "One of the best mutual funds in history" - Jaffe, 2/6/2000. This fund, along with its sibling LLSCX have had the same managers for over three decades. Both are currently rated 1 star.
TEFQX (Firsthand e-Commerce Fund until May 2010): "[M*'s] top rated 5 star funds were all technology and telecom funds that met investors fancy 2 1/2 years ago [mid 1997]. This led to their subscribers pouring money into the Janus and Firsthand Funds". TEFQX not only survived, but is currently rated 4*.
However, Kevin Landis' Firsthand funds generally imploded. His flagship Technology Value Fund (TVFQX) was converted into a business development company, technically not even a registered investment company. That happened not as a result of the dot com bust, but as a result of the GFC years later.
This is all a long winded way of saying that I agree, one can't know how to choose. As a corollary, one can't know whether to stay the course.
Regarding Fidelity's management turnover (i.e. expectation that a new fund manager would still at the fund a few years later), late 80s/early 90s:

This is typical: A look through Fidelity's long list of equity funds finds only about six managers who have been managing the same fund for five years or more. A tenure of one to three years for one fund is much more common, though most managers have been with Fidelity longer than that, graduating from one fund to another.

June 15, 1992
https://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/fl-xpm-1992-06-15-9202140732-story.html

My initial sentiment was only about sticking with solid method over time.
Your initial post showed how wonderful FLPSX was compared with other funds you considered as alternative investments at the time of a market peak (give or take). The fund navigated that one bear market (2000-2002) exceedingly well, even gaining in value. In all other bear markets during the fund's lifetime, it roughly paced the market:
July 16, 1990 - Oct 16, 1990: -17.46% vs. -19.9% for S&P 500
March 24, 2000 - Oct 9, 2002: +18.05% vs. -49.1%
Oct 9, 2007 - March 9, 2009: -53.64% vs. -56.8%
Feb 19, 2020 - March 23, 2020: -36.85% vs -35%
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/14/a-look-at-bear-and-bull-markets-through-history.html
https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/stock-market-sp500-hits-record-high-intraday-bear-market-recovery-2020-8
That one fluke does suggest that "Perhaps it is all luck" after all. Its "solid method" of investing didn't help it reproduce that success in other bear markets. Take away that one fluke and I think you'll find FLPSX 's performance is right in line with that of some good funds and below that of some others.
If the intent of the initial post was to show that funds with "solid methods" perform well, what was the purpose of including FAIRX? It hardly seems like a fund with a "solid method" of investing, at least not in recent years.
Rather than illustrate your thesis, FAIRX seems to act as a counterexample - that funds with lousy methods of investing can do as well as funds with solid methods.
Has he not largely adhered to the fund name?
FLPSX was a small cap fund for about half its lifetime. It managed to remain focused on small caps through the early 2000s even as AUM exploded. It used the tactic of buying more and more different small caps to spread out the money. This tactic ran out of steam when it hit 1,000 different companies.
As I recall, Fidelity explained that the fund was investing in a significant number of mid and large cap companies not because it had grown too large, but because it was remaining true to its "solid method". It claimed that its investing discipline naturally led to invest in larger cap stocks due to market conditions at the time. Ultimately Fidelity had to drop this charade and acknowledge that the fund had morphed into a mid cap fund.
With respect to adhering to its name, "Tillinghast concedes that Low-Priced, which purchases only stocks that sell for $35 a share or less, is 'a bit of a gimmick.'"
https://www.kiplinger.com/article/investing/t041-c000-s002-small-and-mid-cap-funds.html

Let us propose that in the late 1980s or early 1990s we were persuaded, from press or elsewhere, that this guy Tillinghast was worth giving some money too.
Using performance since inception, an objective time frame, is a definite improvement over using a subjectively chosen date in the middle of 2000.
In a similar vein, my "horse changing" date was also objective. When a fund is reclassified, especially if due to increased girth, it's a time for owners to examine what they own. Tillinghast had increased the fund's holdings to over 1,000 securities; he had exhausted this tactic.
Ah, there is a same-house fund that has matched or beaten Tillinghast: FCNTX.
If we're playing this what if, hypothetical game, what would have persuaded you to invest in FLPSX at inception, in a fund and in a manager with no track record? We can hypothesize anything, but it would help if it were believable. Likewise, what would have persuaded you to have invested in FCNTX?
At least that fund had a track record, albeit with three managers over its five year life span (as of 1989). That included its then current manager who had just taken over at the beginning of 1989, and who, like Tillinghast had no prior fund management experience.
To add insult to injury, both those funds sported a 3% load at the time.
https://www.thestreet.com/personal-finance/fidelity-removes-loads-from-five-funds-10095722
In Dec 1989 (when FLPSX started), if one were perusing the press, one could not have helped but be impressed by Lynch's fund. Alas, FMAGX was closed. But there was another LCG fund aggressively implemented lookin' good.
FDGRX had a manager with ten years experience, the last two managing this fund. And from its inception in Jan 1983 through Dec 1989, it was blowing away FCNTX, 219% to 157% cumulative returns.
None of this is to say that these are not all fine funds. But in the late 80s/early 90s, Fidelity was rotating managers like crazy. There was no expectation that any manager would be around for a long time. Just look at FCNTX, with its three managers in five years before it settled on Danoff. Magellan was the exception.

Good stuff. Hard to believe Giroux has been running the fund for near 15 years. I have a modest weighting in PRWCX along with about the same amount in DODBX.
Read D&C’s semi-annual last evening. They have the fund invested 66% in equities. Their stocks overall have a much lower average PE than the S&P. In fact, they hold a 4% short position on the S&P which they see as overvalued. They like financials (which do well when interest rates are rising) but have sold some off recently. Also overweight energy.
Here’s a brief (possibly “suspect”) quotation: “The equity portfolio’s composition is very different from the overall market, and trades at a meaningful discount to both the broad-based market and value universe: 13.9 times forward earnings compared to 22.3 times for the S&P 500 and 17.9 times for the R1000V. Stocks that benefit from rising interest rates are currently trading at particularly low relative valuations, and represent an area of emphasis for the portfolio.”
LINK to June 30, 2021 Report /// DODBX
Apologies for any thread drift. Hard for me to view one fund without comparing it to the other, as both are integral to my approach.

@msf, in showing how wrong additive decomposition of factors is, are you also making a point about this conclusion?

A couple, at least.
That his relying on people's intuition that the factor weightings should sum to 100% is wrong. So his factor weighting column must be wrong. And thus the way he calculated it must be wrong.
That the assertion that this resulted in being off by merely a few basis points is sleight of hand. The misdirection comes about in switching from the time frame used in most of the column, 45 years, 3 months (542/12 years), to a single year toward the end. Calling that single year "annualized" enhanced the illusion, as it makes it seem that the factor weighting (percentages) are the same over time.
That's not true. Over time, the discrepancies compound just like the returns. What may be a rounding of a few basis points over one year becomes a large deviation over decades.
Here's a simple example to illustrate. Take two factors, one that adds 2% to the return per year and one that adds 3%. Call them inflation and earnings if it helps make things more concrete.
Over one year (i.e. annualized), the increase in value is:
(1+ 2%) x (1 + 3%) - 1 = 5.06% ≈ (2% + 3%) = 5% (give or take 6 basis points)
Using addition rather than multiplication isn't significant at first. But over 45 years, 3 months we get, first using the correct (multiplicative) annual return of 5.06% and then the rounded (additive) return of 5%:
(1 + 5.06%) ^ (542/12) - 1 = 8.2951 = 829.51% increase in nominal value
(1 + 5%) ^ (542/12) = 8.0584 = 805.84% increase in value
That's a difference of 2,367 basis points. Not just "a few basis points". Swept under the rug by redirecting attention from a decades long time span to a time span of a single year.

tnx, OJ, that was my point, sort of. Have winner faith, hang in.
Obvious, if not to some.
Let us propose that in the late 1980s or early 1990s we were persuaded, from press or elsewhere, that this guy Tillinghast was worth giving some money too.
30 years later --- which is not all that long for those of us older investors --- guess how his work compares w other wise touts of that time: DODGX, VFIAX, PENNX (old sc), DFCIX (old mc) ?
Oops --- his returns are more than 40% higher than the best of them. Whoa. Well over double SP500, no less.
One manager, one method, one fund. Snowball's insight is true!
Ah, there is a same-house fund that has matched or beaten Tillinghast: FCNTX. With several managers. So you could even argue, sometimes and with hindsight, for having constant faith in a house and its LCG sector aggressively implemented.
(If we had stuck with those two, instead of fretting and tracking and reading and trading, well, we could be giving a lot more to charity and kids these days!)

Back in the 70s we started with a number of American Funds, and kept with them for well over 21 years. Sure, did some buying, selling, and trading among various American Funds, but still stayed the course with the family. In fact, still have a very small position in a couple of their funds to this very minute.
Sure, theoretically could have done much better by changing horses as we crossed various streams, but for a guy who never was very brilliant at investing we managed to accomplish what we needed to, and are now financially living very happily.
Different strokes, and all that...

Over the years much has changed for us. We switched to use mostly index funds and ETFs, except for smaller caps and overseas. Our 401(k) choices are all index funds and target dated funds. Our expected return is modest. Getting market-like return is more than suffice.

Great stuff hindsight is, innit, especially when one knows about streams and horses. The significant foreign slug has always had an effect. The impulse behind my retrospect was the updated M* highest rankings of both fund and manager --- since covid began, looks like. (Yet it's not even an MCV leader.)
Not having been in FLPSX for some years, I was simply interested to see they were back in the site's news. Continuous MFO Great Owl all those years as well.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/892071/000119312521258957/d158365d497.htm
TCW Funds, Inc.
Supplement dated August 27, 2021 to the
Prospectus dated March 1, 2021 (the “Prospectus”)
For current and prospective investors in the TCW Core Fixed Income Fund, the TCW Enhanced Commodity Strategy Fund, the TCW Global Bond Fund, the TCW Short Term Bond Fund, the TCW Total Return Bond Fund (each a “Fund” and together, the “Funds”)
TCW Investment Management Company LLC, the investment adviser to each Fund (the “Adviser”), has announced that Tad Rivelle, one of the portfolio manager for the Funds, will retire from the Adviser at year-end. The remaining portfolio managers for those Funds will continue to have responsibility for managing the Funds after his retirement.
The Adviser has provided the following statement regarding Tad Rivelle’s retirement:
“We are writing today to provide you news on developments that we have long prepared for in the management of our business and the trusted oversight of our client portfolios. Committing ourselves as we have over the years to a team approach to managing assets, focused on process, we have tapped the collective best thinking of our investment professionals and established redundancies that serve the essential need for consistency of approach.
It is against this backdrop that we announce forthcoming changes to our Generalist team, first that Tad Rivelle, following nearly 35 years in the industry, will retire from TCW Investment Management Company LLC, the Funds’ adviser, at year-end, and that Laird Landmann, Steve Kane and Bryan Whalen will continue as Generalist portfolio managers, with Steve and Bryan assuming Co-CIO roles for the Fixed Income team beginning in the fourth quarter 2021. The Specialist portfolio managers that comprise such a key element of our team and process, remain in place, and continue to guide the management of their sectors, supported by well-built out trading and research functions, in which TCW continues to make considerable commitments from a resource and systems standpoint.
Says Tad Rivelle: “We recognized very early on that asset management businesses are built on trust and competence. The enduring success of the team and of the TCW fixed income enterprise has been predicated not only on delivering the pattern of returns as represented but also on an unwavering commitment to transparency with our clients. I have had the pleasure and honor of working with a team of Specialist managers of unrivalled competence, led by a team of Generalists, for now some 20 to 30 years, who have first, last and always placed client interests above all else.”
As an additional dimension to these changes, longtime Senior Analyst to the Generalists Ruben Hovhannisyan has been promoted to a newly-established Associate Generalist position. Expectations are that these functions will scale over time, as a commitment to evergreen management and to building a deep bench of investment talent, as well as in response to business demands and emerging opportunities.
Naturally, change in our industry is one that brings with it plenty in the way of questions and we stand ready to address inquiries about this and all aspects of our business. We appreciate your ongoing partnership and look forward to those opportunities.”
Please retain this Supplement with your Prospectus for future reference.
From Metropolitan West:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1028621/000119312521258954/d160297d497.htm
497 1 d160297d497.htm 497
Metropolitan West Funds (the “Trust”)
Supplement dated August 27, 2021 to the
Prospectus dated July 29, 2021 (the “Prospectus”)
For current and prospective investors in the Metropolitan West AlphaTrak 500 Fund, the Metropolitan West Intermediate Bond Fund, the Metropolitan West Investment Grade Credit Fund, the Metropolitan West Low Duration Bond Fund, the Metropolitan West Strategic Income Fund, the Metropolitan West Total Return Bond Fund, the Metropolitan West Ultra Short Bond Fund, the Metropolitan West Unconstrained Bond Fund, the Metropolitan West Flexible Income Fund and the Metropolitan West Opportunistic High Income Credit Fund (each a “Fund” and together, the “Funds”)
Metropolitan West Asset Management, LLC, the investment adviser to each Fund (the “Adviser”), has announced that Tad Rivelle, one of the portfolio manager for the Funds, will retire from the Adviser at year-end. The remaining portfolio managers for those Funds will continue to have responsibility for managing the Funds after his retirement.
The Adviser has provided the following statement regarding Tad Rivelle’s retirement:
“We are writing today to provide you news on developments that we have long prepared for in the management of our business and the trusted oversight of our client portfolios. Committing ourselves as we have over the years to a team approach to managing assets, focused on process, we have tapped the collective best thinking of our investment professionals and established redundancies that serve the essential need for consistency of approach.
It is against this backdrop that we announce forthcoming changes to our Generalist team, first that Tad Rivelle, following nearly 35 years in the industry, will retire from Metropolitan West Asset Management, LLC, the Funds’ adviser, at year-end, and that Laird Landmann, Steve Kane and Bryan Whalen will continue as Generalist portfolio managers, with Steve and Bryan assuming Co-CIO roles for the Fixed Income team beginning in the fourth quarter 2021. The Specialist portfolio managers that comprise such a key element of our team and process, remain in place, and continue to guide the management of their sectors, supported by well-built out trading and research functions, in which TCW continues to make considerable commitments from a resource and systems standpoint.
Says Tad Rivelle: “We recognized very early on that asset management businesses are built on trust and competence. The enduring success of the team and of the TCW fixed income enterprise has been predicated not only on delivering the pattern of returns as represented but also on an unwavering commitment to transparency with our clients. I have had the pleasure and honor of working with a team of Specialist managers of unrivalled competence, led by a team of Generalists, for now some 20 to 30 years, who have first, last and always placed client interests above all else.”
As an additional dimension to these changes, longtime Senior Analyst to the Generalists Ruben Hovhannisyan has been promoted to a newly-established Associate Generalist position. Expectations are that these functions will scale over time, as a commitment to evergreen management and to building a deep bench of investment talent, as well as in response to business demands and emerging opportunities.
Naturally, change in our industry is one that brings with it plenty in the way of questions and we stand ready to address inquiries about this and all aspects of our business. We appreciate your ongoing partnership and look forward to those opportunities.”
Please retain this Supplement with your Prospectus for future reference.
LEGAL_US_W # 109241964.2

Thanks, @msf, for the detailed post. Just an FYI - a few years ago, I tried to convert at Schwab investor class shares of a Vanguard active fund into Admiral shares and it was not possible and I had to move the investment to Vanguard. So, it is possible the Fristrade availability of Admiral shares @fundly mentioned is limited to Vanguard index funds.

I have been using Firstrade for years and happy with service overall. I can confirm that they do charge loads for load funds, but I still find they have the best selection of funds being offered at NTF AND institutional shares at low minimums in some cases.

Firstrade is great for access to shares that you can't get elsewhere. I used it for years to get Franklin-Templeton's lower cost Advisor class shares.
While it's not as bare bones as it was when I was a customer, it's still not a brokerage I'd use as my primary institution. It doesn't make ATM reimbursements (and charges foreign transaction fees except for one per month), and has check printing fees, ACAT transfer fees, and limited phone hours (M-F). They don't seem to offer mobile deposits. IMHO none of which is significant for a secondary brokerage.
The main question in my mind is how long the free fund trading will last. I'm repeating myself here: we've seen similar programs sent off to the dustbin of history including Welltrade, Scottrade, and Scudder Retirement Plus. Though even if it brings back its $9.95 charge per trade, that's little more than a nuisance fee and not much more than the $5 that Fidelity charges for incremental investments in TF funds.

Firstrade:

A Short Term Redemption Fee of $19.95 will be applied to redemptions of mutual fund shares held less than 90 days. Broker-Assisted redemptions will incur a charge of $19.95. Redemptions of less than $500 will incur a $19.95 fee, unless the entire value of that fund is less than $500. For mutual funds transferred to Firstrade, the 90 day holding period will begin when the account transfer process is complete.

https://invest.firstrade.com/cgi-bin/main#/content/customerservice/pricing/
Once one logs in, there's a fund screener that gives not 11,000 funds but 16,854 funds, of which 10,265 are described as no load, and 6,589 of which are called load funds.

Before Firstrade dropped all fund transaction fees, it charged no transaction fee for funds on its NTF list and for load funds (since it collected loads on those funds), while charging $9.95 for no load, TF funds. I'm inclined to think that all Firstrade did was remove the $9.95 charge on the TF funds but that it still charges loads on funds it labels load funds. Especially since it shows 6K load funds in addition to the 10K+ funds that are "no load".
NTBAX is one such fund. Firstrade lists it as open but as a load fund. However, it does also list NTBIX as a noload fund, albeit with a $25K min.
While you won't find NTBAX on the Firstrade's public pages, you will find its sister fund NAVAX / NAVCX there, displayed as a load fund. That gives you a good indication of how NTBAX is handled there as well.
Interestingly, you will also find its purported sister fund NDNAX /NDNCX listed. The problem is that this fund is defunct. Which suggests that the number of funds Firstrade is claiming is inflated, whether intentionally or not.

I have been using Firstrade for years and happy with service overall. I can confirm that they do charge loads for load funds, but I still find they have the best selection of funds being offered at NTF AND institutional shares at low minimums in some cases.

I maintained an account with T Rowe Price for years in the hope that they would reopen PRWCX. I finally threw in the towel and transferred all of my TRP funds to Fidelity to simplify my investments and have access to more options. My Roth IRA is still invested in TRP funds but through my Fidelity brokerage account. My TRP funds have lagged the markets due to their high allocations to foreign and value stocks, but hopefully that will pay off in the long run.