You're correct that the management completed clawing back its fees. From the annual report:

For the year ended April 30, 2021, the Investment Manager has fully recovered all of its previously waived fees totaling $401,308. For a period not to exceed three years from the date on which a Waiver is made, the Investment Manager may recoup amounts waived or assumed, provided it is able to effect such recoupment and remain in compliance with the Expense Limitation.

Excellent reply @msf. Thanks.
The only fund of funds I ever considered buying was CTFAX (but did not buy). During my review, I called the fund and asked among other things about duplication of management fees and the rep who I spoke with said NONE. We can forgive him for a 10 bps error. I have found most reps are limited in their knowledge - may be they are over worked or may be they hold temporary jobs to invest their time! Talking to the managers / fund investment professional is the best but usually one has to be an RIA or a big investor in the fund before that access is given.
Good to know this year NICHX expenses have come under the cap - efficiencies of scale I suppose going from $550M AUM at Oct 2020 to $1.35B at Nov 2021. Nice of them not to use up the disclosed cap. (I used to work in professional services and my team never gave any part of the fee cap back to the clients!) Given the current year claw back was only 0.07% and the charged expenses were below the cap, is it reasonable to assume that all the previous waivers are now clawed back and no claw back of historic waiver would be needed in the future years? I am guessing yes, but thought I would ask in case you know the answer off hand.
More importantly, thank you for bringing to light Vanguard's clever way to charge fees (I am sure they disclosed!), considering how much chest thumping it does about fees. Thankfully, I never invest at Vanguard for their presumed low fees; high fees never stopped me from an investment, though I like to know / understand how much I am paying.

CTFAX is an example of a fund that tacks a management fee (0.10%) on top of its expenses including its acquired fund expenses (0.40%). It has put a temporary cap of 0.50% on fees excluding the acquired fund fees. When you add back the acquired fund fees of 0.40% to the capped expenses of 0.50% (including 0.10% for the second layer of management), you get to 0.90%. That's the current ER.
Absent that cap, the fees (excluding acquired fund fees) would be 0.56% and the total ER would be 0.96%.

Columbia Thermostat Summary prospectus.
Extra management fees can be instead added surreptitiously by using an excessively costly share class of underlying funds. That's what Vanguard does with its funds of funds (e.g. STAR). Instead of utilizing Admiral or Institutional class shares, these funds purchase more expensive investor class shares of underlying funds. In fact, Vanguard eliminated the more expensive investor class shares of its index funds except for use in its funds of funds.
An expense cap usually reduces current expenses. In order to satisfy a cap, a fund's management company waives some of its fees. Later, the fund may operate more efficiently (e.g. economies of scale) or a cap may still be in place but with a higher expense limit. Either way, it can happen that actual expenses are below the stated cap. At that point, the cap appears to be moot.
But then the management is allowed to "claw back", i.e. recover, the fees that it originally waived. At least so long as the actual expenses plus the claw back don't exceed the current expense cap. Usually a claw back is limited to three years - management can only recover fees that it waived in the past three years.
Your question about how ERs work with caps is where the twist comes in. Total expenses of NICHX are 1.78% (per prospectus). Excluding the expenses that don't count toward the cap (such as acquired fund expenses) brings the ER well below 1.45%. So the management is allowed to claw back previously waived fees.
The annual report shows that the clawback for the year ending April 2021 amounted to 0.07%. That plus the prospectus' 1.78% ER (including underlying fund expenses) gets one to 1.85%.
Finally, it may be worth noting that the way NICHX handles fees of underlying funds that are affilitates is to disclose the conflict of interest rather than to adjust for double dipping. Again from the prospectus (Conflicts of Interest section):

The Fund may also invest ... in affiliated entities or accounts that may directly or indirectly benefit the Investment Manager or its affiliates, including Underlying Funds managed by affiliates of the Investment Manager.

Un-Intuitively, the fund did not lose until March 23, 2020 when both monetary and fiscal stimulus was announced. It lost about 1% TR Which it did not recover from until sometime in May 2020 - it was down for 2 months.
At inception, each manager invested between $5 and 15 million. Forms 4 are posted on the fund website. May be they started the fund to invest their own money and then must have attracted clients from their previous job where all three managers worked concurrently for a number of years. Manager bios are on the fund website - seems they have always been outsourcing managers, rather than being selectors of securities and trading them.

Regarding the 1.85% fee - there's actually a cap in place of 1.45%. But this excludes the cost of acquired funds (0.57%). That's enough to drop the remaining expenses below the cap which in turn allows the fund to claw back previously waived fees. This is why on the fact sheet that Lewis linked to the gross ER is 1.78% while the net ER is higher, at 1.85%. (Usually net is lower than gross because of fee waivers.)
Regarding stale and stable prices - this likely goes a long way in explaining where the high Sharpe ratio comes from. Sort of like looking at a Madoff portfolio. I'm not suggesting anything improper here (unlike with Madoff), just agreeing with Lewis that the pricing can be misleading. It's doubly risky here because for the acquired funds, this fund relies on the acquired funds' managers to price their own illiquid investments and suggest their NAVs. From the prospectus:

The Fund bases its NAV on valuations of its interests in Underlying Funds provided by the managers of the Underlying Funds and/or their agents. These valuations involve significant judgment by the managers of the Underlying Funds and may differ from their actual realizable value. ... The Board, the Investment Manager and the Valuation Committee may have limited ability to assess the accuracy of these valuations.

It wasn't that many years ago when a number of posters were complaining about fair market valuations, which often meant valuing foreign securities with prices stale by hours, not days or weeks. Pricing here is much more uncertain.

“So quit worrying so much about that unlikely event ( really old and broke)”
Suppose we’ll get blasted for straying OT. Appreciate the takes of everyone. @Junkster doesn’t comment often enough. As he has mentioned before, the longer we’re invested the faster the stash appreciates in nominal terms owing to compounding. . And, considering one’s ever increasing financial knowledge and skill-set, that $$ should appreciate even faster than it did in earlier years (at least on a risk-adjusted basis).
Now the other side. I was terrible managing money up until near age 50. A good job kept me afloat. (and a bad marriage nearly done me in). The “catch-up” provisions in our workplace tax-deferred plan saved my a** in hind-sight. But I will say, having at least glimpsed both conditions, it’s a thin line between “rags” and “riches”. Die rich? Die broke? They’re not really comparable - the former being much more endurable ISTM.
I’ve no answer to the dilemma. You could annuitize everything and really splurge in those luxurious later years. Just be sure that annuity has a generous inflation rider - because inflation is the big unknown - and probably the reason we over-save.

Have never owned UNIQX because I bought NICHX after UNIQX closed. NICHX is just a few years old but the Sharpe and Sortino ratios are extremely high and max DD is quite low.
The fund does buy "exotic" stuff so jockey experience is key.

The immediate consequences of switching index provider is that VIGI distributed 6.5% cap gains. Luckily, the switch did not result in VIG needing to trigger any cap gains or it had sufficient prior cap losses to soak up any cap gains triggered from the switch. VIG has net realized (and unused) cap losses as of 11/30/2021 which as a percentage of NAV amounted to 2.65%. Any ETF other than the ones that are tracking broad indices like SPY, QQQ, etc. always runs the risk of triggering cap gains because the sponsor can switch the underlying index provider (and shareholders vote in favor without recognizing the cost to them). This happened to me on another ETF 5-6 years ago. In any case, I will not be adding to VIG / VIGI anymore or for that matter buy any new Vanguard ETFs that are just a different class of their mutual funds because cap gains triggered by mutual fund redemptions can be allocated to the separate class ETFs.
Below is the M* article re the switch.
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/1040749/dissecting-vanguards-new-dividend-indexes
Note: M* quote page for VIGI has inaccurate info for December 2021 distributions. It overstates dividend (income) distribution by approx the size of the cap gain. Per share total distribution for December quarter per Vanguard is approx $5.4; whereas, M* shows $10.6

The 80+% bond allocation is well positioned for further stock decline. Majority of the bond is high quality, AAA and some in BBB. Duration is 5.5 years so it is reasonable for the rising rate in 2022.

@msf, that 22% passive seems correct now. I just used my memory that a few years ago, the split was 2/3 rd passive, 1/3 rd active. But there has been a huge expansion on the index side, including the ETFs. I don't know how VG characterizes its factor ETFs but that isn't a big amount yet.

I have a friend who owned a condo (not a co-op) in Ocean Grove - a town where the land is owned by the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association of the United Methodist Church.
https://www.charitynavigator.org/ein/210652120
Leases there are typically for 99 years. In the past few years there seems to have been a fair amount of commotion about the terms and rates of those leases. My friend sold before then, after being shocked, shocked, at the high NJ property taxes. No problems regarding prices or conducting transactions, though.
I dug up a couple of articles about some of the more recent leasing problems there. These seem like worst case scenarios and not something one would typically be concerned about, at least if the lease is clear and you know what to expect.
It seems that in 2016 the Camp Meeting Association tried to increase the rents for land occupied by commercial property. People organized to to sue to void the entire leasing scheme. The land owner backed down, but according to the article, at least one sale closed at reduced price because of the potential increase in the land rent. (The rent would have increased from $21 to $5K!)
https://thecoaster.net/wordpress/no-increase-planned-for-ocean-grove-land-leases/
More recently (article below is from three days ago), the Camp Meeting Association started up again with increased rents and modified terms.

The Camp Meeting Association has begun to issue new leases for commercial properties here that come with higher rent and reminders that its owners need to refrain from selling anything that would be considered incompatible with Christian values. ...
The Camp Meeting historically ... and transferred the leases to new owners when the properties were sold. But it has begun to review and issue new leases for properties that aren't single-family homes when they change hands, offering terms that can include higher rent, fewer years and restrictions on activities it finds antithetical. ...
The morals clause, she said, opens the door to interpretation.

https://www.app.com/story/news/local/neptune-wall/ocean-grove/2021/12/15/ocean-grove-camp-meeting-association-raises-rents-businesses/8718660002/
Yankee Stadium (the original) was owned by the Knights of Columbus and the land was owned by Rice University. (The Yankees leased the stadium.) This complicated matters in the 70s when Yankee Stadium was renovated.
https://www.nytimes.com/1972/08/11/archives/city-acquires-the-title-to-yankee-stadium.html

My parents lived on a lake in the north Georgia mountains that was owned by Georgia Power Co. The power company owned most of the land bordering the lake and leased lots to homeowners for 100 years. That arrangement apparently hasn’t hurt residents because the cost of homes has skyrocketed over the years. My parents originally bought their home in the 1960s for about $14,000. My mom sold the house in the 1980s for about $350,000 and the same house is probably worth $1 million plus now.

I bought a property in a very unique community that has 45 years left on a 100 year land lease. The property is part of a Co-op (think Condo) but our association doesn't own the land. We pay a hefty land lease fee on top of our normal HOA expenses.
It's my first year as an owner and I am questioning the logic of our board members regarding insurance premiums. None of these properties are bank owned... everyone is cash. Insurance premium increased 25% this year over last year's costs. To add insult to injury, the association needed a bridge loan to avoid payment penalties from the insurer. That loan charges 4.61% interest.
We are in year 55 of a 100 year lease which means that in 45 year the value of the condo goes to zero (for shareholders...remember I own a share of a Co-Op) and the land lease owner takes possession of all of our "property".
I understand the importance and need for basic insurance coverage (liability being one), but I would like find alternative ways to manage the risk of an aging property and its diminishing value due to the this land lease dynamic.
Anyone have any thoughts on this very unique real estate dynamic that I now call home (well at least until I am 107)?

"Ckucking" back in. GGSOX -6.7 % for 3months from 12/16
+19.2 for 5 years " "
GPROX -6% For 3 months as of 12/16
+18.4 for 5 years
Looking to buy more on the dip after distributions

I have several of GP Funds. While some of the best stock ideas are being shared among the GP fund managers, each fund manager has the final decision in purchasing/selling a stock. Also, each fund has different mandates from the others. For example, the Global Micro Cap Fund is not the same as the Global Reach Fund, but some of the Global Micro Cap stock suggestions have been utilized in the Global Reach Fund, but not all of them. Similarly, Global Micro Fund may have some picks that are shared with the International Opportunities/Global Opportunities Funds, but not all of Global Micro Cap stock ideas are utilized.
For example, compare USNQX and NASDX. While both are based on the Nasdaq 100 benchmark, why aren't both funds performing the same (fund expenses are slightly different from each other)? Currently, USNQX has a lower expense ratio (.44%) than NASDX's expense ratio (.50%) but NASDX has a better YTD return than USNQX (from Google Finance). Years ago, NASDX performed better than USNQX. Then for several years, USNQX performed better. For the last year or two, NASDX has performed better than USNQX. Same can be said for S&P 500 funds (fund expenses are slightly different) as to why aren't they performing more in synch while utilizing the same benchmark
Second, Wasatch and GP have similar tendencies in closing their funds to keep them nimble. Since the GP managers learned Wasatch's management practices, they are probably being used similarly in GP's practices. I would hate to miss out on a fund that is closed for 5-10 years waiting for it to re-open.
Disclosure: I own the Global Micro Cap (in taxable and non-taxable accounts) and Contrarian funds, Global & International Opportunities funds, Emerging Opportunities, and Global & International Stalwarts. Thinking about a position in the US Stalwarts Fund.

Good point BaluBalu. It's like, why even bother opening this fund if you're already capacity-constrained in other funds. Good boutique fund company, but the apparent overlap in all their funds is concerning to me. It reminds me a little of what Royce funds did 10-15 years ago.
FWIW. I've owned GPGOX since inception and have been very happy with it. For many years it was my only SC investment.
Can anyone with more than a couple Grandeur Peak funds chime in as to why? Maybe it is beneficial to own multiple, but why?

December 16, 2021
Please see below for today’s Press Release announcing the launch of the Grandeur Peak Global Explorer Fund (GPGEX) on Thursday, December 16, 2021.
The Global Explorer Fund will only be available in one share class (Institutional), with a minimum investment of just $1,000 ($100 for minors)* in order to make it broadly accessible to all investors. The Fund should be available through most of our existing channel relationships (Schwab, TD Ameritrade, Pershing, Fidelity, etc.) and it is of course available directly from Grandeur Peak Funds. If you have difficulty purchasing the Fund, please let us know and we will work with you to try to get it listed on your platform.
To learn more about this new fund, call any of us on the client team (contacts below) or our Investor Services team at 1-855-377-7325; Additional information will also be posted to our website: www.grandeurpeakglobal.com.
Best Regards,
Mark Siddoway, CFA, CAIA, MBA
Head of Client Relations
801-384-0010
Todd Matheny, CAIA
Director of Client Relations
801-384-0095
Amy Johnson, MBA, CFP®
Sr. Manager, Client Relations
801-384-0044
*Third-party platforms may impose different minimum requirements.
PRESS RELEASE
Dear Fellow Shareholders,
We are pleased to announce the launch of the Grandeur Peak Global Explorer Fund (GPGEX). The Fund will invest in what the firm believes are the most interesting equity investments around the world. The holdings will primarily be micro to mid-cap companies.
The new fund is a sister fund to the existing Grandeur Peak Global Reach Fund (GPRIX). The two funds share a similar mandate, but they approach portfolio management from a different angle. The Global Reach Fund (launched in 2013) is managed collaboratively by the firm’s five industry teams/portfolio managers, plus a guardian portfolio manager. Similarly, the new Global Explorer Fund will be managed by the firm’s seven geographic region teams/portfolio managers, plus a guardian portfolio manager.
Said Blake Walker, CEO, “In our quest to cover the globe, members of our research team wear multiple hats – some combination of an industry hat, a geography hat, and a fund hat. We long ago divided the world up into industries (5) and geographic regions (7) and gave analysts the charge to find the most interesting companies in their assigned space. The beauty of viewing the world through these two different lenses is that we have at least two people looking at every company, namely the relevant industry analyst and geography analyst. We have found it to be a powerful ‘multiple minds’ tool.”
Juliette Douglas, a geography portfolio manager, and the portfolio manager who will coordinate the Global Explorer team’s efforts, continued, “In hindsight, it could have made sense to launch the Global Explorer at the same time as Global Reach, but candidly we weren’t staffed or ready to do so eight years ago. Today it’s an easy extension for our team and the geographic paper portfolio we have managed for some time. We expect Reach and Explorer will look fairly similar given our collaborative approach, but we also believe there will be a very real benefit in putting our geography PMs at the helm of their own fund. Those benefits will play out in the Global Explorer Fund and also radiate through the rest of the Grandeur Peak Funds. The geography teams are thrilled at this opportunity.”
Grandeur Peak has from day one shown a very strong commitment to managing capacity at a firm level, and closing funds early. With many of the Grandeur Peak Funds currently closed, Todd Matheny, Director of Client Relations, commented on the capacity of the new Fund: “With the Global Explorer Fund focused on our more capacity-constrained micro to mid-cap space, we plan to soft close the Fund around $35M in AUM. We are excited about this Fund, and the strategic value it adds across our entire family of funds, but we intend to close it very small to ensure all of our funds retain the investment flexibility they need to remain focused on delivering performance for our clients.”

As a long term owner of two Primecap funds (at either end of the so-called risk spectrum) I have some concerns. The obvious one is relative performance: all of the Primecap funds seem to have under-performed their benchmarks -- as well as "the market" -- over the past five years, some over the past ten (especially when taxes are taken into account). I regard that as a moderate length of time, sufficient to capture my attention. When it comes to the riskier funds (in my case POAGX), I seem to see some very off-beat names in the top 25 holdings, although I'm certainly not privy to the research resulting in those buy decisions. Of far greater concern to me is the fact that the team at Primecap appears to lack any notion of a "sell" discipline. The concept of a "target price" seems alien to them. On many occasions in the recent past the market has literally gifted stocks in the portfolios with sudden, unwarranted, and ultimately temporary price increases that Primecap rarely takes advantage of. (Examples include BABA, BIIB, NKTR, SGEN, but there are quite a few in addition.) What to do? I decided to take this year's hefty capital gains distributions (attributable to shareholder redemptions) in cash. Based on preliminary information, it looks like most Odyssey fund shareholders did the same thing yesterday. The Vanguard funds haven't made their distributions yet.

PRHSX held 29.3% of its 200 name portfolio in biotech as of 09-30-2021.
I've owned the fund for a long time, and the key to me has been to buy it and forget it. An investment in a health sector fund is definitely a long term (10+ years) prospect.

@JonGaltill: right, BST is a BlackRock closed end science and tech fund, but it does have a global portfolio. Of its 3 managers, 1 also serves on BME, the Health Sciences CEF that has done well previously, although it has done little to merit its M* 5 star rating in recent years.

I own BME and it's been solid in my view. No concerns about that one ... not to go off-topic but I'm fairly impressed with how Blackrock allocates for their CEFs.