I appreciate all the comments and observations about how OAKBX has altered its portfolio (both in allocation and in types of bonds) over the past several years. This seems to be in response to the changing fixed income market (interest rates low and presumably bottoming out though not rising).
Interestingly, OAKBX is the only Oakmark fund that M* does not like (rated neutral). So while M* does not see significant changes happening on the equity side, somethings must have changed to cause the equity funds to degrade so much.
(M* still loves long time managers Nygren at 2*, gold-rated, OAKMX; Herro at 2% gold-rated OAKIX and 1* bronze-rated OAKEX; McGregor at 2*, silver-rated OAKGX.)

I too want to thank you for all your hard work and interesting ideas. As a recent retiree I am concerned about the potential for significant losses early in retirement that will never be made up, having lived through 1974 and later bear markets. Many other portfolio recommendations ( ie AAII) claim that there has never been a five year period of negative returns on various indices so if you just can leave your equity position alone and have a 5 year supply of resources, don't worry.
My math show the negative period is in fact longer but it really depends on "hanging on" as you see your net worth drop by 30 or 50%. This works far better at age 25 or 35 than 65, believe me, and almost all of the previous periods did not start from such insane valuations.
The only concern I have with your suggestions is Hussman. Many of us were quite convinced Hussman knew what he was doing with HSGFX in the run up the 2008 but his fund did especially poorly since, and I can't say I feel comfortable believing him now. There is very little recent data ( since June) on HSTRX even on his web page. The data on M* is equally unhelpful.
As for Gold, I have owned a small % for years as inflation hedge. Seems to work OK although some mining stocks would pay a dividend

It looks like HFCSX has a history of not being tax efficient. Its tax cost ratio, not counting the current distribution (figures are through Nov. 30th) is 2.29% for one year and 2.18% for three years. Though funds in its category, MCG, are typically not tax efficient. On average they lost 1.85% to taxes annually over the past three years.
Last year HFCSX distributed about 10% of its NAV (click on 2019 box here). 2020 was a great year for growth funds, so one would not be surprised to see cap gains distributions double or triple that of last year's.
For example, one of the handful of other mid cap growth funds with mid cap blend portfolios, HMDYX, had a cap gains distribution in 2019 of 2.28%, while its estimate for 2020 is 10.62%.
"They don't deserve to have my funds."
Is it because of their cap gains distribution this year, though last year's 10% was tolerable? Or is it at least in part because of the fund's recent anemic performance of 4.45% YTD? None of the MCG funds with MC blend portfolios did better than average for the category; still HFCSX's performance was way under that of its peers.
"I'll be liquidating in 30 days."
If you're worried about wash sales, your net gain (or loss) will come out the same regardless since you're liquidating. Or are you thinking about postponing any remaining gain in your shares until 2021? (That would be 23-24 days.)

I owned OAKBX for about 10 years in my IRA, and it generally performed better than average. I sold it several years ago because it was changing in ways that didn’t suit my purposes. It started holding higher percentages in stacks, its volatility increased, and its bond sleeve seemed to underperform. It no longer had the excellent downside performance that attracted me in the first place. I replaced it by increasing stakes in funds I already owned — FBALX, PRBLX, TWEIX— that had good downside performances. I also added money to good performing bond funds to achieve a comparable stock/bond allocation.

I own Oakmark funds, both in taxable and Roth accounts. Have long been a fan of the firm and their process, and more concentrated portfolios.
OAKBX appears to have really lagged a surprising number of "usual suspect" actively managed funds over a moderate time period. At one time I thought OAKBX would be one of the folds I'd hold until well into retirement; maybe I still will, but I have reduced my position there substantially.
I have posted here how OAKEX (which I also used to hold both in Roth and taxable) has really been lackluster vis-a-vis any other number of actively-managed competitors. I haven't held it for ages and doubt I will return.
I still hold OAKIX. I have held OAKGX in taxable and non-taxable, and may do so again.
There's not a lot of active managers who wow me at the moment; I try to be reasonable on timelines, because a value mindset has kept me in markets when others I know have panicked. I look harder now at indexing than I did years ago, but I haven't fully drank that Kool-Aid yet.

Good article. I've traveled a lot. I used school and then work as the means to do it. Living in places for a few years at a time, like a serial-location monogamist. When, after a few years into retirement, the time to leave that safe and secure address came, I knew it. Because it wasn't safe and secure, anymore. CRIME! So, I could not let inertia hold me there any longer. Family connections provided a new opportunity. And the marriage part? I still don't have to like it, but by now, I'm accustomed to the way my wife "communicates." Her ability to plan ahead seems to have a three week limit into the future. Even about major stuff. There are things I can easily agree to. But I have to say "no" to the long-term items on her wish-list which she seems to think are short-term items. Because "long-term" is not a thing she comprehends. ;) Changes? I can enjoy the beach again, since I discovered what water shoes are. The rest is easy: I need to get up to DO stuff only rarely. I LIKE that! I'll be so glad for LIVE music again, and the LIVE opera-on-screen, when covid is behind us. I use the local library a lot. I learn on YouTube. For FREE. And I give myself permission not to respond when my wife reminds me that she doesn't like the fact that she still has to work--- at age 47. :) LOL.

There are many wise and thoughtful contributions from several of the varsity team here on MFO. When I held one of the Fidelity Asset Manager funds way back when, then OAKBX, and then BRUFX, I believed (probably naïvely) that what I had were "all-weather" funds. The past few years have demonstrated that allocation funds work great when markets are "behaving" as they usually have. Interest rates and rates of inflation rose and fell with a certain regularity. Value stocks and growth stocks alternated with being the flavor of the year or two, but there was an alternation. Nowadays, interest rates remain far below historical levels and value securities can't find even hold-the-nose buyers. My thought is that the weather has changed so drastically that it's pointless to expect a balanced fund to thrive in this climate.
While I hold PTIAX and TMSRX in my taxable portfolio, what I expect from them is not that their managers hedge their stock holdings as a balanced fund manager might do, but that they will provide a steady stream of income or capital appreciation that does not depend on the performance of my stocks and equity funds. I have a small slice of RPGAX, but no other allocation fund in my taxable portfolio. As for my TIAA retirement account, I let Vanguard's retirement target fund managers decide what bonds to buy. The only decision I make is on the year (2025, 2030, etc.). Those mixed asset funds-of-funds represent approximately 40% of the portfolio, which is tilted farther towards equities than most 78-year-olds can tolerate. Not advice, just observations.

“The difficulty in finding value in bonds helps explain poor absolute performance of balanced funds, but it doesn't help explain relatively poor performance. All of OAKBX's peers face this same problem.”
Yes and No. Not all bonds are equal. I’m aware of no other balanced fund that relied(ies) so heavily on upper tier and longer dated bonds as OAKBX during its hey-day.. It doesn’t take a big commitment to AAA bonds with 15 or 20 year durations to pack a lot of hedging power - if you get it right. I’d argue that that’s a riskier proposition than hedging with short-term junk bonds - just by way of example. During the time I was with OAKBX management sounded distrustful of the junk and lower rated bond sector. They did begin to exit the AAA stuff - but in so doing weakened or discarded the method of hedging against equity losses they knew best.
DODBX, from what I can tell, utilizes the same components as their relatively tame DODIX (income fund) for its “bond” portion. That’s a much more docile approach to bonds. Yeah - I’m disappointed in my DODBX holding. But, unlike Oakmark I think, D & C has stuck to its stated and time-proven philosophy. Unfortunately, they were early (by years) in predicting the uptick in long-term rates which now appears to have begun. Their big stake in financials has now started to pay off (and the fund’s recent performance shows some improvement.) So, I’m comfortable continuing to hold DODBX.
Final thought - As a group balanced funds are a very unbalanced lot. :)

https://www.marketwatch.com/story/so-much-of-retirement-planning-is-wishful-thinking-what-ive-learned-after-3-years-of-actually-being-retired-11607448083?siteid=yhoof2
Stay Safe, Derf

Laziness is not a virtue. :) - I’ve now taken the effort to Google the referenced column (November 2020 Mutual Fund Observer). I think in fairness to Ed I should post his exact words:
“ When I left Harris Associates in January of 2012, the Oakmark Equity and Income Fund had, on 12/31/2011, $18.9B in assets. Performance over the long-term had been above the relevant benchmarks. As of 10/31/2020, per Morningstar, the fund’s assets are at $7.2B, and performance has been lagging benchmarks for the last 1, 3, and 5 years.
What is the problem? Has my former colleague Clyde McGregor lost his touch? No, certainly not that I can see. The equity portion of the portfolio is a classic Harris Associates’ value portfolio, and it looks very interesting to me looking forward over a three to five-year time horizon.
There are two areas of issue. Please recognize that I am speaking about balanced funds, which is the class of investment I am most familiar with, having managed the same for more than twenty-five years at a national bank trust department as well as at Harris Associates. The first competitive issue is fees. When Fidelity’s Balanced Fund shows a 53-basis point expense ratio and Vanguard’s Wellington Fund shows a 25-basis point expense ratio (and the Vanguard Admiral share class drops that fee to 17 basis points). A 25 to 35 basis point fee disadvantage is a lot of baggage to overcome consistently in terms of its detrimental impact upon performance. If the fee disparity is larger, making up the differential becomes nigh on impossible. I will leave it to others to address the issue of the fee disadvantages relative to exchange traded funds.
The other area of disadvantage currently is fixed income as an asset class for a balanced portfolio. With rates where they are and where they are likely to be for the foreseeable future, it is almost impossible to add any value in the fixed income area without taking on extreme amounts of risk. Money market rates, when not negative, are running from zero to perhaps eight basis points. Maturities beyond two years are not compensating you for the risk you are taking on (if you are lucky, you can find 1% on a credit union’s three-year insured certificate of deposit).
I will leave aside the issue of value being out of favor as opposed to growth. Those of us who are value investors are prepared to wait through those periods of underperformance. That said, the goalposts for various asset classes have shifted. Small cap was equities with a market capitalization of $500M to $1B. Now, the range is extended up to $2.5B. And one must consider the extent to which other asset classes impinge on your allocation decisions. An article on the “Seeking Alpha” website was making an argument not too long ago that the better way to achieve portfolio diversification going forward was to pair an S&P 500 Index Fund with one of the publicly-traded C-Corporation private equity firms. It is an interesting question to think about.”
The End of Many Eras

Thanks for the pointer to the column. You can find a list of Ed Studzinski's pieces here, including his November post:
https://www.mutualfundobserver.com/2020/11/the-end-of-many-eras/
Your memory is perfect, right month, and 3/3 on his reasons. (More on that below.) I appreciate your additional thoughts about the quality of bonds used (Ed also commented on this in his column, saying that one can't add value without adding excessive risk). Interesting observation about using the energy sector.
Value vs. growth does seem to be a major factor. I looked at all 50%-70% allocation funds at M*. Of the 40 distinct funds with value portfolios, the number in the top half over the past five or three years can be counted on two hands. Of the 38 with star ratings, just 5 manage even four stars, with more having two stars than three. The four star fund people will recognize is BRUFX.
Cost would seem to be a smaller factor, though it could be why DODBX retains three stars. The difficulty in finding value in bonds helps explain poor absolute performance of balanced funds, but it doesn't help explain relatively poor performance. All of OAKBX's peers face this same problem.
Apparently value vs. growth has more of an impact on funds in this category than I suspected.

I'm sounding like a broken record here, but 2020 was an unusual year. Take a look at its performance since inception through 2019 instead. Over the 7¾ years, it achieved an annualized return of 5.156% vs its peers' 3.936%. Still impressive, but far from the 7% advantage you're seeing to date.
Inception to Dec 31, 2019 chart. IMHO this chart really puts this fund into perspective.
Irrespective of the fact that most of the figures you gave are long term (multi-year) results, what they're really showing you is short term performance. That's because the past year has so distorted the longer term averages. So the next question is why did it do so well on a relative basis this year?
Look at its portfolio (again in the context of the 2020 market). It's nearly off the scale on the growth side. (YTD, VIGAX has returned 36.89% vs. 16.13% for VFINX.) Was this a matter of skill, that the management took the fund to the right part of the market at the right time, or was it luck? The fund has always been growth leaning (check its portfolio history). Its peers are a much tamer group (look at the "Value and Growth Measures" section of the M* portfolio page for the fund.)
I tend to look just as much at year by year performance as cumulative performance. Especially this year, one good year can skew the numbers. Likewise, while growth has tended to do better than value or blend for a long time, it hasn't had a year like this since the dot-com bubble burst.
https://www.longtermtrends.net/growth-stocks-vs-value-stocks/
Difference in annual returns of growth and value (from Vanguard)

Side note: what happened to Oakmark?

I can only speak to OAKBX which I owned for a decade or longer before bailing late in 2018. As to “EdStud” (referenced above), Ed Studzinski did address the dire situation at his old fund (OAKBX) in a recent MFO Commentary. For some reason I’m unable to bring up any except the December issue, but I think it was in the November issue - or possibly October. Ed was magnanimous in addressing the fund’s stumble since leaving as pertains current manager Clyde McGregor. Something along the lines of Miller’s “Nobody dast blame this man”.
Memory is a funny thing ... :) - But I believe Ed attributed the problems more to (1) value being long out of favor, (2) bond rates being too low and (3) competition from extremely low-fee index funds which compete against moderate-fee OAKBX. (Hopefully I got 2 out of 3 correct.)
My own perceptions:
- OAKBX (more than other balanced funds) hedged their equity risk with AAA rated (government bonds). Some had rather long duration. I never understood how they pulled it off, but for many years it worked for them. So when “the band stopped playing” (so to speak) and rates in AAA debt plunged to near 0, that hedging strategy ceased to work.
- OAKBX also hedged successfully in the energy sector, particularly with small drillers. So the depressed prices and upheaval in how oil is extracted had to hurt their strategy.
- Around the time I exited (late 2018) I noticed that OAKBX had begun mirroring (resembling) the performance of the major indexes on big “up” and “down” days. For a defensive fund, that’s not a welcome characteristic. That’s what drove me to get out. I tried unsuccessfully to prove my case that it had become a closet indexer and posted those thoughts here, but without success. The fund’s largest holdings did not correspond with those of the S&P. I remain convinced, however, that they had begun taking on more risk with OAKBX back than in an effort to compensate for the fund’s poor performance.
- Like all value funds OAKBX has suffered from value being out of favor.
- Likely, a lot of money has hit the exits (I believe Ed referenced the drawdown) and money flowing out generally hamstrings a manager. Conversely, money flowing in during strong markets generally helps a fund - though only in the near term.
Just some rambling thoughts. But, Ed’s comments were appreciated by me and definitely worth reading if you missed them.

Side note: what happened to Oakmark? Not a single fund rated higher than 2 stars. Though M* still loves the company, giving most of its funds gold or sliver prospective (forward looking) analyst ratings.

M* "likes" them because they advertise on the platform, not because they truly have conviction.

Clearly my question was not understood. Oakmark used to be a fine fund company. For example, OAKBX was a

five star fund in 2010.

Oakmark Equity & Income (OAKBX) is another popular moderate-allocation offering that looks especially good these days. This fund grew from less than $60 million in assets at the end of 1999 up to roughly $7 billion in late April 2004, as it crushed its peers during each of the first four years of this decade.

https://www.morningstar.com/articles/108318/choose-your-all-weather-fund-with-care
Recent (and not so recent) history suggests things have changed. M* does not perceive a change in most of Oakmark's funds (it still thinks highly of the people/process). Do you perceive any changes, and if so, what?

I don't think your question was misunderstood at all. Note, the star rating is simply an objective risk/return metric. Regarding the lack of change to the Gold/Silver/Bronze rankings which are indicative of M*'s perspective on the platform, I'm simply highlighting that M* has a bias to not alter those rating because they serve as a source of revenue to them (i.e. they would never admit it, but M* is bias and influenced by factors other than conviction).

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/773757/000119312520311432/d33073d497.htm
Columbia Multi-Asset Income Fund
Columbia Pacific/Asia Fund
497 1 d33073d497.htm COLUMBIA FUNDS SERIES TRUST I
Supplement dated December 7, 2020
to the Prospectuses, Summary Prospectuses and Statement of Additional Information (SAI), each as supplemented (as applicable), of the following Funds (each a Fund and together the Funds):
Fund Prospectus, Summary Prospectus and SAI Dated
Columbia Funds Series Trust I
Columbia Multi-Asset Income Fund----Prospectus and Summary Prospectus: 9/1/2020; SAI: 12/1/2020
Columbia Pacific/Asia Fund-----------Prospectus and Summary Prospectus: 8/1/2020; SAI: 12/1/2020
The Board of Trustees of the Funds has approved a Plan of Liquidation and Termination (the Plan) pursuant to which the Funds will be liquidated and terminated.
Effective at the open of business on January 11, 2021, the Funds will no longer be open to new investors. Shareholders who opened and funded an account with the Funds as of the open of business on this date (including accounts once funded that subsequently reached a zero balance) may continue to make additional purchases of Fund shares, including purchases by an existing retirement plan that has a plan-level or omnibus account with the Transfer Agent or other omnibus accounts relating to new or existing participants seeking to invest in the Funds. Effective January 11, 2021, any applicable contingent deferred sales charges will be waived on redemptions and exchanges out of the Funds.
Under the terms of the Plan, it is anticipated that the Funds will be liquidated on or about February 5, 2021 (the Liquidation Date) at which time the Funds' shareholders will receive a liquidating distribution in an amount equal to the net asset value of their Fund shares. For federal income tax purposes, the liquidation of the Funds will be treated as a redemption of Fund shares and may cause shareholders to recognize a gain or loss and pay taxes if the liquidated shares are held in a taxable account. You should consult with your own tax advisor about the particular tax consequences to you of the Funds' liquidation. Shareholders of the Funds may redeem their investments in the Funds or exchange their Fund shares for shares of another Columbia Fund at any time prior to the Liquidation Date (as described in the next paragraph). If the Fund has not received your redemption request or other instructions prior to the Liquidation Date, your shares will be automatically liquidated on the Liquidation Date.
As of the close of business on the business day preceding the Liquidation Date, the Funds will no longer accept any orders for the purchase of or exchange for shares of the Funds. Orders for the purchase of or exchange for shares of the Funds may, in the Funds' discretion, be rejected prior to the Liquidation Date, including for operational reasons relating to the anticipated liquidation of the Fund.
During the period prior to the Liquidation Date, the Funds' investment manager, Columbia Management Investment Advisers, LLC (the Investment Manager), may depart from the Fund’s stated investment objectives and strategies to reduce the amount of portfolio securities and hold more cash or cash equivalents to liquidate the Funds' assets in a manner that the Investment Manager believes to be in the best interests of the Fund and its shareholders. Shareholders remaining in the Funds may bear increased transaction fees incurred in connection with the disposition of the Funds' portfolio holdings. Any such transaction costs would reduce any distributable net capital gains.
Shareholders who hold their Fund shares through a retirement plan or account (such as a 401(k) plan or individual retirement account) and who receive a distribution of liquidation proceeds will be subject to taxes and, if under 59½ years of age, applicable early withdrawal penalties, unless the distribution proceeds are reinvested as a rollover in an eligible retirement plan or account within 60 days after the proceeds are received.
The Funds will seek to pay out all distributable net income and net capital gains prior to the Liquidation Date. Shareholders will receive liquidation proceeds as soon as practicable after the Liquidation Date.
Shareholders should retain this Supplement for future reference.

Side note: what happened to Oakmark? Not a single fund rated higher than 2 stars. Though M* still loves the company, giving most of its funds gold or sliver prospective (forward looking) analyst ratings.

M* "likes" them because they advertise on the platform, not because they truly have conviction.

Clearly my question was not understood. Oakmark used to be a fine fund company. For example, OAKBX was a five star fund in 2010.

Oakmark Equity & Income (OAKBX) is another popular moderate-allocation offering that looks especially good these days. This fund grew from less than $60 million in assets at the end of 1999 up to roughly $7 billion in late April 2004, as it crushed its peers during each of the first four years of this decade.

https://www.morningstar.com/articles/108318/choose-your-all-weather-fund-with-care
Recent (and not so recent) history suggests things have changed. M* does not perceive a change in most of Oakmark's funds (it still thinks highly of the people/process). Do you perceive any changes, and if so, what?

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/917469/000168386320014977/f7564d1.htm
LOOMIS SAYLES FUNDS
LOOMIS SAYLES BOND FUND
LOOMIS SAYLES FIXED INCOME FUND
LOOMIS SAYLES INSTITUTIONAL HIGH INCOME FUND
LOOMIS SAYLES INVESTMENT GRADE FIXED INCOME FUND
(each a "Fund" and together the "Funds")
Supplement dated December 7, 2020 to the Loomis Sayles Funds' Summary Prospectuses, Statutory Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information ("SAI"), each dated February 1, 2020 as may be revised or supplemented from time to time.
Effective March 1, 2021, Daniel J. Fuss will take a significant step back from portfolio management and will no longer serve as a Portfolio Manager of the Funds. This is the latest phase of the Loomis Sayles portfolio management team's succession plan, which has been in place for more than 20 years.
Accordingly, effective March 1, 2021, all references to Mr. Fuss as a Portfolio Manager of the Funds in the Summary Prospectuses, Statutory Prospectus and SAI are hereby deleted.
Matthew J. Eagan, Brian P. Kennedy and Elaine M. Stokes will remain as Portfolio Managers of the Loomis Sayles Bond Fund, Loomis Sayles Fixed Income Fund and Loomis Sayles Investment Grade Fixed Income Fund.
Matthew J. Eagan and Elaine M. Stokes will remain as Portfolio Managers of the Loomis Sayles Institutional High Income Fund.
Change to Fiscal Year End of Loomis Sayles Bond Fund and Loomis Sayles Investment Grade Fixed Income Fund
The Board of Trustees of Loomis Sayles Funds I has approved a change to the fiscal year end of Loomis Sayles Bond Fund and Loomis Sayles Investment Grade Fixed Income Fund from September 30th to December 31st. The implementation of the change to the fiscal year end and the expected disposition and realignment of certain foreign currency-denominated positions over the next few weeks are likely to result in additional trading costs, increased realized capital losses and currency losses from the sales of portfolio securities, and increased audit, printing and mailing expenses for the Funds in the short term. Further, these changes are expected to reduce the future impact of currency exchange losses on taxable monthly distributions and reduce the amount of currency-related losses available to offset future taxable ordinary income for Loomis Sayles Bond Fund and Loomis Sayles Investment Grade Fixed Income Fund shareholders. Increased monthly income distributions going forward may result in an increased tax liability for shareholders who are subject to state and federal income taxes on their income distributions from the Funds.
LOOMIS SAYLES HIGH INCOME OPPORTUNITIES FUND
Supplement dated December 7, 2020 to the Summary Prospectus, Statutory Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information ("SAI") of the Loomis Sayles High Income Opportunities Fund (the "Fund"), each dated February 1, 2020 as may be revised or supplemented from time to time.
Effective March 1, 2021, Daniel J. Fuss will take a significant step back from portfolio management and will no longer serve as a Portfolio Manager of the Fund. This is the latest phase of the Loomis Sayles portfolio management team's succession plan, which has been in place for more than 20 years. Accordingly, effective March 1, 2021, all references to Mr. Fuss as a Portfolio Manager of the Fund in the Summary Prospectus, Statutory Prospectus and SAI are hereby deleted.
Matthew J. Eagan, Brian P. Kennedy, Elaine M. Stokes and Todd P. Vandam will remain as Portfolio Managers of the Fund.

All ratings have been updated on MFO Premium site, including MultiSearch, Great Owls, Fund Alarm (Three Alarm and Honor Roll), Averages, Dashboard of Profiled Funds, Portfolios, Quick Search, and Fund Family Scorecard. The site now includes several analysis tools, including Correlation, Rolling Averages, Trend, Ferguson Metrics, Calendar Year and Period Performance.
November marked the second time this year that the S&P 500 posted a greater than 10% return. The other month was April, the beginning of the current bull market … 8 months ago … or was that 80 years ago?
There are about 2,400 mutual funds and ETFs in the US Equity category (aka SubType). Their average 8-month return is nearly 50% and 24 of these funds have more than doubled, as described here.

I use mainly the new M* chart and only use the old for links because I can do more with the new charts. The old charts don't work if you want to see more than one newer funds + older funds. Try to see PIMIX+MWFSX+EIXIX on the same chart. You can start with MWFSX and add PIMIX but not EIXIX. If you start with PIMIX you can't add any of the others. MWFSX has more than 2 years history.
The new M* can handle all the above.
You can link to the old but not to the new. One plus to old M*.
New M* Charts show daily data for 1M, 3M, 6M, YTD, 1Y, 3Y, and weekly data for 5Y, 10Y, Max.
Old M* Charts show daily data for 1M, 3M only, and weekly data for YTD, 1Y, 5Y, 10Y, Max.
Huge advantage for the new M*.
Much easier reading with the new M*, it actually tells you the % instead of calculating it with the old which is harder when it's negative.
In the example of VCFIX from 2/25 to 3/25. The old shows you just chart numbers, the new shows you chart numbers + the % near the ticker at -19.72%
ETF: I tried HYG,HYD and they were wrong with the new. Then I tried BIV and it was accurate with the new.
I try to stay away from ETF and for comparison I use OEFs VBILX=BIV, VBTLX=BND.
10 years:
old M* 10K grew to: BND=14.36K VBTLX=14.356K
new M* 10K grew to: BND=14.3K VBTLX=14.3K
Then I tried VBILX, for YTD old M* chart was close at 9.05, new chart 8.77%, real number 9.06. So now the new chart is also bad?

>> [new M* charts] show reinvestments for mutual funds only, not for ETFs
wow, how dumb

What does this chart supposedly without reinvestments show? Just price appreciation, or price appreciation plus divs with 0% return (i.e. one just piles up the cash divs over the years), or ...?
Over the past decade (12/6/10 to 12/4/20), the new M* chart for BND shows $10K growing to $14,306.99. (The link is just to the page; you have to pull up the graph yourself.)
Over the past decade, using M*'s old ETF chart, the total (not annualized) price appreciation was 8.15%, i.e. $10K worth of shares appreciated to $10,815. NAV appreciation wasn't much higher, at 8.24%. So the new chart is showing much more gain than mere price appreciation.
FWIW, using div data from Yahoo, one gets another 28.29% in cash over the decade. If not reinvested these divs plus the share appreciation (28.3% + 8.2% = 36.5%) is much less than the total return shown in the new chart (43.07%). So whatever the chart is showing isn't just appreciation plus unreinvested divs.
The new interactive chart for BND shows that between 11/30/10 and 11/30/20, $10K grew to $14,327.71. Vanguard's performance page for BND has a graph showing growth of $10K ending 11/30/20. Set the tab to 10 years and mouse over the tail of the graph. According to Vanguard, $10K grew to $14,327.70.
Okay, M* is off a penny. It sure looks like these graphs are showing total returns, including reinvested divs, of the BND ETF.