Lipper has SFGIX 78% Asia. But at least half of that is in Taiwan, Hong Kong Singapore and S. Korea, all of which are considered developed markets. I also noticed unusually heavy concentration at the top (37% in top 10 holdings). http://www.funds.reuters.wallst.com/US/funds/holdings.asp?YYY622_tNYDpo1qU/MLQg9W+6KX6RuZTH3KwZb8EX/lL+8rQLcFNPvJvJFoMad8BeSVDYky
Interesting name (Growth and Income). Price’s TRIGX was called G&I until maybe 5 years ago when they dropped that description and renamed it a “value” fund. When I looked at its 1-year performance, it’s done far worse than SFGIX with more than a 13% loss. But it never was a good performer. (TRIGX is concentrated in Europe.)
International have lagged U.S. equities for a while. One reason has been the very strong Dollar. While I like to hedge against the Dollar, I do it using less volatile EM and global bond funds. As far as being an EM in disguise, it’s hard to say. Even non-EM international funds usually dabble in EM. Sometimes that exposure can be “unlimited” per Prospectus.
No opinion on whether you should buy, sell, hold this one. Generally after I sell a fund it bounces back with outperformance. The financial media is hot with stories of how the EM markets stand to lose big in the Trump trade war. Again, by the time you and I hear this type news it’s likely already been discounted by the markets.

Morning @MikeM
I enjoyed your humor and understand. I'm sure everyone here has had the add-on symbol of WTF for various holdings over the years. Not that we have necessarily made a bad decision; but other forces beyond our control get in the way of our well thought plans.
A non advertised benefit of MFO and the discussion board is "investment therapy" sessions.
Outside of MFO, and the WTF notation; my greatest frustration over the years is attempting to motivate those I know well to invest. I'm sure our breed of investor is a very small percentage of the public.
But, I'm drifting off the subject of your post; and will stop here.
Take care,
Catch

Lastly, I couldn't find a specific listing for the symbol, WTF

I've had a lot of funds with this symbol over the years @catch22, as in WTF did I buy this fund for :)
A few things going on in my head I guess. One is a post from a few weeks ago with the question, do you really need an EM fund? The other is the performance record for SFGIX over the past 3+ years. On the positive side, it is a tamer way to play the EM category if you choose to be there. That plus the managers thoughtful approach to capital protection IS why I bought it.
Oh, well, just thinking out loud. Thanks for the discussion.

@Derf: Apparently the EM index is 74% Asia. Here's SFGIX, showing its benchmark alongside the fund's holdings (scroll down to "World Regions"):
Benchmark
And here's EEM, the MSCI index, corroborating the 74%:
EEM (EM index fund)
I recall the index as being in the 60s a few years back (haven't owned an EM equity fund in a while), so Asia's expanded.
There are different ways to parse what's EM and what's not, tho. Maybe the more developed east Asian nations skew the proportion if they're included in the count; I don't have Premium, so can't check the country-by-country list of the EM benchmark on M*, but the main portfolio page does show 25% developed Asian economies (per M*, apparently) in the "diversified EM" benchmark.

Here’s how TRP describes PRWCX : “The fund invests primarily in the common stocks of established U.S companies we believe to have above-average potential for capital growth. Common stocks typically constitute at least half of total assets. The remaining assets are generally invested in other securities, including convertible securities, corporate and government debt, foreign securities, and futures and options.” https://www.troweprice.com/personal-investing/tools/fund-research/PRWCX
Here’s how they describe RPBAX: “The fund seeks to provide capital growth, current income, and preservation of capital through a portfolio of stocks and fixed-income securities. The fund normally invests approximately 65% of total assets in U.S. and foreign common stocks and 35% in fixed-income securities. At least 25% of total assets will be invested in senior fixed-income securities.” https://www.troweprice.com/personal-investing/tools/fund-research/RPBAX
Here’s how they describe RPGAX: “The fund seeks to invest in a broadly diversified global portfolio of investments, including U.S. and international stocks, bonds, and alternative investments. The fund uses an active asset allocation strategy in conjunction with fundamental research to select individual investments ... Under normal conditions, the fund's portfolio will consist of approximately 60% stocks; 30% bonds, money market securities, and other debt instruments; and 10% alternative investments.” https://www.troweprice.com/personal-investing/tools/fund-research/RPGAX
While it’s common to refer to PRWCX as a balanced fund, Price’s RPBAX would appear to better fit that description. And RPGAX at first blush also appears to be more accurately termed a balanced fund. However, with RPGAX Price’s approach seems to point more in the direction of an equity-centric hedge fund, employing various hedging strategies (and also investing in an outside party hedge fund).
I’m not sure what to call PRWCX. It does have some similarities to a balanced fund, but Price assigns it more of a “go-anywhere” mandate. Seems to me that over the 25 years I’ve owned it, different managers have taken it in quite different directions. Each has been successful in his own way. It’s my fourth largest holding at TRP. RPGAX, RPSIX and TMSRX are all ahead of it. That has everything to do with my overall allocation approach and isn’t a reflection of which fund I think is better. If I had to guess 10-15 years out, however, I’d guess RPGAX might outdistance it.

Doesn't make sense to me to leave a very successful fund manager because he's getting older. Why not let performance guide you? There has been no drop off there. Rank in category, 7 in past 3 years, 2 in past 1 year, per M*.

Mr. Akre has a good reputation of training successors; i would not be too worried at this point.
FYI: I have a significant amount invested in AKRIX/AKREX.

Maybe that's not the point. I took my money and ran from AKREX few years back. Manager age is a concern to me. I'm not sure about what "track record" he has of training replacement managers. The fact is one of them left.
All I can hope for existing investors is Akre does not end up like Third Avenue.

Glad to stay away from someone who mix politics with investment. Not only it detracts from his main duty to his investors and it shows as the performance lags badly several years in a row.

FYI: ( Unfortunately, PRWCX is closed to new investors.)
Hi, I'm Jason Kephart, senior analyst on Morningstar's Multi-Asset and Alternatives Research Team, and I'm joined today by David Giroux, portfolio manager of T. Rowe Price Capital Appreciation, a fund that's been on a Joe DiMaggio-like streak over the last decade. It hasn't finished worse than 29th in the category over any single year over the last 10 years.
Regards,
Ted
https://www.morningstar.com/videos/928989/the-sector-powering-t-rowe-price-capital-appreciat.html
M* Snapshot: PRWCX:
https://www.morningstar.com/funds/XNAS/PRWCX/quote.html
Lipper Snapshot PRWCX:
https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/fund/prwcx
PRWCX Is Ranked #6 In The(50/70 E) Fund Category By U.S. News & World Report:
https://money.usnews.com/funds/mutual-funds/allocation-50-to-70-equity/t-rowe-price-capital-appreciation-fund/prwcx

I appreciate the thoughtful analysis from the above posts. Sadly, I invested in this fund the day it opened. I was a Mutual Series investor from the 80s. Wintergreen Fund looked like an opportunity to get Michael Price like talent at the beginning of his run. It had a great first year and it went downhill from there. (I never understood why he thought he could push Coke around). I gave up and sold the fund two years ago. A great investor will make money in any type of market, no matter his style. Peter Lynch did. Michael Price did. David Winters didn’t.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/794105/000093247119007082/ltbond497052019.htm
497 1 ltbond497052019.htm VANGUARD LONG-TERM BOND INDEX FUND 497
Vanguard Long-Term Bond Index Fund
Supplement Dated May 10, 2019, to the Prospectus and Summary Prospectus for Investor Shares and Admiral™ Shares Dated April 26, 2019
Effective July 10, 2019, the Fund will charge a 0.50% fee on all purchases of its Investor Shares and Admiral Shares, including shares that you purchase by exchange from another Vanguard fund. Purchases that result from reinvested dividend or capital gains distributions are not subject to the purchase fee.
Unlike a sales charge or a load paid to a broker or a fund management company, purchase fees are paid directly to the Fund to offset the costs of buying securities. This fee is separate from, and in addition to, other expenses charged by the Fund.
Prospectus and Summary Prospectus Text Changes
Effective July 10, 2019, the following will replace similar text under the heading “Fees and Expenses” in the Fund Summary section:
Fees and Expenses
The following table describes the fees and expenses you may pay if you buy and hold Investor Shares or Admiral Shares of the Fund.
Shareholder Fees
(Fees paid directly from your investment)
Investor Shares Admiral Shares
Sales Charge (Load) Imposed on Purchases None None
Purchase Fee 0.50% 0.50%
Sales Charge (Load) Imposed on Reinvested Dividends None None
Redemption Fee None None
Account Service Fee (for fund account balances
below $10,000) $20/year $20/year
Annual Fund Operating Expenses
(Expenses that you pay each year as a percentage of the value of your investment)
Investor Shares Admiral Shares1
Management Fees 0.13% 0.04%
12b-1 Distribution Fee None None
Other Expenses 0.02% 0.03%
Total Annual Fund Operating Expenses 0.15% 0.07%
1 The expense information shown in the table reflects estimated amounts for the current fiscal year.
Examples
The following examples are intended to help you compare the cost of investing in the Fund’s Investor Shares or Admiral Shares with the cost of investing in other mutual funds. They illustrate the hypothetical expenses that you would incur over various periods if you were to invest $10,000 in the Fund’s shares. These examples assume that the shares provide a return of 5% each year and that total annual fund operating expenses remain as stated in the preceding table. You would incur these hypothetical expenses whether or not you were to redeem your investment at the end of the given period. Although your actual costs may be higher or lower, based on these assumptions your costs would be:
1 Year 3 Years 5 Years 10 Years
Investor Shares $65 $98 $134 $241
Admiral Shares $57 $72 $89 $139
Prospectus Text Changes
In the More on the Funds section, a new section “Purchase and Transaction Fees” will be added after the “Temporary Investment Measures” section:
Purchase and Transaction Fees
Vanguard Long-Term Bond Index Fund charges a fee of 0.50% on all purchases of shares, including shares that you purchase by exchange from another Vanguard fund.
In addition, Vanguard Total Bond Market Index Fund, Vanguard Short-Term Bond Index Fund, and Vanguard Intermediate-Term Bond Index Fund each reserve the right to charge the following transaction fees to investors whose aggregate share purchases into a Fund equal or exceed the following amounts:
Vanguard Fund Transaction Fee Aggregate Purchases
Total Bond Market Index Fund 0.25% Over $500 million
Short-Term Bond Index Fund 0.15 Over $200 million
Intermediate-Term Bond Index Fund 0.25 Over $100 million
Each of the Vanguard Total Bond Market Index Fund, Vanguard Short-Term Bond Index Fund, and Vanguard Intermediate-Term Bond Index Fund may impose these transaction fees if an investor’s aggregate purchases into a Fund over a 12-month period exceed, or are expected to exceed, the indicated amounts upon notice to the client in conjunction with a purchase that triggers application of the fees. The transaction fees will be assessed only if the client elects to proceed with the purchase. Generally, these fees will not apply to transactions coordinated in advance between a client and Vanguard.
Unlike a sales charge or a load paid to a broker or a fund management company, purchase and transaction fees are paid directly to the Fund to offset the costs of buying securities.
See Investing With Vanguard for more information about fees.
In the Investing With Vanguard section, the following will replace similar text that begins with the heading “Transaction Fees on Purchases”:
Purchase and Transaction Fees
Vanguard Long-Term Bond Index Fund charges a fee of 0.50% on purchases of shares, including shares that you purchase by exchange from another Vanguard fund.
In addition, Vanguard Total Bond Market Index Fund, Vanguard Short-Term Bond Index Fund, and Vanguard Intermediate-Term Bond Index Fund each reserve the right to charge the following transaction fees to investors whose aggregate share purchases into a Fund equal or exceed the following amounts:
Vanguard Fund Transaction Fee Aggregate Purchases
Total Bond Market Index Fund 0.25% Over $500 million
Short-Term Bond Index Fund 0.15 Over $200 million
Intermediate-Term Bond Index Fund 0.25 Over $100 million
Each of the Vanguard Total Bond Market Index Fund, Vanguard Short-Term Bond Index Fund, and Vanguard Intermediate-Term Bond Index Fund may impose these transaction fees if an investor’s aggregate purchases into a Fund over a 12-month period exceed, or are expected to exceed, the indicated amounts upon notice to the client in conjunction with a purchase that triggers application of the fees. The transaction fees will be assessed only if the client elects to proceed with the purchase. Generally, these fees will not apply to transactions coordinated in advance between a client and Vanguard.
Purchase fees will not apply to Vanguard fund account purchases in the following circumstances: (1) purchases of shares through reinvested dividends or capital gains distributions; (2) share transfers, rollovers, or reregistrations within the same fund; (3) conversions of shares from one share class to another in the same fund; (4) purchases in kind; and (5) share rollovers to an IRA within the same Vanguard fund for plans in which Vanguard serves as a recordkeeper. Unlike a sales charge or a load paid to a broker or a fund management company, purchase and transaction fees are paid directly to the Fund to offset the costs of buying securities.
© 2019 The Vanguard Group, Inc. All rights reserved.
Vanguard Marketing Corporation, Distributor...
(includes institutional classes also)

Thanks @lewis and @msf for confirming my correct decision some years ago to stay clear of Wintergreen. The smell of the tobacco was enough to deter me, but you have pointed out other good reasons.

While there's little here that I disagree with, I do wonder how relevant it is to the past five years - the ones M* characterized as growth leaning. Yes, traditional value metrics like P/E were skewed following GFC. But was that still true from 2013 onward?
Yes, tobacco stocks have traditionally been regarded as value stocks, and troubled in the 90s due to the anticipated 1998 settlement. But these days? I'm having a hard time finding value funds with tobacco stocks in their top 25 holdings. I spot checked DODGX, LLPFX, VEIRX, TAVFX, PRFDX (MO is #23 at 1.37%), MDISX (BATS is #21 at 1.50%), YAFFX (KT&G is #25 at 0.68%), TBGVX. Maybe I'm just not looking at the right funds, but it looks like value funds aren't finding much "value" in tobacco.
We can each define value investing however we want. Just look at Bill Miller. I think your observation about concentration and protection goes a long way toward explaining the failure of this fund, value or not.

Certainly that describes the fund's portfolio now. Looking at its performance graph (e.g. in the latest [Dec 2018] annual report), one can see it diverge sharply from the S&P 500 starting around 2012-2013. It also significantly underperformed its category starting around 2012, with the exception of 2016.
The fund has been investing in Consolidated Tomoka since 2006. Going along with your comment about Berkowitz, Wintergreen held a significant portion of Consolidated Tomoka (over 5%) since day one. But it didn't represent an excessively large portion of the fund until the last 2-3 years. So while this stock holding does help explain more recent problems (thanks!), there's more to the story than one stock and a manager's obsession with it.
At the end of 2013 CTO represented about 2.6% of Wintergreen. The fund's top holdings were Jardines (7%), Swatch (7%), and Berkshire Hathaway, with a good amount of tobacco thrown in (BAT and Reynolds, over 10% combined).
At the end of 2014, tobacco moved up, with Reynolds in top spot (7.3%) but also BAT (6.8%) and Altria (4.7%). Consolidated Tomoka appears in the top ten at 4.7%, primarily through appreciation (50%+) but also because of some AUM shrinkage (15%). The fund continued to hold the same number of shares as it had since 2012; they represented 21% of CTO. (The 2014 annual report has a discussion of this holding.)
By the end of 2015, Consolidated Tomoka had grown enough to have become the fund's second largest holding (9.3%). Again, with no additional stock purchases, and with tobacco still the dominant holding - Reynolds (12.4%), BAT (8.5%), Altria (6.3%). CTO's performance (down around 6%) was in line with the fund's 2015 performance (down7%). The rise to 2nd largest holding was thus due to the fact that people were pulling money out of the fund and Winters didn't sell off CTO pro-rata. AUM dropped over 50%.
So arguably it wasn't until 2016 that CTO began to dominate the fund. But Winters also continued favoring tobacco during this period. By the end of 2016, CTO constituted 13.9% of the fund, while tobacco kept pace, with Reynolds now at 19.5%, BAT at 9.4%, and Altria at 7%. Tobacco stocks now accounted for three of the four largest holdings. CTO was essentially flat on the year, while the fund itself performed well relative to its peers, gaining 6.67%.
Once again, the increased fraction of the fund that CTO represented was a result of people pulling money out of the fund (AUM down nearly 1/3) and Winters hanging on to CTO, and onto the tobacco stocks. Note also that real estate didn't grow much as a fraction of the fund in 2016 (just to 13.9% up from 13.5%), because Winters gave up on his other real estate holding, Sun Hung Kai.
By the end of 2017, CTO was the fund's largest holding, at 20.4%. BAT (now owning Reynolds) was 16.1%, and Altria 5.7%. That was a result of CTO appreciating 20% and AUM shrinking 20%. Again, no change in the number of shares owned by the fund.
Finally, by the end of 2018, CTO represents 42.6% of the company (despite underperforming in 2018), BAT is still the second largest holding, but that's just 5.9% of the fund. Tobacco and every other stock have become nearly immaterial.

FYI: Quantitative investment strategies suffered poor performance last year, but there isn’t one intuitive way to pinpoint exactly why it happened, said Cliff Asness, managing principal and chief investment officer at AQR Capital Management.
It’s easier to explain why one individual component of a multifactor strategy underperformed, such as why the value factor lagged, he said. But explaining total performance in down years is difficult, especially over the short to medium term.
Regards,
Ted
https://www.fa-mag.com/news/aqr-s-asness--no-simple-explanation-for-quant-failure-in-2018-44771.html?print

Thanks for explaining that @MikeM. Too many different funds from TRP nowadays if you ask me, but I guess they need that to remain competitive. Have to wonder if they couldn’t rename that static fund category. It need not be solely for retirement. May be good reasons someone wants a particular risk exposure regardless of years to retirement.
20-25 years ago I could name most of TP’s funds and explain what they were all about. Today it’s hopeless.
Another thought. That “allocation fee” Oppenheimer slaps on their allocation funds - might make sense if the underlying funds they hold are some type of institutional class or otherwise paying a lower ER. I doubt that’s the case, but might be worth someone’s time to check on it.

Yes, very good article. I never really thought of balanced funds as "target risk" funds, but it's true. For over thirty years we maintained a substantial investment in American Century's "Strategic Allocation (Moderate)", a "balanced" fund. There were three types offered: "Conservative", "Moderate", and "Aggressive".
When I now look at the American Century site, this family of funds is no longer called "Balanced"- now they are called "Target Risk", and the spectrum has been expanded to five allocation models, from "Very Conservative" to "Very Aggressive".
I would venture that their "Target Date" offerings are more than likely very similar (if not identical) in makeup to the "Target Risk" funds, but simply moving your position down the spectrum from Aggressive to Conservative as time elapses and the target date becomes near.
I haven't looked at details with respect to any possible "allocation fees" for this product at American Century, but there were no such fees with respect to the old "balanced fund" approach.

FYI: While stocks staged a remarkable comeback from Monday’s deep decline, they still closed in the red. A day later, and the sellers are back at it.
Long-suffering market bears, like John Hussman, have to be savoring this kind of action. After all, when things turn south, Hussman’s fortunes turn north.
In fact, riding the cred he earned from calling prior market collapses, his assets under management swelled to almost $7 billion. Now, however, after years of underperformance, that figure stands at a fraction of what it once was.
Hussman’s flagship $312-million Strategic Growth Fund HSGFX, +0.17% , which focuses on “the protection of capital during unfavorable market conditions,” has had a rough go of it during this relentless bull market, shedding almost 9% a year, on average, since 2014, according to Morningstar.
Regards,
Ted
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/ho-hum-a-65-market-plunge-would-be-run-of-the-mill-fund-manager-says-2019-05-07/print

@Derf - Great article. Please come to the front of the class!
I hadn’t heard the trim “target risk fund” before this. But they make good sense. With target date funds you’re making a lot of assumptions about the future. What will your situation be 20 years down the road? What will your home and other acquired assets be worth than? Your health and family situation? Will you still feel like working than?
Target risk funds attempt to maintain a static level of risk suitable for current situation. I’m reminded of a series of funds Oppenheimer offers. They have a series of four or five ranging from asset allocation - conservative all the way out to asset allocation - aggressive. Allocations remain static. Investors may shift from one to another as their life situation evolves. Big problem with Oppenheimer’s is that they charge an “allocation fee” on top of the fees incurred from the underlying funds. However, I’m sure you could find something similar from T. Rowe and others without the added fee.

@Derf, no mutual funds, all ETFs. They use mostly their own. Out of 20 ETFs in the portfolio, 14 of them are Schwab. There are a couple others, Vanguard, ishares , Vaneck.
I don't plan to make any changes right now. I've held it for about 3 years now. I plan to reconsider the robo when interest rates start to climb and the Fed starts to raise rates again. That would be because of the large, low interest cash position they hold. Who wants to hold 12% of their portfolio in cash making < 1/2 % when CDs will be climbing to 3, 4, 5% ?
Anyway, I think it's a decent option to consider for the hands off approach, especially for those who just can't help tinkering with their portfolios. But, there are other options too.
Oh, forgot to mention, a benefit to the Schwab Intelligent Portfolio is a very low cost personal advisory service. I haven't done that yet, but I might.