Clearly some institutional investors such as state pension plans are better in their support of these governance issues than others such as mutual funds:
https://twitter.com/search?f=tweets&vertical=default&q=sustainability%20ratings%20tell%20half%20the%20story&src=typd
One reason I've found in my research is that institutional investors like pension plans are by design expected to think long-term. Long-term risks like climate change and poorly designed executive compensation plans which encourage short-term thinking are risks they can't afford to ignore. Meanwhile, many but not all of the retail investors who buy mutual funds too often think short term and are less inclined to care about what could damage a company's prospects five or ten years down the road.

Hi Guys,
Being an "aimer" is very common. We all have goals. The challenge is how realistic those goals are. What are the odds of achieving those goals? Given market uncertainties, a 100% success goal is very bushy-tailed. But it is achievable if an investor is flexible to changing circumstances.
An early step in that process is to identify the likely odds of success. Monte Carlo simulators provide one useful tool to make those estimates. That tool not only yields the odds for success, but also makes estimates of end wealth, and a timeline for the portfolio failures. If those failure times are well beyond likely life expectancy, the failures are far less significant for planning purposes.
I well understand why only a 95% portfolio survival projection would be troublesome for some folks. It was for me. However, once that estimate is known, an investor could think about adjusting his withdrawal plan to alleviate that possibility.
When planning my retirement, I programmed my own version of a Monte Carlo code. I frequently calculated portfolio survival likelihoods in the mid-90% ranges. What to do? To improve that survival rate, I modified the code to reduce drawdowns by an input value (like 10%) if annual market returns were negative for some specified years. Withdrawals were increased once the markets turned positive in the simulations.
I explored many such portfolio survival issues by using my easily modified Monte Carlo code. Portfolio survival rates of very near 100% could be projected when very modest withdrawal rate flexibility was allowed. Like in so many other life situations, flexibility is a winning strategy.
My Monte Carlo calculations identified the frequency of shortfalls, the magnitudes of any shortfalls, and the timeframe of those shortfalls. These were all useful inputs for my retirement decision. The very modest adjustments needed to alleviate that unacceptable outcome gave great comfort. These additional Monte Carlo simulations cemented my retirement decision.
I believe (alternately, IMHO if you dislike "I believe") that Monte Carlo simulations would help many MFOers when considering their retirement decision.
Thanks for the Kitces reference. Be aware that he has a vested interest in the subject matter of that referenced article. He closes his piece with the following declaration:
"Michael Kitces has a financial interest in the US distribution of the Timeline app."
I have no such vested interest in Monte Carlo codes. I merely advocate that they be included as one tool to support investment decisions. They permit easy multiple sensitivity analyses. Of course, they depend on good input data ranges. They do not stand alone.
Best Wishes

I always wonder what the practical effect of such fine distinction-making is.
'For the particular kind of [prostate, breast] cancer you have, the new data show that watchful waiting outcomes are as good in terms of mortality and life quality as treatment, often better, and the number needed to treat is yada yada. Discuss with your doctor whether treatment or monitoring is right for you.'
'Return-sequence risk is always significant and badly down years at the start of your retirement can be deleterious to all of your planning. Discuss with your adviser the consequences of not planning yada yada ...'
And then what? What is the discussion? What can it change besides (dis)comfort level and moves toward drastic preventive actions? How wise is it to have 'just get rid of it' surgery or go to all laddered CDs? In the worst case, plenty wise. So is the discussion necessarily education in likelihood of worst cases?

Some of it certainly is education about worst case probabilities. There's a general belief that outcomes are better if treatment is more aggressive. Sometimes that's true, often it's not, especially given possibilities of false positives (not ill when tests say otherwise).
For example, mammograms are not too reliable with dense breast tissue. Here's a page from the American Cancer Society suggesting in that case you talk with your doctor, because on the one hand you might want to also have an MRI. But it also says that MRIs produce false positives leading to more tests and biopsies (which have their own risks).
https://www.cancer.org/cancer/breast-cancer/screening-tests-and-early-detection/mammograms/breast-density-and-your-mammogram-report.html
Similarly, PSA tests are not especially reliable and can lead to biopsies with risks.
A good part of the conversation can simply be an exploration of what's really important to you. In some other thread was a link to an article on how the usual financial planning questions are not helpful, e.g. "would you risk a 20% loss if 2/3 of the time you'd gain 15%?" People don't know what they want or how they'd react if actually (not hypothetically) faced with a 20% loss.
So IMHO talking with a planner at length about what really concerns you and discussing the cost/benefits of different risk mitigators (e.g. immediate annuities, long term care insurance, greater cash allocations, etc.) is a good use of time.
Different people place different values on a given outcome. Worse, most people don't even have a clear idea of how they value each possible outcome.
At one end of the spectrum you have women who will have radical mastectomies because they have a genetic risk of cancer. They choose life, regardless of its quality, over all else. At the other end of the spectrum, you have men who will decline prostate cancer treatment even when faced with certain death, rather than assume any risk of impotence due to treatment.
There are real people like that. I think I can appreciate their perspectives even if I don't agree with them.
Personally, I don't want to go broke, period. In that financial sense, I take an extreme position. A magic number of, say 95% chance of success tells me nothing. I need to know what the 5% of paths look like. Then I can explore possible followup actions that would increase success to 100%.
Likewise with that doctor talk. It's difficult to follow radiation therapy with surgery if the radiation is unsuccessful, while the reverse is much easier. That's a consideration in selecting choice of treatment, if one is willing to live with the much higher likelihood of a degraded quality of life due to multiple therapies.
Knowing not only the odds but the paths of outcomes enables you to plan for dealing with possible failures. And for not doing something just because the expert, whether physician or advisor, felt it was best in his not so humble opinion.

There are now nine equity funds at least 10 years old through September that have never incurred a negative return over any 3-year rolling period. There were only five last month. The four new funds just turned 10! They are Boston Trust Midcap Fund (BTMFX), Delaware Healthcare Fund Inst (DLHIX), Prospector Capital Appreciation Fund (PCAFX), and Prospector Opportunity Fund (POPFX).
Four of the nine are MFO Great Owls, and David profiled PCAFX in 2011. He gave it a thumbs-up.
Here's an update of the complete list published in this month's commentary (click image to enlarge):

I always wonder what the practical effect of such fine distinction-making is.
'For the particular kind of [prostate, breast] cancer you have, the new data show that watchful waiting outcomes are as good in terms of mortality and life quality as treatment, often better, and the number needed to treat is yada yada. Discuss with your doctor whether treatment or monitoring is right for you.'
'Return-sequence risk is always significant and badly down years at the start of your retirement can be deleterious to all of your planning. Discuss with your adviser the consequences of not planning yada yada ...'
And then what? What is the discussion? What can it change besides (dis)comfort level and moves toward drastic preventive actions? How wise is it to have 'just get rid of it' surgery or go to all laddered CDs? In the worst case, plenty wise. So is the discussion necessarily education in likelihood of worst cases?

Equities appeared to be propelled by a pair of key trends: stronger year-on-year earnings growth at the corporate level, plus evidence of synchronized global GDP growth for the first time in several years. The latter trend suggests that companies could sustain or even accelerate their profitability in the coming quarters.
Projected year-on-year U.S. earnings growth rate for 3Q is in the high single digits, and it’s even higher in overseas stock markets. This is one of the key reasons why we favor international developed and emerging markets
We are underweight U.S. large cap and small cap stocks, primarily based on relative valuation metrics.
We are overweight non-U.S. developed market equities, emerging market equities, high-yield bonds and long-dated Treasuries. Emerging market stocks have been among the best-performing asset classes in 2017, and we think they remain an appealing investment opportunity based on valuation and earnings growth potential. Profitability is also on the upswing in developed markets as GDP growth improves. High yield is benefiting from very low default rates, while expectations of a slow-moving Fed buoys long Treasuries.

Market-Commentary

@PBKCM, it's a very good point but I think you're leaving out a couple of points that I'd love to have your perspective on. First, as long as 20 cents of every new dollar in the stock market goes to passive and 80% of that goes to market cap weighted passive, there's a lot of momentum behind the continued success of market cap indices. Unfortunately, saying active management is positioned to take advantage doesn't help at all with choosing one or more of the thousands of active managers.
Mark Hulbert wrote an article in May (marketwatch.com/story/why-way-fewer-actively-managed-funds-beat-the-sp-than-we-thought-2017-04-24) based on S&P research suggesting the chances of picking an active manager who can beat their benchmark was 5% over the last 15 years. In the best category, global equity, there was a 17% chance.
When the tide finally changes how high do you think the chances will be for someone to actually pick one or more managers who can beat their benchmark, market cap weighted index? And how many of those will be able to outperform to an extent that gets them out of the hole they're in now?
Second, I wonder a lot why the discussion tends to be dominated by active and passive with the assumption that passive means market cap weighted. If we start with an assumption that you're right, that market cap weighting is distorting the weighing machine but the scale will eventually win, why should we expect active managers to do better than other forms of passive, like equal weighting or factor based? I know other forms of passive are subject to the same argument as market cap weighting, but if one day everyone gives up on market cap passive and decides to put their money in dividend weighted passive, they might outperform 95% of active managers for the next 15 years.
Just for the record, I have always been and still am almost entirely invested in actively managed funds over passive. I just struggle sometimes with the idea that we're all trying to predict the future, almost no one has been able to do that in a reliable way but everyone who engages in these discussions wants us to believe that its a logical exercise and they have the best logic.

Not to be mean, but it would seem to mean that MJG's quote: "over much longer, meaningful periods of time (referring to years), the surest rule in the stock market is the rule called "regression to the mean." is essentially meaningless.

Hi @catch22 - I didn't take your post as contradictory, not at all. You pointed out that things (including mean returns) do change at least for many years at a time (e.g. post 2008). I appreciated that observation and just tried to build on it, with more data on how the "marketplace ... is still ... discovering its future path."

@bee EDV is a bit unusual in that it holds a portfolio with an extremely high duration. You've got a good idea in looking at zeros (like the AC target date funds) for other vehicles with high duration. (That's because for zeros, duration equals maturity; normally with LT bonds, duration is much less than maturity.)
But since BTTRX is a target date fund, its duration gets shorter and shorter. Its 2025 target date means that it now has an 8 year duration. Even a decade ago it started with just an 18 year duration.
If you just need a 10 year history (and not all of 2016), you can try using PTTRX. Identical 5 year return to EDV. Over the earlier part of EDV's lifetime, it did a little better. It was more stable in 2008 (not rising quite as much) and 2009 (not falling quite as much), and outperformed in 2010.
Other long duration funds didn't track EDV nearly as well (i.e. were not nearly as wild) over 2008-2009. Maybe WHOSX (duration ranged between 16 and 23 years over the past decade) would be a passable substitute if you need to cover all of 2006.

As I have expressed before, IMO; one may continue to name the ongoing markets since the big melt as still feeling the effects of policy(s) and that "this time is still different" and thus the "mean regression chart line" is progressive/dynamic, not static and has the baseline in "float" mode. The 2008/2009 market melt was/is an overwhelming shift in the financial marketplace that is still impacting and discovering its future path.
In other words, jolts to the market come along that can take years to work their way through. There may or may not be an ultra long term static "mean regression chart line", but at least for these multi-year periods, it's dynamic.
Even assuming an ultimately constant mean, because of these jolts it seems one needs an extremely long time frame to compute that average - say 100 years or more, in order to include the jolt of the Great Depression, or maybe 150 years back to the panics of the late 1800s, or ... At some point you're essentially averaging the entire "modern" history of the stock market.
More info from the 1928-present NYU/Stern data set I've cited (this table was in the spreadsheet, they're not date ranges I selected):

Period     S&P 500   3 mo Treas   10 Yr Treas
1928-2016  11.42%     3.46%        5.18%
1967-2016  11.45%     4.88%        7.08%
2007-2016   8.64%     0.74%        5.03%

. The S&P 500 is up "only" about 15% YTD. If it ends 2017 up 20%, that would raise arithmetic mean of 2007-2017 just to 9.68%. If you're a believer in a constant long term mean, that suggests that recovery from the 2008 jolt still has years to go.

Hi @msf
Thank you for your presentation.
I started this reply to the thread relative to the bond portion of this discussion. I've obviously blipped more just below.
What I'll name, The Exquisite Investor; being without much meaningful flaw as to getting the timing right 75% of the time and being patient enough to wait until the next trading (buy/sell) shows its face via technical numbers in particular, but with an understanding of real world events that can/do/may factor into why the technical numbers arrive and depart creating a more possible profitable investment.
I suppose this process could place this as to one being a "value" investor; being careful enough to try to understand that some "value" within investment sectors is cheap for a good reason and may remain cheap for a long time; a perverted "mean".
As I have expressed before, IMO; one may continue to name the ongoing markets since the big melt as still feeling the effects of policy(s) and that "this time is still different" and thus the "mean regression chart line" is progressive/dynamic, not static and has the baseline in "float" mode. The 2008/2009 market melt was/is an overwhelming shift in the financial marketplace that is still impacting and discovering its future path.
I may be completely wrong about any or all of this....tis my view at this time. @Tony may respond as to the technical side.
The below chart compare for about 10 years for EDV and SDY may surprise a few folks for total returns over the time frame. I recall @bee using EDV for reference points against other sectors for cross over points, etc. I fully expect most folks would not consider a holding as EDV or similar versus a more likely holding of a total bond fund or a 10 year Treasury fund for a bond area investment. One is able to view the movement of EDV and cross overs points relative to my pick of SDY for reference, especially during the ongoing turmoil of the markets for several years after the melt. Europe, in particular; was still attempting to find a path forward for several years, which includes events as "Greece" being in the news headlines as well as the ongoing, questionable stability of many European banks during the "recovery" period.
Yes, the 10 year Treasury will remain a reference point and this is valid for on overview of risk on or off conditions, but remains a choice of various bond types, eh?
http://stockcharts.com/freecharts/perf.php?EDV,SDY&n=2467&O=011000
Okay, time for another coffee, yes?
Regards,
Catch

@Crash
RBC appears to be more than fairly priced at this point in time. If interest rates really move upward over the next few years; one may have a chance to have some profit from current pricing levels.
http://stockcharts.com/h-sc/ui?s=RY&p=W&yr=5&mn=0&dy=0&id=p16334527354

Hi Guys,
Change happens; it is a certainty.
"Richard Russell, the famous Dow Theorist, once noted that over a shorter time frame almost anything can happen in the financial markets, but over much longer, meaningful periods of time (referring to years), the surest rule in the stock market is the rule called "regression to the mean.""
This quote was extracted from this regression advocating article:
https://seekingalpha.com/article/2315705-regression-to-the-mean-and-why-investors-should-not-ignore-its-importance
I am in complete agreement with the main theme of this article. There is a compelling and irresistible market pull towards a regression-to-the-mean. In any single year, almost any extreme is possible; anything can and does happen even if probabilities are low. But as the timeframe expands, the marketplace adjusts to deliver more predictable average returns. Over time, sanity rules.
I have zero confidence that I can predict tomorrow's market returns, but I am very comfortable about staying in the market for the loooong run.
Best Wishes

@msf, I understand that 10 years treasury is often used for illustration purpose. Would a total bond index make more sense even though it may not have the long history as treasury?

1. The objective is to get as much into the Roth as possible while paying taxes on $10K.
Using Bee's example, the current combined value of all five accounts is $61,830. If you recharacterize all but the one that did best (PRIDX), you wind up with $13,106 in the Roth and $48.724 recharacterized back to the traditional IRA. If you recharacterize all but, say, PRWCX, you wind up with "just" $11,206 in the Roth and $50,624 recharacterized back to the trad IRA.
Either way you pay taxes on $10K, but leaving PRIDX as the converted fund results in the largest percentage of your portfolio converted into the Roth for the same amount of tax.
That's not to say that you're stuck with these investments. You could choose to exchange PRIDX inside the Roth for PRWCX and/or exchange PRWCX inside the traditional to PRIDX, or anything else. Perhaps I should have said you pick the "subaccount" with the highest value to keep as a Roth, and recharacterize the others.
2. Bee mentioned that an objective is to keep income low enough to qualify for ACA subsidies. Getting $1500 out of a taxable account to pay for the Roth conversion could result in recognizing capital gains, and thus increase income. That extra income might disqualify Bee from any ACA subsidy. On the other hand, getting the $1500 out of a Roth account would not increase income, so the ACA subsidy would remain safe.
3. Say you have two funds each worth $1500, the amount of the tax. You expect the first to double in the next four years, the other one to grow by 50%. All else being equal, you'd rather keep the first investment and sell off the second, since you'd have more money ($3000 vs. $2250) at the end of four years. Of course there are other considerations, notably asset allocation and risk. In glossing over those considerations, I may have underestimated their importance.

DSENX has performed well during its nearly 4 years of existence.
I use the S&P 500 as a benchmark for this fund. Not an ideal benchmark, but for me, close enough. I've noticed that, over the past year or so, DSENX is barely outperforming the S&P 500.
I'm not going to make a sell decision based on the last year's performance, but I'm wondering how much longer DSENX's outperformance can last. Any ideas?

Amit Wadhwaney is mentioned in David's October commentary in connexion with preferring experience over inexperience. New funds run by older, experienced Managers. The link to his fund doesn't work. But I found this one: (retail shares.)
http://www.morningstar.com/funds/XNAS/MOWNX/quote.html
I'd hesitate more than a little, in this case. I fled TAVIX (Third Avenue International Value) in 2008 or 2009, after the fund--- managed by Wadhwaney--- started to tumble downwards. Yes, those were the bad years. But I distinctly recall that TAVIX was underperforming everything else I owned at that time. And I also distinctly recall being very patient, not rushing away from TAVIX just because of a few bad weeks or months.
The performance numbers for this Moerus fund are short-term, of course, since it is new. And those numbers look good right NOW. But why would I want to entrust money (again) with that particular fund manager, now? I'm aware that the Tweedy Browne shop has been in tumult, though perhaps they're back on track, more recently...

While the intent of that business insider chart is clear, the data are less so.
What stock market (US or global, S&P 500 or Wilshire 5000 or ...), and what bond market (ten year T-bonds, corporates, or ...)? If one uses returns of the S&P 500 and 10 year treasuries, the numbers don't match. They're not far off, but they show that at least this reader doesn't know quite what data were used.
What sort of rebalancing if any was done over the rolling 1, 5, 10, and 20 year periods? Nothing is said about this either.
Here's the data I used. It goes all the way back to 1928.
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/histretSP.html
Those older figures are important, because while returns since 1950 (a few years after WWII ended) have been "okay", earlier periods showed that the market can be even worse. Not that losing 2% each year for five years (cumulative loss of 9.6%) is that great.
It used to be we were told that "the stock market" (whatever that meant) never had a loss (ignoring inflation) over any ten year period since WWII (maybe that's what you were thinking of). But then 1999 - 2008 came along. And right after that, another rolling ten year nominal loss, 2000 - 2009.
There's a problem with putting too much faith in historical data. Things change. One can either ignore that, or adjust expectations accordingly.
We've had a 35-40 year bull market in bonds (with 10 year treasury yields now bouncing around 2%), that followed a 35-40 year bear market in bonds (that started in 1941 with yields around 2%). That's a looong cycle that should be incorporated into projections. There's no way that bonds can boost a portfolio's returns - they yield virtually nothing, and if the yield goes up, the total return could turn negative.
From the end of 1940 to the end of 1956 there were only two years where the total return of 10 year treasuries broke 4% (none 5% or more). Which gets us back to the question of whether these figures include rebalancing, and more generally, why even bother with bonds now? Cash isn't yielding that much less, and if interest rates rise, cash should track bonds. (In the 1940-1956 time frame, 3 mo treasuries returned 1.6% annualized, not much worse than bonds at 2.6%, and with virtually no volatility.)
The only cherry picking I'm doing here is with the end date of 1956. Bond yields bottomed out around 1941 at 2%, just as they seem to have done now (more or less). The graph below is ten year treasury yields over time.

@slick: Fantastic post!! I've always appreciated @Old_Skeet's discussion of his portfolio and sleeve system and this is right up there.
I have 22 funds and 16 stocks plus the cash in funds and that I hold in my IRA. I won't comment on the stocks except to say I should stick to funds and I'm glad I'm headed in that direction. Like you and others, I check performance but I tend to focus on slightly different things. I view the returns as a reflection of my asset allocation decisions and prefer category rankings when reviewing funds because the results can differ. For instance, 12 of my 22 funds have greater than 20% returns with 3 of those over 30%. Another 7 had returns greater than 10% and only 3 were between 0-10%. However, only 7 of my 22 funds are top decile in their category, 2 more are top quartile, 7 more are top half and 6 are doing pretty lousy with 5 of the 6 in the bottom decile of their category.
My 3 largest positions are 7-10% positions in my portfolio and their rankings are GPIIX at 40, POAGX at 24 and GPEIX at 90 (ugh!). If I screen out large cap emerging markets funds GP isn't doing much better but I'm a believer and the longer term record is still good so I'm not even close to thinking about giving up.
I'm overweight healthcare at 16.6% of my portfolio and that's been working really well especially with my 3 healthcare funds (HQL, SBIO and PRHSX) ranked top 1%, 8% and 32%, respectively. Half of my healthcare exposure is within other funds or a couple of the stocks but being overweight has helped a lot this year.
I'm also overweight emerging markets at 15.7% of my portfolio but while that should make me a big winner this year, all 3 specific EM funds I own (GPEIX, SFGIX, MEASX) are having tough years. Like with healthcare I'm getting exposure from other funds as well, some of which are having great years, but I feel like EM has been a disappointment.
I've had no bonds for years, often to my hindsight's regret, but I count cash in my IRA as an investment decision. Together with the cash in funds I own it's 15% of my portfolio and has been since the beginning of the year in rough terms. Overall, my returns on the 85% invested are very close to the S&P but considering my overweights to healthcare and EM should both be helping as well as getting a currency benefit from a 50/50 split between domestic and international investments, I would have hoped to be having a better year. Which brings me back to stocks...