The math:
You could have purchased gold for around $150 an ounce during the 1975-1977 period (after which the price rose sharply). Today's price is close to $1100. Over a 40 year period (1975-present) that equates to around a 5% annually compounded return.*
Historical gold prices http://www.nma.org/pdf/gold/his_gold_prices.pdf
It would have been better to purchase gold prior to 1975 when the price (artificially set) remained around $35 an ounce for many years. Unfortunately, U.S. law prohibited private citizens from owning gold except in smaller quantities in the form of jewelry.
The Gold Reserve Act (1934) https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gold_Reserve_Act
---
*(interest compounded yearly - added at the end of each year)
Year Year Interest Total Interest Balance
1 $7.50 $7.50 $157.50
2 $7.88 $15.38 $165.38
3 $8.27 $23.64 $173.64
4 $8.68 $32.33 $182.33
5 $9.12 $41.44 $191.44
6 $9.57 $51.01 $201.01
7 $10.05 $61.07 $211.07
8 $10.55 $71.62 $221.62
9 $11.08 $82.70 $232.70
10 $11.63 $94.33 $244.33
11 $12.22 $106.55 $256.55
12 $12.83 $119.38 $269.38
13 $13.47 $132.85 $282.85
14 $14.14 $146.99 $296.99
15 $14.85 $161.84 $311.84
16 $15.59 $177.43 $327.43
17 $16.37 $193.80 $343.80
18 $17.19 $210.99 $360.99
19 $18.05 $229.04 $379.04
20 $18.95 $247.99 $397.99
21 $19.90 $267.89 $417.89
22 $20.89 $288.79 $438.79
23 $21.94 $310.73 $460.73
24 $23.04 $333.76 $483.76
25 $24.19 $357.95 $507.95
26 $25.40 $383.35 $533.35
27 $26.67 $410.02 $560.02
28 $28.00 $438.02 $588.02
29 $29.40 $467.42 $617.42
30 $30.87 $498.29 $648.29
31 $32.41 $530.71 $680.71
32 $34.04 $564.74 $714.74
33 $35.74 $600.48 $750.48
34 $37.52 $638.00 $788.00
35 $39.40 $677.40 $827.40
36 $41.37 $718.77 $868.77
37 $43.44 $762.21 $912.21
38 $45.61 $807.82 $957.82
39 $47.89 $855.71 $1,005.71
40 $50.29 $906.00 $1,056.00
Standard CalculationBase amount: $150.00
Interest Rate: 5%
Effective Annual Rate: 5%
Calculation period: 40 years
From "The Calculator Site" http://www.thecalculatorsite.com/finance/calculators/compoundinterestcalculator.php

HomeFed issued $150 million in senior notes that mature in three years, with a coupon of 6.50%. The company chose not to pay for a rating. The money was used to buy a 1,400 acre property known as Otay Ranch, which according to Sherman was “contiguous to property HomeFed already owned.
That would be a tad over $107,000 / acre. It must be a Wall St. property !!!! ??? (California)5300 acre development.
Derf

Thesis for Continuation of Those and Other Current Trends
By Tom Stevenson4:44PM BST 01 Aug 2015
Tom Stevenson is an investment director at Fidelity Worldwide Investment. The views expressed are his own. He tweets at @tomstevenson63.
Excerpts from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11778011/Commodities-rout-brings-global-winners-and-losers.html
Commodities rout brings global winners and losers
The sell-off in commodities is terrible news for emerging market countries which depend on high resource prices
The commodity slump is important because, unlike the Greek debt negotiations and Shanghai’s bursting equity bubble, its impact is felt throughout the global economy. Greece is a rounding error in worldwide terms while the Chinese stock market remains largely sealed off from the rest of the world. Last month’s slide in oil, industrial metals and agriculture speaks to a broader concern – that the long slow recovery from the financial crisis is far from secure.
Although the past month has seen an acceleration of the slide in commodity prices, it is actually part of a secular shift that may have barely begun. Commodities boomed for a decade from 2001. It is unrealistic to expect the correction to be over in just four years. This is good for some countries, sectors and asset classes and catastrophic for others. No wonder Janet Yellen is leaving her options open.
Companies are belatedly acknowledging that they face a prolonged downturn in prices and they are finally facing up to the consequences.
That’s bad news for commodity producers and companies dependent on investment in the sector. It’s also terrible news for emerging market countries whose economies and current accounts depend on high resource prices. Between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s, inflation-adjusted earnings for basic resources, industrials, chemicals, oil services and machinery companies went nowhere. It is hard to see why this pattern should not be repeated.
But for the commodity consuming parts of the economy, a slide in the cost of resources is just another tail-wind to add to falling unemployment, rising wages and persistently low inflation. This is why the US stock market trades at a premium to the rest of the world and why resource-hungry Japan continues to look so interesting.
For many companies and individuals, reduced input prices and lower transport and heating costs are a positive that will keep a lid on inflation and give the central banks on both sides of the Atlantic pause for thought. It’s not too late to get on the right side of this trade.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11778011/Commodities-rout-brings-global-winners-and-losers.html

"M* don't like. It will never admit it, while it keeps currying favor with other managers whose funds never "recovered" (sic)."
M* didn't like this fund when it covered it (aside from one later report, it stopped covering the fund in the mid 2000s, just like its "spinoff" and probably its other peers).
This fund has recovered its losses from its 2000 peak, but M* never praised this fund. Rather, M* continues to praise other funds (not necessarily its peers) that didn't recover from the bust at the turn of the millennium.
"Investors who listened to M* would have generally fared badly."
The vast majority of this fund's peers have vanished. M* continually panned the group of funds as a whole, so generally one would have done well by heeding M*'s advice.
But this fund fared moderately well, so one would have done better holding on and ignoring M* for this specific fund.
"10K at inception, VFINX : 41K, FUND : 137 K"
See graph for growth of $10K. VF set chart at "maximum", and moused over to get the final (current) values of VFINX and this fund as of the posting date.
"M* would start dissing the fund at end of 2000"
M* started coverage in 1999, and never wrote a positive report (though some were nuanced). The mid 2000 report said that one could do better by purchasing a peer fund.
The late 2000 report (apparently the one VF is using as the first "dissing") said that the fund was positioning itself somewhat defensively (not a bad idea for late 2000), while acknowledging that the fund still lost as much as its average peer. Being defensively positioned, it should have fared better.
"At this time [late 2001] M* is all over this fund."
The late 2001 report said that the fund had blown away its peers by virtue of its defensive positioning (losing a lot less), but if the market turned up, that could reverse. M* advised avoiding the fund - it was no longer focused on its objective (hard to fit into a portfolio), heavily concentrated (high risk), and had recently changed management (favorable short term performance may not be meaningful).
"Last 5 Years, VFINX marginally higher than fund
Last 3 Years, VFINX marginally lower than fund"
Over the past five years, this unnamed fund has slightly underperformed the S&P 500; over the last three, it has done a smidge better than the S&P 500. (Didn't I just write this before?)

Since we're cherry picking data, holding PRPFX since 2000 would have yielded 7.7% CAGR vs 4.3% for SPY. Better sharpe, half the volatility and draw down as well.
Holding GLD since its inception has a slightly better return than SPY with roughly the same draw down and volatility.
So it can and does diversify, IMO.

clacy, but it wasn't until PRPFX had such a great run that it became a board favorite. It's five year annualized return isn't anything to crow about either. I would wager most here succumbed to all the incessant articulate ramblings about the fund in the past five years. Just go back to 2011 in the MFO board archives on PRPFX.

Well Maurice, I am one of those posters. I don't feel a need to do weekly posts to promote holding AU. Nor do I ponder/fret what to do about it day-to-day. So you needn't fret about why you haven't seen such posts...
I continue to hold my position in AU bullion (all of which I self-custody). And it makes a wonderful diversifier. --- A diversifier does not mean "go up all the time". AU had a VERY LONG up-market; several down-years is nothing too unusual. -- After all, equities, after topping in 2000, took a decade to reach new highs. Assets come/go out of favor. AU excelled when stocks did nothing. AU has foundered the past few years as stocks have climbed. Definitionally,that IS diversification. Breaks in the price of AU below $1K would commence my accumulating. (If I had NO AU position, I'd probably commence SLOW accumulation here --- as the GDX/GDXJ suggests possible capitulation in those securities).
I do find from time-to-time, what I will call "gold haters" post on investment message boards, why, I do not know. Energy stocks are down sharply since Nov. EM-stocks too. Is it your contention that asset are only attractive for purchase/holding if they are at/near all-time highs..? --- I generally go about deploying capital the other way: buy/accumulate when prices are down. Maybe different strokes for different folks...?
In the past month I have initiated and expanded new positions in MLPs and EM, as those have encountered price weakness, but IMO represent real longer-term value. Will probably commence accumulating shares in Aug-Nov in quality energy producers -- my thesis being the quality producers (XOM, CVX, COP, OXY, EOG) will recover -- primarily because I suspect circumstances will eventually drive WTI higher. I don't claim to know when, but $45/WTI is not conducive to producers -- so producers will (voluntarily or otherwise) curtail production, and that will "solve" the problem of low WTI (just as happened in earlier cycles).

Well that's a blast from the past.
The best known of the early managers went off to form his own competing fund that cratered even worse. Like the fund he left, this "spinoff" did marginally worse than VFINX over the past five years, but a smidgeon better over the past three. This original manager was a media darling at the time he left.

This is easy. M* don't like. It will never admit it, while it keeps currying favor with other managers whose funds never "recovered" (sic). Investors who listened to M* would have generally fared badly. The performance numbers are from M* as of right now.
10K at inception, VFINX : 41K, FUND : 137 K
M* would start dissing the fund at end of 2000
10K on 12/31/2000, VFINX : 20.8K, FUND : 28.4K
10K on 12/31/2001, VFINX : 23,4K, FUND : 31K
At this time M* is all over this fund.
10K on 12/31/2002, VFINX : 30.4K, FUND : 41K
Need I go on?
Last 10 years, VFINX : 20K, FUND : 28 K
Last 5 Years, VFINX marginally higher than fund
Last 3 Years, VFINX marginally lower than fund

Bruce Fund (BRUFX) near top of all funds for past 15 years.
http://www.marketwatch.com/tools/mutual-fund/screener?FundType=0&FundValue=0&ReturnFundPeriod=11
New holdings include 3 utilities /21% cash
http://quicktake.morningstar.com/syndication/holdings.aspx?cn=GLG117&symbol=BRUFX
http://portfolios.morningstar.com/fund/summary?t=BRUFX&region=usa&culture=en_US

@Jerry: http://www.marketwatch.com/story/shed-no-tears-for-departed-funds-2009-12-27
It finally died, but not without tears of fears and years of tears.

too lazy to check whether the Steadman funds still exist (obviously not under the same name !0+ years since this link
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2002-04-14/business/0204130137_1_steadman-funds-account-activity

You're right - I scrolled down too far in the prospectus before cutting and pasting - Driehaus did this "prepending" with a number of funds. For DMCRX, it prepended Driehaus Micro Cap Fund, L.P. - hope I got it right this time. The prospectus also says that in addition to DMCRX succeeding this LP fund, it also took in the assets from Driehaus Institutional Micro Cap Fund, L.P. (That was essentially a clone.)
What happens when a a company in the portfolio grows (or shrinks, for that matter) out of a fund's target cap size depends on the fund. Some funds say that they will continue holding the stock so long as it looks like a good position. This can result in modest style drift. Funds with more rigid sell policies will likely have higher turnover but better style purity.
It sounds like DMCRX will (or at least is allowed to) keep companies even if they grow out of microcap range. The prospectus says: "For purposes of the Fund, the investment adviser currently considers a company to be a micro-cap company if it is within the same market capitalization range at the time of investment as those included in the Russell Microcap® Growth Index. "
Style drift of individual stocks is also an issue with index funds. What index companies (like MSCI) have done over the past several years is build "buffer zones", so that a company is not automatically thrown out of an index just because it becomes too large, or too growthy, or too whatever. The company may be given some time before getting kicked out, in case this cap change is temporary. Or a stock may be kicked out only after the company changes its cap size by a lot (i.e. not just going a little over the line). These ways index funds don't turn over as much.

Re: "Now if that's skill or luck?"
I always attribute my good years to skill and my off years to bad luck. :)
If you trade a lot, skill has much to do with returns. Kudos to those who do it successfully.
If you are more of a passive allocation type investor, much of your year-to-year success depends on the whims of the various markets, and to some extent, the skill of the managers you have hired to manage that allocation. For example, your bond fund manager may have a premonition of impending doom and position the fund on the short side. That won't eliminate losses completely, but will provide superior returns to a manager who kept maturities long.
Just my 2 cents.

Data mining at it's best ?
Had one invested in my 2000, 2003, 2006, 2009, and 2012 Model Stock Portfolios and held them for the 3 following years, one would have outperformed a portfolio of low cost index funds by an amount approaching 3% per year. This, I would argue, is a record that would have been hard to beat by merely trying to figure out the fund sectors with the current fastest growth.
What would be his return if he started investing in 1999 ?
Derf

A top performing small cap may not always be one. A fund comes to mind a few years ago I had RYPRX. It was closed and became too large. They are now mid cap.

I have been wanting to get back into NEFJX for sometime now as it has remained closed to new investors for a good number of years. It looks as though the A shares have 337 million in asstets while some other funds I have reviewed for possible purchase are much, much larger. And yes, it is a fund that I have used, in the past, for special investment (SPIFF) purposes. Maybe that is why they closed it? LOL.
I have linked its M* report for those that have an interest. Notice its 10 year performance as well as its one, three and five year numbers. Reminds me of an old song titled ... Leader of the Pack ... youtube link below.
http://www.morningstar.com/funds/XNAS/NEFJX/quote.html

And, another take ...

FYI: Few of the top-performing small-cap mutual funds of the past 10 years are still open to new investors.
Success has a bad side for small-cap funds. Performance lifts assets and attracts more assets from new investors. But most fund managers have a limit to how much money they can run efficiently in the small-cap space.
Regards,
Ted
http://license.icopyright.net/user/viewFreeUse.act?fuid=MjAwODE0Njk=
Enlarged Graphic;
http://news.investors.com/photopopup.aspx?path=webLV073015.gif&docId=764173&xmpSource=&width=1000&height=1063&caption=&id=764072

@davfor: Unfortunately, with many fund investors, its what have you done for me lately. As soon a a fund turns south over a couple of years they start looking for reasons to dump it Both of the Yacktman Funds are in the 1 & 2 percentile for ten and fifteen years. For what its worth I owned Fidelity Magellan from 1972-1996.
Regards,
Ted

@Ted Thanks. That was interesting. Their process continues to make long term sense to me. I recall a similar interview with Don Yackman in 1997 about the time I first invested in YAFFX. YAFFX is up about 510% since inception in 1997 while the S&P 500 is up about 365%. I currently plan to stick with it to see what the next 10 years brings.

I haven't backed up the truck with GILD shares, although I did purchase some more shares last Thursday.

Basically, you have a situation - even more than Apple (and Gilead has often been called the "Apple of Biotech") where the market is demanding to know more about what the next five years looks like.
Look at Celgene, which has really kind of spelled out what the next 5 years look like, complete with projections and a number of recent purchases/partnerships. Celgene is trading at nearly a 50 p/e.
Gilead, which has really not spelled out what the next 5 years looks like, is trading with about a 13-14 p/e and has just had two quarters where the analyst estimates weren't even close to the beat that the company delivered.
If Gilead makes a "transformative" purchase (and their two major purchases have resulted in enormous success) or even a series of small purchases then would it stand to reason that Gilead should deserve to trade at a higher multiple? I think so. Is Gilead undervalued at present time? I think so, too. The market/valuation is acting like there isn't any pipeline at all and is basically ignoring growth internationally. The company has nearly $15B in cash.
The company is certainly not without risk, but it has taken in a lot of cash and management should have - at this point - proven themselves quite capable, given their track record. With the valuation where it is, I'm not buying anymore than the already large position, but I do feel very comfortable holding it and that there is a margin of safety with the valuation where it is. The dividend helps, as well.
I'm not expecting Gilead to repeat its past performance. I simply see what I believe to be a very undervalued stock that I think could do very well over time (and potentially grow the dividend.) I think it's gone from a volatile biotech to something that looks and feels more like a buy-and-hold stock.