John wrote: " But, are they planning to make changes to get back on track?"
From the interview I cited above it seems these guys like to make contrarian bets - in the belief markets will eventually realize the wisdom of those positions and "catch up." He mentioned an early bet on Europe as one contrarian play that worked. Funds using a contrarian strategy need a stable core of long-term investors who aren't going to jerk their money out after one or two bad years. (And recent articles posted on this board cite a flood of money pouring out).
If money flees before those investments turn-around and start making money, it puts the fund in greater jeopardy. That's because isn't enough leverage left (in dollar terms) to make up for the loses from having sold assets at a steep discount. I don't know enough to say whether this fund will turn-around. If they can stabilize their asset base (perhaps by reducing the retail investor component) they have a good chance.
It's hard to get inside their heads. Are they running their operation more as a hedge fund, with a fairly stable asset base from a core of large investors? Or, are they primarily trying to pull-in greater and greater AUM from retail investors? There was a lot of speculation on the board earlier on that they should have closed the fund to new money. I understand that concern, but think it's somewhat mis-placed. Unless you can stop assets from running out the door after a bad year or two, it's very hard to run a "contrarian" fund like this.

okay, got it. i still would like to see MFO allow user-input start dates for comparisons. most of the stats do me no good when one find is three years old and the next is 15 years old.

Re: risk metrics, it's possible that you are only getting 5 years worth because that's all M* offers unless you have a premium membership. Just a hunch.

Bob C is correct.
Hussman tries to time equities in and out, long and short (technicallyhe doesn't "short" stocks - but he achieves similar effect through puts). 10+ years losing $$.
MFLDX stepped right when they should've stepped left. Overweighted commodities at the wrong time in an attempt to hedge equity risk. Can happen to anyone. But that's what these types of funds are supposed to do - hedge equity risk.
I dislike the go anywhere funds largely because I don't think the advantages justify the high fees. Also, they are subject to unusually heavy inflows and outflows due to the fickle nature of many investors. MFLDX might be wise to do more to encourage longer term investing. Some ideas: raising minimums, imposing front-loads, adding or extending redemption fees or otherwise cracking down on hot money. Wouldn't have prevented this year's swoon - but would have lessened the impact (and perhaps the negative publicity).
But, please don't put this fund in the same other-worldly camp as HSGFX. How many other funds would even have retained the same "manager" for a full decade with so dire a performance record?

i just went to run a risk profile comparing POAGX to PHRSX and, well, come to find out that according to the profile, POAGX is only five years old and thus the metrics that are spit out can't easily be used to compare the two funds. see: http://www.mutualfundobserver.com/fund-ratings/?symbol=poagx+prhsx&submit=Submit. and yet if i go to morningstar, i see that POAGX's chart started in 2005. what am i missing here?
also: it sure would be nice to be able to set a customized starting date for risk-profile comparisons. that way, if one fund is very old and another fund is just sort-of old, you could set the date to just sort-of old and the resulting stats would be directly comparable. the way it is now is sometimes, it seems to me, less than useful. what do you think?

Hussman's funds have been effectively market neutral for a while, with (I believe, I haven't looked lately), near/all of the holdings hedged. The options strategy seems overly complex and I'm wondering - if Hussman's stockpicking is actually doing well if you take away the hedging, is the hedging overly costly/a poor method? Hussman should break out his non-hedged performance (well, what it would have been.)
Basically, Hussman - from what I've read - underestimated QE and ZIRP. As I've noted in other threads, he wasn't betting on something that would provide an asymmetric return if shareholders waited long enough (the poor returns that those who bet against subprime had until they were finally right), he was simply bearish.
I'd love to ask Hussman a few questions, not to go after the performance of the last few years, but to try and gain an understanding of the strategy, as I don't quite see how his views line up with a fund that has a considerable weighting in stocks and is fully hedged. Would a few staples and healthcare stocks with little-or-no hedging have been a cheaper and more effective strategy that also expresses his views? I think so, but maybe he'll prove me wrong somehow.
The fund's website has no email address or else I'd ask him a few questions.

There is still about $550 million in his Total Return fund. That's down from $2.7 billion in 2011. But it is hard to believe any shareholder would still be in the fund. Similar for the so-called Growth fund, which has actually a 10-year NEGATIVE return, but still has more than $900 million in it (down from $6.2 billion in 2010). Folks have crabbed (rightly so) about MFLDX this year, but at least that fund's long-term record is respectable. Hussman's funds are simply terrible in almost every way imaginable. Can you imagine the marketing tool..."We will only charge you 1% to give you an average return of -2% over 10 years."

It has been a good discussion indeed. There are many facets of healthcare including pharma and medical supplies which are the old school but still performing well, and the future stocks of biotech, bionics and some other fascinating areas. Nano and molecular therapies are just starting and maybe in ten or twenty years will be mainstream. For a long term holding these are sure bets.
In some cases it is hard to separate biotech and healthcare as big pharma has and will continue to buy out companies that hold promising therapies. They have the big pockets so to speak.

It seems M*'s problems go back some years so your wait might be a long one. While they do have a very comprehensive data page, the fact that they cannot update a simple NAV is very frustrating as you know.
The day before I was watching AAPL and had their current day chart up. The live quote displayed on top was way different than the price on the chart. We are talking 30-35 cents or so. I ended up using another service. I am not a paid subscriber to M*.

Hi Guys,
Given his painful results over the past few years, John Hussman is an easy target to condemn. Indeed his investment outlook and outcomes have been errant and dismal, respectively. He now looks like the Wall Street gunner who can’t shoot straight. Just another financial hero who falls from grace.
I have never invested a dime with him, but I do enjoy his reports on occasion. As a minimum, he always develops a respectable argument to support his conclusions and recommendations. Unfortunately, predicting the future is hazardous business, and has been most costly for his clients.
Hussman is further evidence that forecasters can not really forecast. Phil Tetlock has studied thousands of so-called expert forecasters and has firmly established their record as no better than a fair coin toss. Here is a Link to a rather long discussion with Tetlock that explores how to improve any forecasting talents:
http://edge.org/conversation/how-to-win-at-forecasting
Hussman is far too nuanced for my investment tastes. I prefer much more simplified approaches, much like in the practices of the Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger team. Here are a few Buffett quotes that seem to conflict with the way John Hussman conducts his business:
“You don’t need to be a rocket scientist. Investing is not a game where the guy with the 160 IQ beats the guy with 130 IQ.” I suspect Buffett failed to recognize that a guy with a 130 IQ is pretty smart. That’s 2 standard deviations above the average person.
“If you don’t feel comfortable owning something for 10 years, then don’t own it for 10 minutes.” Long term holding periods is a key to successful investing as illustrated by the Fidelity references cited in the earlier commentary.
“The Stock Market is designed to transfer money from the Active to the Patient.” Frequent trading is erosive to end wealth has been demonstrated time and time again.
“I don’t look to jump over 7-foot bars: I look around for 1-foot bars that I can step over.” Hussman’s style seems to be the 7-foot barrier with great rewards when successfully cleared, but many pratfalls more often than not.
And finally, “By periodically investing in an index fund, the know-nothing investors can actually outperform most investment professionals.” Even the know something investor can profit from this bit of wisdom.
Buffett has penned scores of other applicable quotes that caution against the policies, the procedures, and the practices deployed by John Hussman. I prefer the Occam’s Razor general strategy (take the route with the fewest simple assumptions) endorsed by Buffett and Munger.
Have a terrific Holiday season, and Best Wishes.

TRAMX has not had a good very recent streak. I was fortunate in a backhanded way, so I did not get in right away, in '07, when it first opened. The new(er) Fund Manager seems to know what to do.
Past 5 years: +10.7% (Reuters.)

As MFO reports, Meridian Equity Income Fund is changing managers. Minyoung Sohn is taking the reins. He apparently earned a good but short record [3 years] with Janus Growth and Income.
I’ve been invested in this small Meridian fund since the day it opened. My investment has more than doubled, and I liked the conservative value approach of its experienced managers [the same people who manage Meridian Contrarian Fund, formerly Meridian Value Fund].
I’ve experienced many manager changes over the years [always an unsettling experience if you had confidence in the founding managers. The most distressing was when Michael Price sold his Mutual Series funds to Franklin Templeton].
The first result of this change at Meridian Equity Income is that the fund almost immediately issued a large capital gain. This occurred because the new manager sold a large number of holdings so he could invest in stocks that meet his different investing style. I suspect the distribution was made early [before December] to prevent existing shareholders from selling the fund in an effort to avoid the large capital gain distribution. [Fewer shareholders to share the taxable gain obligation] [Last year, Meridian Growth Fund also sold a large portion of its holdings as its new managers implemented their investment style].
The second result of this change of managers is that my money will now be invested in a more growth than value style.
I plan to keep my money in this small fund and give the new manager an opportunity to impress me. But these manager changes may be an argument in favor of investing in ETFs.
Does anyone have any thoughts about Minyoung Sohn?

Good stuff. Thanks Ted.
I think one reason my Roth has outdistanced my Traditional IRA over the past 5-6 years is that I leave it alone and seldom, if ever, "tinker" with it. I don't know if that strategy works under all market conditions, but it has worked since early '09.
One lesson from Hussman may be that the harder we work to get something "right", the more apt we are to get it wrong. I guess you could say this guy has "written the book" on screwing-up. So sad for all those investors who sent him their money over the years,

There was the article not that long ago that said that Fidelity found that some of the customers who performed best were the accounts that had not been touched for so long they were deemed forgotten.
http://www.businessinsider.com/forgetful-investors-performed-best-2014-9

Yikes! No thanks! Some years back, T Rowe Price started an African fund. Sounded interesting, lots of interesting sales literature, Price has conservative reputation, what could go wrong? So I invested. Lost more than 50% in the blink of an eye, until I was unable to sleep at night and couldn't digest my breakfast. Sold it and took the 50%+ loss. Too risky for me. [Please don't tell me the fund has gone up 10,000% since I sold, I can't stand the pain.]

Good stuff. Thanks Ted.
I think one reason my Roth has outdistanced my Traditional IRA over the past 5-6 years is that I leave it alone and seldom, if ever, "tinker" with it. I don't know if that strategy works under all market conditions, but it has worked since early '09.
One lesson from Hussman may be that the harder we work to get something "right", the more apt we are to get it wrong. I guess you could say this guy has "written the book" on screwing-up. So sad for all those investors who sent him their money over the years,

Nice post msf. It looks like neither the Vanguard 500 Index fund VFIAX nor the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index Fund VTSAX have had any capital gains distributions in the past 10 years
Source: https://advisors.vanguard.com/VGApp/iip/site/advisor/investments/price?fundId=0540#state=30
And the tax cost ratio and tax adjusted returns for VTI (Vanguard Total Stock Market Index ETF) and VTSAX (Admiral shares, Total Stock Market Index Fund) were just about identical over 1, 3, 5 and 10 years, per Morningstar.

They are clones now, since DuFour, the manager of Focused Stock, took over Fifty four years ago.
They weren't before, and Fifty has the poorer record. A record that will be lost to the ages.
Also, despite the somewhat lower AUM, Fifty has the lower ER, so shareholders will be losing a few basis points to higher costs. Some of that is likely due to Fidelity having performance-based management fees - the poorer performing fund will have the lower management fees. Another reason for merging Fifty into Focused Stock.
I'm not saying that any of this doesn't make sense - Focused Stock is the larger fund, the manager has been there longer, he's taken FIfty's fund and made it mirror that of Focused Stock. It's just curious how it always happens this way - the fund with the poorer record and/or lower ER gets merged into the other fund.

Sometimes ETFs are not more tax efficient.
Vanguard Admiral class shares and ETF class shares are identical in tax efficiency. Vanguard Investor class shares, which are a poorer choice, are inherently more tax efficient.
For example, for the Vanguard 500 fund, its admiral share class (VFIAX) and ETF share class (VOO) have 1 year tax cost ratios of 0.83%, and 3 year tax cost ratios of 0.57%. (VOO doesn't go out five years.)
VFINX, the investor share class, has corresponding tax cost ratios of 0.78% and 0.53%.
The reasons are twofold:
1) These are different share classes of the same (not merely identical) portfolio, so they share equally in the realized gains.
2) Interest and dividends of the underlying stocks are used to pay the ERs. So the higher the ER of a share class, the less that is distributed in the way of income dividends. That means that the higher the ER, the higher the tax efficiency (lower dividends).
It's the same idea as hoping a fund will have small distributions because it made little money. Not something to be hoped for.
Admiral shares and ETF shares currently have the same ERs, so they'll have the same tax efficiency. All else being equal, the ETF will lose a little bit on a round trip, because of the bid/ask spread that is absent from the other share classes.

QVAL is the subject of a big article in the December issue. As I've been an investor with Alpha Architect, the manager of QVAL, I wanted to take a moment to endorse the ETF. I've had a SMA with Alpha for close to two years. Due to regulations, I assume Alpha was not allowed to use the SMA figures in any QVAL documents but there is no prohibition against my doing so. The account I had that used the same approach that QVAL is using outperformed the S&P 500 after management fees by several percent during the period I was invested. I have transitioned my SMA to QVAL because of the superior tax efficiency of the ETF structure. If you really want to do a deep dive into the inner workings of the strategy, read Wes Gray's Quantitative Value book. AA are good people and I'm writing this as an MFO subscriber that wants to see QVAL succeed so that I'm not caught up in a fund liquidation if it were forced to close due to not enough AUM. I don't think that will be a problem because I believe in the long run it will outperform its benchmark and there are very few funds that actually do that. OTOH I wouldn't want it to get so successful that huge AUM interferes with their ability to execute the strategy! However, the inevitable stretches of underperformance will probably prevent that from happening. So I encourage you to look into QVAL unless you're looking to invest a billion dollars. If so, please don't ruin it for the rest of us!

M* Lizzie: "Thank you for your patience and understanding."
Nothing against Lizzie, but that's been M*'s plea for years. These problems persist at M* - sometimes fixed for a few weeks or months, but always returning, a la MacArthur - and are the reason I finally gave up portfolio tracking there in 2010. I hope folks posting here don't wear themselves out or get too frustrated, or think that they're the first to try to assist M* in fixing their broken feeds. They may patch them together for a short time yet again, but they always break, yet again.
Good luck, AJ