>> [[DG]] diversified asset allocation offered little or no protection against the types of extraordinary losses my portfolio suffered via the tech bubble, 911 or the real estate financial crisis.
Huh? How do you figure? When I chart, say, GLRBX and FPACX against, say, FCNTX, I see significant protection in, and smoothing out of, each one of those dips you cite. Just as diversification is supposed to do.
Now, if you really cannot afford a 3-4 years (often less) to recover within a given bucket, then yeah, low equities for you would be best. Ditto some dividends, given your seed corn philosophy (some of us newly retired eat ours regularly).

@mrdarcey.
Thanks man.
Early on, I believe the board debated why not 7, 12, and 15 years?
When we first rolled it out, I think we had "aspiring GOs" or something like that for funds that were top quintile the past 1 and 3 years. But, after discussing with David, we thought to just simplify it to current definition: top quintile for all evaluation periods 3 years or more, as applicable.
Nothing scientific here. Just the definition we chose.
Think too the board debated why not ratings based on other metrics (absolute, Sortino, upside/downside) as well, which is something again we are working on. Probably won't change the GO definition, but I believe it would be valuable to have the other metrics...just to know.

@davidmoran.
First, a disclaimer. I'm a Steve Romick fan. If FpA did not charge so much for FPACX, I would have owned it long ago.
A look at the numbers...

They are great.
Top quintile across its lifetime and across last two full market cycles with consistently moderate risk.
OK, it's "only" forth quintile during last 3 and 5 years, but that again is because of the defensive nature of the fund given the bull market.
But who cares?
Again, if FPACX had a lower er, I would own it in a NY minute.
In this case as well, MFO results consistent with M*:

OK, BUFBX...

Ha!
A classic case.
Its 10 year numbers are great, but it's lifetime numbers and full cycle results not so great.
If it helps, when BUFBX soon crosses the 20 year mark, it will NOT be a GO. Another case where GO assignment should be taken in context of age group.
Looks like M* has same issue here, since its ratings only go out 10 years:

Hey, working hard to make the full cycle and life time metrics and much more available to MFO readers. Thanks to good questions and suggestions from readers on the board, I've come to appreciate full cycle and lifetime numbers more and more.
Now, time for another cup of coffee.

So, I am aware of three surface level problems with the Great Owl designation about which Charles has been more than forthcoming:
1) The ratings don't take into account style changes. PRBLX was Parnassus Balanced Fund, for instance, until 1998;
2) The ratings do not do a good job comparing funds with differing life spans. You can't compare a three year old fund with one that is 20;
3) The ratings are contingent on the exact moment of time they are taken. You cannot use the MFO ratings to compare funds within a given time period that does not end in the present (say, Summer of 2007 to Spring of 2011).
It's the last that people seem to be running up against here. The last five years have been a consistent bull market. Funds that lag, even slightly, in that up environment are not going to meet the Great Owl requirement of top quintile returns in all periods but 1 yr. I understand the impulse to say that underplays downside performance. But if you took the same measure after the next correction, there might well be an excellent chance both PRBLX and FPACX would both be Great Owls, assuming they repeat past downside performance. We're at the disadvantage of looking historically from an odd moment in time that is distorting results. Call it the Cinnamond Effect. The problem isn't that the MFO ratings downplay downside protection, but that they perhaps overemphasize recency. This is perhaps one area where M* gets it right by overweighting longer term performance.
FPACX and BUFBX strike me as a good example. Take a look at M*'s "ratings and risk" comparison for the past three and five years for the funds:
performance.morningstar.com/fund/ratings-risk.action?t=BUFBX&region=usa&culture=en-US (edit: when I use this link, FPACX isn't listed, so you might have to input into the compare function.)
By any measure you look at there, BUFBX trumps FPACX. BUFBX has better returns, SD, Alpha, Treynor, Sharpe, and Sortino ratings over those periods. If you look at M* proprietary measures, BUFBX has a higher return with lower risk. Over the past three and five year periods, FPACX is a four star fund, while BUFBX gets five for both. If all mama looks at is 5 year returns, the choice is easy.
If mama extends her timeframe out to 10 or 15 years then other historical attributes of the funds become clearer. By this measure, FPACX begins looking much better. When we look at M*, both are 5* funds. Now when we look at Charles' records we see FPACX scores better on Downside Dev, Sharpe, Sortino, Martin, and Ulcer ratings. BUFBX is no slouch, however, and when you put all the temporal results together it gets denoted a Great Owl precisely because its 3 and 5 year results are better. Again, that isn't preferencing upside to down, its weighting recency differently, and looking from a specific point in time that gives an advantage to upside performance. IIRC, FPACX was a Great Owl until the last quarter, when its recent performance slipped into the second quintile.
When MFO first released these ratings I specifically remember two things: Charles was concerned that they specifically demonstrate downside protection in a way other rating systems, particularly M*'s, didn't; and the whole team was leery of coming up with a list of winners lest it be taken as a specific recommendation and lead people not to do their homework. To the first, Charles included all kinds of historical downside numbers you don't see elsewhere. For the second, I seem to recall the conversation pointing out one of the reasons the made a list of "Great Owls" was to demonstrate just how difficult it is to achieve consistent returns over 10-20 years.
All MF rating systems are arbitrary at some intrinsic level, and the user has to understand how they work in order to make sense of them. MFO's system is no different. If dear mother uses it blindly without doing further homework and ends up making a fund choice she is unhappy with, that's on her. That we are having this conversation, though, means that maybe Charles and David's fears about ratings misuse are well-founded.

@Andy. Yes, think we lost lock. Not sure I'm following the issue, sad to say, again.
When you say M* has it, you mean because M* gives PRBLX 5 stars...but it's not a GO on MFO?
If that is the issue, the explanation is easy. M* uses a composite of years 3, 5, and 10 when assigning stars. In the case of PRBLX, here's what M* has:

In this case, those 3, 5, and 10 year ratings turn-out to be same ratings MFO assigns. Right? The difference is for a fund to be designated an MFO GO, it must be to in top quintile for all evaluation periods.
Really that simple. Believe results are consistent with definitions in both rating systems.
Note too that M* has PRBLX risk at 1 or "Low", while MFO has it as 4 or "Aggressive." The difference here is MFO's system is hyper sensitive to risk and all funds are rated against market, while M* rates risk within category. So, a volatile fund like VGENX can get low risk rating at M* because its within the energy category, which is generally volatile as a whole.
For a closer look at the M* system, might check this out: http://www.mutualfundobserver.com/2014/03/morningstars-risk-adjusted-return-measure/
If I'm still missing the issue, I apologize. Happy to keep assessing if you see something amiss.
PS. Looks like we match here too...

FYI: Copy & Paste 6/21/14:
Regards,
Ted
A well-thought-out exit strategy is vital to the success of a mission, as the recent events in Iraq demonstrate quite dramatically.
Given that unfortunate example, it might be well that the Federal Reserve appears to be thinking about the consequences of the end -- and eventual reversal -- of its massive experiment in monetary stimulation. Last week, the Financial Times reported that the central bank is mulling exit fees on bond mutual funds to prevent a potential run when interest rates rise, which, given the ineluctable mathematics of bond investing, means prices fall. Quoting "people familiar with the matter," the FT said that senior-level discussions had taken place, but no formal policy had been developed.
Those senior folks apparently didn't include Fed Chair Janet Yellen. Asked about it at her news conference on Wednesday, she professed to be unaware of any discussion of bond-fund exit fees, adding that it was her understanding that the matter "is under the purview" of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
That nondenial denial leaves open the possibility that some entity in the U.S. financial regulatory apparatus is indeed mulling bond-fund exit fees. The Financial Stability Oversight Council established by the Dodd-Frank legislation oversees so-called systemically important financial institutions, or SIFIs, which include nonbank entities. And, indeed, the FSOC has considered designating asset managers as SIFIs, as Barron's has noted previously ("Why Fund Firms Aren't Too Big to Fail," June 2).
To Dan Fuss, the longtime chief investment officer at Loomis Sayles, the exit-fee story seemed like a "trial balloon." But, he added, "from a practical point of view, I don't think it has a snowball's chance in hell, given the resistance from the retail distributors of mutual funds."
Still, he continued, "it won't make me very popular -- but I think it's a good idea." That's from someone whom I would call the Buffett of bonds. Like his fellow octogenarian in Omaha, Fuss has lived through more than a few market paroxysms and has been able to take advantage by putting money to work opportunistically during panics. Unlike the head of Berkshire Hathaway, Fuss also has had to contend with outflows from his flagship Loomis Sayles Bond fund and the firm's other corporate-bond funds, as happened during the 2008 financial crisis. For staying the course during those dark days, Fuss was named Morningstar's Fixed-Income Manager of the Year in 2009.
The latter vantage point no doubt informs his endorsement of the concept of exit fees for bond funds. As the FT quoted former Fed Governor Jeremy Stein, bond funds give investors "a liquid claim on illiquid assets." That is most acute for open-end, high-yield bond funds, Fuss says, and extends to exchange-traded funds "in less liquid areas," which would apply to junk-bond and bank-loan ETFs.
It is a fact of financial life that most bonds are relatively illiquid, in part owing to their bespoke nature; every bond has its own unique coupon rate and maturity, plus possible features such as call options, seniority, and security, even among the same issuer. In contrast, every common share of most companies is identical (with exceptions for stocks with multiple share classes). Multiple buyers and sellers of the same item is economists' definition of a perfect market, as with a commodity such as wheat. Big, listed stocks come close; bonds, given their granular nature, don't.
The problem of liquid claims on illiquid assets is etched into American culture in the Christmas-time classic film, It's a Wonderful Life. Faced with a run on his savings-and-loan, Jimmy Stewart pleads with his depositors that there's little cash in the till because the money is invested in the townfolks' mortgages and businesses. The practical solutions to this conundrum: deposit insurance and having central banks act as lenders of last resort.
Those facilities don't apply to bond funds now, and didn't to money-market funds in 2008. Following the Lehman bankruptcy, the Reserve Fund "broke the buck," with its net asset value falling below $1 a share. The resulting run on that money fund and others exacerbated the crisis as this source of funds to the money market dried up.
Officials fear that bond funds could represent "shadow banks," the FT writes, intermediaries subject to runs but without resort to the backstops available to banks. Yet, the irony is that the rush into bond funds is a result of the Fed's own policies of pinning interest rates to the floor, which spurred investors to seek income wherever they could find it. As a result, bond funds have ballooned to $3.5 trillion -- with a T -- according to the most recent data from the Investment Company Institute. That's close to the Fed's securities holdings, which total $4.1 trillion.
Statistical evidence of that reach for yield comes from a research paper from Bank of Canada economists Sermin Gungor and Jesus Sierra (which was passed along by Torsten Slok, chief international economist at Deutsche Bank Securities).
Not surprisingly, low rates spurred bond funds to increase the credit risk in their portfolios to boost returns. Canadians, it's safe to assume, are no less desirous of maintaining investment income than are their neighbors to the south.
But with investors having stampeded into bond funds, would exit fees be effective at keeping them from stampeding for the exits at the first sign of higher yields and lower prices? Research suggests otherwise. And, ironically, it comes from within the Fed itself.
According to a New York Fed staff paper by Marco Cipriani, Antoine Martin, Patrick McCabe, and Bruno M. Parigi (and surfaced by Zerohedge.com), impediments to redemptions could actually spur bond-fund investors to sell first and ask questions later. In other words, exit fees or "gates" to discourage redemptions could backfire.
In Sartre's No Exit, hell is famously defined as "other people." The crisis that might ultimately await bond-fund investors is the prospect of being stuck with their fellow shareholders as yields rise and prices fall, rather than paying a ransom to escape. The existential choice facing bond-fund investors is whether to stay and face that prospect, or exit while they can -- if they are not prepared for a long-term commitment.
THE SUMMER SOLSTICE just arrived in the Northern Hemisphere, putting the sun highest in the sky. And, appropriately, the major stock-market averages closed the week at records, notably the Standard & Poor's 500 and the Dow Jones Industrial Average, which approached another round-number milestone: 17,000.
The latest liftoff came after Fed Chair Janet Yellen made clear that neither rising inflation nor soaring asset prices would deter the central bank from monetary tightening. She called the uptick in the consumer-price index, which is running above the Fed's 2% inflation target (admittedly using a different gauge, the personal consumption deflator), "noisy." But it's hurting Americans' budgets more than their ears.
In essence, Yellen endorsed the view espoused by hedge fund mogul David Tepper a couple of years ago, that the course of monetary policy "depends" on the economy. If growth is sluggish, policy will remain accommodative, which is bullish for risk assets. Interest-rate hikes won't come until there is strong growth, which also is bullish. And as long as the monetary authorities have their back, investors have little reason to worry. So, volatility premiums collapsed in the options market; if the Fed is offering free insurance, why pay for it with hedges?
This benign environment is spurring investors to vote with their portfolios. Michael Hartnett, chief investment strategist at Bank of America Merrill Lynch, notes a big, $13 billion inflow into equity mutual funds in the latest week and the first outflows from bond funds, totaling $2.3 billion, in 15 weeks.
Have fund investors finally been infused with animal spirits? Hard to say, given that the equities data showed a record influx into utilities, some $1.2 billion, which Hartnett suggests indicates some chasing of that group's torrid past performance, up some 16% in 2014. Utility stocks are viewed as first cousins to bonds; income is their primary allure, but with the prospect of dividend growth, that should trump fixed coupons.
Still, public participation in the stock market has yet to evince irrational exuberance, notes David Rosenberg of Gluskin-Sheff. In other words, the market has yet to violate rule No. 5 of Bob Farrell, the legendary market analyst at Merrill Lynch -- that the public buys most at the peak and least at the lows.
Tops, Rosenberg explains, typically show a melt-up of a heady 11% over 30 days, which represents a first peak. A pullback lures neophytes and momentum chasers "hook, line, and sinker," to form twin peaks. That pattern was apparent in November 1980; August-October 1987; June-July 1990; April-September 2000; and July-October 2007, he points out.
To quote every parent of young kids, we're not there yet. But, Rosenberg relates, there also is Farrell's rule No. 7: Markets are strongest when they are broad and weakest when they narrow to a handful of blue chips.
Another veteran market maven, John Mendelson of International Strategy & Investment Group, last week pointed to the declining number of New York Stock Exchange stocks trading below their 200-day moving averages, a sign of waning momentum in the broad market that he says represents a "negative divergence." That is especially so with the major averages notching records.
So, easy money continues to float Wall Street's yachts. Belatedly, the gold market also has noticed, with the metal surging 3% on the week, and mining stocks leading the advance. Gold may be sending the true signal, above the supposed noise from the inflation indexes.

Roger, understood; am using Miraculous Multisearch now, which is much more useful.
I would still urge tweak of GO criteria such that no one could write things like this:
"SMVLX is a much younger fund [[hence not really an owl?]]. It gets GO status because of its top quintile performance the past 3 and 5 years, so different league ... compared a top 20 year [[non-GO]] like PRBLX. And ... I suspect SMVLX will not do so well when market heads south...much worse than PRBLX for the reasons you point out. I don't see much in way of downside protection there."
Some real disconnects going on for owl designation. I do get your numbers and history points, sure. GO title to me implies something rather wiser than 'Strictly Numerical Winners'. That's all.

Good stuff Andy.
OK, I think I see what you are getting at...sorry for being slow.
Yes, funds like YAFFX do have higher standard deviations than PRBLX.
So, if you equate standard deviation with downside risk, then sure its "underweight."
But, during the past five year bull, funds like YAFFX had higher standard deviation (and higher absolute return), but lower downside deviation and lower Ulcer Index than PRBLX .
So, if you equate downside deviation and/or Ulcer Index with downside risk, then I think the result is consistent.
The rating system is based on Martin, which is related to excess return over max drawdown (aka Ulcer Index), for the period being evaluated.
Break, break.
SMVLX is a much younger fund. It gets GO status because of its top quintile performance the past 3 and 5 years, so different league to me compared a top 20 year, like PRBLX.
And, probably like you, I suspect SMVLX will not do so well when market heads south...much worse than PRBLX for the reasons you point-out. I don't see much in way of downside protection there.
Hope that helps...think we are seeing same things.
Thanks man.
PS. Here are the five year stats for the three funds we talking about:

If you are sleeping well as it is, you are ahead of many others. If you are well diversified, you should not see a 50% loss or have to worry about it. I am more diversified than I used to be and as we age, that is always a good thing since we have less time to recover. If we have learned anything from the past ten years it is this: its very tempting to belong to the church of whats working now, but diversification works best in the long run. My funds that were flat last year are year to date best performers with 12% + ytd. I have no pimco funds but congrats on your PIMIX.

Question for ZEOIX managers - Your fund is 3 years old. You claim to be inspired by Ben Graham. He would have the courage of his convictions, so why don't you? Why do both managers have $1 invested in the fund? ($1- $10000 in most recent SAI has to be interpreted as $1 and not $10000, which of course is moot). The trustees of your fund also have $0 in your fund. Does this reflect their confidence in your conviction as well?

Slick,
I have achieved my retirement goals (retired)...and won't really need to draw upon any of the funds for at least another 5-7 years (when my wife retires). However, along the way with asset allocations similar too or greater than yours, we endured portfolio fluctuations of 3-500K several times. From 1987 going forward, I've experienced them all and as I age, in an effort to avoid losses of that magnitude again, I have become perhaps overly concerned about limiting downside risk (not the 10% kind...the 50% kind). I agree that my portfolio at 42% equities is conservative...perhaps overly so, but for the present, I sleep much better at night. There are worse things than just reinvesting the bond income stream. Have you seen what the YTD total return of PIMIX is?

@Guido: FYI: I have been linking John Waggoner's weekly USA Today column for over 15 years here at MFO & FundAlarm.
Regards,
Ted
http://www.mutualfundobserver.com/discuss/discussion/14189/john-waggoner-new-highs-don-t-mean-you-have-to-sell#latest

"I find it somewhat puzzling why a few MFO members are so short-tempered and even hostile towards Morningstar’s limitations, errors, and costs.".

Here's the thing: I'm not particularly upset by any of M*'s issues. I look at things like S & P analyst reports, M* reports and other things as sources of information that I can take a little bit from here, a little bit from there and make a larger decision.
I do think that people (not saying towards anyone here) are giving a little too much slack towards companies whose products decrease in quality and/or quality. I think - in some ways - people are a little too forgiving. I think people also are moving away from quality if it means convenience in some things (photography, music, etc) but that's another story.
When the product deals with people's money - such as investment research - people are going to be harsh critics. It shouldn't be surprising when there's money at stake.
"It is far too easy to be a constant critic. The bad is overemphasized while the good is swept away without acknowledgment. If the Morningstar presentations are too dull or too inept, the answer is simple enough: abandon the ship."
It's also far too easy to be a pollyanna and then have the convenient "whocouldaknown?" excuse when things go wrong. There is a happy medium, although finding that medium may take a great deal of trial and error.
"I’m not advocating the elimination of skepticism. At some point, it detracts from permitting a timely decision from being made."
Sometimes skepticism does save people from making rash decisions that they regret later. After the financial crisis, I think people aren't skeptical enough - everyone just wanted things to be rebooted back to a few years prior without the unpleasantness of actually trying to make it so something similar wouldn't happen again. History is bound to repeat itself because having to learn from mistakes is no fun.
If Madoff was out of prison tomorrow and started a fund again, I bet he'd have willing investors. It's the second "Wall Street" movie. The Gekkos of the world go in front of an audience of those just willing to believe and they listen and clap and don't ask questions. 2008 happens and a few years later, they're sitting, clapping and hanging on every word yet again.
Is there a problem with being too cynical, skeptical? Sure. I also remain that a far more widespread problem is people who are firmly at the other end of the spectrum.
"At that event, Ken Fisher made a presentation that seems to be a mirror image of Gross’s misstep"
I don't know how people can listen to Fisher, who is so aggressively promotional, with those smarmy ads. Odd that I never see Fisher on financial media, it's always as banner ads on financial websites and the like.
As for Gross, I think the issue with Pimco is that you had two people who were the "face" of Pimco and El-Erian was always the far better public speaker. Yet, Gross was always interesting with his knowledge and experience. Now Gross is starting to seem to falter and there's no one that has been kind of groomed to be the next public face of Pimco (although I have said I thought Tony Crescenzi should be the next CNBC face of Pimco.)
I've stopped selling what I have left in Pimco funds, but would like to see a little clarity about the company getting its house in order before adding anything to Pimco offerings. Bill Gross comparing himself to Justin Bieber and Kim Kardashian is not exactly a confidence builder.

Hi Professor David and MFOers,
With apologies to its author Elbert Hubbard, thank you for your Message to MFOers ( originally to Garcia). Your messages, in almost real time, of what’s what at the annual Morningstar Conference should permit us to take the investment initiative. So far that hasn’t happened. That’s not your fault. It’s like we are seated in the conference rooms with you.
It’s really not surprising that a fair review of the proceedings is almost always a mixed bag. Are the insights gleaned from the presentations worth the time and effort? Typically, these conferences generate a jumble of rubbish and a few gems. The wheat must be separated from the chaff.
For years (like 15), both my wife and I have been attending and even occasionally participating in the annual Las Vegas MoneyShow. Each year we question if the learning is worth the price. Yet each year we return with an optimistic mind-frame. Hope springs eternal. Fortunately we usually return home with a few nuggets of wisdom. So I suppose my answer is “yes”. Although the promises and expectations far exceed what is ultimately delivered, it is still a worthwhile time investment.
The Morningstar agenda at this conference is clearly directed at financial professionals. That suggests that the presentation bar should be set a bit higher given the likely sophistication of the audience.
Based on your summary reporting, the bar standard is unacceptably too low, or perhaps, the presentations are so generic or fuzzy, that the bar height can not even be accurately defined. That too is bad, but it is not a shock either. If the presenter actually had a special forecasting insight or investment preference, he/she is not likely to freely reveal it to a non-subscribing audience. If I were the presenter, I would reserve this gem for my paying clients.
I find it somewhat puzzling why a few MFO members are so short-tempered and even hostile towards Morningstar’s limitations, errors, and costs. Research and data collecting costs money. Folks are imperfect and blunders are made despite the best organizational, structural, and double-checking safeguards. Accepting that reality, I adopt a more forgiving posture. Even my Toyota was delivered with several minor flaws which the manufacturer quickly corrected.
I’m not advocating the elimination of skepticism. A skeptical attitude is needed when making all investment decisions. However, it has a limit to its usefulness. It has the usual diminishing returns characteristic. At some point, it detracts from permitting a timely decision from being made.
Morningstar is one of the preeminent mutual fund data sources available to us individual investors. Overall, it has served us well. How do I know this?
It has a growing legion of loyal customers who trust its services. It attracted a huge number of professionals at this session who were willing to invest time and to pony-up 795 dollars to attend these sessions. Its sponsor and exhibitor lists are impressive. It has a history that dates back to when Peter Lynch managed the Magellan fund. Morningstar must be doing something of service to the investing public.
Since it is a successful enterprise, it must be a win/win scenario for both the buyer and the seller. Otherwise money would not change hands. Morningstar is prosperous and expanding; it continuously tries to improve its products. Certainly not all of these experiments are successful or equally useful for its disparate customer base.
Early in its history, Morningstar was very weak on analytical talent. Originally they hired professionally trained writers while passing on market analytical/investment types. Eventually, Morningstar recognized that shortcoming and integrated Ibbotson into their team. As an elite provider of investment data and analyses, Morningstar is committed to keeping its edge. Sometimes their efforts work; sometimes these efforts fail. It is up to their users to assess the merits of these exploratory projects for their special circumstances.
It is far too easy to be a constant critic. The bad is overemphasized while the good is swept away without acknowledgment. If the Morningstar presentations are too dull or too inept, the answer is simple enough: abandon the ship.
As usual, Warren Buffett had a succinct and wise way of putting it: “ Should you find yourself in a chronically leaking boat, energy devoted to changing vessels is likely to be more productive than energy devoted to patching leaks.”
Regardless of its shortcomings, I plan to continue using Morningstar as a primary mutual fund data resource. In the end, it is my responsibility to critically examine that data to judge its reliability prior to making a decision.
Your description of Bill Gross’s weird behavior is reminiscent of a like event at the recent Las Vegas MoneyShow. At that event, Ken Fisher made a presentation that seems to be a mirror image of Gross’s misstep. It was totally not decipherable and made no sense whatsoever. To be generous, everybody has a bad day. Perhaps it was caused by the Chicago air compared to the Newport Beach air? Nope, these guys are just being human.
We are often Fooled by a Random Success. I capitalized the phrase because I coupled a Nassim Taleb saying with a contribution from an old friend. Even tossing 10 consecutive heads doesn’t mean we’re in control. Luck is always an investment component. For what it’s worth, we each have a 1 in 1024 probability of tossing 10 straight heads. Not likely, but doable.
Professor, please keep the report flow coming. I wish I were there with you.
Best Regards.

Mr. G, recent actions and departures of staff over the past few months was discussed a few months ago here; and my main concern remains as to the morale of all managers and the "in the background" staff at Pimco.
Many of us have access to a variety of bond funds, with many funds having very acceptable performance; relative to Pimco's Total Return fund.
One Pimco fund we hold ( PIMIX ), is one that I hope we are able to keep; at least until we might choose to sell for our own reasons, and not reasons that may result from performance problems internally modified at Pimco from a poor morale culture.
I note the morale issue; as I have been involved in this circumstance within a large national/international company. Twenty years of fine performance with a tight team of 15 people, being disrupted by a manager who no longer "had a grasp" of events. The team lost members and was never again of established quality. The "morale factor" played a large role in destroying the team and, of course; the performance suffered.
Regards,
Catch

Hi heezsafe. I don't recall. I did once read Motley Fool and listen to Saturday radio program, years ago. Now, the site overflows with pop-ups, ads, teaser articles to paid services, etc. Rarely visit it any more.

Gross in shades pic and other thoughts:
http://dealbreaker.com/2014/06/here-are-some-things-that-exited-bill-grosss-mouth-this-afternoon/
http://www.valuewalk.com/2014/06/bill-gross-morningstar/
"Proclaiming he’s 70 years old “and moving on as they say,” Gross repeatedly compared himself to a “70 year old version of Justin Bieber,” while others may compare him to a Kim Kardishian impersonator “if you want to hear about my feminine side,” he said."
WTF?

FYI: Value-stock mutual funds have had the upper hand for the past 15 years, with the average value fund performing better for investors than growth funds by a large margin. But top growth and value funds in the period have similar performances.
Regards,
Ted
http://news.investors.com/investing-mutual-funds/061714-705126-top-value-funds-vs-top-growth-funds.htm

Thank you David.
Once again I am reminded of...

"For over a thousand years Roman conquerors returning from the wars enjoyed the honor of triumph, a tumultuous parade. In the procession came trumpeteers, musicians and strange animals from conquered territories, together with carts laden with treasure and captured armaments. The conquerors rode in a triumphal chariot, the dazed prisoners walking in chains before him. Sometimes his children robed in white stood with him in the chariot or rode the trace horses. A slave stood behind the conqueror holding a golden crown and whispering in his ear a warning: that all glory is fleeting."

Not all that long ago I considered Mr. Gross one of the brightest minds in the financial world. This story along with all the others that have floated out there does make me wonder what happened to him? He is 70 years old so it could be possible that a medical condition is evolving in him though I don't wish anything of the sort.
Perhaps it is time for him to enjoy life while he can.