“Valuation is an immaterial part of the process for me ... It’s the least useful piece of information you will ever get because everybody knows what the valuation is.”
Interview: Fidelity Manager Mark Schmehl - 2017
Interview: From 2019
Interview: From 2019

Looks pretty good to me if his numbers show it, and they do. Looking for disrupting companies is a great thyme and using momentum is another good idea. I looked at 2 of his funds and I see companies such as SHOP,ZM,SQ. 3 great momentum companies YTD, I traded SHOP,SQ several weeks ago for fun.
Buffett's stock hasn't been doing particularly well in the last 10 years and why BRKA trails it significantly (link). Buffett finally gave up and bought Apple and now it's his biggest stock holdings. This is not the 70"-80" we are in the IT age where every kid around the world has free access to a lot of data and why it's much harder to find a hidden nugget. The big high tech companies now rule the world, they make so much money too.

+1

Another one posting here characterized RPSIX to me as "a good place to hold money when you haven't decided yet what to do with it."

I made that comment 5 or more years ago. Things change. As noted elsewhere, within the past 10 days, I closed out my dwindling allocation to RPSIX. I suspect however, it will still have enjoy some good years - contingent now on how the riskier assets it holds behave (stocks, EM and junk bonds), since there’s not much room to maneuver on the interest rate end.
My abandonment of RPSIX has more to do with changes in investment style. I’ve added some additional risk out on the “risk end” of the spectrum (with spec positions in gold and foreign equity), reduced my allocation to the center of the spectrum (RPSIX) and gotten more conservative on the conservative end of the spectrum by adding the investment grade bond index fund PBDIX so that it is now one of my largest holdings.
One size doesn’t fit all. Nor were these changes sudden. Just a slow shift that began in early March as I reacted to a drastically altered playing field. It gets complicated - but as an investor one tries to balance out competing themes and risk/reward contingencies: Covid-19 / very low prevailing interest rates / an accommodative Fed / Government stimulus packages / supply chain issues and shortages of some goods (ie lumber) / political strife / action in the dollar on currency markets, etc.

Another one posting here characterized RPSIX to me as "a good place to hold money when you haven't decided yet what to do with it." I think that person has proven to be correct. I wish that TRP offered some other bond funds, more that they currently do--- which have a better record than I'm already seeing. I'm in the 10% bracket. I don't need MUNIS. With an eye on the future, I'll be wanting YIELD. And I want to keep my equity stake rather limited now, in retirement. I just may have to go off the reservation and open a bond account with a different fund house.

RPSIX +0.85% YTD // 10 year average + 4.28%
We could delve into numerous issues confronting this once fine fund, notably its exposure to a value-leaning equity fund, as noted by msf.
I’m inclined to think it has more to do with the extremely low rate environment. Which leads me to comments by Ed in the November Commentary regarding his old fund, OAKBX. ISTM - Ed exculpates (or attempts to) Clyde McGregor for the fund’s loss of more than half its AUM in recent years and related sub-par performance. To oversimplify Ed’s well reasoned arguments - the issue traces back not to management but to the prevailing historically low rate environment and the way
balanced funds seek to operate. The downside protection once offered by bonds simply doesn’t exist in this environment.
I think to an extent the same argument can be applied to RPSIX - thought it isn’t a balanced fund in the traditional sense. The fund has always sought to balance risk (from equity, EM debt, junk bonds) with higher quality paper, including longer dated treasury bonds. But that hedge has largely been lost now in a period of such low rates. Is Price’s new “darling” TMSRX the answer? At just 2 years of age, I’m inclined to withhold judgment. But that won’t stop torrents of $$ from pouring in (including some of mine).
@TheShadow / Sorry for the thread drift here. Afraid my brain doesn’t always run in a straight line. :)

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1418191/000141304220000637/walth497pros110420.htm
497 1 walth497pros110420.htm
WALTHAUSEN FUNDS
Walthausen Small Cap Value Fund (WSCVX and WFICX)
Supplement dated November 4, 2020
to the Prospectus dated June 1, 2020
Effective immediately the second paragraph under the heading Management on page 4 of Prospectus is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:
Portfolio Managers
John B. Walthausen has managed the Fund since its inception in February 2008. Mr. Walthausen is the Chief Investment Officer of the Advisor. Gerard S.E. Heffernan has co-managed the Fund since March 2018. Mr. Heffernan is a portfolio manager for the Advisor. DeForest R. Hinman has co-managed the Fund since November 2020. Mr. Hinman is a portfolio manager for the Advisor.
Additionally, first paragraph under the heading The Investment Advisor on page 7 of Prospectus is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:
Walthausen & Co., LLC, 2691 Route 9, Suite 102, Malta, NY 12020, is the investment advisor of the Fund and has responsibility for the management of the Fund's affairs, under the supervision of the Fund's Board of Trustees. The Fund's investment portfolio is co-managed on a day-to-day basis by John B. Walthausen, CFA Gerard S.E. Heffernan CFA and DeForest R. Hinman. Mr. Walthausen founded the Advisor in 2007 and is a managing director of the Advisor. Mr. Walthausen is the Chief Investment Officer of the Advisor. Mr. Walthausen has managed the Fund since its inception. Mr. Walthausen's formal education includes a BA from Kenyon College and a MBA from New York University. Mr. Heffernan joined the Advisor in February 2018. His involvement in the investment industry spans over 25 years, including 15 years at Lord Abbett & Co., where he was a partner and portfolio manager specializing in small cap value equities. From June 2013 until February 2018, he was self-employed managing his own portfolio. Mr. Heffernan received a B.S. in Business Administration from Villanova University. DeForest R. Hinman has been a principal of Walthausen & Co. since the firm’s inception in September, 2007. Before his appointment as a co-portfolio manager, he served previously as a co-portfolio manager of the Walthausen Small Cap Value Fund and Walthausen Select Value Fund in 2017, and retains his position as Director of Research for Walthausen & Co. DeForest’s formal education includes a B.S. in Business Administration (Summa Cum Laude) from State University of NY at Albany and a M.B.A. in Finance from the State University at Albany.
This supplement and the Prospectus dated June 1, 2020 provide the information a prospective investor ought to know before investing and should be retained for future reference. The prospectus has been filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission and can be obtained without charge by calling the Fund at 1-888-925-8428 or by visiting the Fund’s website at www.walthausenfunds.com.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/808303/000174177320003154/c497.htm
(see link for table also)
497 1 c497.htm SPI STAT STICKER 11-4-20
T. Rowe Price Spectrum Income Fund
Supplement to Prospectus Dated May 1, 2020
At a meeting held on October 26, 2020, the fund’s Board of Directors approved an amended and restated investment management agreement, which will result in changes to the fund’s overall expense structure, as described below.
The changes to the fund’s expense structure are subject to shareholders approving the fund’s amended and restated investment management agreement. Shareholders of the fund at the close of business on the record date, November 30, 2020, will have the opportunity to vote on a proposal to approve the amended and restated investment management agreement. It is anticipated that proxy materials and voting instructions will be mailed to shareholders of record beginning on January 4, 2021, and a special shareholder meeting will be held on February 10, 2021. If the proposal is approved by a majority of the fund’s shareholders, the changes to the fund’s expense structure are expected to take place in mid- to late March 2021.
The fund does not currently charge a management fee. However, the fund incurs acquired fund fees and expenses, which represent the fund’s proportionate share of the expenses of the underlying T. Rowe Price Funds in which it invests (Underlying Funds). In addition, the fund passes through its direct operating expenses to its Underlying Funds and the fund effectively does not directly pay any operating expenses.
If shareholders approve the proposal, it is anticipated that in mid- to late March 2021, the fund will begin charging an all-inclusive management fee of 0.62% based on the fund’s average daily net assets. The all-inclusive management fee will cover investment management and all of the fund’s operating expenses except for interest; expenses related to borrowings, taxes, and brokerage; nonrecurring, extraordinary expenses; and any acquired fund fees and expenses.
The fund currently invests in the Investor Class of its Underlying Funds. Effective on the date that the fund begins charging an all-inclusive management fee, the fund will end the pass-through of its direct operating expenses to its Underlying Funds and will convert its Investor Class shares of each Underlying Fund to Z Class shares. T. Rowe Price is contractually obligated to waive and/or bear all of the Z Class’ expenses, other than interest; expenses related to borrowings, taxes, and brokerage; and nonrecurring, extraordinary expenses. As a result, the fund’s total acquired fund fees and expenses associated with investing in the Underlying Funds’ Z Classes are expected to be less than 0.01%.
If shareholders approve the proposal, the prospectus will be further supplemented with more details regarding the changes to the expense structure prior to its implementation. However, the following changes to the prospectus are effective immediately:
Under “Principal Investment Strategies” in section 1, there are no changes to the investment ranges set forth in the “Asset Allocation Ranges for Underlying Funds” table. However, the T. Rowe Price U.S. Treasury Intermediate Fund has changed its name to the T. Rowe Price U.S. Treasury Intermediate Index Fund and the T. Rowe Price U.S. Treasury Long-Term Fund has changed its name to the T. Rowe Price U.S. Treasury Long-Term Index Fund.

Why does this sound like teenager saying they don't believe in Santa Claus?

He’s obviously made money for his investors. Comes across to me as a bit “smug” however. He’s currently 46. Likely BD - 1974.
For some perspective .....
- I was already investing with Sir John Templeton and reading the financial press when this kid was born.
- Schmehl would have been 5 when Paul Volker became Chairman of the Fed with ramifications that investors are still feeling today. He has only known falling interest rates. Never witnessed high inflation and 15-20% interest rates on money market funds.
- Buffett’s been investing at least 40 years longer.
Not to be misunderstood: I posted this for assorted reasons - one being it’s valuable to learn about as many different investing styles as possible. It’s easier to chart your own course if you understand the playing field you’re standing on (apologies for the mixed metaphor).

Whatever this is, I’ll take it. Second hot day in a row. What’s interesting is that the oil and metal sectors are coming along for the ride, both having fallen off a cliff last week.
Enjoy ..... The Dead Cat Bounce :)

Morgan Stanley funds currently managed by Kristian Heugh:

Actually, these are all the share classes that he manages. I've grouped the list by funds so that this is clearer. Also, the H share class is defunct, as is an entire fund (Opportunity Portfolio).

Morgan Stanley Institutional Advantage Fund
http://financials.morningstar.com/fund/purchase-info.html?t=MAPPX
Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund, Inc. International Advantage Portfolio Class A (since 12/28/2010) MAPPX
Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund, Inc. International Advantage Portfolio Class C (since 12/28/2010) MSPRX
Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund, Inc. International Advantage Portfolio Class I (since 12/28/2010) MPAIX
Morgan Stanley Inst Intl Advtg IS (since 12/28/2010) MADSX
Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund, Inc. International Advantage Portfolio Class L (since 12/28/2010) MAPLX
The following share class has not existed since 2013. It was reclassified into P shares which were simultaneously converted into A shares; see 2013 prospectus supplement.
Morgan Stanley Institutional International Advantage Portfolio Class H (since 12/28/2010)
Morgan Stanley Europe Opportunity Fund
http://financials.morningstar.com/fund/purchase-info.html?t=EUGAX
Morgan Stanley Europe Opportunity Fund Inc. Class A (since 4/14/2020) EUGAX
Morgan Stanley Europe Opportunity Fund Inc. Class C (since 4/14/2020) MSEEX
Morgan Stanley Europe Opportunity Fund Inc. Class I (since 4/14/2020) EUGDX
Morgan Stanley Europe Opportunity Fund Inc. Class L (since 4/14/2020) EUGCX
Morgan Stanley Institutional International Opportunity Portfolio
http://financials.morningstar.com/fund/purchase-info.html?t=MIOPX
Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund, Inc. International Opportunity Portfolio Class A (since 5/31/2010) MIOPX
Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund, Inc. International Opportunity Portfolio Class C (since 5/31/2010) MSOCX
Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund, Inc. International Opportunity Portfolio Class I (since 5/31/2010) MIOIX
Morgan Stanley Inst International Opp IR (since 5/31/2010) MRNPX
Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund, Inc. International Opportunity Portfolio Class IS (since 5/31/2010) MNOPX
Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund, Inc. International Opportunity Portfolio Class L (since 5/31/2010) MIOLX
The following share class has not existed since 2013. It was reclassified into P shares which were simultaneously converted into A shares; see 2013 prospectus supplement.
Morgan Stanley Institutional International Opportunity Fund Class H (since 3/31/2010)
Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund Global Opportunity Portfolio
http://financials.morningstar.com/fund/purchase-info.html?t=MGGPX
Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund, Inc. Global Opportunity Portfolio Class A (since 5/30/2008) MGGPX
Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund, Inc. Global Opportunity Portfolio Class C (since 5/30/2008) MSOPX
Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund, Inc. Global Opportunity Portfolio Class I (since 5/30/2008) MGGIX
Morgan Stanley Inst Global Opp IR (since 5/30/2008) MGORX
Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund, Inc. Global Opportunity Portfolio Class IS (since 5/30/2008) MGTSX
Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund, Inc. Global Opportunity Portfolio Class L (since 5/30/2008) MGGLX
The following share class has not existed since 2013. It was reclassified into P shares which were simultaneously converted into A shares; see 2013 prospectus supplement.
Morgan Stanley Institutional Global Opportunity H (since 5/30/2008)
Morgan Stanley Institutional Asia Opportunity Portfolio
http://financials.morningstar.com/fund/purchase-info.html?t=MSAUX
Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund, Inc. Asia Opportunity Portfolio Class A (since 12/29/2015) MSAUX
Morgan Stanley Inst Asia Opp C (since 12/29/2015) MSAWX
Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund, Inc. Asia Opportunity Portfolio Class I (since 12/29/2015) MSAQX
Morgan Stanley Inst Asia Opp IS (since 12/29/2015) MSAYX

Morgan Stanley Cntrpnt Global
http://financials.morningstar.com/fund/purchase-info.html?t=GLCAX
Morgan Stanley Cntrpnt Global A (since 6/29/2018) GLCAX
Morgan Stanley Cntrpnt Global C (since 6/29/2018) GLCDX
Morgan Stanley Cntrpnt Global I (since 6/29/2018) GLCIX
Morgan Stanley Cntrpnt Global IS (since 6/29/2018) GLCSX
Morgan Stanley Institutional Opportunity
In 2015 this fund was reorganized into the Global Opportunity Fund (see 2015 prospectus, p. 18)
Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund, Inc. Opportunity Portfolio Class A (since 6/30/2006)
Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund, Inc. Opportunity Portfolio Class I (since 6/30/2006)
Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund, Inc. Opportunity Portfolio Class IS (since 6/30/2006)
Morgan Stanley Institutional Fund, Inc. Opportunity Portfolio Class L (since 6/30/2006)
Morgan Stanley Institutional Opportunity H (since 6/30/2006)
Morgan Stanley Developing Opportunity
http://financials.morningstar.com/fund/purchase-info.html?t=MDOAX
Morgan Stanley Developing Opportunity Portfolio Class A (since 2/14/2020) MDOAX
Morgan Stanley Developing Opportunity C (since 2/14/2020) MDOBX
Morgan Stanley Developing Opportunity Portfolio Class I (since 2/14/2020) MDOEX
Morgan Stanley Developing Opportunity IS (since 2/14/2020) MDODX
VALIC Company I International Growth (since 3/8/2018) VCINX

“Valuation is an immaterial part of the process for me ... It’s the least useful piece of information you will ever get because everybody knows what the valuation is.”
Interview: Fidelity Manager Mark Schmehl - 2017
Interview: From 2019
Interview: From 2019

Turnover for AKREX has always been very low, with M* pegging it a 4% currently. One consequence of this, I assume, is the amazing low tax bills presented to shareholders at year end. AUM have risen commensurate with the fund's great success since 2011, so management must have been faced with the problem of what to do with the new cash. Just what did Mr. Akre train the new colleagues to do if it was not to find new stocks for the fund to buy? Have they been trained to buy more of the winners? I enjoyed the anecdote about Mr. Akre's bedroom built off his office so he wouldn't have to stop working. OTOH, I have to wonder why a PM would need to work such long hours at a quintessential buy-and-hold fund. Seems as though he could go home and sleep peacefully. We have more than one account happily invested in AKREX.

AKREX has served me well. A funds turnover rate does not mean there is little work. I am sure that there is a lot of review, study and investigation for new and existing holdings.

In the NOV commentary David wrote that investors should not be anxious that Mr. Akre is leaving AKREX. I hope that he is right. In 2009 Mr. Akre left a mutual fund to start AKREX. His analysts stayed to run the old fund which has consistently underperformed AKREX. Its current symbol is HFCSX and it has a 2 star Morningstar rating. Investors will need to closely monitor AKREX. It has a high expense ratio (1.32) and a high PPE (38.42). Performance has already slowed: 1YR (91 percentile rank), 3YR (50 PR), 5YR (29 PR), 10YR (15 PR). There have been many mutual funds that were never the same after the star manager left. Will that happen to AKREX? Only time will tell.

ANTS-active non-transparent etfs. Also, in 2013 we had the Fed taper, which became conflated with the plant-eating mammal tapir .

Seems to me most of those phrases are male oriented - an indication the market was dominated by males until recently. Story about Muriel Siebert
Had women promulgated the market’s vocabulary a discussion of investing might sound something like this ...
“The lotus flower’s unfolding petals suggest the expansion of the soul; the growth of its pure beauty from the mud of its origin holds a benign spiritual promise.”
Translation: The current economic expansion which has lasted for many years will continue.
“A wooded hill where perpetual twilight reigns under the star lit sky ... “
Translation: This fund’s a perennial looser. Manager hasn’t a clue.
“Thick-growing firs and spruces ... “
Translation: Large established companies make attractive investments
“June Bells - the sweetest of woodland blooms ...”
Translation: Great fund / Closed to new investors
“Some flowers that look like buttercups are marigolds, and colours that some would call yellow others might call orange.”
Translation Their accounting appears suspect. Avoid this one.
“The south wind blows Dora, so that the wild flowers in the hedges are all Doras, to a bud.”
Translation: Don’t fight the Fed.
“The little blue flowers were withered and dry, having lost nearly all their leaves ...“
Translation: My portfolio stinks.
*Citation: In composing this, I borrowed heavily from 18 Metaphors for Flower.

My impression is that comparing Matthews Asia Small Companies against its Morningstar Pacific/Asia ex-Japan Stock fund category peers is misleading as most of them are not small-cap oriented. If one looks at the fund versus a Asia small cap benchmark like MSCI All Country Asia ex Japan Small Cap Index, Ms. So's skills are apparent:
https://us.matthewsasia.com/our-funds/f-10/matthews-asia-small-companies-fund/investor/performance.fs

Agreed Lewsbraham. Furthermore, if i recall correctly, small caps have been taking a pounding versus large and mega cap growth names (IE: Alibaba, Tencent, etc), which the other asia ex funds have large positions in.

Spiders (SPDRs) and VIPERs (Vanguard)
CATS, TGRS, and LIONS (proprietary versions of STRIPS)
According to M*, there were also RATS, COUGARs, GATORs, EAGLEs, and DOGS (Dibs on Government Securities, not to be confused with the aforementioned dogs of the Dow)

Dunno if it's a dead cat bounce or not. I sold my gold miners into the bounce today though.

I've got a long way to go before I do much better than break even with USAGX. Initiated my first position at 41.63 per share on 8/12/2011.
Bought again at 26.84 per share on 12/14/2012.
And finally, at 13.62 per share on 6/7/2017.
Sigh.
It's a small slice at .0145 portfolio weight. I throw nickles around like manhole covers.