Hi @Starchild, for what its worth .
I have owned NPSAX, off & on, through the years. Currently, I do not own this fund as its total return (nav expansion) can not cover its distributions this results in a negative total return year-to-date. I'm thinking this is due to a rising interest rate environment where a good number of income securities are having a difficult time maintaining their value while meeting their income distributions.
In reviewing NPSAX's Moringstar report I am finding that through August 7th it has had a negative ytd total return of -1.63%. So, even though it has a nice yield its loosing principal value and is not covering its yield resulting in a nav contraction. On the other hand my money market mutual fund GBAXX has a positive ytd total return of 0.94%. With this, I've been reducing my fixed income positions if they can not keep pace (or out perform) my money market mutual fund.
With this, I'm building cash over buying fixed income securities. The exception, for me, is in a bank loan fund that I own along with some hybrid income funds where their nav's are be maintained (or even growing) while meeting their income distributions.

A “few large servicers [have offered] modifications at half the rate of others,” the authors say The largest mortgage servicers are Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Wells Fargo and Citi.

Bank of America in particular (the largest of all the servicers when HAMP launched) has been far slower to modify loans than even the other large servicers, as other analyses we've cited have shown.

Wells Fargo isn't the only bank where heavy sales pressure led employees to open fake accounts.
A federal review triggered by the Wells Fargo scandal found that "weaknesses" at other banks led employees to open accounts without proof of customer consent — just like Wells Fargo did — according to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
... Citigroup (C), US Bank and Bank of America declined to comment.

Collusion Between Germany's Biggest Carmakers
The diesel scandal is not a failure on the part of individual companies, but rather the result of collusion among German automakers that lasted for years. Audi, BMW, Daimler, Volkswagen and Porsche coordinated their activities in more than a thousand meetings.

The motor industry was embroiled in a new diesel emissions scandal last night [June 11, 2018] after 774,000 Mercedes-Benz vehicles were found to contain cheating software.

The raids on Tuesday, in which about 100 investigators targeted BMW offices in Munich and an engine factory in Austria, suggested that all of Germany’s top domestic automakers may have evaded emissions rules, although perhaps not to the same degree as Volkswagen.

Ford became the latest company to become embroiled in the issue, with drivers in a U.S. lawsuit claiming some 500,000 Super Duty pickup trucks were rigged to beat emissions tests.

No Republican sign-off was necessary for Obama’s Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). The Treasury Department alone decided to run it through mortgage companies that had financial incentives to foreclose rather than modify loans. Treasury never saw the program as a relief vehicle, but a way to “foam the runway” for the banks, allowing them to absorb inevitable foreclosures more slowly.

From Ross’ vantage point, Trump offered the perfect exit. The future cabinet secretary’s private equity funds were underperforming—one on track to lose 26% of its initial value and another two dribbling out mediocre returns—and the accusations were starting to pile up. Roughly two months before the 2016 presidential election, the SEC announced WL Ross was paying a fine and refunding $11.9 million it allegedly skimmed from its investors, including interest. The scheme was complex. Like other private equity firms—including several that coughed up money to the SEC around the same time—WL Ross derived much of its revenue from management fees charged to its investors. With funds as large as $4.1 billion, management fees of 1.5% could alone bring in more than $60 million a year for Ross’ firm—serious money.
But WL Ross promised that it would give its investors something like a rebate. For example, when Ross and his colleagues got certain fees for working on deals, they were supposed to give at least 50% of that money back to investors. But, according to SEC investigators, the firm gave back less than it suggested it would and pocketed the difference, leading the feds to conclude Ross’ firm broke laws that prohibit defrauding and misleading clients. WL Ross paid the big settlement but never admitted guilt.
According to the feds, WL Ross charged some of those inappropriate fees in the years before the commerce secretary sold his firm to Invesco for $100 million up front and the possibility of another $275 million down the road. That meant that when Ross cashed out, he presumably did so at bigger valuation than he deserved. In a statement, Ross suggested that Invesco never clawed any of that money back. “The terms of the sale of my business in 2006 remain unchanged,” he said. Invesco declined to comment.
There is more to the story. According to five former WL Ross employees and investors, the firm was also charging its investors on money that it had lost. Here’s how it worked: If WL Ross made an investment of, say, $100 million that declined dramatically, in the final years of the fund the firm was supposed to charge management fees on the actual value of the investment, not the $100 million starting point. However, WL Ross allegedly continued collecting fees on the amount invested, taking more than it deserved. WL Ross was allegedly even charging fees on one investment that was essentially worthless. When approached about the discrepancy, Wilbur Ross initially insisted his firm was calculating the fees correctly, according to someone familiar with those discussions. “There are all sorts of fee issues,” says an investor, “but it was just the most egregious that I’ve seen.”

Invesco has seen its stock plunge since Jan. 26, 2018 — from $38.4 per share to $25.68 as of Tuesday morning.