Hi Guys,
A few days ago I was shocked by the number of mutual funds owned by a wise and loyal MFO member. I didn’t examine the incremental diversification benefits accrued by the overall funds or their individual investment philosophies; I simply counted.
I’m sure the owner had excellent reasons and logic when these funds were originally added to his portfolio. I’m equally sure that the styles and the strategies deployed by such a competitive group tend to cancel each other out and neutralize a potential high excess returns.
Diversification is a cardinal investment rule; it is the stuff of successful investing. Well maybe, but more likely it must be exercised prudently; it has its own set of limits. Safety in numbers is a residual human characteristic from our hunter-gatherer days.
J. Paul Getty opined that “Money is like manure. You have to spread it around to make things grow”. Warren Buffett proffered the other viewpoint with “Buy two of everything in sight and you end up with a zoo instead of a portfolio”. Economist and financial advisor Mark Skousen summarized both sides with this wealth-linked compromise: “To make it concentrate, to keep it diversify”.
Assembling a huge number of actively managed mutual funds in multiple categories is almost a 100% guarantee of underperformance relative to any reasonable benchmark. That failure guarantee is mostly tied to active fund management fees. It is true that some superior fund managers do overcome the fees hurdles, but these are few in number and even this minority subset is further eroded by persistency problems over time.
A recent study that illuminates this issue was released by Rick Ferri a year or so ago. It is a Monte Carlo-based parametric study that has been referenced on MFO earlier. Here is a Link to it:
http://www.rickferri.com/WhitePaper.pdfYou can use these study results to estimate your likelihood of selecting a group of active fund managers that potentially might outdistance a passive portfolio, and importantly, by how much.
The overarching findings from this extensive analysis is that the odds are not especially satisfying, and that the likely excess returns are negative. Notwithstanding these unhealthy findings, they do not completely close the door for active portfolio elements. However, these results do put a hard edge on the low probabilities and the negative expectations.
To illustrate, assume that an investor has somehow increased his likelihood of choosing a positive Alpha fund manager to 70 percent by applying an undefined meaningful fund manager selection process. That’s actually quite high given the poor historical record of individual investors. Using Ferri’s numbers for a 3-component portfolio (40% US equity, 20% International equity, 40% Investment grade bonds), the likely outperformance median return is 0.
52% while the underperformance median is -1.2
5%. That asymmetry reflects cost and fee drags.
The prospective excess returns coupled to a 70% chance of selecting a superior active manager is (0.7 X 0.
52) + (0.3 X -1.2
5) = -0.011. So, an investor needs to have a higher than 70% active fund manager selection probability before he can anticipate a net positive excess return for his efforts. That’s a tough task.
The situation deteriorates rapidly as more active managers are added to the mix within each investment category. In the sample scenario, the likelihood of hiring two successful active fund managers is simply 0.7 X 0.7 = 0.49 without impacting the median expected excess return numbers.
The probabilities of generating excess rewards from active management falls from neutral to bad to worse very rapidly. The bottom-line is that hiring a ton of active fund managers adds to investment risk without substantially enhancing the rewards side of the equation. Charles Ellis might well characterize this as a Losers game.
Twenty years ago the investment game was a lot easier to play. Market efficiency has improved over time and has reduced the opportunities for excess profits just like improvements in baseball pitching staff depth has improved to lower overall batting averages.
At that time, it was investor against investor on trades; today the trades are much more commonly executed on an institution against institution basis. And these institutions are populated by well educated, smart professionals who are supported by extensive research staff and super computers for numbers crunching. The chances for an individual investor to outplay these titans has dimmed over the decades.
I don’t mean to say that it can’t happen because it does happen. But it’s not an easy chore. Institutional agencies have their own set of hobgoblins to battle. Since retirement, I have been benchmarking my private portfolio against an Index benchmark that I vary as my asset allocation changes, and against a nice pension that is tied to a portfolio maintained by a highly regarded financial service organization.
Anecdotally, over most of my retirement, my personal portfolio was dominated by active fund holdings. I slightly underperformed the Index benchmark, but I frequently outperformed my pension portfolio. I don’t have access to the pension portfolio’s specific allocations, but I suppose they are more widely and more conservatively distributed than my personal portfolio. They have access to alternate investment products that I can not touch.
One takeaway from all this is that some active managers can deliver the goods, but they are a rare breed. So choose carefully, monitor diligently, and very definitely limit the number of active managers that you hire for your portfolio(s). That’s just my amateurs opinion.
Simplifying is wonderful. It will certainly add to your free time; it will likely enhance your portfolio returns, especially if you use active fund management.
Best Regards.
