>> "flawless execution" ... and the "opportunities [that] exist for Valeant long term"
Huh. Well, this fine deep piece of reporting appeared mid-January:
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/01/valeant-wall-st-darling-to-pariah.html
See if you can follow all the twists and turns. What a story, and what sketchy types.
Wonder which Fido funds owned it and how much.

@ Old Joe .. If you were a kid today you would just write a little script telling your computer to print it out 1499 times and watch it spill paper on the floor.......

I can do that. I had to write "I will not be an intractable clown" 1499 times!

And then there is the matter of debt paydown (probably NOT), which really unsettled creditors after what must have seemed like a freakshow of a conference call for them:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-15/valeant-shatters-calm-among-lenders-as-debt-casts-bigger-shadow

Creditors are starting to lose faith that Chief Executive Officer Michael Pearson will be able to execute on his promise of rapidly cutting Valeant’s debt load. A delay in filing its annual report with regulators is also complicating the company’s standing in debt markets. Failing to file its so-called 10-K before Wednesday will trigger a technical default under its credit agreement, restricting it from using its credit line, the company said.

All you stockholders, remember, if it all blows up, we bondholders will be in the line ahead of you. :)
Artisan High Income Fund (ARTFX)
Top 10 Holdings (% of total portfolio as of 29 February 2016)
USI Inc 5.4
VEREIT Inc 5.1
Valeant Pharmaceuticals Intl 4.2
First Data Corp 3.8
Opal Acquisition Inc 3.3
Renaissance Learning Inc 3.2
York Risk Services Holding Corp 3.0
Gardner Denver Inc 2.9
Altice SA 2.8
Infinity Acquisition LLC 2.8
Total 36.5%
Not sure/can't imagine what Bryan Krug was thinking, when he was amassing this large position in Valeant debt.
update: apparently, Valeant didn't meet the Wed. deadline re. 10-K filing:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-17/valeant-declines-on-report-that-drugmaker-faces-lender-pressure

Harmonizing Ted's post with David's:
PRGFX: $41.6B
TRBCX: $28.9B
PRHSX: $11.7B
TRLGX: $12.4B
TRVLX: 21.6B
Total TRP: $116.2B
Sequoia: $5.7B, or about 1/20th the size, i.e. 20x as committed as these T. Rowe Price funds.
David wrote that after Sequoia, the next most committed funds had 4%. These T. Rowe Price funds collectively have about 1.5% (1/20th of 30%). For funds that hold around 100 positions that's more a run-of-the-mill position than an infatuation.
Big families buy big positions in lots of stocks.

Interesting Ted, but I wonder if TRP sold out of VRX already. PRGFX was down only -0.7% yesterday, not much different then the S&P500. SEQUX was down -7.7% with the VRX drop.
And actually, SEQUX's drop of -7.7% with VRX's drop of 52% says that the Sequoia percentage in VRX is "only" about 15% (all other investments being flat).

@MFO Members: From the what its worth department, of the largest ten holders of VRX T. Rowe Price has five funds who's total holdings are almost as great as Sequioa's.
Regards,
Ted
Sequoia 12,803,392
T. Rowe Price Growth Stock 4,878,500
T. Rowe Price Blue Chip Growth 2,722,700
T. Rowe Price Health Sciences 2,319,205
T. Rowe Price Instl Large Cap Growth 1,567,179
T. Rowe Price Value 1,165,000

A remarkably unremarkable fund (albeit concentrated). But terminating C shares (and converting to A shares) is a new one on me.
The closest situation I know of is American Funds class C shares that automatically convert after 10 years to class F-1 (not quite A) shares. That's also a one-off (I know of no other family that does this either).

http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1215880/000141304216000370/neimansupplargecap497.htm
497 1 neimansupplargecap497.htm
Neiman Large Cap Value Fund
Class C Shares (NECMX)
For Investors Seeking Long-Term Capital Appreciation
Supplement dated March 16, 2016 to the
Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information dated August 1, 2015
____________________________________________________________________________________
The Board of Trustees of Neiman Funds (the "Trust") has concluded that it is in the best interests of the Neiman Large Cap Value Fund (the "Fund") and its shareholders that the Fund cease offering Class C shares. Effective immediately, the Fund will not accept any new investments in Class C shares.
Class C shareholders of record as of March 29, 2016, will have their Class C shares exchanged for load-waived Class A shares (NEAMX) effective March 30, 2016. That is, Class A shares will be issued without any sales charge. Exchanges are made at net asset value such that the value of your investment does not change as a result of the exchange. Additionally, Class A shares have lower operating expenses than Class C shares. An exchange of shares is not a taxable event for federal tax purposes.
IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS, PLEASE CONTACT THE FUND AT 1-877-385-2720.
________________________
This Supplement and the existing Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information ("SAI") each dated August 1, 2015, provide relevant information for all shareholders and should be retained for future reference. The Prospectus and the SAI have been filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, are incorporated by reference, and can be obtained without charge by calling toll-free 1-877-385-2720.
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1215880/000141304216000371/neimansupptacticalincome497.htm
497 1 neimansupptacticalincome497.htm
Neiman Tactical Income Fund
Class C Shares (NTCFX)
For Investors Seeking Total Return With Capital Preservation as a Secondary Objective
Supplement dated March 16, 2016 to the
Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information dated August 1, 2015
____________________________________________________________________________________
The Board of Trustees of Neiman Funds (the "Trust") has concluded that it is in the best interests of the Neiman Tactical Income Fund (the "Fund") and its shareholders that the Fund cease offering Class C shares. Effective immediately, the Fund will not accept any new investments in Class C shares.
Class C shareholders of record as of March 29, 2016, will have their Class C shares exchanged for load-waived Class A shares (NTAFX) effective March 30, 2016. That is, Class A shares will be issued without any sales charge. Exchanges are made at net asset value such that the value of your investment does not change as a result of the exchange. Additionally, Class A shares have lower operating expenses than Class C shares. An exchange of shares is not a taxable event for federal tax purposes.
IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS, PLEASE CONTACT THE FUND AT 1-877-385-2720.
________________________
This Supplement and the existing Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information ("SAI") each dated August 1, 2015, provide relevant information for all shareholders and should be retained for future reference. The Prospectus and the SAI have been filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, are incorporated by reference, and can be obtained without charge by calling toll-free 1-877-385-2720.

Valeant appeared, at one point, to be printing money. I suspect that "Mike" told a really good story about how beautifully all the pieces of his strategy were coming together, which was true until it wasn't. I suspect that Sequoia's tradition of "a few great stocks" led them to want to believe that they'd found the next Buffett (the only other CEO to whom they'd entrusted such a large fraction of the portfolio). They got into the stock, it paid off, they got in deeper, then deeper, then way deeper ... at which point it had become, psychologically, a "too big to fail" position. It had to work. So when it started to wobble, they bought more.
Valeant is owned by 1226 mutual funds, including Vanguard's Total International Index. You beat the crowd (and the index) only by acting differently than they act. In Sequoia's case, that meant going all-in. They had 30% in Valeant. The second most-committed set of funds are all sitting around 4% in Valeant. And that did promise returns unlike any other.
David

As of February 29, the fund's holdings accounted for just over 90% of its assets. That implies a cash position just under 10%. With its focus on called bonds and other ultra-short duration securities, it generates a lot of reinvestable cash every week. My recollection is that Mr. Sherman has to find $4 worth of securities each year for every $1 in the portfolio.
The fund is up 0.89% YTD and might find the first quarter up 1%. Given its risk profile, it continues to hold the highest five-year Sharpe ratio of any fixed-income fund and second-highest over the past three years. The Sharpe remains positive over the past year, but far lower than the Sharpe ratios for other sorts of fixed-income funds.
David

@MFO Members: Here is today's M* article placing Sequoia "under review" !
Regards,
Ted
http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=745818

Sequoia (SEQUX) has always been a Gold fund in the judgment of Morningstar's analysts. Today it was placed "under review." Morningstar offers two reasons for that: (1) investors are bailing out and have pulled $800 million over the past six months. That goofs with both execution and tax efficiency. (2) "[T]he team does not seem to have taken any steps to mitigate the risks of such a large position.... Because of these concerns, we have placed this fund under review."
Oddly, they also placed it "under review" on October 30, 2015. At that point, Valeant was over 30% of the fund, investors had presumably been pulling money and the management team conducted their slightly-freakish public defense of their Valeant stake. Following the review, the analysts reaffirmed their traditional judgment: Gold! The described it as "compelling" in the week before the review and "a top choice" in the week afterward.
There's no evidence in the reaffirmation statement that the analysts actually talked to Sequoia management. If they didn't, they were irresponsible. If they did and asked about risk management, they were either deceived by management ("don't worry, we're clear-eyed value investors and we're acting to control risk") or management was honest ("we're riding out the storm") and the analysts thought "good enough for us!" I don't find any of that reassuring.
Similarly, up until quite recently Morningstar's stock analyst assigned to Valeant recognized "near-term pain" while praising the firms "flawless execution" of its acquisition strategy and the "opportunities [that] exist for Valeant long term."
David

FYI: (Click On Article Title At Top Of Google Search)
The US public continues to vote decisively against traditional fund management, which attempts to manage equities actively, and beat broad benchmarks, in return for a fee. In the 12 months to the end of January, according to Morningstar, some $245bn flowed out of active funds while $408bn flowed into passive funds, which merely seek to match the returns of a benchmark and to minimise their fees. Once a niche category, passive funds now account for 32.5 per cent of US assets managed in mutual and exchange traded funds.
Regards,
Ted
https://www.google.com/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=active+fund+managers+find+their+voice+FT

@MFO Members: From 2012-YTD the S&P 500 Index has outperformed SEQEX. I agree with BobC, its time to move on.
Regards,
Ted

Here are the 2/29 holdings (from RiverPark):
http://www.riverparkfunds.com/Funds/ShortTermHighYield/FullHoldings.aspx
90.06% are securities. There are not sufficient details given to completely identify the securities, but based on M*'s analysis a reasonable guess would be that all but 2% are bonds, and the remainder are convertibles.
From one of M*'s methodology papers: "Morningstar includes securities that mature in less than one year in the definition of cash."
M*'s analysis of the fund portfolio says that its average effective maturity of bonds is 1.83 years. So we can guess that M* is calling about half of the bonds "cash". Possibly a bit less, depending on the distribution of bonds. Let's say it's 40%.
So M* describes 40% of the 90% of bonds as cash. That's 36%. Add in the 10% that Riverpark says is not held as securities, and we've got 46% cash (by M*'s definition).
One can call these short term bonds whatever one wants - cash, ultrashort bonds, securities. Regardless of what one calls them, recognize them for what they are - bonds maturing in under a year, that have better-than-cash yield but also retain credit risk.

VRX dropped 51% today.

Didn't SEQUX go down 7.69% today, 3/15?

Looks like the fund went down by 15% today. At first, I thought they had sold Valeant but the quote from Morningstar was 3/14. When I saw the quote was old, I searched and found today's.

Asset Allocation RPHYX
Type %
Net %
Short %
Long Bench-
mark Cat
Avg
As of 02/29/2016
Cash 46.66 — 46.66 — 4.42
US Stock 0.00 — 0.00 — 1.33
Non US Stock 0.00 — 0.00 — 0.01
Bond 51.02 — 51.02 — 92.87
Other 2.32 — 2.32 — 1.36