Yes. 20% in a money market fund - Delaware Cash Reserves. The company is no longer existent.
Wasn’t all happy. Especially shopping for groceries in the big stores in the northern (Detroit) suburbs. There were always several employees moving up / down the aisles marking items up by hand. No bar codes in those days. Things went up fast. The loaf of bread you paid 50 cents for became 60 cents a few weeks later and 75 cents by year’s end. On and on it went. Not only bread. Meats, staples, everything rising. Year after year. So, after paying federal income tax on your 20% “windfall” you were lucky to end up ahead. Fortunately unions were strong and protected workers with COLA wage raises. To some extent, non union workers benefited indirectly.
This source shows annual inflation peaking around 18% in 1980 and remaining in double-digits for several years.
I didn’t sense as much angst among the public back then over rising prices as today. But maybe I wasn’t looking or listening. I think it came on gradually over many years and people got used to it. They say if you put a frog in a pot of cold water and heat it up to a boil slowly the frog will die of the heat rather than jump out.

Simpler back then to grab a CD at 15%... i knew a guy who did just that.

Yes, I was just beginning to work full-time and saving. I remember going around to several institutions buying CD's. From what I remember they were paying maybe 10-12% and had short maturities, maybe no more than a year?
After that, Templeton Growth was my first mutual fund investment through my account executive at a local Prudential-Bache office.
No internet/online brokerages yet and no-load mutual funds were just beginning to gain traction.

Compare those chart events with Reagan years (1980-88) and Volcker years at the Fed, 08/1979* - 08/1983** - 08/1987.
In 1987, rumor went both ways - one was that Volcker didn't want a 3rd term, and another that Reagan wasn't going to nominate him for the 3rd term, had a search setup for possible replacement that was headed by Greenspan. The politician that Greenspan was, he recommended reappointing Volcker, but Reagan nominated Greenspan instead.
Two months into Greenspan's term, stock market crashed on 10/19/1987 (Black Monday). It had more to do with dollar and some harsh statements that the US Treasury Secretary Baker made about Germany and the US allies.
BTW, as reported by various sources, it was Baker who said to Volcker that the President was "ordering" him to lower rates. Reagan (who was present) and Volcker didn't say anything. Volcker left the meeting without reacting to Baker's "order".
*Nominated by Carter
**Nominated by Reagan

"It wasn't until fairly recently that I became aware that I had helped build an enormous coal-fired generating complex. Who knew?"

@Old_Joe, that was the Navajo Generating Station, and it was demolished in 2020, so it's no longer messing with regional air quality and the climate. Video of the three smokestacks coming down here: Vox article.

Volker raised rates to their peak under Carter. Rates were cut at the start of Reagan's administration only to be raised again to that peak in June 1981. You can see the twin peaks in the graph below.
Fed funds rate (blue) vs. CPI Y/Y (inflation; red)

30 year yields (blue) did not follow Fed funds rates (red) down for almost a year.

Nor did they fall with inflation.

Volcker had promised that once inflation starting falling interest rates would follow. Long-term interest rates did not follow Volcker’s prediction and inexplicably rose, despite lowered inflation.

https://ou.edu/content/dam/cas/economics/Student Journal of Economics publications/Derrick Jones_VolckerJOE.pdf
30 year yields (blue) vs. CPI Y/Y (inflation; red)

A blast from the past.

Photo caption: ”President Ronald Reagan ordered Federal Reserve Chair Paul Volcker not to raise interest rates. It didn’t work.” (Barron’s, August 19)

...high % of uninsured deposits are a concern for the regulators. Bank run may hit any bank, large or small. But small & medium size banks are most vulnerable. Last year, the FDIC rescued all deposits when it didn't have to, but don't expect that every time.
Use different titles for CDs (e.g. up to 5 POD accounts are possible, each insured to $250K) or spread the CDs among the banks.
https://dailyhodl.com/2024/08/17/bny-state-street-and-jpmorgan-chase-and-91-us-lenders-at-serious-risk-of-bank-runs-report/

M* Risk Score & SD indicate what is.
M* Risk Score LCORX 32, VFIAX 73, so for LCORX 43.84%
SD LCORX 9.92, VFIAX 17.84, so for LCORX 55.61%
Moderate-allocation range is 50-70%, so it's effectively near the lower end of moderate allocation or upper end of conservative-allocation.
Conservative-allocation is now split, 15-30%, 30-50%.

Perfect @msf
It was getting late when I last posted and I overlooked the 60% cash figure @BaluBalu cited. As you stated, he was looking at the economic rather than classic view at Morningstar as I once did, For some reason the ”economic” view appears to be the default view whenever I click on LCORX’s holdings at M*. So I nearly always need to reset it.
As much of @BaluBalu’s questioning (Devil’s Advocacy? ) has centered on how to incorporate a fund like LCORX into one’s overall portfolio construction, I’d suggest he start a separate thread on portfolio construction to garner as many different approaches as possible with an eye to see how LCORX might contribute.. He might also want to look at a thread I put up a couple weeks ago: How many funds is the right number? In spite of the silly misleading title, the thread does tread with caution into the realm of portfolio construction.
PS - In the above linked thread, I made reference to LCORX as a “balanced fund.” Technically that’s incorrect. However, for me it fills a spot once occupied by a balanced fund. I don’t find the risk / reward trade-offs substantially different. “Tactical Allocation” is a more accurate moniker.

10 minute opening remarks video

B-G's funds have been out of style for the past few years. It's not just with HAIGX and B-G's sleeve of VWIGX. M*'s automated analysis notes: "The parent firm's five-year risk-adjusted success ratio [is] 21%". See, M*'s quant analyses are not entirely useless. :-)
HAIGX is a clone of B-G's BGCSX. 44 holdings overlap, all of which are in each fund's top 50 (M* portfolio tool). Same set of managers. And no management investment at BGCSX either.

Curious why you are using March 31 portfolio info. M* shows June 30 info - 60% fixed income. Very different and dynamic as you mentioned. Seems like a tactical long-short allocation fund.
As @hank did in another thread, you are looking at M*'s economic exposure view rather than its classic view. The classic view is designed to tell you what a fund is doing while the other views are designed to tell you more about how a fund is doing that.
LCORX is not so dynamic, at least based on 2nd quarter changes. Its 68% turnover is annual, not quarterly.
M*'s classic June 30th view shows 15.75% fixed income exposure. Very different from the 60% you are quoting. And that 15.75% is within rounding error of the 15% (14% IG + 1% HY) Leuthold itself shows in its 2nd quarter (June 30th) report.
If you're interested in how the classic view is calculated, here's a M* methodology paper:
Shorts and Derivatives in Portfolio Statistics, December 31, 2009.
If you're interested in what the newer portfolio views (economic exposure, market value) are supposed to show, here's a M* video. You must watch the tail end of the video for the charts. They are not shown in the text and without them the example is useless.
https://www.morningstar.co.uk/uk/news/204541/does-my-fund-invest-in-derivatives.aspx

Simpler back then to grab a CD at 15%... i knew a guy who did just that.

Just curious, what was the psychology of retail investors then towards 10, 20, and 30 yr Treasuries when interest rates were 20%. Were retail investors hoovering these instruments, with no risk of being called?

"The manager turnover is the main reason M* recently downgraded its rating of LCORX to silver from gold. Interestingly, LCOR retains their gold rating."
Three of the 4 managers are unchanged at least since 2015. There was one manager change in 2021. IMO, not enough justification to drop fund rating because of manager change.
I know enough Gold rated funds I would not own and I am happy to own many Silver rated funds. I do not get hung up on M*'s Gold vs Silver.
In any case, I see the fund analysis at M* for LCORX done by solely machines. M*'s machine driven analysis and ratings have been more harmful than useful - the Chicago firm has taken to heart the Silicon Valley mantra of "fake it until you make it."
Their drop from Gold to Silver is as credible as you like. I would completely ignore their medal rating for LCORX.
It seems, since the recent market peak on July 16, the active / dynamic / tactical hedgers PHEFX and LCORX did not fare as well as the passive hedger HELO but PRWCX performed the best among these. I can accept the differences as not material / significant. However, I see that LCORX did so much better than PRWCX during the Covid crash or during the 2022-23 interest rate environment - so, I see the attraction to LCORX.
I guess I will take my chances with the passive hedger HELO which I already own and hope that if we have an armageddon situation, the Fed and Congress will bail the markets out. As I often say, it is not a question of whether an alt fund is good or bad, it really is what role one expects the fund to perform in one's portfolio. Since i already have two hedgers and if I count in MRFOX and QLEIX, that is four hedgers, I should not add one more to my portfolio, rather increase the existing ones or cut bait.
Most of my posts are not to educate or debate others but to help me think out loud and perhaps, revisit the posts when my memory fades. I bookmarked this thread and hopefully, I will remember.

”Curious why you are using March 31 portfolio info. M* shows June 30 info - 60% fixed income. Very different and dynamic as you mentioned. Seems like a tactical long-short allocation fund.”
The March 31 chart was posted only to allow comparisons with the more recent numbers to determine what changes in allocation may have been undertaken.
* I make no recommendation of this fund. I’d expect it to decline in an equity bear market like virtually every other equity fund. . My experience with this fund is extremely limited. (I hadn’t heard of it until David profiled it in November.) I did my own due diligence before sending money. Others should do the same.

@hank, Thanks. Thought you are a prospective owner - now I know you are a current owner.
Seems like your goal is Hedged Equity. And then you are using this fund for the means by which it attempts to accomplish the goal. I probably should read the manager commentary to understand their approach better - just a snap shot of portfolio contents may not do justice. One thing I like is it is a multi-manager fund.
Curious why you are using March 31 portfolio info. M* shows June 30 info - 60% fixed income. Very different and dynamic as you mentioned. Seems like a tactical long-short allocation fund.
I have always been nervous about long- short funds. I must confess to owning QLEIX (not yet a fan). I own the Hedge Equity funds HELO (passive hedging) and PHEFX (dynamic hedging) and am reasonably satisfied. These accomplish hedging differently than LCORX and they do not go short, to my knowledge.
Thanks again for sharing.

https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/video/shows/trading-day/2024/08/16/economy-not-going-back-to-normal-larry-mcdonald/
"The economy is not going back to normal." No surprises here. Metals, oil/gas are the places to invest, looking forward, he says. Good questions and response points from the host.
https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/video/shows/trading-day/2024/08/16/economy-not-going-back-to-normal-larry-mcdonald/

Changed the headline. Bump-up the list here. BCE, Telus, Rogers, Quebecor.
https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/video/shows/trading-day/2024/08/16/we-are-seeing-a-bottoming-in-wireless-pricing-analyst/

+1.