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Here's a statement of the obvious: The opinions expressed here are those of the participants, not those of the Mutual Fund Observer. We cannot vouch for the accuracy or appropriateness of any of it, though we do encourage civility and good humor.
  • In case of DEFAULT
    @Baseball_Fan
    Everytime the taxes for the "wealthy" have went up three things have happened. 1) Economy slows down 2) Both the wealthy and the poor are hurt with the poor being hurt more 3) tax receipts go down.
    Show your data as I've seen the exact opposite. The late 1920s income tax rates had a peak below 30% and we hit the Great Depression, during which the government started to raise taxes for New Deal social programs and the War Effort and we had strong economic growth after they did this. Then in the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s we had a peak tax rate of close to 90% and our economy was booming with many government projects, the GI bill, etc. Tax breaks on the wealthy have not proven to be an effective form of economic stimulus. Trickle down economics is hogwash. Reaganomics is widely known among serious economic circles to be an utter failure and Reagan himself quietly raised taxes to pay the bills.
    image
  • In case of DEFAULT
    Everytime the taxes for the "wealthy" have went up three things have happened. 1) Economy slows down 2) Both the wealthy and the poor are hurt with the poor being hurt more 3) tax receipts go down.
    What the Bolsheviks want is exactly what you see now...defund the police = crime, breakdown in society and chaos. High inflation = tax on everyone. Bat shit crazy monetary and fiscal policy and spending, who cares about the debt limit. the MATH DOES NOT WORK. You can't keep spending into oblivion .
    So we get what you see...chaos...so the Bolsheviks can install their Totalarian govt...just like when the Grifter in the White House says he won't debate...
    Do agree with the fella in Germany...what he said the other day...we need maturity in the USA to resolve this issue...
  • How far have the averages advanced since (edit) their 2022 lows?
    ?
    https://stockcharts.com/h-perf/ui
    put in ivv and djia and select your start date
    +~9.6% and +~8.11% as of a minute ago ...
  • How far have the averages advanced since (edit) their 2022 lows?
    And yes, hank; S&P 500 from low Oct. 11, 2022 to date at 1:35 pm is about +14.5431%. I used SPY...a different animal.
  • How far have the averages advanced since (edit) their 2022 lows?
    @hank, strange thing about StockCharts is that custom settings carryon for a while, but after some time, they default to 1-year. So, my comment about resetting the date. Good that you could see custom 9/22/22 as intended.
  • Calls on CDs
    All of them are callable except some of the shorter term ones. Non-callable CDs tend to have much lower yields.
    I have bought about 15 CDs this past year from Schwab, that were non-callable, but I did not buy anything longer than 2 years. I just went on Schwab, and looked at their 3, 4, and 5 year CDs and it appears to be primarily non-callable CDs on their menu of offerings. I have no interest in callable CDs, have no intention of buying a callable CD in the future, so apparently I am not facing the same dilemma you are describing. Good luck!
  • How far have the averages advanced since (edit) their 2022 lows?
    Thanks @Yogi. Looks like you pre-set the start date for 9/22/22. If I’m reading the chart correctly, as of today all 3 major indexes are up about 10% from that low. Umm … feels like more. Extremely left brained. Charts & maps drive me up a wall. Raw data expressed in numbers / words work better. Have had good luck reading the Google charts. Will give it a try there as well.
    Edit: Google shows the 2022 low for the S&P (3590) occurring around mid-October. (Looks like I had an incorrect date when I posted.) Currently, BB has the S&P @ 4104. By subtracting (3590) the low from today’s number and then dividing the difference by the October low, I come up with a 14% increase in the S&P since the low. (Assuming some dividends were paid, it would be a bit more.)
    Now, are today’s numbers temporarily depressed over fears of a debt default ? Or, are they still considerably elevated by historical standards - which everybody (including the shoeshine boy) seems to agree on? Of course it’s a market of stocks - not a stock market. Indexes aside, there will be individual winners and losers.
  • How far have the averages advanced since (edit) their 2022 lows?
    All major indexes are similar since 9/22/22, except R2000. In the chart link below, enter date 2022-09-22. However, there were other dips in Oct, Nov, Dec 2022.
    https://stockcharts.com/h-perf/ui?s=$INDU&compare=$COMPQ,$SPX,$TRAN,IWM&id=p53718167248
  • How far have the averages advanced since (edit) their 2022 lows?
    Hi @hank A decent method below. Not too bad to use after a few test runs.
    Google Finance for SPY.
    From Sept. 22, 2022 to noon May 12, indicates SPY at +9.922%.
    Click the one year link, which is set for SPY. Enter at the top of the page, search box, whatever ticker you choose. Hover on the graph at Sept. 22, 2022 to obtain the price for that date. You'll have to do the math with a calculator to discover the performance between this date and 'current'.
  • Seeing red across the board this morning.
    @mark
    Congratulations! I hope my wife and I will be that lucky.
    I am 71 so my kids need to get moving!
    My son is getting married May 27, so at least things are going in the right direction!
  • FDIC Proposal to Assess 12.5 bps on Uninsured Deposits over $5 Billion
    The FDIC needs to recover it costs after the recent banking turmoil.
    Under their proposal, banks with more that $50 billion would shoulder 95% of the cost.
    This "special assessment" fee would apply to approximately 113 banks.
    A very small number of individual depositors are at risk due to FDIC insurance limits ($250K of deposits per depositor, per FDIC-insured bank, and per ownership category).
    These depositors should be offered an option to purchase additional FDIC insurance beyond the $250K limit.
    If additional insurance is not purchased, depositors will be subject to complete losses beyond the limits.
    There is no need to saddle everyone with this added expense.
  • The Week in Charts | Charlie Bilello
    The Week in Charts (05/11/23)
    A tour of the markets covering the most important charts & themes, including a potential end to the Fed's rate hikes, why the inflation rate is set to decline even more, a return to prosperity, and the sentiment gift that keeps on giving.
    Video
    Blog
  • FDIC Proposal to Assess 12.5 bps on Uninsured Deposits over $5 Billion
    This is almost a soft expansion of the FDIC insurance, although not stated explicitly.
    First, the FDIC covers ALL deposits at 3 failed banks (SVB, Signature, First Republic). Second, to recover its costs, it imposes this 12.5 bps fee for 8 quarters on uninsured deposits over $5 billion. During this time, depositors and banks may realize that this is a reasonable cost to just make the insurance "ahead", instead of "after" in an ad-hoc way. If the fee would be for the long-term, it would be reduced too.
    The FDIC also has some proposals for deposit insurance modifications on the table. The Treasury and the Fed are evaluating those.
  • Calls on CDs
    At least early in the history of callable CDs, banks were pretty quick to pull the trigger as rates fell:
    When banks and brokerages began hawking callable CDs in the mid-1990s, interest rates were generally headed down, which meant that many issuing banks did indeed call their CDs after the first year.
    https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2001-01-09-0101090053-story.html
    That article also states that callable CDs are not limited to brokered CDs. Banks can directly issue callable CDs.
    To get an idea of when calls on IOUs are exercised by debtors (such as banks issuing CDs), one can look at callable bonds and at mortgages (where the debtor has the option of prepaying/refinancing, continuously).
    One expects bonds to get called if they are trading at a premium, i.e. if they are paying above market rates. Bonds purchased at a premium don't always get called, though, for a couple of reasons.
    One is that by the time the call can be exercised, market rates have risen to meet or exceed the bond coupon rate. You seem satisfied with the 5+% you're getting, so in the "worst" case, that's what you'll be stuck with if rates rise rather than fall.
    Another reason that premium bonds don't get called is that the issuing institution runs into problems. The institution may have difficulty raising cash to pay off the bond (i.e. it can't refinance at a lower rate).
    If a bank gets into trouble, it too may have difficulty raising cash, even when offering above market-rate FDIC-insured CDs. So there are some unusual circumstances when a bank might be slow in calling a CD paying above market rates. (But if it is taken over by the FDIC, the higher CD rate is likely to be terminated anyway.)
    Next, mortgages. Anyone who has held a mortgage during a period of declining rates has likely looked into refinancing at the lower rate. Since there's overhead involved (documentation fees, possible points, etc.) one doesn't refinance every time rates drop a few basis points.
    And if rates are dropping quickly, one may hold off a bit rather than refinance and then refinance again. By waiting a little longer (and paying the old, higher rate in the interim) one saves costs by refinancing fewer times.
    So speed of rate decline is a consideration, and one that I suspect banks look at as well in deciding when to call a CD.
    When all is said and done, I expect the late 1990s experience described in the Chicago Tribune to be representative. Many banks will call CDs as soon as they're able, so long as the CDs are paying above market rates for their remaining terms.
  • In case of DEFAULT
    JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM)’s Jamie Dimon took a jab at Donald Trump for encouraging Republican lawmakers to dig in over raising the debt limit even if it means default — an outcome his bank is prepping for by convening a weekly war room. “It’s one more thing he doesn’t know very much about,” Dimon said in an interview with Bloomberg Television Thursday, when asked about the former president’s comments. “Anyone who’s anyone knows that is potentially catastrophic,” he said. 
    Excerpt from Bloomberg Media 5/11/23
  • FDIC Proposal to Assess 12.5 bps on Uninsured Deposits over $5 Billion
    "The FDIC is proposing to collect the special assessment at an annual rate of approximately 12.5 basis points over eight quarterly assessment periods; however, the special assessment rate is subject to change prior to any final rule depending on any adjustments to the loss estimate, mergers or failures, or amendments to reported estimates of uninsured deposits."
    https://www.fdic.gov/news/press-releases/2023/pr23037.html
  • Seeing red across the board this morning.
    Bloomberg’s in “worry mode” today. It varies day to day along with the weather.
    Hitting little white balls would be infinitely more productive and interesting than watching red / green squiggles on a stock chart. But so would be fishing, mowing the grass or carrying out the trash.
    That said … While most everything equity related is down (mid-day) miners / metals are being taken to the woodshed. Silver is leading the way down, off more than 4% today - but to be expected after a phenomenal run this year. It’s a bit unnerving how far the yield on the 10-year has fallen in just a month or two. Certainly suggests growing fears of recession. (3.38% today).
    @Derf - hope you get a “hole-in-one” today!
  • Federal Reserve Financial Stability Report
    https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financial-stability-report-20230508.pdf
    "...the framework focuses primarily on assessing vulnerabilities, with an emphasis on four broad categories and how those categories might interact to amplify stress in the financial system.
    1. Valuation pressures arise when asset prices are high relative to economic fundamentals or historical norms. These developments are often driven by an increased willingness of investors to take on risk. As such, elevated valuation pressures may increase the possibility of outsized drops in asset prices (see Section 1, Asset Valuations).
    2. Excessive borrowing by businesses and households exposes the borrowers to distress if their incomes decline or the assets they own fall in value. In these cases, businesses and households with high debt burdens may need to cut back spending, affecting economic activity and causing losses for investors (see Section 2, Borrowing by Businesses and Households).
    3. Excessive leverage within the financial sector increases the risk that financial institutions will not have the ability to absorb losses without disruptions to their normal business operations when hit by adverse shocks. In those situations, institutions will be forced to cut back lending, sell their assets, or even shut down. Such responses can impair credit access for households and businesses, further weakening economic activity (see Section 3, Leverage in the Financial Sector).
    4. Funding risks expose the financial system to the possibility that investors will rapidly withdraw their funds from a particular institution or sector, creating strains across markets or institutions. Many financial institutions raise funds from the public with a commitment to return their investors’ money on short notice, but those institutions then invest much of those funds in assets that are hard to sell quickly or have a long maturity. This liquidity and maturity transformation can create an incentive for investors to withdraw funds quickly in adverse situations. Facing such withdrawals, financial institutions may need to sell assets quickly at “fire sale” prices, thereby incurring losses and potentially becoming insolvent, as well as causing additional price declines that can create stress across markets and at other institutions (see Section 4, Funding Risks)."