Hi guys, In viewing my portfolio in M*'s Portfolio Manger this morning (Saturday 10/2) around 5:45 AM, I am finding than a good number of my mutual funds have stale pricing from Thursday's market close and M* has failed ... yet again ... to update many mutual funds in my portfolio with Friday's nav market closing values. No wonder M* gets bashed on many investment boards.

Thank you Old_ Skeet.

Hi guys, In viewing my portfolio in M*'s Portfolio Manger this morning (Saturday 10/2) around 5:45 AM, I am finding than a good number of my mutual funds have stale pricing from Thursday's market close and M* has failed ... yet again ... to update many mutual funds in my portfolio with Friday's nav market closing values. No wonder M* gets bashed on many investment boards.

How about “Falling Star”? Seems like as soon as I latch on to one of their 5-star funds it starts falling … down to 3 stars in no time at all.

Checked my watch lists in M* Portfolio Manager at 22:25 ET.
Looks like Portfolio Manager has not been updated with today's market changes.

Wow, that's really bold. Betting that the DOW will drop 0.95% below today's close sometime within the next three months.So I guess you would probably also bet straight up that BUF will beat HOU this weekend?

Than I guess I don’t understand the celebratory note evident in your post. Markets go up. Markets go down. Since we’ve pivoted somehow to football - When their prima donna clowns spike the ball and dance in the end zone following a score, coaches sometimes admonish: “Act like you’ve been there before.”
Bet on football? Not interested. And a tough game to wager on. Basketball? Yes. I can usually make a dime gaming the changing point spreads - if betting site is so enabled. Bet on the stock market? Yes. Best of all. I can usually make a buck.

I’ll bet you a nickel the Dow closes below 34,000 again at some future point this year.

Wow, that's really bold. Betting that the DOW will drop 0.95% below today's close sometime within the next three months.
So I guess you would probably also bet straight up that BUF will beat HOU this weekend?

You're right that JAAA tends to move a bit more in tandem with stocks (R² of about 0.5) than the other ultrashort term bond ETFs I mentioned. Though there's not much default risk in AAA tranches of CLOs (vs CDOs).
On the upside, there's that higher yield:

To be sure, AAA-rated CLOs and the new ETFs investing in them offer the much safer corners of the leveraged-loan market, with layers of default protection yet higher yields than investment-grade bonds. As of Sept. 30 [2020], the average yield of AAA-rated CLOs was 1.6%, more than double the 0.78% yield of AAA-rated corporate bonds.

https://www.barrons.com/articles/collateralized-loan-obligations-clos-are-now-available-in-etfs-should-you-buy-51603184400
(This was written just as JAAA launched; since then it has done well in part because of those higher yields and in part, as you said, because it moved up somewhat along with stocks.)
JBBB is a different story. Lower credit rating => moves more closely with stocks, more risk of default.

BNY has been updated
https://im.bnymellon.com/us/en/documents/manual/tax-forms/2021-early-estimated-capital-gains-november-2021.pdf
Dodge and Cox (new)
https://www.dodgeandcox.com/pdf/shareholder_services/dc_estimated_year_end_distributions_2021.pdf
Evermore (new)
https://evermoreglobal.com/our-products/global-value-fund-distributions/
Harbor Mid Cap Growth is paying 40% (But I think they switched strategies/managers this year) https://www.harborfunds.com/docs/Dividend_Estimates_HMCGF.pdf
Harbor Capital
https://assets.harborcapital.com/docs/Dividend_Estimates_2021.pdf
FPA
https://fpa.com/docs/default-source/tax-dividend-info/all-fund-year-end-2021-distributions-estimates.pdf?sfvrsn=e2d9919d_3&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=176507488&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_pVNDZGWeFi77zgEJdgzwsWk6FOCm1LAz373HAYaS_3Rsc1zSzI2mRqVNIS7x02olDuTg4Ft4U8N2ZL6qRG8bChq3NfQ&utm_content=176507488&utm_source=hs_email

I may have missed it, but Wells Fargo Asset Management was spun off as well. Changing the fund names is just part of this larger change. WFAM is becoming Allspring Global Investments.
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/wells-fargo-asset-management-to-become-allspring-global-investments-initiates-leadership-transition-301340853.html
IMHO, the "why" is pretty obvious, especially to investors who wouldn't touch any service or product coming from Wells Fargo.

“Rebranding is vital as is a new broom at the top to reboot the ailing WFAM business,” said Amin Rajan, chief executive of Create Research, an asset management consultancy.
...
Efforts by WFAM to attract new clients have ... been hampered by the 2016 mis-selling scandal involving the fraudulent opening of millions of customer accounts, which Wells Fargo bank has struggled to recover from.

https://www.ft.com/content/fdf0f369-5d5f-4385-8689-158ad173f793

This is how I have done it since 2000(link).

update:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/908802/000139834421019444/fp0069092_497.htm
497 1 fp0069092_497.htm
Filed pursuant to Rule 497(e) and Rule 497(k)
under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended
File Registration No.: 033-65632
SCHRODER SERIES TRUST
(the “Trust”)
Schroder Long Duration Investment-Grade Bond Fund
(the “Fund”)
Supplement dated September 30, 2021
to the Fund’s Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and
Statement of Additional Information (the “SAI”), each dated March 1, 2021, as supplemented
This supplement provides new and additional information beyond that contained in the Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and SAI, and should be read in conjunction with the Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and SAI.
On July 6, 2021, the Trust filed a supplement (the “Original Supplement”) disclosing that the Board of Trustees of the Trust approved the liquidation of the Fund and that the liquidation was scheduled to occur on or about September 30, 2021. The Fund’s liquidation has been delayed to occur on or about October 21, 2021. Accordingly, the Original Supplement has been reproduced below with this new liquidation date.
The Board of Trustees of the Trust, at the recommendation of Schroder Investment Management North America Inc. (the “Adviser”), the investment adviser of the Fund, has approved a plan of liquidation providing for the liquidation of the Fund’s assets and the distribution of the net proceeds pro rata to the Fund’s shareholders. In connection therewith, the Fund is closed to new investments. The Fund is expected to cease operations and liquidate on or about October 21, 2021 (the “Liquidation Date”). The Liquidation Date may be changed without notice at the discretion of the Trust’s officers.
Prior to the Liquidation Date, shareholders may redeem (sell) their shares in the manner described in the “How to Sell Shares” section of the Prospectus. For those shareholders that do not redeem (sell) their shares prior to the Liquidation Date, the Fund will distribute to each such shareholder, on or promptly after the Liquidation Date, a liquidating cash distribution equal in value to the shareholder’s interest in the net assets of the Fund as of the Liquidation Date.
In anticipation of the liquidation of the Fund, the Adviser may manage the Fund in a manner intended to facilitate the Fund’s orderly liquidation, such as by holding cash or making investments in other highly liquid assets. As a result, during this time, all or a portion of the Fund may not be invested in a manner consistent with its stated investment strategies, which may prevent the Fund from achieving its investment objective.
The liquidation distribution amount will include any accrued income and capital gains, will be treated as a payment in exchange for shares and will generally be a taxable event for shareholders investing through taxable accounts. You should consult your personal tax advisor concerning your particular tax situation. Liquidation costs will be accrued on the date of this Supplement and shareholders remaining in the Fund on the Liquidation Date will not be charged any additional fees by the Fund associated with the liquidation. Shareholders will receive liquidation proceeds as soon as practicable after the Liquidation Date.
PLEASE RETAIN THIS SUPPLEMENT FOR FUTURE REFERENCE
SCH-SK-016-0100

Basically, yes, it just amounts to a savings of a few basis points for retail investors.
I'm not sure why the cited article implies that all the retail target date fund ERs are the same 12 basis points when according to Vanguard they range from 12 to 15 basis points.
Here's Vanguard's list of retail target date funds (with ERs), followed by institutional target date funds (with ERs), followed by collective investment trust target date vehicles (no ERs).
https://institutional.vanguard.com/fund-list/?filters=trgDt,&sortBy=assetClass&viewType=quarterEndReturnsNAV

Yeah - I caught Wood on Bloomberg. Makes a certain amount of sense. Don’t rule it out if the stock market bubble were to pop. However, I’ll go with persistent inflation as the more likely future. Trip to area “Dollar” store yesterday. First time in a while. A small generic branded 9V battery (most smoke detectors) had increased from $1 to $3.50 over past 12-18 months. Similar 2X + increases in household cleaning supplies. Of course, isolated cases like this don’t a trend make. Just saying …
(Deleted)

@Old_Joe,
I think I have 14 shares and a fraction in total. I am sure I picked up the 98% of them when I first purchased it with a $250 initial investment. I am sitting on a huge amount of capital gains but I am not going to sell it. I think I will wait until I see a split or huge pullback on it.

@TheShadow- Bought another 26 shares @ 750. Now have 50, and will buy again if the chance occurs. Tried to automatically reinvest dividends, as I normally do with all holdings, but Schwab says "not allowed" with this particular stock. No big deal, but interesting.
OJ

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physicianonfire.com/drawdown
Second Article:

5-steps-for-defining-your-retirement-drawdown-strategy

This shows that there's more than price or profits that go into deciding when to sell.
As I recall, you were far from alone in reacting this way. So don't take the following data as a personal comment, or as something one could have predicted. Hindsight is great, but it only works for the past.
As of May 31, 2015, TPINX held 10 Ukrainian government or agency bonds with a face value of $2.919M, and a market value of $1.425M. That was 2.1% of the fund's assets. (In TTRCX these represented 1.6% of the fund's assets.)
Three months later, August 31, 2015, those same bonds (none were bought or sold) had a market value of $2.145M (50% appreciation), and now represented 3.5% of the fund.
Ukraine was in trouble, and what happened that November was that the bonds were swapped:

Ukraine’s other bondholders, led by Franklin Templeton, accepted a 20 percent principal writedown, a coupon increase to 7.75 percent, a four-year maturity extension and GDP warrants - additional annual payments linked to Ukraine’s future economic growth.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-debt/ukraine-completes-debt-restructuring-of-around-15-billion-idUSKCN0T12FT20151112
The haircut was on the face value, which had been way above the market value. So the fund wasn't hurt by this. After the swap, as of Nov 30, 2015, the replacement bonds and warrants had a market value of $2.831M, and constituted 4.8% of the portfolio.
As a M* analyst put it,

Hasenstab has also shown a willingness to buy what the rest of the market shuns: He loaded up on Irish bonds in the depths of the 2011 eurozone crisis and swooped in on even shakier Hungarian debt that same year. In early 2014, he added to the fund's single-digit stake in dollar-denominated Ukrainian bonds, a move that hurt throughout [2014] but paid off during the first nine months of 2015.

Looking at the holdings rather than the price, ISTM that taking flyers (even 5% positions) in distressed debt was not unusual. But the nearly total, long term move into purely EM debt in the mid 2010s was a fundamental shift. For me, that's what met observant1's third criterion for reevaluation: "Significant investment strategy modifications"

I sold TTRCX in 6/2015 when I discovered a sizeable allocation to Ukrainian debt, which scared the **** out of me ! At that point, return of capital outweighed return on capital . ( Templeton A shares still carried loads then)