David,
Are you advocating MMT? I don’t think the country should have a balanced budget but if interest rates rise, servicing the debt will take a bigger and bigger slice of the pie. I know you’ll say we are paying ourselves - but that doesn’t include foreign held Treasuries. Additionally, servicing the debt is just another transfer scheme. Tax payers pay in, bond holders take out - the 2 groups probably overlap, but they are not one in the same.
Consider the following:
National debt as a share of the economy will reach a record next year, reaching 108% of gross domestic product — more than the 106% milestone we hit just after World War II. As things stand right now, debt will hit 121% GDP by 2030 and a staggering 220% of GDP by 2050. Deficits of this size will take years to rein in, so the sooner we start thinking about how to change the trajectory of our budget, the better.

Today's entry: T Rowe Price filed a 497 - statement of material change - form with the SEC in which they announced that even if the S&P 500 and other broad-based indexes evolve in such a way that they are no longer diversified portfolios, Price's index funds will continue to track them.
Hmmmm ... I wonder what made them start to worry about that possibility?

David

Hi, guys.
Sorry about the delayed response. I was trying to learn a bit more. As far as I can tell, we're sort of at a confluence of three sets of changes that were mostly unrelated but overlapped in time. I'm still working on getting details that I can share.
Some of the changes at Matthews are sort of "clean up" operations that have been in the pipeline for a bit; that includes some manager reassignments and additions of analysts as Matthews tries to skate to where the puck is going to be. Some of it is "coincidencee," in the sense that at the five-year mark, Matthews Asia Value is not financially viable (at $14 million) and is not growing (money has been sort of dribbling away) although its been an exceptionally solid performer (up 9% in 2019 which was its only year with sub-par performance). Mr. Zhou is passionate about his vision of value investing; it was foreseeable that a decision to close the fund would occasion his departure. So while the three manager departures were announced together, I suspect they were two separate events overlapping in time.
The "consequential" change is Ms. Hsiao's departure for parts (as yet) unknown. China Small Companies is five-star, $500 million and a top 1-2% performer since inception. Asia Innovators is five-star and $1 billion; though she's not the lead manager there, it's been vastly stronger during the two years she's worked with it. I have no idea of her next steps but she certainly has the credentials to leave the public investing sphere altogether. Too, several larger firms are on the hunt for star management teams, so she might eventually resurface. Matthews has a deep bench and a healthy internal culture, so far as I can tell. The folks rotating into the funds are successful in their own right, both at Matthews and in the years before.
I'll continue asking around and I'll share what I can.
David

@Sven, (you might already know this but) sometimes those minimum initial investment amounts are not what they seem at Fidelity at least. I have bought some $1M funds with a $2500-5000 initial investment (TIBIX and one of the Eagle funds). I always try to enter a trade if I'm interested enough.

Possibly Overvalued: Hard question. I’m a bottom grubber, so high valuations normally drive me away. But probably my g/s mining fund OPGSX is due for a correction. May not occur for several months. And PRPFX may be overvalued as both the precious metals and bonds it holds are at lofty (ridiculous?) levels. And I always worry about PRWCX simply because it’s done so well for so long.
I’d agree with Leon Cooperman that today “bonds represent returnless risk.” But I still own them in funds - chiefly the non-U.S. issues.
Possibly Undervalued: In the undervalued camp, I still like PIEQX which is in developed markets of Europe, Australia and Japan just because those markets in aggregate have lagged for so many years. I think DODBX is likely undervalued due to value lagging for so long. At last check it had only 28% in bonds and my understanding is those tend to be short and intermediate duration which shouldn’t get hammered too badly when rates rise. As I’ve noted before, D&C has positioned their domestic funds (I can’t speak for their international) in anticipation of rising interest rates. So they’ve been underweight funds that benefit from lower rates and overweight those that do better in a rising rate environment. This - for at least the past 5 years. I’ll leave it for the pundits to decide whether they’ve been wrong or just early.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1004655/000168386320012719/f6675d1.htm
497 1 f6675d1.htm VANGUARD INTERNATIONAL EXPLORER FUND SUPPLEMENT
Vanguard International Explorer™ Fund
Supplement Dated August 24, 2020, to the Prospectus and Summary Prospectus Dated February 27, 2020
Restructuring of the Investment Advisory Team
The Board of Trustees of Vanguard Whitehall Funds, on behalf of Vanguard International Explorer Fund (the Fund), has approved a restructuring of the Fund’s investment advisory team, adding Baillie Gifford Overseas Limited (Baillie Gifford) as a new investment advisor to the Fund.
The Fund operates under the terms of an SEC exemption, whereby the Fund’s Board of Trustees may, without prior approval from shareholders, hire a new advisor.
Effective immediately, Baillie Gifford manages a portion of the Fund’s assets along with the Fund’s existing advisors. Each advisor independently selects and maintains a portfolio of common stocks for the Fund. The Fund’s Board of Trustees determines the proportion of the Fund’s assets to be managed by each advisor and may change these proportions at any time.
In connection with the addition of Baillie Gifford to the Fund, effective immediately, Brian Lum and Stephen Vaughan are added as co-portfolio managers of the Baillie Gifford portion of the Fund.
Also effective immediately, the following other changes to the Fund’s investment advisors are made:
•  Mary L. Pryshlak, who leads Wellington Management Company LLP’s (Wellington Management) International Small Cap Research Equity team, is added as a portfolio manager of the Wellington Management portion of the Fund. She replaces Simon Thomas, who led the International Small Cap Equity team managing Wellington Management’s portion of the Fund since 2010. Mr. Thomas is removed as a portfolio manager of the Fund, and all references to Mr. Thomas and corresponding disclosure related to Mr. Thomas in the Fund’s Prospectus and Summary Prospectus are hereby deleted.
•  Luke Biermann is added as a co-portfolio manager for Schroder Investment Management North America Inc.’s (Schroders) portion of the Fund, joining existing Schroders portfolio manager Matthew Dobbs who will be retiring from that role at the end of March 2021...

I recently got an offer from my Chase Sapphire Reserve credit card to convert points into statement credit, with a 25% points bonus through September 30. It included any charges that were for food and dining..."food" included grocery stores, but also Walmart and Target. Since I'm not rushing out the door to fly somewhere, I took advantage of the offer and got an $895 statement credit. I plan to do this again before the September 30 deadline.

No kidding.
I've toyed with throwing some speculative $$ into the CLIX ETF, but it doesn't hold many mall operators, just retail companies who have presences in malls..
The ProShares Long Online/Short Stores Index combines a 100% long position in retailers that primarily sell online or through other non-store channels with a 50% short position in those that rely principally on revenue from physical stores. A potential advantage is that the long and short positions may offset one another, resulting in a lower net exposure to the direction of the market.

no piper to pay, not how it works
otherwise not arguing,
will listen, every day of being so much in cash it goes up, way up, SP500 heading toward 3500 ...
agony, but I have done this agony before, and worse agony w plunges

@Mark, Thank you for the info. $100K is doable if one consolidates several funds into one. Many institutional shares require $1M. At Vanguard, one can buy Pimco institutional shares for $25K while it requires $1M at Fidelity.

Here’s the pieces conclusion:

Direct tail-risk hedging using equity put options has proven a successful approach. Tail-risk hedging provides protection against extreme market moves that have occurred historically at a frequency well beyond what is predicted by a normal return distribution.
Properly managed options-based tail-risk hedging can raise the CAGR where bonds have failed. Over time this can improve funded ratios, regardless of interim market crashes. Standard risk mitigation through diversification in the pursuit of higher Sharpe ratio has almost uniformly lowered the CAGR of a typical pension over a full market cycle.”

And how timely, Fidelity is offering training tomorrow:
Options 101: Buying options
Join Fidelity's Trading Strategy Desk® for a look at what you need to know when buying options.
When: Tuesday, August 25, 2020, Noon–1:00 p.m. ET
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To answer your question, with few exceptions, every active fund I’ve invested in has disappointed me eventually. My largest active managed stake is in Fidelity Puritan.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/923184/000119312520228363/d48487d497.htm
497 1 d48487d497.htm FORM 497
MATTHEWS ASIA FUNDS
SUPPLEMENT DATED AUGUST 24, 2020
TO THE INVESTOR CLASS PROSPECTUS DATED APRIL 29, 2020, AS SUPPLEMENTED (THE “PROSPECTUS”)
For all existing and prospective shareholders of Matthews Asia Value Fund – Investor Class (MAVRX):
Liquidation
The Board of Trustees of Matthews International Funds (d/b/a Matthews Asia Funds) (the “Trust”) has approved a Plan of Termination, Dissolution and Liquidation for the Matthews Asia Value Fund, a series of the Trust (the “Fund”), pursuant to which the Fund will be liquidated (the “Liquidation”) on or about September 30, 2020 (“Liquidation Date”). This date may be changed without notice at the discretion of the Trust’s officers.
Suspension of Sales. Effective on August 25, 2020, the Fund will no longer sell shares to new investors or existing shareholders, including through exchanges into the Fund from other series of the Trust.
Mechanics. The Fund will cease investment operations in accordance with the Fund’s investment objective and policies, and the Fund’s assets will be converted into cash and cash equivalents on or before the Liquidation Date. In connection with the Liquidation, any shares of the Fund outstanding on the Liquidation Date will be automatically redeemed as of the close of business on the Liquidation Date. The proceeds of any such redemption will be equal to the net asset value of those shares after the Fund has paid or covered with reserves all of its charges, taxes, expenses and liabilities. The distribution to shareholders of these liquidation proceeds will occur as soon as practicable, and will be made to all shareholders of the Fund of record at the time of the Liquidation. Additionally, the Fund must declare and distribute to shareholders any realized capital gains and all net investment income no later than the final Liquidation distribution. Matthews International Capital Management, LLC (“Matthews”), investment advisor to the Fund, intends to distribute substantially all of the Fund’s net investment income before the Liquidation. Matthews will bear all expenses in connection with the Liquidation to the extent those expenses exceed the amount of the Fund’s normal and customary fees and expenses accrued by the Fund through the Liquidation Date, provided that those accrued amounts are first applied to pay for the Fund’s normal and customary fees and expenses.
Other Alternatives. At any time before the Liquidation Date, shareholders of the Fund may redeem their shares of the Fund and receive the net asset value thereof, pursuant to the procedures set forth under “Investing in the Matthews Asia Funds – Selling (Redeeming) Shares” in the Prospectus. Shareholders may also exchange their Fund shares for shares of the same class of any other series of the Trust, as described in and subject to any restrictions set forth under “Investing in the Matthews Asia Funds – Exchanging Shares” in the Prospectus.
U.S. Federal Income Tax Matters. For tax purposes, with respect to shares held in a taxable account, the automatic redemption of shares of the Fund on the Liquidation Date will generally be treated as any other redemption of shares (i.e., as a sale that may result in gain or loss for federal income tax purposes). Instead of waiting until the Liquidation Date, a shareholder may voluntarily redeem his or her shares before the Liquidation Date to the extent that the shareholder wishes to realize any such gains or losses before the Liquidation Date. See “Other Shareholder Information – Taxes” in the Prospectus. Shareholders should consult their tax advisors regarding the tax treatment of the Liquidation.
If you have any questions regarding the Liquidation, please contact the Trust at 1-800-789-ASIA (2742).
Portfolio Manager Changes
For all existing and prospective shareholders of Matthews Asia Funds:
Effective as of August 31, 2020, Tiffany Hsiao, CFA, YuanYuan Ji and Beini Zhou, CFA, will no longer act as Portfolio Managers of the Trust. All references to Mses. Hsiao and Ji and Mr. Zhou are removed in their entirety as of the same date.
For all existing and prospective shareholders of Matthews Asia Growth Fund – Investor Class (MPACX):
Effective as of August 31, 2020, Michael J. Oh, CFA, will act as Co-Manager of the Matthews Asia Growth Fund. Taizo Ishida will continue to act as the Lead Manager of the Matthews Asia Growth Fund.
For all existing and prospective shareholders of Matthews Asian Growth and Income Fund – Investor Class (MACSX):
Effective as of August 31, 2020, Satya Patel will act as Co-Manager of the Matthews Asian Growth and Income Fund, and John Paul Lech will no longer act as Co-Manager of the Matthews Asian Growth and Income Fund. Effective as of the same date, all references to Mr. Lech in respect of the Matthews Asian Growth and Income Fund are removed. Robert Horrocks, PhD, and Kenneth Lowe, CFA, will continue to act as Lead Managers of the Matthews Asian Growth and Income Fund.
For all existing and prospective shareholders of Matthews Asia Innovators Fund – Investor Class (MATFX):
Effective as of August 31, 2020, Raymond Deng will act as Co-Manager of the Matthews Asia Innovators Fund. Michael J. Oh, CFA, will continue to act as the Lead Manager of the Matthews Asia Innovators Fund.
For all existing and prospective shareholders of Matthews Asia Small Companies Fund – Investor Class (MSMLX):
Effective as of August 31, 2020, Vivek Tanneeru will act as the Lead Manager of the Matthews Asia Small Companies Fund, and there will be no Co-Manager for the Matthews Asia Small Companies Fund.
For all existing and prospective shareholders of Matthews Asia Value Fund – Investor Class (MAVRX):
Effective as of August 31, 2020, Robert J. Horrocks, PhD, will act as the sole Lead Manager of the Matthews Asia Value Fund through its liquidation on or about September 30, 2020.
For all existing and prospective shareholders of Matthews Emerging Markets Equity Fund – Investor Class (MEGMX):
Effective as of August 31, 2020, John Paul Lech will act as the sole Lead Manager of the Matthews Emerging Markets Equity Fund.
For all existing and prospective shareholders of Matthews China Small Companies Fund – Investor Class (MCSMX):
Effective as of August 31, 2020, Winnie Chwang and Andrew Mattock, CFA, will act as Lead Managers of the Matthews China Small Companies Fund, and there will be no Co-Manager for the Matthews China Small Companies Fund.

Thanks. That makes a lot more sense now.
Here are three funds that actually meet your more stringent original requirements, but there is no way I would suggest any of these as something to use in lieu of VWINX:
GBLMX - max drawdown 11.83% (8/31/18 - 12/24/18); Sharpe 0.97
SVARX - max drawdown 3.25% (6/8/20 - 6/30/20); Sharpe 1.30
(its price didn't move between 3/13 and 3/24, which is suspicious)
SFHYX - max drawdown 17.34% (10/12/07 - 2/25/09); Sharpe 1.32
(this is the only one of the three that was around in 2009)

TAIFX is an option for taxable accounts. It’s more of a 50/50 rather 40/60 for stocks/bonds and holds more foreign securities than VWINX. It’s a tax managed fund, so all of its bonds are munis and it also holds a lot of dividend paying stocks. Although it hasn’t done as well as VWINX this year, it should do better when foreign stocks and munis outperform. Its after tax returns are probably as good or better than VWINX.

PRWCX Semi-Annual Report
David Giroux's reports are typically insightful:
Bullish on GE & utilities (added to both during downturn). Lightened up some in healthcare. Bearish on treasuries (eliminated from fixed income sleeve). Added leveraged loans (but holdings in report show only bank loans- so I'm not sure if these are same- Morningstar shows no bank loans for PRWCX- but 40% unknown).
Currently at: Equities 65%; Fixed Income (half corporate bonds & half leveraged loans (?bank loans) 21%; Cash 11%; the other 3% ? convertible stocks.
I'm not sure that he'll always be correct but I am very comfortable with his thought process.

Yes, my plan was to take any candidates that pass this 5 year screen and then test them 2007-09 depending on fund inception date. Max Draw is personally my highest priority risk measurement metric (compared to CAGR). Therefore the fund will need to be in the ballpark with VWINX's 21% from the 3/09 low. If the VWINX equity Mgr ever decides to depart, VWINX will go thru a 3 year period of performance reevaluation for my money. I want other options. The fixed income mgr departed recently. VGCIX has my interest although young. VWINX has a wonderful record. Never understood why some other fund family did not attempt to clone it. A VYM/VCIT combo is as close as I have ever found but I do not want a two fund combo.

DHHIX was @davfor 's suggestion. It looks like you're restricting max drawdown to the past five years, else (I believe) VWINX's max drawdown would be -21.77%, between 10/29/07 and 3/9/09.
On the one hand, limiting your time frame to five years does add a bit of consistency to your criteria. On the other hand, as you observed, funds have different personalities. They should be stress tested more than once. We've had only one bear market since VWINX dropped nearly 22%; that was this past March.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/business/bear-market-stocks-dow.html
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/27/heres-how-long-stock-market-corrections-last-and-how-bad-they-can-get.html
Any fund that lucked out in March could meet your criteria but still have a good chance of dropping 20%. Something else to consider is the possibility that a fund changed its strategy in the past 2-3 years.
If neither of these is of concern you, Skeet (at least I think it's Skeet) has owned a fund for many years that meets your criteria. I believe he's looking for a substitute because it's changed focus recently. Also, though it hasn't had any huge drawdowns since the 2007-2009 bear market, it did drop 47.6% between 5/18/08 and 3/9/09. The fund is CTFAX.
That huge drop was almost exactly the same drop as VPMAX (47.66%) had over the same dates. Yet, while VPMAX dropped 32.42% between 2/19 and 3/23 of this year, CTFAX fund dropped "just" 10.43% (almost 7% better than VWINX).

Yay, I like DHHIX too.
And Dennis' RCTIX. (See his profile.)
Don't forget PIMIX.

msf, I posted on M* earlier today and threw out Sharpe in that post. OK good point, lets focus on CAGR and Max Draw. Do you have any suggestions? I got PBRNX as another suggestion I have not looked into yet. DHHIX is close enough to populate my watch list. Thank you for the suggestion. Funds have different personalities/cultures ranging from very high risk to low risk within a benchmark. You never know what you will find. Purpose of 5 year timeframe is a bull/bear stress test.

Lewis wrote: "he final two are credits that benefit the middle class." The implication is that they benefit primarily the middle class. (For any tax law change one can usually find some middle class person somewhere who benefits.)
Yes, Section 8 vouchers benefit primarily the lower class, not the middle class.

Created by Congress in 1974, the “Section 8” Housing Choice Voucher Program was supposed to help families move out of broken urban neighborhoods to places where they could live without the constant threat of violence and their kids could attend good schools.
...
The Housing Choice Voucher program is the nation’s largest housing subsidy, serving 2.2 million families, which is still only about 25 percent of eligible households. It makes up a big part of the government’s efforts to improve housing conditions for America’s poorest families.

https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/06/section-8-is-failing/396650/