Sounds about right @Sven. According to Investopedia they have up to 60 days after a quarter’s end to file their holdings with the SEC. If this is tantamount to a “public release”, than the near 2-month delay in D&C providing the semi-annual report to investors makes sense.
The current Barron’s contains an article “A fresh Batch of Active ETFs“ written by some guy named Lewis Braham. In it he mentions the issue of front-running when fund holdings are revealed too early. Different companies and managers have differing views. But TRP was singled out in particular as one house that likes to withhold such information as long as legally possible. I’d be willing to bet D&C is another.
Link to Barron’s Article (subscription required): https://www.barrons.com/articles/capital-groups-american-funds-is-finally-getting-into-etfs-51630089111
Note: The online article carries a different title from the print version which I read. Same content.

Let us propose that in the late 1980s or early 1990s we were persuaded, from press or elsewhere, that this guy Tillinghast was worth giving some money too.
Using performance since inception, an objective time frame, is a definite improvement over using a subjectively chosen date in the middle of 2000.
In a similar vein, my "horse changing" date was also objective. When a fund is reclassified, especially if due to increased girth, it's a time for owners to examine what they own. Tillinghast had increased the fund's holdings to over 1,000 securities; he had exhausted this tactic.
Ah, there is a same-house fund that has matched or beaten Tillinghast: FCNTX.
If we're playing this what if, hypothetical game, what would have persuaded you to invest in FLPSX at inception, in a fund and in a manager with no track record? We can hypothesize anything, but it would help if it were believable. Likewise, what would have persuaded you to have invested in FCNTX?
At least that fund had a track record, albeit with three managers over its five year life span (as of 1989). That included its then current manager who had just taken over at the beginning of 1989, and who, like Tillinghast had no prior fund management experience.
To add insult to injury, both those funds sported a 3% load at the time.
https://www.thestreet.com/personal-finance/fidelity-removes-loads-from-five-funds-10095722
In Dec 1989 (when FLPSX started), if one were perusing the press, one could not have helped but be impressed by Lynch's fund. Alas, FMAGX was closed. But there was another LCG fund aggressively implemented lookin' good.
FDGRX had a manager with ten years experience, the last two managing this fund. And from its inception in Jan 1983 through Dec 1989, it was blowing away FCNTX, 219% to 157% cumulative returns.
None of this is to say that these are not all fine funds. But in the late 80s/early 90s, Fidelity was rotating managers like crazy. There was no expectation that any manager would be around for a long time. Just look at FCNTX, with its three managers in five years before it settled on Danoff. Magellan was the exception.

OEF reports are, annoyingly, usually at least 2 months old by the time they come out.

Right. Seems to me D&C emailed me the link to the semi-annual within the past few days. But I could be wrong. Agree that the June 30 date on the D&C report is pretty old. Looks like the FT article is recent, bearing an August 25 date. Yet, when I look at the CNBC clip @Sven posted, it’s dated April 23. So, apparently, Giroux was already scaling back on equities and publicly stating that as far back as April.
Here’s Sven’s link again. https://www.cnbc.com/video/2021/04/23/t-rowe-prices-david-giroux-we-are-underweight-equities.html

@bee: Yes, BRK's a conglomerate. There are also some of those in Europe and Asia, for example Jardine Matheson.
Companies with moats are usually thought of as "quality." Here's a M* article with ten funds they considered top of the moat heap back in 2018. There are more of course, including the etf MOAT. (The M* moat rating for funds must be a premium feature; that field is blank on my non-premium screen.)

Good stuff. Hard to believe Giroux has been running the fund for near 15 years. I have a modest weighting in PRWCX along with about the same amount in DODBX.
Read D&C’s semi-annual last evening. They have the fund invested 66% in equities. Their stocks overall have a much lower average PE than the S&P. In fact, they hold a 4% short position on the S&P which they see as overvalued. They like financials (which do well when interest rates are rising) but have sold some off recently. Also overweight energy.
Here’s a brief (possibly “suspect”) quotation: “The equity portfolio’s composition is very different from the overall market, and trades at a meaningful discount to both the broad-based market and value universe: 13.9 times forward earnings compared to 22.3 times for the S&P 500 and 17.9 times for the R1000V. Stocks that benefit from rising interest rates are currently trading at particularly low relative valuations, and represent an area of emphasis for the portfolio.”
LINK to June 30, 2021 Report /// DODBX
Apologies for any thread drift. Hard for me to view one fund without comparing it to the other, as both are integral to my approach.

@msf, in showing how wrong additive decomposition of factors is, are you also making a point about this conclusion?

A couple, at least.
That his relying on people's intuition that the factor weightings should sum to 100% is wrong. So his factor weighting column must be wrong. And thus the way he calculated it must be wrong.
That the assertion that this resulted in being off by merely a few basis points is sleight of hand. The misdirection comes about in switching from the time frame used in most of the column, 45 years, 3 months (542/12 years), to a single year toward the end. Calling that single year "annualized" enhanced the illusion, as it makes it seem that the factor weighting (percentages) are the same over time.
That's not true. Over time, the discrepancies compound just like the returns. What may be a rounding of a few basis points over one year becomes a large deviation over decades.
Here's a simple example to illustrate. Take two factors, one that adds 2% to the return per year and one that adds 3%. Call them inflation and earnings if it helps make things more concrete.
Over one year (i.e. annualized), the increase in value is:
(1+ 2%) x (1 + 3%) - 1 = 5.06% ≈ (2% + 3%) = 5% (give or take 6 basis points)
Using addition rather than multiplication isn't significant at first. But over 45 years, 3 months we get, first using the correct (multiplicative) annual return of 5.06% and then the rounded (additive) return of 5%:
(1 + 5.06%) ^ (542/12) - 1 = 8.2951 = 829.51% increase in nominal value
(1 + 5%) ^ (542/12) = 8.0584 = 805.84% increase in value
That's a difference of 2,367 basis points. Not just "a few basis points". Swept under the rug by redirecting attention from a decades long time span to a time span of a single year.

Lots of talk, a grand total of one stock as the "one investment," and never a word about mutual funds that own "quality."

That's interesting. The show took me to funds that have a large position in BRK.A or BRK.B. For example FCNTX owns both share classes.
Berkshire holds a slew individually publicly traded stock (ie KO, MMM) that they hold "forever in the Berkshire Ecosystem". For example, Berkshire owns 9.28% of KO stock which makes up 7.8% of Berkshire's Stock.
I don't think of Berkshire purely as a stock. Maybe more like a conglomerate stock...a companies that owns many companies. Berkshire is diversified across sectors (consumer, RE, Finance, etc). BRK.A or BRK.B seems much like a mutual fund.
If you own BRK.X stock it comes with a management team that eat their own cooking and charges an ER of Zero. Reminds me of maybe even a Hedge Fund since it owns entire companies that are not traded publicly (GEICO, See Candy).
Berkshire is a conglomerate stock. What assets does it hold? Lots.
List_of_assets_owned_by_Berkshire_Hathaway
berkshire-hathaway-portfolio
top-5-shareholders-berkshire-hathaway-brka-brkb
Lastly,
Buffett Shaped Berkshire As An All-Weather Conglomerate

tnx, OJ, that was my point, sort of. Have winner faith, hang in.
Obvious, if not to some.
Let us propose that in the late 1980s or early 1990s we were persuaded, from press or elsewhere, that this guy Tillinghast was worth giving some money too.
30 years later --- which is not all that long for those of us older investors --- guess how his work compares w other wise touts of that time: DODGX, VFIAX, PENNX (old sc), DFCIX (old mc) ?
Oops --- his returns are more than 40% higher than the best of them. Whoa. Well over double SP500, no less.
One manager, one method, one fund. Snowball's insight is true!
Ah, there is a same-house fund that has matched or beaten Tillinghast: FCNTX. With several managers. So you could even argue, sometimes and with hindsight, for having constant faith in a house and its LCG sector aggressively implemented.
(If we had stuck with those two, instead of fretting and tracking and reading and trading, well, we could be giving a lot more to charity and kids these days!)

Back in the 70s we started with a number of American Funds, and kept with them for well over 21 years. Sure, did some buying, selling, and trading among various American Funds, but still stayed the course with the family. In fact, still have a very small position in a couple of their funds to this very minute.
Sure, theoretically could have done much better by changing horses as we crossed various streams, but for a guy who never was very brilliant at investing we managed to accomplish what we needed to, and are now financially living very happily.
Different strokes, and all that...

Over the years much has changed for us. We switched to use mostly index funds and ETFs, except for smaller caps and overseas. Our 401(k) choices are all index funds and target dated funds. Our expected return is modest. Getting market-like return is more than suffice.

As of 6/30/21, PRWCX holds high % in utility (11%) and cash (10%). Still he managed to gain 13% YTD and leads the balanced fund category. The fund is well in position when the market corrects when the Fed starts to taper later this year.
https://fundresearch.fidelity.com/mutual-funds/composition/77954M105?type=o-NavBar

100 bps = 1.00%
1 bp = 0.01%
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/what-basis-point-bps/

I swear, in the CNBC interview, at 1:28, he says he’s lowered his equity allocation “100-200 BIPS”. What is that? The FT article says from 70% equities down to mid 50s. So, there you go, a BIP is 0.1%. Give or take.

I've had one taxfree OEF reinvesting on itself since the 1980s when I was a teenager. I've got several AF's that I've held nonstop since mid-2006. I've got some stocks that I've held since 1996 ... and one stock position that's inherited that was originally purchased in the 1950s.
I like boring investments. ;)

Graphical image to illustrate why one can't decompose factors additively:

Start with 1x1 square (black).
If you double the height, you add the yellow square (1 new square).
If you triple the length, you add the blue squares (2 new squares).
If you do both, and only if you do both, do you add the green (mix of yellow and blue) squares (2 new squares).
We can say that doubling the height doubles the number of squares. That's true whether the length is one (and only the yellow square is added), or the length is three (and the yellow and green squares are added). So doubling the height truly adds 100% to the area.
Likewise, we can say that tripling the length triples the number of squares. That's true whether the height is one (and only the blue squares are added), or the height it two (and the blue and green squares are added). So tripling the length truly adds 200% to the area.
You can't just add up squares created by increasing the height alone (the yellow square) and the squares added by increasing the length alone (the blue squares) and figure that you've got everything covered. Area is computed by multiplying height and length, not by adding them. If all you do is add the yellow and blue squares, you miss the green squares, which exist only because both height and length increased.
It's absurd to suggest that the green squares (or parts thereof) are due solely to changes in height or changes in length (exclusive "or").

As Rbrt pointed out, the effects of various factors are multiplicative, not additive. It is an error to try to hammer the question into an additive one. This mistake permeates the column. Not only in the "straw men" as John put it, but in the "real" answer.
Percentages assume that the effect of returns from different factors are additive (so that they can be summed, presumably to 100%). That's an erroneous assumption, and it's why I gave my geometric (square) example.
Try to allocate the factor weightings (for height and length) in that example yourself. We assume that height of the square doubles (100% rate of increase) and length triples (200% rate of increase) in a year. Thus the area expands sixfold (500% increase).
What portion of the 500% increase is due to the 100% increase in height, and what portion is due to the 200% increase in length? And remember that the two portions have to sum to 100%.
It's an absurd question. Yet that's the calculation being performed in the table above where factor weightings are assigned. Further, one doesn't need factor weightings at all to answer the original question posed: if one factor (e.g. inflation) were excluded, what would the return be?
You can see how to answer this from my square example. If we exclude the increase in height, then the area triples in size. So the "return", excluding height growth, is 200%. Clean, simple, answers the question, and doesn't go into the weeds with additive percentage factor weights.
Finally, to illustrate just how deeply this conflating of multiplicative and additive effects goes, we can look at the hypothetical in the column where inflation runs at 51% and nominal return runs at 50%/year. With a 50% rate of return, a dollar invested would be worth $92,924,336.24. That's multiplicative (1+50%) x (1+ 50%) x ...
The gain, an additive quantity, would be a dollar less, $92,924,335.24, i.e. an increase of 9,292,433,524%. But what is written is: "investors would have gained 9,292,433,624%". Significant? Not numerically, but conceptually.

Yes, a smaller asset base might result in a higher ER, but M*'s speculation was that the higher fee was also due to its higher return potential.
The full sentence reads: "Its fees are likely to come down as assets scale, but the higher levy also likely reflects Vanguard Advice Select Dividend Growth's greater return potential. "
Also, given the fact that this fund is just pruning an already concentrated portfolio of about 40 stocks in VDIGX down somewhat, the cost of this incremental effort would seem to be minuscule. So I'm not even sure that a small asset base would necessarily entail significantly higher costs.
Given that VDIGX has already closed in the past, and a concentrated version of it would tend to have more stringent capacity limits, I don't see the Advice Select sibling being offered generally. In fact, when VDIGX closed, it was a very hard close. Unlike funds like Primecap (VPMCX), Vanguard didn't let even Flagship customers open new VDIGX accounts when the fund was closed.
Compare, VDIGX closing:

Vanguard Dividend Growth Fund is closed to all new investors (with the exception of (1) investors who are added and invest in the Fund only through technology-driven model portfolios and (2) participants who invest in the Fund only through defined contribution plans that offer the Fund as an existing option).

with VPMCX closing:

New or current Vanguard PRIMECAP Fund (the Fund) shareholders may not open new accounts or contribute to existing Fund accounts, except as described in this supplement. Clients enrolled in Flagship Services™ and Vanguard Asset Management Services™ may open new Fund accounts, investing up to $25,000 per year as described ...

ER is only 1.05% for I class shares. Proof of conviction may be evidenced by how much the managers invest in the fund right out of the gate. The website has not populated much info, not even daily price changes.

This is always a very in depth report:
https://usfunds.com/investor-library/investor-alert

Powell did just enough to preserve the view that his goals align with investors’: growth that is fast enough to boost hiring and earnings but not inflation, and an approach to stimulus that avoids shocks and leaves actual interest rates alone.
-- one week of smooth sailing doesn’t mean there are no storms ahead. Still, for anyone worried that the first tangible signs of withdrawn stimulus spelled doom for investors, the latest stretch is reason for encouragement.

a Taper Without Much Tantrum