@Anna
Hook 'em Horns!!!
I graduated UT in 73, then left Texas after being born and raised there
I don't recognize the place now! Austin is a nightmare

Loving both Firefox & Brave which are knocking down attempts by Google & Facebook to track me. Dumb question … But how do these ”good guys” make money? I’ll assume there must be a business model - or are they supported fully by donation?

...
Dear stillers:
1) Let me ask you an easy question. Why did you use 3 different names(stillers,Arriba, Albie) on different sites? Did you try to hide something?
2) Why don't you try to register on BB as stillers? You have no chance with the moderator who knows you for years.
BTW, the subject of this thread is bond, why not make comments on it?

Anyone know if the concentration of holdings in a relative few companies is historically significant? I know the index is cap weighted but is todays concentration out of the ordinary? Thanks for your replies.

Post-pandemic, kids are back in school, retirees are back on cruise ships, and physical stores are doing better than expected. But offices are struggling perhaps more than most casual observers realize, and the consequences for landlords, banks, municipal governments, and even individual portfolios will be far-reaching. In some cases, they will be catastrophic. But this crisis, like all crises, also represents an opportunity to reconsider many of our assumptions about work and cities.
During the first three months of 2023, U.S. office vacancy topped 20 percent for the first time in decades. In San Francisco, Dallas, and Houston, vacancy rates are as high as 25 percent. These figures understate the severity of the crisis because they only cover spaces that are no longer leased. Most office leases were signed before the pandemic and have yet to come up for renewal. Actual office use points to a further decrease in demand. Attendance in the 10 largest business districts is still below 50 percent of its pre-COVID level, as white-collar employees spend an estimated 28 percent of their workdays at home.
With a third of all office leases expiring by 2026, we can expect higher vacancies, significantly lower rents, or both. And while we wrestle with the effects of distributed work, artificial intelligence could drive office demand even lower. Some pundits point out that the most expensive offices are still doing okay and that others could be saved by introducing new amenities and services. But landlords can’t very well lease all empty retail stores to Louis Vuitton and Apple. There’s simply not enough demand for such space, and new features make buildings even more expensive to build and operate.
With such grim prospects, some landlords are threatening to “give the keys back to the bank.” Over the past few months, the property giants RXR, Columbia Property Trust, Brookfield Asset Management, and others have collectively defaulted on billions in commercial-property loans. Such defaults are partly an indication of real struggles and partly a game of chicken. Most commercial loans were issued before the pandemic, when offices were full and interest rates were low.
The current landscape is drastically different: high vacancy rates, doubled interest rates, and nearly $1.5 trillion in loans due for repayment by 2025. By defaulting now, landlords leverage their remaining influence to advocate for loan extensions or a bailout. As John Maynard Keynes observed, when you owe your banker $1,000, you are at his mercy, but when you owe him $1 million, “the position is reversed.”

The authority to borrow on the full faith and credit of the United States is vested in the Congress by the Constitution. Article I, Section 8, Paragraph 2, states "[The Congress shall have power]…to borrow money on the credit of the United States." In 1917, Congress, pursuant to the Second Liberty Bond Act, delegated authority to the Treasury Department to borrow, subject to a limit. This action mitigated the need to seek congressional authority on each issuance, providing operational convenience. The debt limit essentially achieved its modern form in the early 1940s.

Justice Jackson's well-known words, the Constitution is not "a suicide pact." Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37, 69 S.Ct. 894, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949) (dissenting opinion in a case involving the First Amendment). The Constitution itself takes account of public necessity. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1883, 198 L. Ed. 2d 290 (2017).

Shares in two more US regional banks have been suspended. Regulators moved in to halt trading in Los Angeles-based PacWest and Arizona’s Western Alliance on Thursday after they became the latest victims of an escalating crisis that began with Silicon Valley Bank in March.
The message from central banks and bank supervisors is that this is not a rerun of the global financial crisis of 2008. That may be true. With the exception of Switzerland’s Credit Suisse, European banks have escaped the turmoil. It is specific US banks that are the problem.
There are a number of reasons for that: the business models of the banks concerned; failures of regulation; the large number of small and mid-sized banks in the US; and the rapid increase in interest rates from the country’s central bank, the Federal Reserve.
Luis de Guindos, vice-president of the European Central Bank (ECB), remarked on Thursday that “the European banking industry has been clearly outperforming the American one”. Although he will be praying his words do not come back to haunt him, he is broadly right. European banks, including those in the UK, do look more secure than those in the US – primarily because they tend to be bigger and more tightly regulated.
Despite being the 16th biggest bank in the US, Silicon Valley Bank was not considered systemically important and so was less stringently regulated than institutions viewed by federal regulators to be more pivotal. Many of its customers were not covered by deposit insurance and were heavily exposed to losses on US Treasury bonds as interest rates rose. The other banks that failed subsequently have tended to share many of the same characteristics: they were regionally based and are vulnerable to rising borrowing costs.
Unless the Fed rides to the rescue with cuts in interest rates, the options are: amalgamation, regulation or more banks going bust. The response of the US authorities suggests little appetite for a laissez-faire approach.
According to official data, the US has more than 4,000 banks – an average of 80 for each of the 50 states. The number has fallen by more than two-thirds since the peak of more than 14,000 in the early 1980s, but there is certainly room for greater consolidation. In an age of instant internet bank runs, customers will be attracted to the idea that big is beautiful.
The US authorities certainly do not seem averse to further amalgamation. When First Republic ran into trouble, it was seized by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and its deposits and assets were sold to one of the giants of US banking – JP Morgan Chase. Inevitably, there will be more takeovers and fire sales of assets as alternatives to bank failures. It is reasonable to assume that in 10 years’ time the number of US banks will be considerably smaller than it is today.
What’s more, the banks that remain – including those that are not taken over – are likely to be more tightly regulated and more closely supervised. Even if the Fed, the ECB and the Bank of England are right and a repeat of the global financial crisis has been averted, lessons are already being learned.

I would like to know how anyone can sense the possibility of a solution if you can’t find a half dozen rational house repugs to vote with the Dems.