It makes sense to think that the dividing line traditionally used by investors will become more blurry now that the Fed and ECB have crossed it.....

...the latest move may well turbo-charge the departure from ratings-defined investment processes, especially the cliff-edge division between high-yield and high-grade debt.
“What active managers have been doing since the financial crisis is increasing the flexibility of their mandates,” said James Vokins, head of investment-grade UK credit at Aviva Investors.
...central bank support could be a powerful impetus for more flexibility, especially as yields, or returns, on high-grade debt tumble further and junk markets swell...

https://reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-ratings-analysis/as-central-banks-break-the-junk-debt-barrier-investors-will-follow-idUSKBN22I1WW

Given the overwhelming psychological component of market "valuation" I really don't believe that it is in any way possible to predict, with expectation of any reasonable accuracy, how a market may be "valued" in the face of unknowns which may have major financial impact.
There is likely some predictive ability when a market is cruising along a long-lasting slope, either up or down, as it gradually adjusts to the general financial environment, and some technical indicators may be helpful in such an environment.
In the present environment we have the known unknowns of a major worldwide pandemic with an undetermined end point, an election with the potential to replace a disruptive and dangerously unstable president, a worldwide oil market in freefall, and steadily increasing animosity between the United States and China... actually, increasing animosity between the United States and almost every other major nation.
Then, of course, there are always the real unknowns: for instance, a vice-president who has just announced that the White House, as the death toll passes 70,000, is looking to wind down the pandemic taskforce.
It may be arguable to classify the White House as an unknown: it should be generally expected that they will pursue the most self-serving, ignorant or stupid option available in any situation requiring experience, intelligence or leadership.
The odds of accurate market prediction for the foreseeable future are significantly worse than those of your typical slot machine. Good luck on that.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1012678/000174177320000799/c497.htm
497 1 c497.htm
T. Rowe Price Mid-Cap Value Fund
Supplement to Prospectus Dated May 1, 2020
Effective June 5, 2020, the T. Rowe Price Mid-Cap Value Fund will resume accepting new accounts and purchases from most investors who invest directly with T. Rowe Price.
Accordingly, effective June 5, 2020, the first sentence under “Purchase and Sale of Fund Shares” in Section 1, and the first four paragraphs under “More Information About the Fund and Its Investment Risks” in Section 3, are deleted in their entirety from the prospectus.
Financial intermediaries and other institutional clients should contact T. Rowe Price Financial Institution Services or their relationship manager to determine eligibility to open new accounts and purchase shares of the fund.
The date of this supplement is May 5, 2020.
F115-041 5/5/20

@Derf. S&P revised their TTM earnings projections for the S&P 500 Index moving form the mid 130's to the mid 110's. Since, the barometer is comprised of both fundamental and technical feeds the earnings revision changed the readings within the barometer's metrics. Remember, the Fed's have recently injected large amounts of money into the financial system. With this, I'm sure some of it has found its way into the stock market as it looks for a home. Perhaps, not directly ... but, indirectly. I'm thinking that this is a Fed induced rally which just might wane. I'm still with my thoughts that stocks will go soft through the summer months and rally in the fall as the earnings outlook improves. For now, based upon the metrics of the barometer it is now producing an extermely overbought reading of 130.
At the end of March the barometer produced a reading of 180 indicating that the Index was extremely oversold. Fiar value resides at the 150 mark. Within about a four week period the Index has gained about 27% and has gone from exptemely oversold to extremely overbought during this range of price movement on the barometer's scale.
With this movement ... Old_Skeet is now more of a seller than he is a buyer since I bought equities in the downdraft. And, since we are about midpoint 2810 between the 52 week high of 3386 and low of 2237 ... I'm thinking that the back 50% is going to come much more slowly than the front 50% came. I'm staying with my rebalance stratey and within the confines of my asset allocation model. And, in doing this ... this conforms to a buy low sell high strategy.

Thanks for that link, @msf. The problem faced by IOFIX is not disssimilar to the complete collapse of the financial system in 2007-2008. Michael Lewis’s « The Big Short » explains in painful detail how CDOs and other exotic instruments were a bet on a low rate of failure to repay mortgages issued to people who had no way of paying unless housing prices continued to rise. When housing prices started to decline, the borrowers started defaulting and the house of cards collapsed. « Lower-rated tranches » are nothing more than the dreck or the absolutely riskiest loans. One way Lewis explains these « tranches » is to compare them to the lowest floors of a building built on a flood plain. The top floors represent the highest rated loans (triple A) and thus the least likely to suffer from a flood. As for the bottom floors, it’s merely when they flood, not if.
« The fund focused on lower-rated tranches of residential mortgage-backed securities, with about 60% of its holdings rated BBB or lower, according to Morningstar, which had a five-star rating on the fund. »
Have we learned nothing from the past? For the record, I suffered a big loss on IOFAX.

Just another way of saying that it was goosing returns by investing too much ("many of the securities the Fund holds") in high risk sectors of the market that no one would want when the market turned south.
Barron's, March 23:

The $2.3 billion mortgage-focused AlphaCentric Income Opportunities Fund (IOFIX) lost 31% last week alone, and reportedly put $1 billion of securities up for sale on Sunday.
The fund focused on lower-rated tranches of residential mortgage-backed securities, with about 60% of its holdings rated BBB or lower, according to Morningstar, which had a five-star rating on the fund.
It was also said to have relatively high exposure to “credit risk transfer securities,” or CRTs, a type of mortgage-backed security introduced after the financial crisis. Those CRTs face especially high risk for losses tied to loan modifications. For example, if a distressed borrower negotiates a lower interest rate with an agency, that interest reduction would be passed along to the CRT holder at a loss, according to Goldman Sachs.
AlphaCentric said in a statement that “like many other funds, [the income opportunities fund] is moving expeditiously to address the unprecedented market conditions. With the lack of liquidity in the marketplace, the most effective way to obtain favorable prices is to offer a wider range of securities for bid instead of a smaller number of specific securities. This broadens the potential universe of buyers to try and obtain the most favorable prices.”

https://www.barrons.com/articles/mortgage-backed-securities-get-hammered-feds-move-may-not-be-enough-51584980932
(I was able to read w/o subscription)

Schwab sells Victory Class A funds NTF to its retail investors. It doesn't seem likely that it would turn around and charge the load only to its newly acquired USAA clients.
Schwab bought USAA management for its client base, both 1.5 million current and 10 million potential. It wouldn't make any sense for Schwab to dissuade its larger potential audience by taking advantage of the USAA members already signed up.
It's more likely that these clients would be sold the new Institutional class shares. From the new prospectus:

The Institutional Shares are available for investment through a USAA discretionary managed account program and through certain advisory programs sponsored by financial intermediaries, such as brokerage firms, investment advisors, financial planners, third-party administrators, and insurance companies.

From the April 23, 2020 Schwab Managed Account Services™ Disclosure Brochure:

NTF funds used in the UMP [legacy USAA Managed Portfolios] Program include USAA Victory Mutual Funds, managed by Victory Capital, from which Schwab may also receive shareholder servicing fees.

We've seen this sturm und drang before. When PIMCO did away with its D class shares, there was much handwringing about how investors would have to pay loads for PIMCO's A shares.

USAA recently sold its mutual funds to Victory and its management company (including its brokerage and managed accounts) to Schwab.
The current (August 1, 2019) prospectus starts by saying that "The Adviser Shares listed in this prospectus are available for purchase generally through financial intermediaries by investors who seek advice from them." This is the share class that's being changed, not the retail, noload "Fund Shares" class of shares.
The Fund Shares are cheaper because they don't have a 12b-1 fee, unlike the Adviser Shares. They are currently available NTF at Schwab. For example, here's Schwab's page for USTEX.
Best guess is that this change is to better align the USAA funds with Victory's share classes. Victory Class A shares are also available NTF at Schwab, though they carry that 12b-1 fee. Here's Schwab's page for the Victory fund SRVEX.
As near as I can tell, just move along, nothing here to see.
FWIW, here's the new (June 29, 2020[sic]) prospectus. It adds the new class of Institutional Shares.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/908695/000168386320007766/f5097d1.htm
(see link to see table of affected funds)
The Board of Trustees of USAA Mutual Funds Trust has approved redesignating each Fund's current Adviser Shares as "Class A" shares ("Redesignation"). This change is expected to be effective on or about June 29, 2020 ("Redesignation Date").
The total annual operating expense ratio of the Class A shares of each Fund will be no greater than that of the Adviser Shares on a net basis as a result of the same expense limitation agreement currently in place with respect to the Adviser Shares through at least June 30, 2021. Like Adviser Shares, Class A shares will be available for purchase through financial intermediaries and each Fund will pay ongoing distribution and/or service (12b-1) fees at annual rate of up to 0.25% of the average daily net assets of its Class A shares.
However, Class A shares will be offered and sold at their public offering price, which is the net asset value per share plus any applicable initial sales charge, also referred to as a "front-end sales load." For purchases on or after the Redesignation Date, Class A Shares will be offered and sold with the imposition of a maximum initial sales charge of up to (i) 5.75% of the offering price for equity funds and (ii) 2.00% of the offering price for fixed income funds. The sales charge may be waived or reduced under certain circumstances to be described in a revised prospectus to be furnished to shareholders upon the Redesignation. In addition, a contingent deferred sales charge of up to 0.75% may be imposed on redemptions of Class A shares purchased without an initial sales charge if shares are redeemed within 18 months of purchase.
The Redesignation will be made without the imposition of any sales loads, fees, or other charges to Adviser Shares held in shareholder accounts on the Redesignation Date. Any future purchases of Class A shares of the Fund will be subject to a front-end sales load unless such purchase qualifies for a sales charge waiver or reduction to be described in the revised prospectus. The Redesignation will not be considered a taxable event for federal income tax purposes.
PLEASE RETAIN THIS SUPPLEMENT FOR YOUR FUTURE REFERENCE.
Victory Capital means Victory Capital Management Inc., the investment manager of the USAA Mutual Funds. USAA Mutual Funds are distributed by Victory Capital Advisers, Inc., a broker dealer registered with FINRA and an affiliate of Victory Capital. Victory Capital and its affiliates are not affiliated with United Services Automobile Association or its affiliates. USAA and the USAA logos are registered trademarks and the USAA Mutual Funds and USAA Investments logos are trademarks of United Services Automobile Association and are being used by Victory Capital and its affiliates under license.
Here is the link for the new prospectus:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/908695/000168386320007758/f4863d2.htm

https://seekingalpha.com/article/4340466-municipal-bond-perspective-where-go-from
/where do We Go From Here
Given the financial strength of the sector, we believe airports have the requisite resources to weather a decline in air travel over the next several months.
If investment markets do not recover from recent declines before fiscal year-end (mostly June 30), schools will see significant investment losses in fiscal year 2020.
We expect that sales taxes and income taxes will experience immediate shocks as a result of social distancing and demand-side pressures.
As the COVID-19 pandemic evolved during the first quarter, the municipal bond market experienced one of its most volatile periods in years. Here, the Franklin Municipal Bond Department shares how they plan to navigate the market, which they think is likely to show signs of distress and elevated volatility for some time
elieve levels of municipal market volatility are likely to remain elevated over the next few months, and potentially longer. However, our seasoned team of analysts and portfolio managers have experienced difficult market periods in the past, and we are using that collective knowledge to navigate through this panic as well./
many municipals may end up bankrupted by late/summer fall unless market do rebounds and folks are less worried/install more monies into system/buying more. I think we are slowly getting there. The vanguard advisors that we talked to still recommends balance holdings of different products/vehicles and perhaps may lessen risks just in case another crash /W form recovery takes place
we are still holding to our munis and corp porfolios, have not buy nor added recently.
We did have one bond near bankruptcy past few weeks but we are still holding on since it did slightly recovered recently [RIG oil platforms]

There are many different features that lead someone to prefer one financial institution over another. I came up with a number of relatively minor features that I personally place some value in. Haven't found a single perfect institution though. YMMV.
- individual 401(k): free, Roth option, in-service distributions, investment options (full brokerage or house funds). See The College Investor for other features and major providers. Some brokerages provide Roth options; Fidelity and Schwab do not. Vanguard and T. Rowe Price do provide a Roth option, but limit investments to house funds.
- Retail HSA account (not through employer): free, no min cash balance required to invest. Fidelity is the only brokerage I know of that offers HSA accounts directly. Lively (an HSA provider) gives you a brokerage window to TD Ameritrade. See The HSA Report Card for detailed analyses of HSA providers.
- Cash management (bank) services: bill pay, checking, good interest (relatively speaking), ATM access. Vanguard has high interest and checking, but no bill pay or ATM card. At Vanguard and Fidelity, if your core account does not have enough cash to cover a check, they can automatically draw from another (higher yielding) MMF. Many brokerages other than Vanguard provide bill pay and ATM access with surcharge rebates. These features are not so important if you employ a regular bank account.
Schwab's ATM card charges no foreign (international) transaction fee; Fidelity's sometimes charges a 1% fee. Others tend to charge at least this much and may limit surcharge rebates to US ATMs.
- Fractional share purchases of stocks/ETFs (e.g. $100 exactly of MINT). This is something Schwab promised. AFAIK only Fidelity has delivered. (Robinhood rolled out fractional shares earlier this month but it doesn't support limit orders.) Fractional shares is the only "yet to use" feature on my list. It should make buying ETFs easier - more like mutual funds.
- Donor advised funds:low min to open, low grant min, low maintenance cost, low cost funds, wide variety of funds. T. Rowe Price seems to have the lowest "all in" (admin + fund expenses) cost for actively managed funds, but not lowest if using index funds. Fidelity and Schwab have the lowest mins and are low cost. Fidelity has a small advantage on fund costs and variety of funds. Not that one needs many funds for this type of account. It's convenient if the DAF account is with your brokerage as that makes contributing easier.
This list of 74 DAFs is about a decade old, but still gives a good sense of costs and what's out there.

This article provides a useful look at the current situation and possible future trends. (Some may find it useful to glide around the more dystopian/dramatic references in the article.) Here are a few excerpts:

The manufacturing sector hasn't completely rolled over yet, but the services sector simply ceased to exist starting late last month.....The message is clear: Main Street isn't just hurting, it is disappearing in a very literal sense. As Atlanta Fed boss Raphael Bostic warned earlier this month, "May is going to loom large, in terms of the transition of concern from this being a liquidity issue… to this perhaps translating and transferring into a solvency issue, and whether companies can exist at all."

(...from Homebase, a scheduling and time tracking tool used by more than 100,000 local businesses covering 1 million hourly employees.)

.
.

Deutsche Bank rolled up the fiscal and monetary support programs announced and implemented in the US and Europe into a single "bailout" figure. The sheer size of the COVID-19 response necessitated a log scale (on the left axis) in order to help "better identify the earlier bailouts and get a rough feel visually for the numbers," as the bank put it. ....."Obviously we won’t know how much will be used until much further down the road," the bank cautioned, in the course of presenting the numbers and accompanying visuals.

....policymakers have been deliberately suppressing volatility, compressing risk premia, tamping down credit spreads and keeping the market wide-open for borrowers for the better part of a decade....
Deutsche Bank's George Saravelos.....At the extreme, central banks could become permanent command economy agents administering equity and credit prices, aggressively subduing financial shocks. With unlimited capacity to print money, central banks have unlimited capacity to intervene in asset markets too. Put simply, a central bank that pegs bond, credit and equity markets is highly likely to stabilize portfolio flows as well.

https://seekingalpha.com/article/4340027-dystopia-now

Previously referenced here:
Searches
https://www.mutualfundobserver.com/discuss/search?Search=7twelve
https://www.google.com/search?q=site:bogleheads.org+7twelve
https://www.google.com/search?&q=israelsen+"7twelve"
Review
https://www.portfolioeinstein.com/craig-israelsens-7twelve-portfolio/
Book Review [SSRN: Free Registration]
From: Journal of Financial Counseling and Planning, Volume 23, Issue 1 2012
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2443606

This article just provides a warning about what may happen in the intermediate term when the Fed and Congress try to steer things back towards "normal". (The author didn't note this, but much of what he discusses is occurring on a global basis not just in the U.S)....
Fed actions have increased the quantity of money in the U.S. economy at a blistering rate.
By Tim Congdon

The economists Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz demonstrated in “A Monetary History of the United States” that a collapse in the quantity of money was the main cause of the Great Depression. Hoping to avoid a repeat, the Federal Reserve in recent weeks has poured money into the economy at the fastest rate in the past 200 years. Unfortunately, this overreaction could turn out just as poorly; history suggests the U.S. will soon see an inflation boom.
Excluding the years immediately after the Revolutionary War, the past few weeks have seen by far the highest rate of monetary expansion in U.S. history. The Fed might defend itself by saying that its “shock and awe” tactics have given financial markets confidence that the coronavirus won’t cause a long and deep recession. And its massive bond purchases—more than $500 billion between March 11 and April 1—surely won’t continue at the same rate for the rest of the year.
It’s reasonable to assume that by spring 2021 the quantity of money will have increased by 15% and possibly by as much as 20%. That wouldn’t quite match the peak rates of expansion seen during and immediately after the two world wars of the 20th century, but it could surpass peacetime records, outpacing the previous peaks in the inflationary 1970s.
As in wartime, federal expenditures are rising sharply while tax revenues are being hit by the lockdown. Both World War I and World War II—and, indeed, the Vietnam War—were followed by nasty bouts of inflation.
Mr. Congdon CBE is chairman of the Institute of International Monetary Research at the University of Buckingham, England.

I don't subscribe but for some reason the link worked for me.....
https://wsj.com/articles/get-ready-for-the-return-of-inflation-11587659836

A couple of big name fund guys are bullish on stock market opportunities...

Miller said only four other times have stocks have been as attractive: In 1973-1974 when the Vietnam War was going on and Richard Nixon had resigned as president; in 1982 after Mexico defaulted on its debt; in 1987 following Black Monday; and in 2008-09 during the last financial crisis. "If you missed the other four great buying opportunities, the fifth one is now front and center," wrote Miller, who is now the chief investment officer and founder of Miller Value Partners in Baltimore.
Justin Thomson, a chief investment officer for T. Rowe Price Group Inc. (NASDAQ: TROW) who oversees international equities, also offered some guidance to help investors thrive.....he sees a buying opportunity...."I should emphasize that truly great companies are rare," Thomson wrote in a white paper. "Opportunities to buy great companies at great prices are even rarer. We are currently at one of those moments."

https://bizjournals.com/baltimore/news/2020/04/21/bill-miller-this-is-one-of-the-5-greatest-buying.html?ana=yahoo&yptr=yahoo

"...I can say that if you are not a buy and hold forever (Bogle style) then you are not an investor...."
I come here to learn. Reading many of the interchanges between others here and FD1000, it's clear that he/she has an unreasonable need to win all the time. Reminds me of conversations with my nephew. Reminds me of the Orange Abortion in the White House.
....... When I was a younger man and doing comunity organizing, our leader reminded us very early about a Cardinal Rule: if you control the terminology and definitions and can get the ones on the other side of the issue to start believing and using your definitions and terminology, then you've all but WON the issue.
********************************************
I'm not interested in embroidery nor competition in here. You've got info worth sharing? Share it, by all means.

My main point is that you can't make your assumption on others. If an investor meets their goals then it's that simple. I know a guy that sold his company for millions of dollars years ago and wants low volatility and invested over 90% in Munis and it worked great for him over 20 years. Another one retired with a pension + his SS covers his expenses and all his money is in stocks. Another guy uses only CEFs and trade them with good results. They all met their needs, there is no right or wrong answer, the problem is trying to put someone in a box that you don't like.
Over the years I shared my thoughts and actually helped hundreds who contacted me privately. I never tell them to use my style, never, I helped them using their style. This is what many can't grasp.
Example: An older relative retired around 2001-2 and told me he saw several financial advisors and thinks that 1% is too high and he really doesn't trust them while markets got volatile and he wants a stable LT simple portfolio and all his money is at Vanguard. Based on his portfolio, he needed about 3-3.5% yearly withdrawal. I told him he can be in just 35-40% stocks and the rest bonds and to invest in just 2 funds VWIAX+VSCGX. Every 2-3 years this guy calls me and thank me how I saved him so much money and how it works.
I knew VWIAX would be better but I wanted to diversify a bit more. Below are the results(link)

DERI APRs are now down to 1.75% (under $10K), 1.85% (up to $50K), and 2.00% (over $50K)
https://investors.dominionenergy.com/fixed-income/dominion-energy-reliability-investment/default.aspx
GM Financial Right Notes® are currently paying 2.00%, $500 minimum.
https://www.rightnotes.com/
For something safer, and with a lock on rates, Marcus (Goldman Sachs Bank) is still offering 7 month no penalty CDs ($500 min) at 1.70%.
Marcus just lowered the APY on its savings account from 1.70% to 1.55% today, so the CD rates may not last much longer. They also offer an 11 month no penalty CD at 1.60% and 13 month no penalty CD at 1.50%.
https://www.marcus.com/us/en/savings/no-penalty-cds
To see these rates you have to go to the open CD page. The drop down list of CD terms shows you the rates.
https://www.marcus.com/us/en/savings/new/account-creation?accountType=NPCD&term=7
Other uninsured notes similar to DERI, offered with lower APYs:
Duke Energy PremierNotes® Investments: 1.46% (< $10K), 1.51% (up to $50K), 1.66% (over $50K)
Ford Credit Ford Interest Advantage: 1.46% (< $10K), 1.51% (up to $50K), 1.66% (over $50K)
Ally Financial Demand Notes: 1.16% (< $15K), 1.36% (up to $50K), 1.51% (over $50K)
The Ford page has a link to its rate history, so you can see how rates have been dropping. Though when they first got started in 2017 they were yielding only about 1%.

@FD1000 That "Large Cap Blend" category data is also wrong for that period of history because it can not include survivor bias of all the funds that went out of business that far back and there were many. Of the ones that did survive__ MFS Massachusetts Investors Fund (MITTX) 1924.
Putnam Investors Fund (PINVX) 1925.
Pioneer Fund (PIODX) 1928.
Century Shares Fund (CENSX) 1928.--I suspect they must have had bonds in their portfolio for that. Dividends I'm sure helped but who would have the mental fortitude amd/or financial wherewithal to reinvest in the market when it falls like that? In other words, the data you're providing shows large-cap blend funds falling about 55% when the market fell 89%. That cannot be correct for a pure stock portfolio even if you factor in dividends, which I believe peaked at 14% during the Depression.

The above has nothing to do with your post "The price of blue chip stocks declined, but there was more pain in small-cap and speculative stocks, many of which declared bankruptcy and were delisted from the market. It was not until Nov. 23, 1954, that the Dow reached its previous peak of 381.17."
These numbers for the DOW were way off. I'm not surprised the 24/7 media is all about making headlines for you to read and how they get paid.
Almost every day you hear the DOW is up/down triple-digit because 0.8% isn't selling news.

Additional information:
https://www.janushenderson.com/en-us/advisor/bio/alec-perkins/
Alec Perkins is a Portfolio Manager at Perkins Investment Management LLC responsible for co-managing the Perkins All Cap Value strategy since 2011 and the Value Plus Income strategy since 2018. Additionally, he has managed the Perkins All Cap Value Select strategy since 2013. Mr. Perkins also serves as a Research Analyst covering U.S. REITs, a position he has held since joining Perkins in 2002.
Mr. Perkins received his bachelor of arts degree in history with a minor in economics and Chinese from Middlebury College. He earned his master of arts degree from Stanford University and MBA from the University of California – Berkeley, Haas School of Business. Mr. Perkins has 18 years of financial industry experience.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/277751/000168386320003065/f3426d1.htm
97 1 f3426d1.htm 497
Janus Investment Fund
Janus Henderson Value Plus Income Fund
Supplement dated April 14, 2020
to Currently Effective Prospectuses
Effective immediately, the prospectuses for Janus Henderson Value Plus Income Fund (the “Fund”) are amended as follows:
1.Under “Management” in the Fund Summary section of the Fund’s prospectuses, the following paragraph replaces the corresponding paragraph in its entirety:
Portfolio Managers: Theodore M. Thome, CFA, is Portfolio Manager of the equity portion of the Fund, which he has managed or co-managed since July 2010. John Kerschner, CFA, is Executive Vice President and Co-Portfolio Manager of the fixed-income portion of the Fund, which he has co-managed since August 2018. John Lloyd is Executive Vice President and Co-Portfolio Manager of the fixed-income portion of the Fund, which he has co-managed since August 2018. Seth Meyer, CFA, is Executive Vice President and Co-Portfolio Manager of the fixed-income portion of the Fund, which he has co-managed since August 2018.
2.Under “Investment Personnel” in the Management of the Funds section of the Fund’s prospectuses, the following information replaces the corresponding information in its entirety:
Janus Henderson Value Plus Income Fund
Equity Investments
Theodore M. Thome, CFA, is Co-Portfolio Manager of Janus Henderson Value Plus Income Fund, which he has co-managed since July 2010. He joined Perkins in September 2002 as a research analyst covering the healthcare industry. Mr. Thome holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Life Science from the United States Military Academy at West Point and a Master of Business Administration with concentrations in finance and accounting from the University of Chicago Booth School of Business. Mr. Thome holds the Chartered Financial Analyst designation.
Effective immediately, all references to Alec Perkins are deleted from the Fund’s prospectuses.