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Here's a statement of the obvious: The opinions expressed here are those of the participants, not those of the Mutual Fund Observer. We cannot vouch for the accuracy or appropriateness of any of it, though we do encourage civility and good humor.
  • "Market bulls won't get a 'wall of cash'"
    Thoughtful piece by that title in the WSJ, 3/16-17/2024. One bullish argument for stocks is that there's an ocean of cash "on the sidelines" that might flood the market in the face of a dip.
    Telis Demos, writing for the Journal, argues "not so much." Two reasons. First, while money is pouring into money market funds, it seems mostly to be moving from savings or checking accounts with negative real returns (the average yield on sweep accounts is 0.05% he claims, while my credit union is doling out a rich 0.01% on savings) to liquidity fund that are yielding 5% or so.
    Second, when the money flows back out of money market funds, it usually flows into income investments rather than equity investments.
    (I also suspect that the folks most desperate to buy Nvidia or DJT on a dip are not necessarily folks which huge cash reserves and vice versa, the folks like me who structure a 50% income sleeve into their portfolios are not apt to suddenly become memesters.)
    Money markets hold $6.5 trillion currently, up $150 billion in two months. "[A]nalysts at Barclays estimate that ... what appears poised to possibly move into riskier assets is about $400 billion to $600 billion," including both equity and income investments. JP Morgan Chase strategists report that "companies with huge cash piles are still opting to be weighted toward money funds ... S&P 500 nonfinancial companies' cash investment portfolios hit a historical high of57% allocated to cash" at the end of 2023.
    See "Market Bulls Won't Get a 'Wall of Cash,'" March 16-17, 2024, p.B12. The article is online but behind a paywall.
    Palm Valley Capital Fund continues to putt along with about 80% cash and short bonds which implies that its microcap value stocks have been returning something like 15% a year for the past three years. (I'm assuming a 2% annual returns on the cash portion of the portfolio.) Stocks in the only microcap ETF (First Trust Dow Jones Select MicroCap ETF FDM), which is also value-oriented, 2.92% annually for the same period. Translation: the fully invested microcap ETF returned 2.9% while Palm Valley, with only 20% invested, returned 4.3%.
  • Mutual Fund Managers who Left and came Back
    Hi, yugo.
    A lot depends on what qualifies as "left and came back." There are relatively few managers who liquidated their funds and took a sabbatical. Michael Fasciano comes to mind, but his second act was short.
    If you think, instead, about managers who left a behemoth, waiting out their non-compete agreements then launched, the list is ... well, about half of the funds we're profiled. Seafarer, GQG, Grandeur Peak, Rondure, Prospector, Poplar Forest, Centerstone, Bretton, Moerus, Seven Canyons, and Towpath are all the products of star managers turned entrepreneurs. One of the reasons that we tracked manager changes and funds in registration so assiduously for years was to track to discontent and departure of first-tier managers.
    David
  • WSJ's repeat warning: it's a market on Zoloft
    Covered-call funds, about which Devesh has written a series of essays (two more will appear in our April issue), are artificially and temporarily suppressing volatility, if Charley Grant and the WSJ are to be believed:
    The stock market is calmer than it has been in years. Some worry that a popular strategy is contributing to the tranquility.
    Measures of market volatility have fallen to levels last seen in 2018 ...
    Investors are seeking protection from potential losses by pour money into [covered-call ETFs] ... assets in such funds has topped $67 billion, up from $7 billion at the end of 2020."
    Their argument is that this sort of herd trade (in volatility ETFs) "blew up in spectacular fashion six years ago." The options trade now exceed stocks in value, with ever covered-call position necessarily matched over an opposite position in "call overwrites." The concern is that this is a complex, leveraged structure that might be catastrophically vulnerable to an external shock that causes a cascading rush to the exits.
    To be clear, Devesh and the Journal are competent to comment on the risks. I'm not. Mostly I wanted to highlight the prospect that your hedges might become your anchors. (See Charley Grant, "Popular bet weighs on volatility," WSJ, 3/26/2024, B1. It's online with a paywall and a slightly different title.)
    Curious for them to repeat a story unless their anxiety is growing. (Might call for Zoloft.)
  • Bond funds to invest in now?
    What is the best bond fund total return one can HOPE for in the next twelve months? Assume dividends are irrelevant because they will be reinvested,,, assume low default rate because you have chosen a fund with high quality portfolio. And said fund has a duration of 5.8 years. And let us imagine that in the next twelve months interest rates are cut 1%. More specifically 4 cuts of .25%. So what would be the best possible total return under this scenario? Just wondering.
  • Bond funds to invest in now?
    FCNVX is an ultra-short-term bond. Its retail class was eliminated a few years ago, and the ER was also lowered for the remaining class. Besides the Fido m-mkt funds, it's the only Fido fund without any frequent-trading restrictions; it settles T+1.
    Competing ETFs are USFR, ICSH. JPST.
    These are all inv-grade.
  • GQEPX question
    GQG Partners gets a lot of comments here. Them seem favorable. The institutional version of GQEPX frequently turns up in my screens at MFO Premium as a "Great Owl." I have it on a watch list. The expense ratio is reasonable. It's available at Fido; I could add it to my IRA.
    So? What's my problem? With GQEPX, that is . . .
    The turnover. M* says it's 211%. That's a lot of turnover. So I look at the investment strategy in the prospectus:
    the Adviser typically pursues a “growth style” of investing as it seeks to capture market inefficiencies which the Adviser believes are driven by investors’ propensity to be short-sighted and overly focused on quarter-to-quarter price movements rather than on a company’s fundamentals over a longer time horizon (5 years or more). The Adviser believes that this market inefficiency tends to lead investors to underappreciate (sic) the compounding potential of quality, growing companies. To identify this subset of companies, the Adviser generates investment ideas from a variety of sources, ranging from institutional knowledge and industry contacts, to the Adviser’s proprietary screening process that seeks to identify suitable companies based on several quality factors such as rates of return on equity and total capital, margin stability and profitability. Ideas are then subject to rigorous fundamental analysis as the Adviser seeks to identify and invest in companies that it believes reflect higher quality opportunities on a forward-looking basis. Specifically, the Adviser seeks to buy companies that it believes are reasonably priced and have strong fundamental business characteristics and sustainable and durable earnings growth. The Adviser seeks to outperform peers over a full market cycle by seeking to capture market upside while limiting downside risk. For these purposes, a full market cycle can be measured from a point in the market cycle (e.g., a peak or trough) to the corresponding point in the next market cycle
    That doesn't read to me like "And the only way we can do all that good stuff is to turn this sucker completely over twice a durn burn year! Yeehaw!"
    The strategy reads more like an argument for a sedate rate of turnover to enjoy those "sustainable and durable earnings" over "a full market cycle" with tea and biscuits in an old, well-upholstered leather chair, on a Persian rug, by a crackling fire.
    Am I missing something with this? Are we just hoping the team is that good at selling and buying stocks at that pace? And can keep it up over some period of time?
  • Stock based compensation
    Finance Professor:
    First, a piece of advice. Don’t believe much that you read (including what I write), especially about buybacks. The mythology on buybacks is staggering, including the claims that they are funded mostly with debt, that they come at the expense of value creating investments and that they are primarily to cover stock-based compensation. The truth is that stock-based compensation is not only a much smaller amount than the buybacks, but the companies that are the biggest buyback players are not the ones where stock compensation is a large percent of expenses. ... The truth is that the buybacks, for the most part, are cash infusions to investors, and much of that cash gets reinvested back into the market.
    Let's start with that last part, and for simplicity say that all (rather than much) of the cash is reinvested back into the market. Let's also assume that the cash for buybacks comes from profits. not from debt.
    Then from the individual investor's perspective, there's little difference between distributing the cash in the form of (qualified) dividend distributions and using it the cash buy back shares. In the former case, investors pay cap gains rate tax and reinvest back into the market. In the latter case, share price is boosted. And by assumption investors extract the gain (paying cap gains tax), reinvest the gain back into the market.
    Same net result, same tax consequences.
    One difference between distributing profits via divs and via buybacks is the effect of dilution when options are exercised. However, if the move is toward RSUs w/o voting rights, the dilution effect is somewhat mooted (by being muted).
    Another difference is the effect on stock performance based compensation. Buybacks benefit C-level employees by boosting the value of their options (or RSUs). Also by enhancing their reputations as skilled managers.
    If one changes an assumption, saying instead that many people do not reinvest (redeploy) profits in the market, then buybacks have the potential to benefit mom and pop investors. They don't have to pay taxes on the profits until they cash them out years later. But that would be an instance of tax code distorting investor (and company) behavior.
  • Apple. DOJ. News item. Lawsuit.
    At the end of my non-profit career, I worked for an e-recycler; reuse being the highest form of recycling.
    I have had my hand on lots of different hardware, including vintage McIntosh; but that's another story.
    Apple operating systems are sound. But they don't keep people like my wife from getting into difficult situations that derail her work until Number 2 child helps her out. She listens to him. :) Before going into consultancy, she was regularly talking to her tech support people over an entire career in Apple land. Just the usual stuff I've seen everywhere tech is in use.
    Apple hardware is notorious for built-in obsolescence. They are notorious for making it more and more difficult for anyone but them to repair their products. I believe these are two of the issues that now have them under investigation in the EU.
    Apple isn't the only company churning out crappy hardware. But at least the rest of the industry relies on standard connectors, rather than inventing proprietary ones every two-three years. Well, the EU has already weighed in on that practice.
    I use an Apple iPhone. It's wearing out too soon, but Android always feels like the worst Linux desktop anyone could think of. I'm typing on a used Latitude laptop running Xubuntu Linux. And I have a used Windows 10 PC, on which I can run a virtual machine in which Linux is running for my current main hobby that relies on tech.
    I'm pretty much agnostic about all of the hardware/OS stuff. But I am always tickled by the fervor some feel for one thing or another, as if they were the hometown team.
  • A Dividend Aristocrat Falls - WBA
    @BaluBalu, PEY & SCHD look back 10 years. FDL (M*) looks back 5 years. Those are just a few that made it through to my watch lists that are based on looking back.
    Wisdom Tree has some interesting dividend strategies that aren't reliant on looking back at fixed periods of time.
  • Mutual Fund Managers who Left and came Back
    Two days ago - to my sadness and delight - I had learned via MFO that Eric Cinnamond, one of my all-time favorite managers with ARIVX/ICMAX was back in the mutual funds world with Palm Valley Capital Fund (PVCMX). ('Sadness' because I have missed almost 5 years of exploiting his financial acumen for a modest management fee and 'delight' because I have now been able to put a sizable investment into his new vehicle.)
    This got me thinking, are there any other great/good managers who came back to manage a mutual fund or an ETF after being away for some time in the last, say, 20 years that I might be missing on?
    (No knock on Bill Nygren, who's done an admirable job at the Oakmark Fund (OAKMX), but I am still hoping for the day that Robert Sanborn comes back with a publicly available investment offering.)
  • Texas pulls $8.5 billion from BlackRock funds, and in related news ...
    The notion that because you or I invest in a Blackrock ETF, we give our proxy to Larry Fink is absurd. And its anti-democratic.
    The notion that because you or I invest in virtually any mutual fund, we give our proxy to ISS or Glass-Lewis is absurd. That's the elephant in the room, more so because this duopoly advises nearly all (90%) fund sponsors on how they should vote their proxies.
    https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2023/01/30/the-controversy-over-proxy-voting-the-role-of-asset-managers-and-proxy-advisors/
    Anti-democratic? The corporate world was never democratic. Dollars, not people (dēmos - "common people") hold the power. If you don't like the way Blackrock funds are being run, vote your fund's of directors out of office. See how much sway your paltry dollars have. Or mine.
    image
    ESG means different things to different people, in no small part due to the marketing efforts of financial management companies to muddy the waters. On one end of the spectrum is impact investing, where one invests in companies and technologies specifically to improve the state of the environment. On the other end of the spectrum is what Blackrock and others call ESG integration - considering risk factors like increased exposure to flooding due to a changing environment - among all the risk factors considered when deciding whether to invest in a company.
    https://www.blackrock.com/lu/intermediaries/themes/sustainable-investing/esg-integration
    That's just prudent investing. And good marketing - slapping a label like ESG (popular until recently) onto something that is standard operating procedure. Failure to consider all significant risk factors could be considered investment malpractice.
    For example, last year Texas proposed SB 1446 that would have prohibited state pensions from investing with any management company that considered ESG factors.
    Despite declaring that [Texas County & District Retirement System] TCDRS “has never had an ESG policy,” and does not intend to have one, [Executive Director] Bishop said that the bill “would keep us from partnering with some of the best investment managers in the world.” Bishop added:
    “If we had to adjust our asset allocation, we estimated it could cost us over $6 billion over the next 10 years. And this would cause our employers cost to more than double.”
    https://www.esgtoday.com/texas-anti-esg-investing-bill-faces-pushback-over-6-billion-cost-to-pensions/
  • Texas pulls $8.5 billion from BlackRock funds, and in related news ...
    I'm unclear how MDD management would increase outsourcing of Boeing? The MDD acquisition occured in 1997. That's 25 years ago. Strange it would take so long for these changes to manifest defects/problems.
    As the acquirer, presumably, legacy Boeing management dictated what decisions were made as regards outsourcing. The acquired management team is usually not in a position to dictate how a business is run. If they were unhappy with any pre-merger MDD outsourcing, it would have been in their purview to bring outsourced functions back 'in house', no?
    Anytime a process gets outsourced, its still encumbent on current management to ensure they have sufficient QC controls over the outsourced process. -- You can outsource a function, but you cannot outsource responsiblity!
    Is the current BA CEO an engineer or a finance dude? I believe the latter. Perhaps too much current management emphasis on stroking Wall Street, not enough on getting the engineering right?
    Every hour spent on DEI training is thousands of man-hours which could have been devoted to something else. Like QC.
  • Texas pulls $8.5 billion from BlackRock funds, and in related news ...
    The last thing Boeing needs is financial restructuring. They need to reinstitute the pre-McDonnell Douglas merger ethos where engineering trumps cost cutting.

    +1
    The McDonnell Douglas merger precipitated Boeing's descent.
    McDonnell Douglas management increased outsourcing which led to declines
    in both aircraft quality and employee morale. Various "accidents" (some preventable)
    involving Boeing aircraft in recent years have tarnished this once fine company's reputation.
    As someone who's seen BA in the intergenerational portfolio for many many decades, agree completely!
    (I only hold a toehold for sentimental reasons nowdays - I sold 95% of the position just as the 737 MAX fiasco started to tank the stock, so I thankfully got out quite nicely near the high)
  • Texas pulls $8.5 billion from BlackRock funds, and in related news ...
    The last thing Boeing needs is financial restructuring. They need to reinstitute the pre-McDonnell Douglas merger ethos where engineering trumps cost cutting.
    +1
    The McDonnell Douglas merger precipitated Boeing's descent.
    McDonnell Douglas management increased outsourcing which led to declines
    in both aircraft quality and employee morale. Various "accidents" (some preventable)
    involving Boeing aircraft in recent years have tarnished this once fine company's reputation.
  • Texas pulls $8.5 billion from BlackRock funds, and in related news ...
    Parnassus Funds 2016 Annual Report (Feb 9, 2017):
    I’d like to give you an update on Wells Fargo and its unauthorized opening of accounts. While some of our shareholders have urged us to sell our shares, we believe that Wells Fargo is a far better bank than what is portrayed in the media, and that this is the most important time for an ESG investor to be involved. We met with CEO Tim Sloan in December and had a productive conversation about the bank’s remedies for its customers and employees, discriminatory banking practices towards minority and low-income customers, as well as its financing of the Dakota Access Pipeline. We would not have been able to have this dialogue had we sold our position. While we don’t disclose the results of our engagements, rest assured, we continue to engage with the highest levels of management on these issues.
    Parnassus Funds 2017 Annual Report (Feb 9, 2018)
    Responsible Investing Notes
    ...
    On a brighter note, I’m delighted to share with you a positive development with Wells Fargo, which has worked hard over the past year to repair its damaged reputation. From eliminating sales goals in its Community Banking division to replacing three board members, Wells Fargo has taken significant steps to improve its relationships with its customers, stakeholders and shareholders. ...
    One issue we believed Wells Fargo needed to address was its involvement in the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) project. This controversial pipeline project caused an uproar across the nation, leading to closely watched protests and negative sentiment towards companies involved in its construction. A consortium of seventeen banks, including Wells Fargo, lent money to finance the DAPL.
    We concluded from our discussions with Wells Fargo that they could not have predicted the consequences of financing the DAPL. More importantly, we became convinced Wells Fargo would not have financed the project had it known how much it would upset its customers, shareholders and stakeholders. We understood that Wells Fargo was contractually obligated to finance the project, but we believed the bank could take action to repair its relationship with the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe. In February, as part of our engagement with Wells Fargo about the DAPL, we asked the bank to donate its profits from financing the DAPL to the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe. Wells Fargo indicated they would consider this donation.
    Over the course of the year, we engaged in multiple calls and meetings with Wells Fargo, urging the bank to act. We had three calls with Wells Fargo’s Head of Corporate Responsibility and Community Relations, Jon Campbell. We met with Wells Fargo’s CEO Tim Sloan, and later in the year with incoming Board Chair Elizabeth Duke. During each conversation, we discussed our proposed DAPL donation. In October, Wells Fargo acknowledged to us that financing the DAPL had affected the bank’s relationship with the American Indian and Alaskan tribes that are customers of the bank. In December, Wells Fargo announced a five-year $50 million commitment to the American Indian and Alaskan tribes, which was significantly greater than our request. These monetary grants, to be issued starting in early 2018, will target environmental sustainability, economic empowerment, and diversity and social inclusion programs focusing on the impacted tribes.
    Parnassus Investments statement, March 9, 2018
    You may be aware that several Parnassus funds initiated positions in Wells Fargo stock well over a year ago. Initially, the firm had positive fundamental and ESG profiles. At the time, Wells Fargo was widely considered to be one of the top banks in America, with a strong focus on workplace, diversity and inclusion, and philanthropy.
    As the bank’s community sales scandal and Dakota Access pipeline controversy became headline news, Parnassus immediately began using its substantial holding in the firm to engage top executives. We met with Wells Fargo management—including the CEO and key independent Directors—multiple times to share our perspective on events and suggest potential remedies. We also voted our proxy shares according to our responsible investment policies, including voting against the candidates for the Wells Board of Directors that had served on the Risk Committee for many years.
    While our discussions led to positive changes within the company, troubling new issues continue to emerge. Significantly, the Federal Reserve has decided that the problems at the bank are serious enough to warrant their active involvement in Wells Fargo’s business decisions for an indefinite period of time.
    As events continue to reveal further deterioration in both the fundamental and ESG profiles of the bank, we do not believe that further engagement from Parnassus will be effective. In short, Wells Fargo is not a suitable holding for our portfolios at this time.
  • Texas pulls $8.5 billion from BlackRock funds, and in related news ...
    @rforno
    I seem to remember PRBLX being criticised for this and responding in some way, but it would be hard to locate now.
    As far as financial shenanigans are concerned there are several funds that claim to look for it so as to avoid it. The one I remember from years ago was Robert Olstein who made a big deal out of being able "look behind the numbers" focusing on cash flow with a "forensic analysis"
    OFAFX has not exactly blown out the lights.
    Parnassus told me they still 'had faith' in things and were 'monitoring the situation' but that seemed like a pro-forma response for folks like me/us who questioned things at the time. :(
  • Texas pulls $8.5 billion from BlackRock funds, and in related news ...
    @rforno
    I seem to remember PRBLX being criticised for this and responding in some way, but it would be hard to locate now.
    As far as financial shenanigans are concerned there are several funds that claim to look for it so as to avoid it. The one I remember from years ago was Robert Olstein who made a big deal out of being able "look behind the numbers" focusing on cash flow with a "forensic analysis"
    OFAFX has not exactly blown out the lights.
  • Distributing money out of Inherited Estate DC / 403(b)
    Keep in mind I'm not a lawyer, so take this for what it is worth, i.e. you're on your own.
    "Fidelity decided to pass them into B's estate".
    That sounds like Fidelity followed the beneficiary designation of A's defined contribution plan. So long as B did not predecease A (but see below*) the transfer was likely automatic, regardless of the absence of paperwork. That is, the automatic nature of the transfer meant that the account formally (technically) became B's upon A's death even though it wasn't actually transferred at that time.
    B's "virtual" account had no beneficiary designated since there was no paperwork done before B died. So B's "virtual" account became the account of B's estate. That brings us back to the situation where there's an estate defined contribution plan that must be distributed within five years.
    Edit: The five years is assuming that the RMD period (for B) had not yet begun. Otherwise, it seems that the withdrawal schedule would be based on B's life expectancy. If inherited DC plans follow the same rule as inherited IRAs (haven't checked yet), each year's RMD would be calculated by subtracting one year from the previous year's life expectancy, not by referring to tables every year. That is, if B's life expectancy were 15 years now, then next year one would divide assets by 14, the next by 13, and so on. This could be another source of confusion and why you are seeing various rules.
    Again, just speculating here.
    * did B predecease A from a legal perspective?
    If B's death is close enough after A's death, then state law may create a "legal fiction" that B died before A for purposes of inheritance. This situation is called "simultaneous death".
    Many states have default laws ... including the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act ... Generally speaking, these laws establish a rule that when two individuals die within 120 hours of each other, each individual will be treated as having predeceased the other. Thus, if a husband and wife die at the same time or within 120 hours of each other, and the husband’s will distributes 100 percent of his property to his wife at his death, the wife is treated as having predeceased her husband,
    https://wilsonlawgroup.com/simultaneous-deaths/
    This varies from state to state, and the text above describes how it applies to wills. It seems logical that something similar would apply to beneficiary designations. But I haven't seen that in writing.
    If a state simultaneous death law applies to beneficiaries, and if the two deaths were close enough together to trigger that law, then Fidelity could (should?) have treated the situation as if B died first. That is, it could (should?) have designated you as the beneficiary of A's account.
    That Fidelity didn't do this suggests that either "simultaneous death" doesn't apply to beneficiary designations, or the two deaths weren't close enough in time to trigger that law.
    Somewhat moot, though, since the fact of the matter is that the account currently belongs to B's estate.
  • Texas pulls $8.5 billion from BlackRock funds, and in related news ...
    ESG is just one data point for investors but the GQP makes a biiiig to-do over it to stir up culture-war outrage in new and exciting ways for them to control things -- and ... ahem ... limit 'choice' in one way or another. (yay, freedumb!)
    I don't invest in ESG funds specifically b/c there's no guarantee the managers will stick to their guns. To wit: Parnassus kept WFC in PRBLX for *years* despite numerous 'G' scandals, lawsuits, and failures.
  • Distributing money out of Inherited Estate DC / 403(b)
    Could you clarify the situation? It sounds like the defined contribution plans did not indicate a beneficiary, so by default the estate inherited the assets. Further it sounds like the assets are still in the DC plans, just owned by the estate of the deceased.
    If that's what has happened, you seem to be asking how long does the estate have to move the assets out of the DC plans?
    For a regular inherited retirement account the answer is pretty straightforward,
    Perhaps. Worth looking at, for background. If an IRA owner dies with no beneficiary named, the IRA is retitled as an estate IRA. One has 5 years, not 10, to move the money out of the IRA assuming that death occurred before RMDs were required to begin.
    Here's a page from Fidelity that illustrates the complexity even with IRAs:
    https://www.fidelity.com/building-savings/learn-about-iras/inherited-ira-rmd
    Sections of interest:
    >Estate beneficiary: If the original depositor of an IRA names their estate as the beneficiary of their account, or did not leave beneficiaries on their IRA, the IRA funds may go to their estate.
    -and-
    Death on or after 1/1/20, [and asset recipient is an] estate entity, non-see-through trust beneficiary of the original depositor's IRA. [elsewhere this is called a nonperson beneficiary]:
    [Death before RMDs begin] Move inherited assets into an inherited IRA in the name of the estate or non-see through trust and withdraw the balance by December 31st of the year containing the 5th anniversary of the original depositor's death
    [Death after RMDs begin] Move inherited assets into an Inherited IRA in the name of the estate or non-see through trust and begin taking RMDs the year following the year of the original depositor death using their age in the year they passed away.
    Tax treatment of estate-owned DC plans should be no different.
    Inheriting a 403(b) Plan: What to Do & How It Works
    https://www.missionsq.org/products-and-services/403(b)-defined-contribution-plans/403(b)-inheritance-beneficiary.html
    A “nonperson beneficiary” is an estate, trust or charitable organization. This type of beneficiary has the following options:
    • Account owner dies before the required beginning date.... In that case, the account must be depleted by December 31 of the year that includes the 5th anniversary of the account owner’s death.
    • Account owner dies on or after required beginning date then the entity may use a life expectancy calculation based on the remaining life expectancy of the decedent.
    Ascensus concurs:
    The SECURE Act identifies three groups of beneficiaries: eligible designated beneficiaries, noneligible designated beneficiaries, and nonperson beneficiaries.
    ...
    The third group of beneficiaries consists of nonperson beneficiaries (i.e., entities, such as trusts, estates, or charities). Nonperson beneficiaries of account owners who died before their required beginning date (RBD), which is the deadline to begin RMDs, remain subject to the 5-year rule and—with the exception of certain see-through trusts—must distribute the inherited assets within five years.
    https://thelink.ascensus.com/articles/2024/2/14/understanding-the-10-year-rule
    That's all from the tax perspective. From the estate administration perspective (state law), I'm not convinced that even in the "simple" case of an estate IRA one is allowed to delay five years. My understanding is that the executor (or administrator) is allowed however much time is necessary to distribute estate assets, but not more. For example:
    N.J.S.A. 3B:10-23 holds that an executor “is under a duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of [the will] and applicable law, and as expeditiously and efficiently as is consistent with the best interests of the estate.…”
    https://www.natlawreview.com/article/executor-won-t-distribute-estate-what-can-i-do
    Usual disclaimer: I am not a lawyer, this is not legal advice. It is just general information that may not apply to your situation.