Check the operating performance tab. I'm guessing the little numbers are a reflection of change from previous years or quarters.

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The more you diversify, the chances are your portfolio will not beat the indexes and why Buffett said "Diversification is a protection against ignorance".
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Warren Buffett speaking to MBA students:
"If you are not a professional investor; if your goal is not to manage in such a way that you get a significantly better return than the world, then I believe in extreme diversification.

I believe that 98 or 99 percent —maybe more than 99 percent—of people who invest should extensively diversify and not trade.
That leads them to an index fund with very low costs.
All they’re going to do is own a part of America.
They’ve made a decision that owning a part of America is worthwhile.
I don’t quarrel with that at all. That is the way they should approach it."

It's easy to beat PRWCX on a raw return basis. VOO/VFIAX will do. The question is whether you can do it with an only moderately volatile investment.
VOO beats BRK.A over ten years with less volatility. Thus a better Sharpe ratio (higher returns divided by lower volatility).
PRWCX beats both of them on risk adjusted return (as measured by Sharpe ratio or Sotrino ratio).
Comparison at Portfolio Visualizer

Someone on Big Bang! recently started a thread titled "How can we match or beat PRWCX?"

My Roth IRA is mostly with T Rowe Price but I’ve gradually been moving from TRP to Fidelity funds. I’m ticked at TRP for not letting me invest in PRWCX even though I’ve invested with them for 30+ years.

But inflation proved the perfect issue to enable Summers to regain the spotlight. Intellectually, Summers had been deeply formed by the monetarist revolution instigated by Milton Friedman in the 1970s—which held that a key way to hold down inflation was to raise interest rates in order to increase unemployment (and thereby keep wages in check). In early 2021, Summers began sounding the alarm that the stimulus spending Biden and the Democrats had used to keep the economy afloat during Covid was going to lead to a sharp rise in inflation. When inflation did in fact rise, Summers basked in the role of the prophet vindicated.
But Summers’s rehabilitation rested on an illusion. As Eric Levitz notes in a recent New York magazine article, all evidence suggests that while Summers was right to predict inflation, he was completely wrong about both the causes of that inflation and the best means to fight it. Speaking at the London School of Economics in June 2022, Summers said that “we need five years of unemployment above 5 percent to contain inflation—in other words, we need two years of 7.5 percent unemployment or five years of 6 percent unemployment or one year of 10 percent unemployment.” This is the standard Friedman prescription of a short, sharp shock of unemployment to defeat inflation—the same remedy followed by Paul Volcker in the late 1970s and early ’80s. Those policies, of course, led to the long-term defeat of American labor unions and the rise of Reaganite neoliberalism.
But that scenario was not repeated under Biden. As Levitz reports, Summers’s "call for austerity was premised on the notion that only a sharp increase in unemployment could prevent a ruinous wage-price spiral. In reality, both wage and price growth have been slowing for months, even as unemployment has remained near historic lows. Summers’s failure to anticipate this outcome should lead us to reconsider just how prescient his analysis of the post-Covid economy ever was."
The core problem, Levitz adds, is that from the beginning, [Summers’s] analysis was predicated on the idea that excessive stimulus would lead to unsustainably low unemployment and thus wage-driven inflation. There has never much reason to believe that the labor market was the primary driver of post-Covid price growth. And at this point, it’s abundantly clear that, in 2023 America, a tight labor market will not inevitably trigger a wage-price spiral.
If the Federal Reserve follows Summers’s advice and keeps raising interest rates until the economy hits “five years of unemployment above 5 percent,” then millions of people will suffer for absolutely no reason other than as human sacrifices to a discredited economic theory.
Far from vindicating Summers, inflation is yet another case where he got a big issue wrong. It joins a long list of such errors. As Binyamin Appelbaum documented in his fine book The Economists’ Hour (2015), while serving as deputy Treasury secretary in 1998, Summers took it upon himself to bully staffers who were pushing for the regulation of credit derivatives—the banking practice that led to the housing bubble and 2008 crash. Summers even called one staffer, Brooksley Born, the head of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, into his office to scream, “I have 13 bankers in my office who tell me you’re going to cause the worst financial crisis since the end of World War II.” Ironically, it was Summers’s own failure to heed Born’s advice that caused that very crisis. In 2005, Summers derided critics of the deregulated credit default swap market as “slightly Luddites.”