Reality check - How many of your current holdings (aside from cash) did you possess …
- 20 years ago?
- 25 years ago?
- 30 years ago?
None of mine date back 25 years (1998 or earlier). But three go back over 20 years. Two are multi-asset funds (10% of portfolio each). The third is a balanced fund (5-7% of portfolio).

I think a lack of discipline or psychology plays a role in selling a 30-year TIPS before maturity, but that characterization puts the reason for selling completely on the investor's shoulders as some sort of moral or psychic failing. A lot can happen to one's finances in 30 years that may have nothing to do with discipline and everything to do with unavoidable liquidity needs. I've seen some market commentators point out that if you just bought and held onto stocks through the Great Depression you would've done fabulously. Meanwhile unemployment peaked at 25% in 1933. Many people in such circumstances were understandably afraid and sold after an 89% decline in the Dow from peak to trough, but just as many I imagine had no choice but to sell to stay alive back then. Discipline or a lack of it has nothing to do with selling for unemployed people who have to pay their bills. That is is the unseen personal 30-year risk in holding such a long-term bond. Today, I would think unforseen health risks, might be a more likely reason for selling before maturity, as uncovered medical bills are still a large cause of bankruptcy in the U.S. But recessions, job loss, and selling of securities do tend to go hand in hand.
I would add just from a market history perspective, that leverage plays a really terrible role in the above recession/depression scenario. A recession hits, people lose their jobs, stocks fall and suddenly investors are getting margin calls on their leveraged bets which they can't pay because they're out of work. That forces them to sell their securities even if they want to hold on for a recovery. Worse, when they sell, that puts further downward pressure on the market and more people who consequently get margin calls. Selling begets selling and you end up in a weird kind of death spiral caused by leverage. My impression is margin levels were really high and easy to get prior to the Great Depression. And we saw just what happened with leverage in the 2008 crash. And now we see what happened with SVB, and seemingly safe Treasury bonds. This is why the FDIC exists, and they label banks too big to fail, although I think there are other ways of addressing these problems that benefit the public more and banks less.

Retail investors may not have the fortitude to hang on to 30-yr TIPS. But IMO, holding 5-yr TIPS to maturity and rolling them over (and laddering) should work fine too to approximately capture the CPI. The real-yields (TIPS yields) have been in +/- 2% range most of the time (FRED charts go back to 2003 although TIPS started a few years back in late-1990s), so it isn't as if the investors would miss the boat on locking high real-rates. BTW, the current real yields are 5-yr 1.20%, 10-yr 1.16%, 30-yr 1.44%.
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=1264R
https://home.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/TextView?type=daily_treasury_real_yield_curve&field_tdr_date_value=2023

Great article that summarizes David Giruox’s many interviews he gave in last several years. In light of this large asset base ($47.4) fund, he manages to move and to execute very well in his portfolio in order to deliver this remarkable results over the tenure as the fund manager.
Giruox also written on a book on “Capital allocation” and is available at Amazon that describes how companies can execute successfully in their business.
https://amazon.com/Capital-Allocation-Principles-Strategies-Shareholder/dp/1264270062

I thought I knew what stable value funds in a 401k were. I used them for years, but what you show looks to me more like an annuity.
Stable value fund is available in my 401(K) plan. It is an insurance product that invest in short term treasurys but has the liquidity like money market fund.
There's a lot of subtlety in attributes of these products that results in a fair amount of confusion. In a broad sense everything people have mentioned here is a stable value fund. In practical terms, the distinctions don't matter much.

stable value funds and their close cousins, guaranteed investment contracts, together accounted for 21.3 percent of the assets in such plans in September [2006]
...
The stable value funds in 401(k) plans are generally a pool of short-term bonds or other debt-market investments protected by an insurance contract known as a wrapper.... The underlying investments are generally corporate bonds, which yield more than government bonds but are also at a greater risk for loss of principal. He said Treasury bonds were a more secure long-term choice than stable value funds, which may be subject “to the law of unintended consequences."
...
Like other stable value funds in 401(k) plans, [the Trust Advisors Stable Value Plus fund] was not a mutual fund but a collective trust.

https://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/08/business/mutfund/08stable.html
"Stable value" can refer to even more varied investment structures. Historically, or "traditionally", these were insurance products - guaranteed insurance contracts like TIAA Traditional issued directly by an insurance company.

TIAA Traditional is a guaranteed insurance contract and not an investment for federal securities law purposes.

https://www.tiaa.org/public/learn/retirement-planning-and-beyond/how-do-traditional-annuities-work
"Stable value" evolved into a much broader range of investment structures. The common thread is the use of insurance to provide investment value stability.

Stable value investment options may be offered by investment managers, trust companies, or insurance companies in various structures, such as separately managed accounts, commingled funds or guaranteed insurance accounts. Sometimes a stable value investment option will be managed by a plan sponsor. While stable value investment options may be managed or structured in a variety of ways, the important similarity is the use of stable value investment contracts, issued by banks, insurance companies, and other financial institutions, which convey to the investment option the ability to carry certain assets at book value.

https://www.stablevalue.org/stable-value/ (Links in original)
For a brief shining(?) moment, stable value funds were offered in retail IRAs. But SEC concerns about pricing led to their demise:

[Stable value as an] investing option has disappeared for individuals [in 2005] because of questions raised by the Securities and Exchange Commission about how to value the funds, although no formal ruling against them has been made.
...
Stable value funds have been available for many years, and remain available today-although on a much more limited basis-in some 401(k) plans and defined benefit pension plans maintained by employers. These investments come under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of Labor, which has strict, but somewhat different regulations, from the SEC. The SEC's questions affect investments by individuals in IRAs ...
Scudder launched the first stable value IRA fund in 1997, offering the funds as Scudder Preservation Plus Income and Scudder Preservation Plus. Others were offered by PBGH, Gartmore Morley, Oppenheimer and other mutual fund managers.
But the SEC began raising questions about how to determine the daily valuation of funds with insurance wrappers, which managers had been pricing at book value. The wrapper agreement, which is what made the stable value fund what it was, was also the part that was raising questions at the SEC. The SEC, which initially approved the funds, will not comment on the situation other than to say that there are no stable value funds now registered with the SEC, although there are some nonregistered ones in existence, says John Nester, an SEC spokesman.

https://www.fa-mag.com/news/article-1120.html?issue=56

Congratulations. Live long (at least 30 years until the bonds mature) and prosper.

I might have pointed to Larry Summers as the Democratic poster boy for deregulation.

Between 1992 and 2001, Summers held various positions in the US Treasury Department, including that of Treasury Secretary from 1999 to 2001. Summers has described the 1990’s as a time when “important steps” were taken to achieve “deregulation in key sectors of the economy” such as financial services. He has also said that during this period government officials and private financial interests collaborated in a spirit of cooperation “to provide the right framework for our financial industry to thrive.” Summers recommended before he left the Treasury Department that removing policies that “artificially constrict the size of markets” should remain a priority for the US government.
Along with Robert Rubin and Alan Greenspan, Summers brought about elimination of key US financial regulations including the Glass-Steagall Act. He was particularly aggressive in his efforts to block regulations of derivatives, regulations that might have prevented the economic meltdown the US suffered in 2008. According to economist Dean Baker, "The policies he promoted as Treasury Secretary and in his subsequent writings led to the economic disaster that we now face."

https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Larry_Summers
That's some of what Summers did while he was working in the government. In contrast, Barney Frank had left Congress years before attempts were made to weaken Dodd-Frank. As a private citizen, and as the bill in question was reaching the House for a vote, he wrote an opinion piece titled: "Why I would vote 'no' on Senate bill to amend Dodd-Frank".
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/01/barney-frank-why-i-would-vote-no-on-senate-bill-to-amend-dodd-frank-commentary.html
Though while objecting to the bill, he did not excoriate it. One of his objections was that the threshold for subjecting "large" banks to the most stringent level of examination was set too high. He would have preferred $125B, as opposed to $250B.
Both Dems and Reps voted to loosen regulations. Bags of pus
The opposition to the legislation, though in the minority, was also bipartisan. One Republican voted no.
If calling that bipartisan sounds a bit weird, consider that 83% of the Democratic representatives voted against the legislation, while 99.6% of voting Republican representatives supported it.
https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2018216

TIAA Traditional is indeed an annuity product.
But what you quoted applies only to the annuitized payouts, not for accumulations.
For TIAA Traditional accumulations (savings), the restricted RC and RA allow withdrawals only over several years. But flexible RCP, SRA and newer IRAs have only frequent-trading restrictions.

I thought I knew what stable value funds in a 401k were. I used them for years, but what you show looks to me more like an annuity. See below statement. It's confusing to me that you can buy these TIAA products at these types of rates as a savings vehicle. Rates are better than treasury rates and CDs. I'm sure I'm missing something.

Rates shown above are based on a 67-year old choosing a single life annuity with a 10-year guarantee period or a joint life annuity with a 20 year guarantee period.

I think it makes complete sense to discuss the probability of a 30-year TIPS being a good long-term investment and here's why or why not. Once anyone in finance uses absolute terms like "riskless" or "guaranteed," they've usually lost some of my trust. Fat tails and black swans in finance, unseen and unpredictable risks, are a real thing.
I would say the risk of owning a 30-Year TIPS until maturity if it adheres to all of its debt covenants are extraordinarily low. I would say the political and macro risks that TIPS could violate or alter the debt's terms or covenants--change how their payouts work, how the CPI is calculated to reduce return, or default altogether because the U.S. becomes dysfunctional, or, worse than dysfunctional in the next thirty years--are not extraordinarily low. How high those political or macro risks are is difficult, perhaps impossible, to tell.
Then there are the individual investor, personal, risks. What if you can't hold the 30-year TIPS to maturity for various reasons such as health or other unexpected events? What if your heirs need to sell it to raise cash before maturity and they have to sell it at a loss? I would say this is a medium to high risk for many individual investors with unpredictable finances and health situations.

Well said @LB. As an individual investor, cost of asset ownership is something I have absolute control. Thus, index funds and ETFs are preferred. So are those OEFs with lower expense ratio.
With regard to TIPS, I would only consider the shortest duration individual TIPs of 5 year, and hold it till maturity. The only TIPS funds that I am interested are the new short duration TIPS fund from Vanguard, VTIP, and Blackrock’s STIP. I have no interest in longer duration TIPS such as 30 years, since many changes can take place. Same goes for TIPS funds and their year-to-year performance speaks for themselves

Although I agree with some of what Bernstein says here, I find it amusing for him to use the term "rational investor" in the same article he uses the term "riskless." Nothing in life is riskless. Investors call T-bill interest the "risk-free rate" because it is backed by the "full faith and credit" of the U.S. government. In the short-time frame that T-bills have to mature, that is a fairly safe bet, although the debt ceiling debate shenanigans currently reveal how even a T-bill is not truly riskless. But 30 years? 30 YEARS. I can barely predict what is going to happen tomorrow in the U.S. or in my own life let alone 30 years from now. To assume that a 30-year TIPS is riskless if you hold it to maturity is a mistake.
Securities markets are not rational. People are not rational. Spock, or our inner Spock as Bernstein describes it, is a fictional television character I think certain men with a scientific bent aspire to as a role model. Yet the show was interesting enough to expose the flaws in Spock's beliefs--yes, belief, not absolute fact--in reason. And Spock, and the investment models and algorithms "rational" investors use are also designed by flawed humans to measure other flawed humans financial behavior.
There's a reason physics, chemistry and biology are called the "hard sciences" while economics and psychology are called soft sciences, and even the former despite the scientists in those fields attempts at objective measurability are subject to human biases. I'm not sure finance even qualifies as a soft science as a subset of economics. It's very difficult to determine what is luck and what is skill in this field.
Yet it is very important from a marketing perspective to present certain professional investors as rational. That is the emotional subtext behind this veneer of rationality in the investment management business--greed for investor assets. The usual line of advertising goes: These extremely educated investors approach finance as a science and have developed a never-fail rational and repeatable scientific system for beating the market. See how well that worked with the Long-Term Capital hedge fund.
Alternatively, the line of advertising logic goes for indexing "scientists": Our data of the last 100 years indicates in the long-term the market rises. In every ten year period if you just bought and held, you would have had strong positive performance, and beaten the active managers. And because this was true in the last 100 years we are now going to extrapolate into eternity that owning an index of U.S. stocks is a good idea because human history and global history always repeat themselves.
The irony to me is the most predictable thing in finance may be the fees professional investors charge for us to believe in them. I would add this is where Bernstein, Bogle, and indexers are, for the most part, rationally right. Bogle aways said it wasn't the efficient market hypothesis he subscribed to. It was the costs matter hypothesis.

"The structural vulnerabilities at the heart of money market and open-end funds aren’t new. In the banking sector, capital and liquidity requirements and federal deposit insurance reduce the likelihood of runs taking place. In case runs occur, access to the discount window helps provide buffers for banks. Yet the financial stability risks posed by money market and open-end funds have not been sufficiently addressed.
Over the past two years, the SEC has proposed rules to mitigate the vulnerabilities plaguing these funds.13 The SEC’s proposals would reduce the first-mover advantage, reducing run incentives during times of stress. They would also require new liquidity management tools, while mandating more comprehensive and timely information on these funds for the SEC and investors."
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1376

Thanks @larryB / Last year’s unusually big hit was understandable as bonds slid along with stocks. But it can’t seem to get out of its own way this year. The ”secret sauce” for so many years no longer working it seems. I wonder if money has been leaving?

@Hank. I too use this one as a gage. It’s basically 38% VYM and 62% BND. So last years decline mirrored the sum of its parts. But it’s set and forget for its fans. No miracles tho..

I watch this one as one gage of how conservative allocation funds are faring. For years it’s been regarded (ISTM) as the Cadillac of that group.
Surprised to see it down 0.30% YTD even after today’s +.45% gain. And last year it lost more than 9%. Never owned it. Just trying to figure out what’s causing its problem - likely some staple in its mix that isn’t performing as expected.

Be careful what you ask about. You might get more than you bargained for :-)
There were a couple of exceptions to the "usual" step up rule in the past, there's one current exception (in timing), and potentially one in the future. Perhaps others that I'm not aware of.

Step-up in basis has been eliminated twice during the past 50 years, and each time, the change was short-lived.
Step-up in basis was first eliminated by the Tax Reform Act of 1976 and replaced with a carryover basis regime. The carryover basis rules were heavily criticized and repealed a few years later, before they had taken effect.
The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 repealed the estate tax and adopted a carryover basis regime [no step up] for calendar year 2010 only ...
Congress eventually threw everyone a curveball. In mid-December [2010], Congress retroactively restored the estate tax and step-up in basis for 2010 decedents. However, for decedents who died in 2010, estate executors could opt out of the estate tax and into a carryover basis tax regime.

https://www.aperiogroup.com/blogs/repeal-of-basis-step-up-third-times-the-charm
The current estate tax law generally provides for a step up (or down) to current value as of date of death. However, for estates subject to the estate tax, an executor can elect to do an assessment of all assets in the estate (it's all or nothing) on the alternate valuation date six months after the date of death, assuming that would result in lower federal estate taxes.
The exception to this exception is if an asset is transferred (via sale, distribution, or other method) prior to the end of the six month period, the individual asset is valued as of the date of transfer.
Recent federal and state proposals are floating around to tax billionaires on unrealized capital gains annually based on mark-to-market valuations.
https://itep.org/president-bidens-proposed-billionaires-minimum-income-tax-would-ensure-the-wealthiest-pay-a-reasonable-amount-of-income-tax/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2023/01/17/wealth-taxes-state-level/
Under these proposals there would be no need for a step up because assets would already be valued at their last annual market price. Further, often these proposals are limited to easily priced securities. They might treat real estate and securities differently.

I would assume if they are audited the IRS will want receipts, ie that $5000 check for the fence!
Tell them to be glad their house value went up . We lost money on the sale of our house in CT over 30 years

House sale and capital improvements to calculate capital gains on sale question.
So, house purchased for 'x' $ 20 years ago.
There is a capital gain on the sale of the property, which will be taxable.
Improvements to the property may be used to change the 'cost basis' for calculating full capital gains tax.
My question (below) is that it was stated that the owners made numerous improvements to the property over the years; which did provide for a higher sales price.
One example is, a very nice fence that was placed around the property that cost $5,000 15 years ago, but would cost $15,000 to build today.
The seller, of course, wants to keep the capital gains tax on the sale as low as possible.
It is my understanding that they may use the original $5,000 to change the 'cost basis'; whereas it is suggested they may use the $15,000 cost (when the house was sold), if the fence was installed today, to calculate the 'cost basis'.
In effect, they are suggesting using an 'inflation adjusted' value.
Is this allowed in the IRS tax code for calculating a property sale 'cost basis' to establish the capital gains amount???
Thank you for your time in sorting this conflict of thought about this process.
Catch

Thank you @yogibearbull for starting this thread. I have a few questions on this. What is the maturity profile of CRE debt over the next few years? Will the rates be going up significantly or are the loans floating rate in the first place?