Last few weeks I started dipping my toe in, buying some commodities & energy stocks (BBL, TDW, ESV) that I think can survive and make acquisitions during a downturn, then prosper whenever the cycle turns. I've also bought a little ORIG with play money: I think it's either going to be worthless or multiples of its current value by 2017.
This technique worked well for me with financial stocks in 2009. Right now I'm down quite a bit, but that was the case for a while then with the financials. I know I'm not smart enough to pick the exact bottom, so getting good companies at good prices is all I'm aiming for. Hopefully history will repeat!
But all my stock purchases are small compared to my core mutual funds, my purchases are usually about 0.5% - 1.0% of my total portfolio each.

Hi Old Skeet,
Congratulations to both you and your Engineer friend. You have each chosen separate investment pathways, but your common decisions to save and invest early in your earning lifecycle is yielding a huge payoff today. That’s no great surprise.
Every single financial advisor who has developed a set of financial rules recommends consistent savings and accepting the risks of investing. In his Zurich Axiom book, Max Gunther’s first axiom is to accept the risk challenge. He said: “Worry is not a sickness, but a sign of health. If you are not worried, you are not risking enough.”
It is amazing how many folks are not up to that challenge. I too have experienced the reluctance of smart and successful folks to engage in the investment world. They don’t consider it investing, but identify it as speculation or gambling. Among these folks, the deep recession of the 1930s has a long arm.
A long time ago, I gave lectures to senior citizens and High School age kids to encourage both savings and prudent investing. My single most effective graph when making the presentations was the comparative Stocks, Bonds, and Inflation historical chart. I know you are familiar with it, but here is a convenient Link:
http://www.morningstar.com/products/institutional/SBBI.pdf
This Ibbotson chart was a terrific deal closer. I was always surprised by how conservative folks were, and how uninformed they were with respect to inflation’s erosive impact.
The goal was to get these folks into the ballgame. What game they played and/or what position they took was far less important. “There is no one right portfolio, but there is one right for you.”
That saying comes from Larry Swedroe’s “14 Simple Truths”. It is Number 14 on his list.
I currently own a mixed portfolio of both actively and passively managed mutual funds and ETFs. I am moving in the direction of more passively focused funds, so I am now more inclined towards your engineer buddy’s program than yours. Some of the logic in doing so is captured succinctly by Swedroe’s Truths Numbers 2 and 3.
Truth 2 is that “The past performance of an actively managed fund is a very poor predictor of its future performance.”
Truth 3 is that “If skilled professionals don’t succeed, it is unlikely that individual investors will.”
I believe these are statistically correct with plenty of experimental data to corroborate them. Over my investing career, I have experienced both sides of those arguments. It is indeed a challenge to overcome the professionals’ advantages. As the professionals have become more knowledgeable, and compete more against each other, Alpha is a disappearing quantity.
I especially congratulate you on winning at this most difficult challenge with such a demanding, complex portfolio construction. Just the numerical size of your portfolio would overwhelm me. If fact, the primary reason I defected from a portfolio of individual stock ownership a number of years ago was that I just couldn’t stay current on 50 stock holdings. I wish you continued good luck and much success.
You might consider working on your hesitant cash holder friends to change their losing ways. You would be doing them an invaluable service. You might want to show them the referenced chart. I've now closed the circle of my post.
Best Wishes.

Grantham as in Jeremy Grantham? Now there's a perma bear for you. He thought the market was 25% overvalued in October 2009 and the best we could wish for were meager equity returns going forward. Then again, maybe not a true perma bear. Real perma bears are those who year in and year out are forever saying a stock market crash is just around the corner. Some names come to mind. In reality I think it just makes for more newsletter subscribers and/or appearances on the financial news shows.

T. Rowe is an interesting case as it isn't owned by a larger financial conglomerate such as a bank and has long specialized in no load funds. Yet I do think it has drifted some away from its original mission with advisor share classes and some funds seeming pretty bloated.

Price sold advisor funds more than two decades ago (as a way to distribute NTF), so this isn't a particularly recent drift. Several of their best funds have been closed for years, and they have not shown reluctance to close them when they hit certain sizes (though one can make the case that those thresholds are set too high).
I agree with you that as a general principle, bank/broker/insurer-"owned" funds tend to pay less attention to their "customers" (fund shareholders). But I find that's too sweeping a generalization to be especially useful in fund searches. I wouldn't want to penalize T. Rowe Price just because it's public.
Also, I've never been entirely clear on what the term "fund shop" or "fund family" means. I take it loosely as the marketing/distribution arm, "branding" if you will. But I'm not sure precisely what company one is really talking about.
"Families" often outsource the day-to-day management, so I don't think "family" is the management company. For example, Vanguard contracts with Jennison Associates, a Prudential subsidiary. The family is still Vanguard, not Jennison, and Vanguard makes sure that management owner Prudential isn't gouging the shareholders.
From a practical perspective, it's who controls the fund's board, whatever entity that is.
I know of three (and only three) examples of true fund independence that proves the rule (by demonstrating in rare instances the parent "family" doesn't necessarily control):
Selected Funds moved from Selected Financial Services (a Kemper subsidiary) to Venture Advisers (Davis) in 1993, after Yacktman bolted. Shelby Davis took over management of both funds - SLASX and SLSSX (then called Selected Shares). Not long after, management of the latter was outsourced to Bramwell Capital Management (Elizabeth Bramwell, who had recently left Gabelli). Was SLASX better when managed (mostly) by Chris Davis (at a privately held company) or by Donald Yackman (via a Kemper company)?
Lightning struck a second time in 2005, when the Clipper Fund moved itself from Pacific Financial Research to Davis Selected Advisers. Here too, same question - Pacific Financial Research was acquired by UAM in 1997 (publicly traded), with UAM acquired by Old Mutual in 2000 (also publicly traded). In the ten years since it moved to Davis, this once fine fund has underperformed its category by 1.83%/year (per M*).
My favorite independent board was The Japan Fund, which I've described before. A coda to that post is that Nomura killed off The Japan Fund last year by merging it into Matthews Asia Japan Fund. As you can see from this mid-2014 comparison of Japan funds, this is likely a good thing for the shareholders (not to mention the fund going no-load).

Dear friends,
A number of folks have had questions about Ed's arguments concerning the performance of traditional balanced funds. Being shy and retiring, Ed is not predisposed to post on the board but he does read your comments, often scanning them daily.
Four notes, then, as a sort of gloss on Ed's August essay:
On balanced funds: traditionally balanced funds have provided portfolio protection in falling markets because their two dominant asset classes have had correlations that were, on average, negligible (the one-year correlation over the past century is between 7-10%) and, in times of economic decline, negative (the correlation has been as low as -93%). The Depression, for example, saw consistently strong negative correlations. Cash, at the same time, was not correlated with either. In the past couple decade, the Goldilocks correlation has been positive: both asset classes rose as interest rates fell.
That's been good for investors and helps explain why the Vanguard Balanced Index fund (VBINX) has been nearly unbeatable: dirt cheap, fully invested, religiously rebalanced between two rising asset classes. But correlations tend to be dependent on two factors: beginning valuations and the rate of inflation (hence, of rising interest rates). A combination of pricey assets with rising prices cause stocks and bonds to become positively correlated (as high as 89% correlated), prominently in the inflation wracked '70s. That data is all courtesy of a 2013 PIMCO study. "This analysis," they conclude, "challenges conventional wisdom for asset allocation."
Ed's argument: all three asset classes might be subject to sharp, sustained declines over, say, the next decade. As a deep value investor, he's pretty much appalled by what he sees as a fundamental disconnect between corporate prospects and stock prices. Bond yields can't go any lower unless you anticipate investor acceptance of negative yield, of the sort Switzerland is getting away with: instead of paying interest, the Swiss government promises to return your principle, minus a modest annual holding fee, in a decade. An article in the August 6 Financial Times heralded the sea change in the nature of bond investing, from "risk-free returns" to "return-free risks." And money market reforms now allow money market funds, often used in mutual fund portfolios, to use variable NAVs; that is, for the first time you might buy a MMF at $1.00/share and see your shares soon priced below that.
It's likely that a balanced fund will still be less-bloodied than a pure equity fund but it still might be surprisingly bloody for years. How many? A balanced fund could remain underwater for six to eight years if the bond portfolio doesn't offset the declines in the equity portion. The New York Times published an okay short piece on recovery times, noting that the average recovery time since 1900 for the stock markets has only been about two years, buoyed by dividend yields as high as 14%, but that six to eight year periods can't be discounted.
On 1987 and 2007: the argument is that 2007 initiated a slow-rolling disaster where markets fell, rose, steadied, fell, rose, fell, steadied, fell ... That gave "the smart money" time to reposition to minimize the bloodshed. The market in 1987 rose 44% between January and August, turned choppy for eight weeks, then the crash rolled out over just four trading days in the middle of October: Wednesday (-3.8%), Thursday (-4.2%), Friday (-4.6%) then Black Monday (-22.6%). Markets worldwide fell 40-60%.
Analysts tend to attribute the crash to geopolitical instability (uhhh, Iran was firing Silkworm missiles as U.S.-flagged merchant ships) and computerized trading. "Portfolio insurance" programs, designed to minimize losses by selling fast in the face of a declining market, may have created a negative feedback loop in which each sale triggered a new alarm and another sale. Such algorithms were the province of ultra-sophisticated investors in 1987, today they're common though no one knows how common since the folks who use them don't necessarily advertise the fact. The highest number I've seen is 84%, a common number is 70% and the most conservative is 50% of all U.S. equity trades.
The question is, does the rise of artificial intelligence and its deployment by the ultra-sophisticated minimize or heighten the prospect of an "oops" on a truly global scale. I suppose if you find the widespread deployment of drone into our airspace reassuring (pretty pictures!), you're also likely to find the widespread deployment of AI in the financial markets reassuring.
As an investment concern, the difference is important: you can't react to a 1987-style event, you can only endure it or try to find satisfactory ways to permanently hedge your portfolio in advance. Given the doubts, above, concerning a balance strategy and the availability of insured one-year CDs paying 1.25% (with 12-month inflation at just 0.1%), Ed might recommend that you seriously consider the latter.
On paring his portfolio: Ed's wife, from time to time, points out that he has no rational need for 25 mutual funds. I get the impression he sighs, looks at the lot of them, thinks "but he was so promising as a baby!" and then chucks one of them out of the sleigh. I'll let you know if he shares a more-detailed methodology.
On the difference between Ed and me: I'm the taller one, he's more ... uhh, full-figured. Edward used to co-manage a multi-billion dollar mutual fund, I peaked out at mismanaging my multi-thousand dollar 403(b) account. The other difference is that Ed writes everything that appears under the banner "Edward ex cathedra" while I churn out the fluff and babble. Which I mention just for the sake of folks who are new to the Observer and have misattributed some of Ed's arguments, observations, grumbling and/or brilliance to me.
Back to patching the concrete at the end of my driveway,
David

T. Rowe is an interesting case as it isn't owned by a larger financial conglomerate such as a bank and has long specialized in no load funds. Yet I do think it has drifted some away from its original mission with advisor share classes and some funds seeming pretty bloated. That said, it remains better than other publicly traded fund shops and subsidiaries of publicly traded banks and insurers. Artisan, it's too soon to tell what will happen.

Regarding publicly traded mutual fund companies and those owned by publicly traded financial conglomerates, John Bogle is the master at explaining why they tend to do poorly compared to privately owned shops, i.e., Fidelity and Dodge & Cox,and mutually owned, i.e., Vanguard, shops. This is worth a read as I don't think this subject is discussed enough or understood by enough investors: johncbogle.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Big-Money-in-Boston-5-17-13.pdf

Hi MrRuffles,
I do not have a rigid formulaic set of rules, but I do deploy a generic set that serve as guidelines to reduce the selection field to manageable proportions.
Here is my candidate set, not necessarily in order of importance and it is not necessary that all need to be satisfied. Flexibility and gut feelings are important contributors to the final judgment. Here are my golden 11 rules:
1. A mutual fund that fits nicely into the more important asset allocation plan. Check the Morningstar fund asset distribution.
2. Low costs, like below the category average by at least 25%.
3. Low turnover rate, like 50% annually or less. I want a decisive management that is committed to its decisions.
4. Positive Excess Returns above appropriate benchmark for various, but not necessarily all, longer-term timeframes. That means mostly positive Alphas and Information Ratios above zero after examining different timeframes.
5. An understandable investment selection policy that offers the potential for market outperformance. Something unique that warrants the extra costs.
6. Seasoned and stable fund managers with quantifiable track records.
7. Trustworthy fund firm with deep pockets to hire superior fund managers and research teams.
8. Gut feeling that this fund will deliver the goods over time.
9. A commitment to stay the course with the selected fund to allow a proper test period, like maybe at least 3 years unless circumstances drastically change.
10. A default option to hire an Index fund if nothing satisfactorily surfaces.
11. The fund should have a near zero cash position. I’ll do my own cash management.
12. I’m sure I forgot something. Others will add to this incomplete list. No great discoveries in my golden 11.
Please keep in mind that I’m a very senior investor in the Required Minimum Withdrawal phase of my investment life. On average, I probably adjust my portfolio about twice a year. I’ve never been a very active trader. I am slowly moving my portfolio towards a higher percentage of Index products primarily motivated by cost considerations.
Each of us have different goals, timeframes, and portfolio ambitions. What I do might not mesh in any way with your investment and financial profiles whatsoever. When investing, nothing is ever cast in stone.
I wish you the very best success in your mutual fund decisions. But remember that in the long scheme of happenings, it is really a small matter. Your asset allocation decision has far more influence on your investment success.
Best Regards.

David's comment on the WSJ reducing its personal finance staff to ramp up its financial advisor services was interesting. Many RIAs I know no longer subscribe to the WSJ, either hard copy or online. Fact is, it is becoming irrelevant. The few articles on mutual funds have pretty much disappeared, and most of them are written by freelance journalists based in London and other areas of the world. They are well done, but it is clear the WSJ is like any other rag...it depends on advertising for its survival. And when marketing folks look at the readership numbers, they are often deciding to put their money to better use.

Hi, guys.
In response to DavFor's request, a bit of info on what's up behind the scenes.
It's been a busy year. The Core Four (Ed, Charles, Chip and me) met in Chicago last fall, after the Morningstar ETF Conference. There was a sense that I needed to try to create an enduring legal and financial structure for the Observer. To that point we had very little legal protection (and few legal resources) against the occasional angry and vindictive advisor; we're threatened occasionally and while truth and justice are defenses, they're not safeguards against bankruptcy. And we had no organizational foundation on which to build. It wast mostly me, guessing and hoping.
After talking with managers we respect and a local attorney, we decided to become an LLC. Shortly thereafter, we filed for and received intellectual property protection for our logo and name. Then a hang-up: I went to a non-profit law specialist to begin filing for the 501(c)(3) status and she informed me that LLCs cannot become tax-exempt. So then we filed to dissolve the LLC, incorporate in Iowa as a non-profit and file for 501(c)(3). She warned me that the IRS could take more than a year to adjudicate. Happily, it was closer to six weeks. Next, we need to hire an accountant who specializes in non-profits to work through the question of how we move resources from MFO's account into MFO, Inc's account. The existing account (and its attendant taxes) is legally mine because MFO was a sole proprietorship. Chip has an MBA and believes that I might be able to loan the money to MFO as start-up capital or make it a contribution. But once it's in the new MFO, it becomes a bit legally constrained.
What's next? Ohhh ... we need to recruit one to three additional members to MFO's board of directors. Chip and I sit on the board, but we need folks with broader expertise and a better understanding of the financial services and/or non-profit organization words. We've had several nominees who feel, uhh, distinctly higher on the food chain than me. Those discussions are commencing. We need to decide what, if anything, might be offered to MFO contributors. My bottom line is that nothing we do now gets taken away from folks, it remains free and non-commercial. But we might offer access to Charles's fund screener or some other editorial service. The data contracts, though, are really expensive by our standards, even after considerable negotiation. So I want to be sure we're acting sensibly before mortgaging anything.
And, oh yeah, I start back to full-time teaching and administering my academic department soon; we're searching for two new faculty and I've been asked by my president to help develop a plan to recruit and support transfer students to the college. Had I mentioned trying to finish the September issue several days early so I can drive to Cincinnati and meet the folks at the Ultimus Fund Services client conference (I'm trying to do networking for us)?
For what interest all that holds,
David

FYI: Warren Buffett famously counseled investors to ignore all forecasters. To demonstrate the wisdom of that advice, and with gold now having dropped below $1,100 an ounce, it’s an excellent time to turn our attention to Peter Schiff and his market predictions. A notorious doomsayer and regular guest of the financial media, Schiff’s forecasts often focus on gold prices.
Regards,
Ted
http://mutualfunds.com/news/2015/07/28/gold-is-it-really-likely-to-hit-5-000-an-ounce/

Thesis for Continuation of Those and Other Current Trends
By Tom Stevenson4:44PM BST 01 Aug 2015
Tom Stevenson is an investment director at Fidelity Worldwide Investment. The views expressed are his own. He tweets at @tomstevenson63.
Excerpts from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11778011/Commodities-rout-brings-global-winners-and-losers.html
Commodities rout brings global winners and losers
The sell-off in commodities is terrible news for emerging market countries which depend on high resource prices
The commodity slump is important because, unlike the Greek debt negotiations and Shanghai’s bursting equity bubble, its impact is felt throughout the global economy. Greece is a rounding error in worldwide terms while the Chinese stock market remains largely sealed off from the rest of the world. Last month’s slide in oil, industrial metals and agriculture speaks to a broader concern – that the long slow recovery from the financial crisis is far from secure.
Although the past month has seen an acceleration of the slide in commodity prices, it is actually part of a secular shift that may have barely begun. Commodities boomed for a decade from 2001. It is unrealistic to expect the correction to be over in just four years. This is good for some countries, sectors and asset classes and catastrophic for others. No wonder Janet Yellen is leaving her options open.
Companies are belatedly acknowledging that they face a prolonged downturn in prices and they are finally facing up to the consequences.
That’s bad news for commodity producers and companies dependent on investment in the sector. It’s also terrible news for emerging market countries whose economies and current accounts depend on high resource prices. Between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s, inflation-adjusted earnings for basic resources, industrials, chemicals, oil services and machinery companies went nowhere. It is hard to see why this pattern should not be repeated.
But for the commodity consuming parts of the economy, a slide in the cost of resources is just another tail-wind to add to falling unemployment, rising wages and persistently low inflation. This is why the US stock market trades at a premium to the rest of the world and why resource-hungry Japan continues to look so interesting.
For many companies and individuals, reduced input prices and lower transport and heating costs are a positive that will keep a lid on inflation and give the central banks on both sides of the Atlantic pause for thought. It’s not too late to get on the right side of this trade.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11778011/Commodities-rout-brings-global-winners-and-losers.html

Hi Guys,
Indeed, the market breadth is foul at this time. But as Junkster correctly reported, there can be a long time-lag between that signal and a market direction reversal. That indicator, like all others, also generates false signals. But it is a cautionary warning and merits some monitoring.
The Advance-Decline line is one of many statistics that market gurus have identified to project potential future market direction change. Interestingly, another market monitor also commented on it recently. Here is a Link to the article in The Irrelevant Investor:
http://theirrelevantinvestor.tumblr.com/post/125442897978/breadth-and-major-market-tops
The article concludes with a pertinent overarching warning as follows: “The reason I went through this exercise is not to debunk the importance of market breadth or to say that the lack of participation in today’s market should be swept under the rug. What I’m always trying to do is dig a little deeper and challenge people who draw lazy conclusions using single data points.”
The marketplace is too complex to be easily characterized by any single parameter. I have often used this quote from H. L. Mencken in earlier posts, and it is appropriate here: “For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong”.
In this instance, the “wrongness” of the Advance-Decline criterion is that it is not sufficient as a standalone predictor. It is best exploited when combined with other signals. Those other signals are many. For instance, GDP Growth rate, Investor Sentiment, the projected P/E ratio, and the Presidential cycle to name just a few.
Also context is important. For example, the inverse of the standard P/E ratio (E/P) should be compared to the current yield of the 10-year Treasury bond to weigh the attractiveness of equities against bonds in a relative way to perhaps adjust portfolio asset allocations.
Many financial advisors deploy a multi-dimensional Bear market criteria to recommend the level of equity commitments to their clients. One of my favorite advisors is Jim Stack, owner of InvesTech Research. Here is a Link to a paper that he cobbled together for the most recent MoneyShow in Las Vegas:
http://www.forbes.com/newsletters/investech-research/2015/05/01/investech-research-newsletter-may-1-2015-like-watching-paint-dry/
Please access the detailed reference by hitting the download PDF button.. The Advance-Decline line has deteriorated since Stack wrote that paper.
The assembly of Bear market warning signals has not yet crossed my action threshold. My portfolio remains broadly diversified. If the warning “red flags” continue to rise, I will incrementally move out of equities. I will always hold some equity positions since none of the composite indicators are perfect. Nothing ever is.
Best Regards.

http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1581466/000158146615000101/supplement_lafferdivgrwth.htm
497 1 supplement_lafferdivgrwth.htm SUPPLEMENT TO THE PROSPECTUSES AND SAI OF LAFFER DIVIDEND GROWTH FUND
RX FUNDS TRUST
(formerly the American Independence Funds Trust II)
(the “Trust”)
SUPPLEMENT DATED JULY 31, 2015
TO
SUMMARY PROSPECTUS, PROSPECTUS AND STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
EACH DATED MARCH 1, 2015
(AS SUPPLEMENTED THROUGH JULY 16, 2015)
AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE LAFFER DIVIDEND GROWTH FUND
(TICKER SYMBOLS: LDGIX, LDGAX, LDGCX)
THIS SUPPLEMENT PROVIDES NEW AND ADDITIONAL INFORMATION BEYOND THAT CONTAINED IN THE SUMMARY PROSPECTUS, PROSPECTUS AND STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION LISTED ABOVE.
On July 28, 2015, at the recommendation of American Independence Financial Services, LLC, the investment adviser to the Trust, the Trust’s Board of Trustees (the “Board”) approved the closing and subsequent liquidation of the American Independence Laffer Dividend Growth Fund (the “Fund”). Accordingly, the Fund is expected to cease operations, liquidate its assets, and distribute the liquidation proceeds to shareholders of record on or about August 31, 2015 (the “Liquidation Date”).
Class A shares and Institutional Class shares of the Fund will be closed effective August 7, 2015 to purchases by new shareholders and will be closed effective August 21, 2015 to additional purchases by existing shareholders. Class C shares will be closed to both new and existing shareholders effective August 5, 2015.
The planned liquidation of the Fund may cause the Fund to increase its cash holdings and deviate from its investment objectives and strategies as stated in the Fund’s Prospectus.
Prior to the Liquidation Date, Fund shareholders may redeem (sell) or exchange their shares in the manner described in the Prospectus under “Redeeming From Your Account” and “Exchanging Shares”, respectively. The CDSC fees on redemptions will be waived on Class C shares starting August 3, 2015. Shareholders remaining in the Fund just prior to, or on, the Liquidation Date may bear increased transaction fees incurred in connection with the disposition of the Fund’s portfolio holdings.
If no action is taken by a Fund shareholder prior to the Liquidation Date, the Fund will distribute to such shareholder, on or promptly after the Liquidation Date, a liquidating cash distribution equal in value to the shareholder’s interest in the net assets of the Fund as of the Liquidation Date. The liquidating cash distribution to shareholders will be treated as payment in exchange for their shares. The liquidation of your shares may be treated as a taxable event. Shareholders should contact their tax adviser to discuss the income tax consequences of the liquidation.
PLEASE RETAIN THIS SUPPLEMENT FOR FUTURE REFERENCE

FYI: How will you help me avoid self-destructive investor behavior?”
It might come as a surprise that one of the most important questions investors should ask when vetting financial advisers has little to do with fees or past performance relative to a stock index
Regards,
Ted
http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2015/07/27/how-financial-advisers-can-help-close-the-behavior-gap/

Obviously not surprising now, but I would be surprised if they haven't raised by December.

I'm still thinking it winds up being next year, if that. Inflation is not where they want it, China is not in good shape and other cracks showing.
UPS earnings call:
CEO Abney: “But to get to the economy, recent economic news has just been mixed and it’s caused us to be cautious. The continued strength of the U.S. dollar and I think this impending rate hike by the Fed appears to be holding back some U.S. growth.”
Chief Financial Officer Richard Peretz: “The U.S. domestic business is on track with its revenue management and efficiency gains. However, we are seeing some softening in the economy.
Chief Commercial Officer Alan Gershenhorn: “We’re about where we thought we would be. [But] we think the economy was certainly slower for sure.”
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/ups-fires-warning-shot-across-the-bow-of-the-stock-market-and-the-fed-2015-07-28
---
Now, I'm not saying that things are falling apart or going to. But I am increasing positions in things like Ecolab (ECL), which is now a very large holding and continues to be a favorite example of "buy and forget".
I do not think that Yellen has forever to raise rates - I think there is a point the window to raise rates will have closed. Some think the window has already closed.

http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/896975/000119312515267440/d948002d497.htm
497 1 d948002d497.htm TWEEDY, BROWNE FUND INC.
TWEEDY, BROWNE FUND INC.
Tweedy, Browne Global Value Fund II -
Currency Unhedged (the “Fund”)
Supplement dated July 29, 2015 to the Prospectus dated July 29, 2015 (the “Prospectus”)
The Fund is closed to most new investors until further notice.
The Fund remains open to existing shareholders (up to certain daily limits) as follows:
› Existing shareholders of the Fund may add to their accounts, including through reinvestment of distributions.
› Existing shareholders of other Tweedy, Browne Funds may establish an investment in the Fund.
› Financial Advisors who currently have clients invested in the Fund may open new accounts and add to such accounts where operationally feasible.
› Participants in retirement plans currently utilizing a Tweedy, Browne Fund as an investment option may also designate the Fund, where operationally feasible.
› Investors may purchase the Fund through certain sponsored fee-based programs, provided that the sponsor has received permission from Tweedy, Browne that shares may continue to be offered through the program.
› Employees of Tweedy, Browne and their family members may open new accounts and add to such accounts.
› Existing separate account clients of Tweedy, Browne may open new accounts in the Fund.
The Fund reserves the right to make additional exceptions or otherwise modify the foregoing closure policy at any time and to reject any investment for any reason.
This Supplement should be retained with your Prospectus for future reference.

I swapped DVN (a relatively long-term holding, I had a small profit) into TDW. This worked well for me in 2008-9 with the housing and financial sectors, I swapped from lower into higher beta names to increase my potential upside when the rebound came without touching my cash stake.
I am, of course, presuming that a rebound is coming is energy, though I am willing to wait a couple years for it...

I am up 4.42% YTD and on track for my worst year since 2008. Not sure that is isolated to me or others are also struggling. I take no solace in the fact my return is higher than many of the market indexes as my goal is to consistently compound my capital and not to shadow or beat any particular market index. I haven't a clue how the rest of the year will unfold. I think China is simply an excuse for an already overall sick market. But as we have seen, at least since 2008, rallies seem to come when the markets have looked the sickest. At my age and financial situation I am in no mood for any drawdown in my total nest egg - even a 1.5% or 2% decline. Then again I was never in the mood for any drawdown, young or old. So all I hold (for the moment) are three very small equity positions in small cap biotech and a bank loan fund. Junk corporates have performed especially poorly lately in part because of the decline in oil prices. On the other hand, junk munis are suddenly looking inviting again.

Congratulations ! You are doing very well given the current environment. I'm up about 1.5% YTD and that's a fairly conservative portfolio. For junk munis, I do own PRFHX. I also hold ZEOIX which is holding up nicely. My other bond funds are a mixed bag with most hovering around the flatline for YTD.

>> At my age and financial situation I am in no mood for any drawdown in my total nest egg - even a 1.5% or 2% decline.
How do you invest meaningfully at all?
Or did you, given your next sentence.