All of them are callable except some of the shorter term ones. Non-callable CDs tend to have much lower yields.

I have bought about 15 CDs this past year from Schwab, that were non-callable, but I did not buy anything longer than 2 years. I just went on Schwab, and looked at their 3, 4, and 5 year CDs and it appears to be primarily non-callable CDs on their menu of offerings. I have no interest in callable CDs, have no intention of buying a callable CD in the future, so apparently I am not facing the same dilemma you are describing. Good luck!

I’ve been building CD ladders in my IRA and taxable savings accounts now that yields are so high. My IRA ladder extends to five years with a yield higher than 5%. However, I’ve been wondering if the longer term CDs will end up being called in if interest rates drop, and how quickly. It’s been so long since yields on cash were this high that I have no frame of reference. Does anyone recall past circumstances when CD yields were high and then dropped? I’m perfectly happy earning a 5% yield and will reinvest maturing CDs if yields stay high, particularly after the bond fund fiasco of the past year or so.

One problem is that legislative Acts that are passed are applicable for years/decades and many are touted to be budget-neutral when passed. But that is based on wild guesstimates of future economy, taxes, consumer and business behaviors. Many Acts are front-loaded for benefits/effects and back-loaded for revenue generation. So, it is hard to quantify their effects on annual budget deficits.
Of course, there is an obvious budget deficit when the the FY budgets are passed, often with long delays, but that is the time to simultaneously adjust the debt-ceiling. If the FY budget is balanced, then there won't be any need to adjust the debt-ceiling.
Keep in mind that the context of the 14th Amendment was the Civil War debt but it is written in a very broad way.

Not a lawyer by a far stretch but to me, there cannot be a ceiling for debt that has already been incurred by Congress itself.
I hope this goes to the SC and the entire silly concept of debt ceiling gets busted once and for all in favor of making spend decisions during the budget process only.

Budgets, and the incurred debt from a long list of previous administrations, is not just a focus on spending, but also on income/revenue. In recent years, the biggest factor that increased our national debt, was a result of Trump and the Republicans decreasing taxes for the wealthy and corportations. It is popular to talk about "spending", but collecting income/revenue is equally important.

Tend to agree with Shipwreck. I’ve long kept a minuscule position in SPDN as part of a hedge position (SPDN = around 2% of portfolio). Doesn’t amount to a hill of beans, but tempers downside on some days and allows for taking more risk in other areas. (And I expect to lose $$ on it.) So the thought today was to sell SPDN and move temporarily into TAIL which more closely corresponds to changes in the VIX. I believe it would provide a better offset near term were someone so inclined. But decided against it. One problem is knowing when to move back out.
The charts back to 2020 show a reading of 16 on VIX to be very low. On a couple instances it dropped to around 10 - but didn’t stay there long. TAIL (etf) has been hampered in recent years by extremely low returns on treasury bonds in which it invests. So, I’m thinking that now with higher rates its better days (as an effective hedge) are probably ahead.
Heads Up - If you’re wondering what turned the markets around in the last hour today, it may be related to Mitch McConnell making a statement around 3 PM saying he believes the deficit dispute will be resolved in time to avoid default. Just my guess. As far as bearish sentiment today, that came in part from Evercore’s Ed Hyman interviewed on Bloomberg extensively this AM. (I actually copped some of Hyman’s concerns in writing my OP.)

I've lived in TX for 17 years and moved from CA. TX today is very different than what it was in 2006. I wouldn't move to TX today. This is a state full of nut jobs at every level of government. Abbott and Patrick would make Taliban proud.
TX lack of income tax is more than offset by high property taxes, high insurance bills and bare minimum services for residents.

ESG investors tend to reward companies with good ESG scores (like green-energy companies) and penalize companies with bad ESG scores (like oil companies).
IMHO most investors just look for an ESG label slapped onto a company or fund. Many ratings services rate companies relative to their industry peers, meaning that you'll have as many top rated oil companies (percentage-wise) as any other sector.

Our assessment is industry relative, using a seven-point AAA-CCC scale.

MSCI, ESG Ratings Methodology, April 2023.

Hess Corporation (NYSE: HES) has received a AAA rating in the MSCI environmental, social and governance (ESG) ratings for 2021 after earning AA ratings from MSCI ESG for 10 consecutive years.

Hess press release, Oct 11, 2021.

BlackRock remains a signatory to the net zero initiative and its iShares ESG Aware MSCI USA ETF holds a host of oil and gas producers, including Exxon, which has a larger weighting than Facebook owner Meta Platforms Inc., and Chevron, which has a larger weighting than Walt Disney Co. Similarly, Exxon is the seventh-largest holding in the SPDR S&P 500 ESG ETF, which also owns Schlumberger, ConocoPhillips and EOG Resources Inc

Bloomberg, ESG Investors' Best Intentions Slam Into Surging Oil Stocks, March 15, 2023 (via FA-Mag, no paywall)
There's ESG investing from a risk perspective (i.e. use ESG considerations in evaluating the business prospects for companies- how well are they mitigating risks); ESG investing from what I choose to call a "feel good" perspective (negative screens - I won't personally profit from bad acts); impact investing (improving behaviour of companies, improving their business prospects). These are all different, though they're all labeled (marketed) as ESG.
If your cost of capital is high, near-term projects are worth relatively more and long-term projects are worth relatively less, so you will focus on the short term
This a very serious issue in developing countries that cannot afford long term investments. The world (IMF, etc.) needs to establish better lending policies. Instead, we have oil companies putting money into short term foreign projects in exchange for building roads (that are used to transport equipment) and schools and internet infrastructure and providing needed jobs, turning villages into company towns.

If you are the chief executive officer of an oil company, and you believe this, what should you do about it? What is the best way to create long-term value for your shareholders?

Therein lies the problem with this analysis. It assumes CEOs care about creating long-term value. In my experience and research, most executives don’t care about this. They think short-term, about the next quarter’s earnings, not about five or ten years down the road. Their compensation packages, their bonuses, are generally built around hitting or exceeding short-term earnings targets.
A CEO is often just a hired gun who if he hits these short-term profit targets can make a fortune and cash out of their stock options bonuses at their earliest convenience, even if their short-term decisions destroy the company five or ten years down the road. Share buybacks fit nicely—for them—into this model. Buybacks create a short term boost in earnings per share and the stock price. This short-term mindset, pervasive on Wall Street, is destructive to businesses, our economy, and in the case of the oil industry regarding climate change and renewable energy, which requires long-term thinking and investment, our entire planet. Changing how executives are compensated could help correct the problem.

We talked last Thursday about two theories of banking, which I called Theory 1 and Theory 2. Theory 1 is that banks borrow short to lend long: Bank deposits are short-term funding, they get paid a variable market rate of interest, and they can disappear overnight if depositors worry about a bank’s stability or just get a better deal elsewhere. Theory 2 is that banks actually borrow long to lend long: Bank deposits are part of a long-term relationship, and much of what banks do — build branches, cross-sell products, offer ATMs and online banking — is designed to make those deposits sticky, so that their cost doesn’t go up when interest rates go up. Theory 2 is the traditional theory of banking; it’s why there are branches. Theory 1 is the standard theory of modern capital markets; it’s why, when Silicon Valley Bank failed due to taking too much interest-rate risk, lots of people were like “how did they not see that coming” or “why didn’t they hedge?”
Part of my goal on Thursday was to try to answer those questions, to suggest that Theory 2 really is kind of how banks (and bank regulators) think about the problem. (“Why didn’t they hedge their interest-rate risk?” Well, they had long-duration liabilities, in the form of deposits, and they matched them with long-duration assets, in the form of Treasury and agency bonds, so they were hedged; they just got the duration of their deposits wrong.)
And part of my goal was to think about why Theory 2 stopped working in 2023, why deposits weren’t sticky, why banks like Silicon Valley Bank and First Republic Bank faced massive runs and disappeared when rates went up. My speculations included better availability of information (bank deposits used to be sticky in part because it was harder to pay attention to them), a more widespread mark-to-market financial culture, the hangover of 2008, and the decline of relationship businesses generally:

In a world of electronic communication and global supply chains and work-from-home and the gig economy, business relationships are less sticky and “I am going to go into my bank branch and shake the hand of the manager and trust her with my life savings” doesn’t work. “I am going to do stuff for relationship reasons, even if it costs me 0.5% of interest income, or a slightly increased risk of losing my money” is no longer a plausible thing to think. Silicon Valley Bank’s VC and tech customers talked lovingly about how good their relationships with SVB were, after withdrawing all their money. They had fiduciary duties to their own investors to keep their money safe! Relationships didn’t matter.

One thing that I would say is that if this is right and you take it seriously, then it is pretty bad news for US regional banks. “Banking is an inherently fragile business model” is a thing that people say from time to time (when there are bank runs), but nobody quite means it. They mean something like “from a strictly financial perspective, looking at a balance sheet that mismatches illiquid long-term assets with overnight funding, banking is insanely fragile, and the whole business model of banking is about building long-term relationships with slow-moving price-insensitive depositors so that the funding is not as short-term, and the business is not as fragile, as it looks.” But if the relationship aspect doesn’t work anymore, then banking really is just extremely fragile. Without the relationships, banks are just highly levered investment funds that make illiquid risky hard-to-value investments using overnight funding. That can go wrong in lots of ways!
At Bits About Money last week, Patrick McKenzie had a deep dive on Theory 2, on “Deposit franchises as natural hedges.” He lays out why banks thought that they could take a lot of interest-rate risk despite their short-term funding; he explains the theory that a deposit franchise — the relationship that banks have with their customers that allows them to keep deposits even as rates go up — is a valuable thing and a natural hedge against rising rates.[5] And he too speculates on why that didn’t work as well as they expected. He is, I think, more pessimistic than I was:

For retail, for a period of years—years!—we took the sweat and smiles business, the work of literal decades, and we—for the best of reasons!—said We Do Not Want This Thing. That very valuable thing was, like other valuable things like churches and birthday parties and school, a threat to human life. And so we put it aside. We aggressively retrained customers to use digital channels over the branch experience. We put bankers at six thousand institutions in charge of teaching their loyal personal contacts that you can now do about 80% of your routine banking on their current mobile app or 95% on Chase’s. And then we were shocked, shocked how many people denied the most compelling reason to use their current bank and shown the most compelling reason to bank with Chase switched.
With regards to sophisticated customers, the answer is not primarily about mobile apps or how difficult it is to wire money out of an account. It is about businesses making rational decisions to protect their interests using the information they had. Sophisticated businesses are induced to bring their deposit businesses, which frequently include large amounts of uninsured deposits, in return for a complex and often bespoke bundle of goods they receive from their banks. The ability to offer that complex and bespoke bundle is part of the sweat and smiles of building a deposit franchise. …
Why did they suddenly trust their banks less about the near-term availability of the bundle? Contagion? Social media? I feel these are misdiagnoses. Their banks suffered from two things: their ability to deliver the bundle was actually impaired. They had “bad facts”, in lawyer parlance. Insolvency is not a good condition for a bank to be in.
And those bad facts got out quickly, not because of social media and not because of a cabal but simply because news directly relevant to you routes to you much faster in 2023 than in 2013. There is no one single cause for that! Media are better and more metrics-driven! Screentime among financial decisionmakers is up! Pervasive always-on internetworking in industries has reached beyond early adopters like tech and caught up with the mass middle like e.g. the community that is New York commercial real estate operators.

The whole relationship aspect of banking is devalued; rational economic decisionmaking based on mark-to-market asset values has become more important. This makes banks fragile. What makes banks something other than highly levered risky investment funds is their relationships, and that support is weakening.
Elsewhere at Substack, here is Byrne Hobart on “ The Relationship-Transactional-Relationship Business Cycle,” which is I suppose more optimistic:

Transaction economics include the flow of object-level decisions—do we buy this Google click, spin up that EC2 instance, or accept this Stripe transaction—and a stock of expectations and trust slowly built up on both sides. It's essentially a form of reputational capital, and a company that's betting most of its revenue or operations on a counterparty that they can't have a conversation with is, in some abstract sense, undercapitalized.

Here is a theory you could have:

• The world runs on oil right now, demand for oil is high, the price of oil is high, and getting oil out of the ground is lucrative.
• In X years — pick a number — the world will not run on oil, because the environmental effects of burning oil are bad, and eventually, through some combination of better green-energy technology, consumer demand and government regulation, the world will stop burning oil.
• Therefore the oil-drilling business will produce a series of cash flows that is large now and will, over the next X years, decline to zero.

You don’t have to believe this theory, but something like it seems to be pretty popular. In particular, environmental, social and governance investors often express some version of this; they talk about the need to transition to green energy and question the long-term viability of fossil fuels.
I suspect that many oil-and-gas executives and investors don’t believe this theory, but what if they do? If you are the chief executive officer of an oil company, and you believe this, what should you do about it? What is the best way to create long-term value for your shareholders? Here are three imaginable answers:

1) Do what you’ve always done. Drill lots of oil, acquire new leases, explore the deep ocean, make long-term investments in drilling technology, keep being an oil company, hope it all works out.
2) Pivot to renewables.[1] Drill oil for now, but make your long-term investments in green energy; build wind farms or drill geothermal wells or whatever, so that in X years, when the world stops using oil, you will be able to sell whatever it does use.
3) Drill the oil you’ve got, but plan for decline. Stop making lots of new long-term investments in oil fields. Maximize current cash flow, and spend it on stock buybacks. Eventually, in X years, your cash flows will be zero, and you will close up shop gracefully. But in the meantime there is money coming in, and rather than waste it on drilling new oil fields, you give it back to shareholders.

Answer 1 seems wrong, on this theory: If you make long-term oil investments, and oil is doomed in the long term, then your investments are wasteful. You are taking profits that belong to shareholders and wasting them on inertia.
Answer 2 seems fine! The idea here is that you are an energy company, not an oil company, and your expertise in energy makes you best positioned to find the energy of the future.[2] You have geologists and engineers and energy economists and a lot of money; you might be better at developing green energy than some inexperienced green-energy startup would be. I think this is debatable — if you are an oil-company CEO, and you grew up around oil, you might be biased against green tech and more comfortable with oil — but certainly possible.
Answer 3 also seems fine! The idea here is that your company got into business, 100 years ago or whatever, to do a thing: drill oil. You did the thing successfully and it made a lot of money. Now the money pours in, but the thing is in decline; there is a natural lifespan to your business, and the end is visible. Rather than fight embarrassingly against the end, you take the cash that is still coming in and you give it to your shareholders.[3]
What do they do with it? Buy groceries or yachts, I suppose, but they could also invest it. They could invest it in green energy companies? Here the idea is that other companies — green-energy startups, utility companies, I guess oil companies other than you — will be better at building green energy than you are. (Or: The idea is that your shareholders will be better at allocating capital to green-energy projects than you, an oil-company CEO, are.) You are an oil company, your employees and equipment and expertise are all optimized for finding and drilling oil, you have no great advantage in building wind farms and a sort of institutional bias against it. Give the money to shareholders and let them fund the best wind farmers they can find, instead of asking them to trust you to build a wind farm.
Anyway here is a Wall Street Journal report about how oil-and-gas shareholders want Answer 3:

Oil-and-gas companies have built up a mountain of cash with few precedents in recent history. Wall Street has a few ideas on how to spend it—and new drilling isn’t near the top of the list. ...
Even as an uncertain economic outlook has weighed on crude in 2023, making the energy sector the S&P 500’s worst performer, cash has continued flowing. Companies that previously chased growth and funneled money into speculative drilling investments, weighing down their stocks, have instead tried to appease Wall Street by boosting dividends and repurchasing shares.
The cash has helped make up for stock prices that often seesaw alongside volatile commodity markets. Steady returns also buoy an industry with an uncertain long-term outlook as governments, markets and the global economy gradually shift toward cleaner energy. …
President Biden has called on producers to ramp up output in a bid to lower prices at the pump. “These balance sheets make clear that there is nothing stopping oil companies from boosting production except their own decision to pad wealthy shareholder pockets and then sit on whatever is left,” White House Assistant Press Secretary Abdullah Hasan said. ...
“U.S. oil-and-gas producers are less focused on capital spending than they have been in years,” said Mark Young, a senior analyst at Evaluate Energy.
The cash buildup owes itself to other factors as well. Many companies have paid off debt racked up during growth mode, when they dug much of the top-tier territory for wells. While some companies have pledged huge sums to carbon-capture technology or hydrogen production, clean-energy investment has been slowed by lower expected returns and the wait for yet-to-be-finalized regulations in Mr. Biden’s climate package.

I should add that, like, pure-play wind-farm companies might have another advantage over oil companies in building wind farms: Their cost of capital might be lower. ESG investors tend to reward companies with good ESG scores (like green-energy companies) and penalize companies with bad ESG scores (like oil companies). This can have the (intended) result of lowering the cost of capital of green companies (lots of ESG investors want to buy their stock) and raising the cost of capital of polluting companies (nobody wants their stock). We talked a few weeks ago about a paper on “Counterproductive Sustainable Investing: The Impact Elasticity of Brown and Green Firms,” by Samuel Hartzmark and Kelly Shue, arguing that this has the effect of making polluting companies more short-term-focused: If your cost of capital is high, near-term projects are worth relatively more and long-term projects are worth relatively less, so you will focus on the short term. Hartzmark and Shue argue that in particular this means that polluting oil companies who get little love from ESG investors will decide to drill more oil to maximize short-term cash flows, but it does also suggest that polluting oil companies might decide to do less oil exploration and other long-term oil-focused investment, and spend more of their cash flows on stock buybacks. Your model could be something like “ESG lowers the cost of capital of green firms and raises the cost of capital of polluting firms, to encourage green firms to invest more for the long term and encourage polluting firms not to plan to stick around.” And then a lot of stock buybacks from oil firms would be a reasonable ESG outcome.
I should also say that the specific story here — oil companies are buying back stock rather than drilling more wells — does not require either an ESG perspective or a long-term view that oil is on the decline. “Last time oil prices were high, oil companies overinvested in drilling, and then prices crashed and investors lost money” is also a perfectly reasonable explanation.
One thing that I think, though, when people get angry about stock buybacks generally, is that there are probably a lot of industries like this? “We do a business, it makes money, we have a lot of money, but eventually this business will end and we won’t be good at whatever replaces it, so we might as well give the money back to shareholders so they can recycle it, instead of naïvely reinvesting in a business that can’t last forever,” is probably the right way to think about things a lot of the time!

I have it in my Schwab account and there are times when I want to move distributions from other funds into VWINX, but the $75.00 fee discourages that if the amount is not significant. That is the reason to look for another fund that is no-load.

+1 Thank you @Bobpa. It makes perfect sense put that way.
I don’t even own VWINX because Fido would hit me with a fee. From following the board many years I respect it for what it is. Has a good reputation. What I don’t do, generally, is sell a good, but underperforming fund, to buy another good, but outperforming, one. Generally, that will cost you longer term.

I probably wouldn’t replace it. All investments go through periods of overperformance and underperformance. The two alternatives you mention certainly have stellar records. INPFX gained over 38% during the 3 years from 2019 thru 2021. The likelihood of a repeat anytime soon would seem slim. That kind of outperformance leads me to suspect it is a riskier / more aggressive fund than VWINX.
If you are still spread equally across 5 different funds (per some of your earlier posts), you should be able to continue holding VWINX during a period of underperformance. Eventually, it may make up lost ground - either by outdistancing many peers during favorable markets or by declining less than them if the bear market resumes.
@Sven summed it up pretty well …

”Since everyone’s situation is unique with respect to withdrawal needs., RMD, and investment horizon, the question is more on financial planning rather than a “drop-in” replacement with a different asset allocation fund.”

It’s hard to come up with a better low-cost alternative than the highly regarded VWINX. Lots of good suggestions, In the end, it’s your decision. But changing horses mid-stream not always wise.

"Hover over the date field"... been here lord knows how many years and didn't know that. Never too old to learn.

Covering 11 years of total returns, there is not much different in the 3 you noted. Yes, they will travel slightly different paths during a 6 month or 1 year time frame, but this is the nature of management investment choices and market valuations during such periods. The largest spread over the entire time frame is 5.3% more return for WBALX vs VWINX. As noted previous; have you a serious reason to desire changing funds ?
VWINX , INPFX , and WBALX chart from May 18, 2012 to May 5, 2023.

Rummaging through old posts uncovered this from last November … Never out of date.

“Have you noticed how easy it is to tell yourself that you would be comfortable with a 10% drop in the value of your portfolio until you are seeing it losing $50,000, $100,000 or $150,000 or more . Dollars seem to have a greater impact on your tolerance.”

I decided a long time ago it’s best to view asset allocation in terms of percentages. So, theoretically, it doesn’t make any difference whether you’re managing $50,000, $500,000, or $5,000,000 when designing a portfolio and maintaining the desired allocation among different asset classes. There are some caveats: Fees tend to be higher for lesser amounts invested. And some lucrative investments may not be available for smaller sums. In that sense, dollar amounts may well influence investment decisions.
As @Bobpa correctly notes, looking at dollar sums can be gut-wrenching during falling markets as money seems to be “flying out the door”. More important, this can lead to hasty knee-jerk reactions we later regret. Another thing I noticed is that dollar sums appear to gain in importance once distributions begin. Up until then (during the working years) they’re largely “numbers” on a chart. However, once you begin spending those funds on real goods and services, your perspective changes. Suddenly you’re looking at “real” dollars in terms of what they can buy.
Post is from November 5, 2022, just a few weeks after the S&P dipped below 3,590 on October 12. That was its low for all of 2022 and lower than where it ended 2020. (Thanks @Yogibearbull for helping on the date.)

4% in PFF in the taxable. Another E ticket. No need for me to sell. I can *enjoy* the ride.
After 40 years in NORCAL, their small stake in PG&E is more concerning.

Steve retired about 11 or 12 years ago and moved from Minnesota to Maine. At the time of his recent death he was, I think, in California. So he's been out of the loop for more than a decade.
There's an argument that his departure was good for the fund, at least in the sense that the new team had an opportunity to step back, review their model and refresh it. In particular, they concluded that the historic allocation model - with something like 130 component industries - was too rigid. Implicitly the size of the fund was controlled by things like the "industrial air gases" industry. The original model said you had to have the option to take a meaningful position there but the industry group was so small that the fund had to turn away assets to keep from growing beyond the constraints imposed by its smallest potential components. The team, my understanding is, reviewed and revamped to buy themselves some flex.
For what that's worth, David

• Trading halted in shares of two more US lenders as fears of banking crisis mount
• Regional lenders such as PacWest and Western Alliance are not seen as systemically important and more consolidation is ahead
Following is a current report from The Guardian:

Shares in two more US regional banks have been suspended. Regulators moved in to halt trading in Los Angeles-based PacWest and Arizona’s Western Alliance on Thursday after they became the latest victims of an escalating crisis that began with Silicon Valley Bank in March.
The message from central banks and bank supervisors is that this is not a rerun of the global financial crisis of 2008. That may be true. With the exception of Switzerland’s Credit Suisse, European banks have escaped the turmoil. It is specific US banks that are the problem.
There are a number of reasons for that: the business models of the banks concerned; failures of regulation; the large number of small and mid-sized banks in the US; and the rapid increase in interest rates from the country’s central bank, the Federal Reserve.
Luis de Guindos, vice-president of the European Central Bank (ECB), remarked on Thursday that “the European banking industry has been clearly outperforming the American one”. Although he will be praying his words do not come back to haunt him, he is broadly right. European banks, including those in the UK, do look more secure than those in the US – primarily because they tend to be bigger and more tightly regulated.
Despite being the 16th biggest bank in the US, Silicon Valley Bank was not considered systemically important and so was less stringently regulated than institutions viewed by federal regulators to be more pivotal. Many of its customers were not covered by deposit insurance and were heavily exposed to losses on US Treasury bonds as interest rates rose. The other banks that failed subsequently have tended to share many of the same characteristics: they were regionally based and are vulnerable to rising borrowing costs.
Unless the Fed rides to the rescue with cuts in interest rates, the options are: amalgamation, regulation or more banks going bust. The response of the US authorities suggests little appetite for a laissez-faire approach.
According to official data, the US has more than 4,000 banks – an average of 80 for each of the 50 states. The number has fallen by more than two-thirds since the peak of more than 14,000 in the early 1980s, but there is certainly room for greater consolidation. In an age of instant internet bank runs, customers will be attracted to the idea that big is beautiful.
The US authorities certainly do not seem averse to further amalgamation. When First Republic ran into trouble, it was seized by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and its deposits and assets were sold to one of the giants of US banking – JP Morgan Chase. Inevitably, there will be more takeovers and fire sales of assets as alternatives to bank failures. It is reasonable to assume that in 10 years’ time the number of US banks will be considerably smaller than it is today.
What’s more, the banks that remain – including those that are not taken over – are likely to be more tightly regulated and more closely supervised. Even if the Fed, the ECB and the Bank of England are right and a repeat of the global financial crisis has been averted, lessons are already being learned.

@jafink63- Well sir, you did all of the right stuff on your way to retirement. Obviously you paid attention to your expenses, and saved adequately as you were able. Likely some degree of luck was also involved... it certainly was with us.
With respect to how you choose to place your investments, I'd say that since you're still quite young in your sixties, your current scheme seems quite reasonable to me. Even if the next few years are turbulent, you still have plenty of time to recover. We, in our eighties, are looking at a much more conservative approach, thus the choice of income instruments.
Carry on!

To me, the question isn't just of efficacy, but whether the government can force these pharamaceutical companies to lower their drug costs? Somehow I don't think a year's worth of this drug costs $25,000 to $58,000 to manufacture. I wonder what the profit margins will be on it, even after factoring in the R&D costs? If it's effective even somewhat, that matters. One thing I would add is the current annual cost of a private room in a nursing home is $108,408: https://health.usnews.com/best-nursing-homes/articles/how-to-pay-for-nursing-home-costs It is sad but true that the most expensive nursing home patients are ones with Alzheimer's as they can be physically healthy otherwise, but still be mentally unfit to care for themselves, becoming both a danger to themselves and others. So, unlike most elderly patients, they can end up in nursing homes for many months or even years. As strange as this sounds, the medicine, if it works, would be cheaper.