Howdy, Stranger!

It looks like you're new here. If you want to get involved, click one of these buttons!

Here's a statement of the obvious: The opinions expressed here are those of the participants, not those of the Mutual Fund Observer. We cannot vouch for the accuracy or appropriateness of any of it, though we do encourage civility and good humor.
  • Holding High Yield/High Income funds.....take note !
    Howdy JR,
    Yes, to your above and I noted other related weakness. However, I do believe the edge placed again towards a problematic "fix" for Greece and related side effects that will show for and against Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Italy are also putting more pressure in this area. Many big institutions have monies and/or insurance hanging in the balance as to fixing a most serious problem with the least amount of financial damage. I am not so sure this will be able to come to pass. The CDS rates having been moving up again in bond areas; and the remainder of the unknowns going forward with the rest of the global economy are all placing pressures.
    We have held the HY/HI for more than 2 years and have a decent NAV cushion; but of course, none of us want to find our money going backwards.
    As always, your insight and comments are most welcome; and I am pleased to know you are still reading through the messages. Thank you again and don't be a stranger here.
    Take care of you and yours,
    Mark/Catch
  • Portfolio Risk Mitigation Summary
    MJG:
    I appreciate your recent expositions. I realize now that I have tacitly assumed that you had in place a rigorous, entirely quantitative system for selecting investments and monitoring your portfolio -- a one man financial engineering approach. The nuanced account you give above (with historical perspective on your continuous modifications of your methods and investments) provide a perspective to which an individual investor of more modest experience and ambition can relate.
    The models, Monte Carlo methods and the rest of your analytic apparatus help you take a deliberate approach. They enable you to "measure twice, cut once" in your portfolio construction. You have many analytic tools in your toolkit; you use them to assist your judgment, not substitute for it.
    This is a useful insight for a person like me, who is a lot earlier on the learning curve.
    Cheers.
    gfb
  • investors w/drew 3 billions from funds in may [some ot and some not not]
    http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9NR6OMG1.htm
    when picking mf - follow the $
    http://www.financial-planning.com/news/mutual-funds-analysis-follow-the-money-inflows-2673802-1.html
    Top Picks of Guru Robert Bruce's Mutual Fund
    http://seekingalpha.com/article/273671-top-picks-of-guru-robert-bruce-s-mutual-fund
    follow the money
    http://www.financial-planning.com/news/mutual-funds-analysis-follow-the-money-inflows-2673802-1.html
    the high [and hidden costs] of your 401
    http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/11/your-money/401ks-and-similar-plans/11money.html?pagewanted=print
    Gloomy year for US asset - MF managers
    http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2011-06-10/gloomy-year-for-us-asset-managers
    your decisions isnt over until your TDF mature
    http://www.boston.com/business/personalfinance/articles/2011/06/05/your_decisions_arent_over_when_your_target_date_funds_mature/?page=full
    Malcolm Gissen: When selecting stocks, he knows no boundaries
    http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20110605/REG/306059978
    position your portfolio for US export bloom
    http://seekingalpha.com/article/273389-positioning-your-portfolio-for-a-u-s-export-boom
    top rank fund is bullish on commodities
    http://www.thestreet.com/story/11144281/1/top-ranked-fund-is-bullish-on-commodities.html?cm_ven=GOOGLEN
    why commodities should belong in your portfolio [marketwatch article]
    http://www.menafn.com/qn_news_story.asp?storyid={4514CC82-91FC-11E0-AE1C-002128049AD6}
    roundtable/Marc Faber's picks
    http://wallstcheatsheet.com/trading/barrons-2011-roundtable-investor-picks-marc-faber.html/
    10 HY large caps for your portfolio
    http://wallstcheatsheet.com/trading/10-high-dividend-stocks-for-large-cap-investors.html/
    govt must act to avoid another crisis ?!
    http://www.cnbc.com/id/43409151
    top 10 HY funds w/ low risks
    http://www.thestreet.com/story/11153278/1/10-top-high-yield-funds-with-low-risk.html
    E.JONES' GREEK COMMENTARY -
    The Impact of Greek Debt Issues
    Global markets are reacting as investors nervously watch Greece, with protests heightening in opposition to additional austerity measures. Renewed concerns intensified over the possibility of a looming Greek default as discussions between Greek officials and the European Union (EU) and IMF have failed to reach a compromise on a new rescue plan for Greece's debt troubles. EU officials said a bailout agreement was unlikely to be passed at a summit next week, and may be delayed until mid-July.
    While we can't be certain these debt issues are only short-term worries, we believe European countries have the capacity to address the problems. Many European countries have announced austerity plans to cut government spending -- amidst public protests -- and have taken initial steps to address some of their short-term and long-term issues. It's important to remember that, combined, Greece, Ireland and Portugal represent only about 5% of the eurozone economy. However, we've learned that small problems sometimes have larger impacts.
    In our view, worries about European debt and slow economic growth are likely to emerge periodically over the next few years and, in turn, trigger episodes of short-term market volatility. It's difficult not to worry about these issues, especially after the market's recent ups and downs, but our advice is to stay invested and review your investments to see if they are appropriately balanced. This may also be an opportunity to add stocks at lower prices, if appropriate.
  • Portfolio Risk Mitigation Summary
    Hi Guys,
    Thanks for reading and responding to my postings.
    Mike, your assessment of my basic investment philosophy and policy is spot-on.
    Investor, your commitment to better understanding the investment universe is outstanding, and it pleases me that I am a small part of it.
    I characterize myself as a buy-and-hold investor, with very few speculative tendencies. However, I am a student of Jack Welch’s 20-70-10 employee evaluation strategy. He granted disproportionate rewards to the 20 % of his workforce that likely generated 80 % of the firm’s output. He gave the central 70 % a cost of living increment. Finally, Welch enforced firing the bottom 10 % of performers each year. I fire one or two fund managers each year in an attempt to improve the overall quality of my portfolio holdings incrementally.
    So although I trade infrequently (like once or twice a year), I do that task based on multi-year mutual fund performance assessments or fund management judgments.
    When I started investing in the mid-1950s, I was a committed chartist. The very first investment book I bought, studied, and applied was Edwards and Magee’s “Technical Analysis of Stock Trends”. I now own an extensive economics/financial/investment library that is more heavily weighted with books that promote a more fundamentals-based approach.
    I truly believe that there are 1001 ways to successfully participate in the marketplace. There is no dominating golden rule that guarantees success. The world changes, styles mutate, and established methods need updating, and sometimes major revision or even complete rejection.
    A growing fraction of academia now favors a newly-minted Mean Reversion hypothesis instead of the honored Random Walk hypothesis to explain market return series. Change and understanding happens.
    Since everything evolves, it is prudent to maintain a flexible mindset in all investment decisions. I attempt to ferret-out the most promising aspects of the various approaches, and integrate them into my policies and procedures. I do all this informally without rigid mechanical rules.
    Many leadership gurus believe that the pathway to success to be emotionally energized with an edge. My edge is to adapt what I perceive as the best parts of technical analyses to augment a fundamental approach.
    So my investment procedures are a mixed bag of both technical and fundamental factors. So as an illustration of this compromise, although I do not consider myself a chartist, I do employ charts to summarize data, and as an aid to the decision-making process. I scan rather then study and draw projection lines on a chart.
    I am neither a technical purist or a fundamental purist. Elements of both these camps are in almost any selection criteria we choose to use. The basic components of my factors are composed of fundamental value elements, sometimes embedded into a technically-oriented framework. Often, definitions are confusing and puzzling.
    For example, most would accept the S&P 500 Index P/E ratio as a fundamental value measurement of the equity marketplace. However, if you compare that against historical averages, or if you contrast the inverted P/E ratio against the 10-year corporate bond yield, some purists would claim you are deploying technical analysis. Both perspectives are valid.
    Many parameters selected to complement investment decisions are bastardized in some manner. They represent a mixture of both fundamental and technical considerations. The industry’s tautology is kind of arbitrary, and serves no useful purpose. However, as I documented earlier, I do consider myself more fundamentally-inclined then technically-oriented. Even that loose and purposely vague admission morphs with time and circumstances.
    I can not quote you the performance of my portfolio over time as a function of the six-factor model that I summarized in my earlier posting. I have not back-tested it. My dynamic X-factor model is under constant revision and has gotten more complex. However, I do use it to inform my investment decisions based on its current status at decision time.
    For more then two decades, I reviewed the government Yield curve and the S&P 500 Index moving averages to guide equity allocation commitments. About a decade ago, I started looking at the Greenspan-Yardeni Inverted P/E ratio/10-year treasury relative return positioning to supplement my allocation decisions in a very informal way. For the last two years, I have monitored and added the AAII Sentiment indicator to my decision matrix.
    Merely two months ago, I incorporated the M2 money supply signal into my decision-making array. Mine is an evolving tool kit. My knowledge, prejudices, and preferences are constantly maturing, and so have my market trend indicators.
    I have adjusted my action plans as I have integrated these factors into my portfolio management efforts. Consequently, I have not calculated a track record relative to its incremental performance on my portfolio. I suspect that the procedure outperforms a pure buy-and-hold strategy, but I can not prove that assertion. Hope is eternal.
    I have incrementally adjusted my portfolio asset allocations for a decade now based on the threshold signals and the strength of these guiding signals. Unfortunately the model itself has not been invariant during this timeframe.
    I think everyone should endorse flexibility when managing their portfolios, and should also tolerate a huge array of management tools. Each has their separate and distinctive place in managing and mitigating portfolio risk.
    Having a somewhat mechanical macroeconomic/investment model enforces a discipline and structure to the otherwise arbitrary and emotional investment decision process. I think it reduces the fear factor.
    Best Wishes.
  • Risk Measures
    [Haven't tried it yet, but is closest that I can find so far. Will miss RG. - Ira]
    --------------------------------------------------------
    What do you think about this: FundGrades (https://www.fundgrades.com/Default.aspx)
    >>OVERALL METHODOLOGY: (https://www.fundgrades.com/Overall.aspx)
    Grading Information: Overall Honor Roll
    "There is no free lunch!
    Each grading element is designed to recognize attributes that are appealing and yet also expose risks that less sophisticated systems would ignore. Maybe a fund is graded highly for risk and return, yet it received that high grade due to one lucky month (that wasn't the norm) or by making a huge gamble that happened to pay off...this time."
    >>RELATIVE RISK: (https://www.fundgrades.com/RelativeRisk.aspx)
    "Here is how the risk grades work. Say a fund's best fitting benchmark is Large Cap Blend (like the S&P 500). Also, assume that over some period of time the S&P 500 had a standard deviation (a measure of the volatility of returns) of 10%. If a fund's volatility matched the benchmark within 1% of the benchmark's standard deviation (i.e. 1% X 10% = 0.10% or 9.90% to 10.10%) it is graded average, or C as you would expect for a fund closely tracking the asset class return, such as an index fund for that same asset class."
    >>DIVERSIFICATION: (https://www.fundgrades.com/Diversification.aspx)
    "The first step in our grading methodology is to measure how closely a fund behaves like any one of over thirty different asset classes covering domestic blend, value, growth, and large, mid, small and micro cap, foreign developed, world and emerging markets, taxable government, corporate, high yield and tax exempt fixed income of varying maturities, balanced (a blend of stocks and bonds) and finally, real estate as well. "
    >>ABOUT: https://www.fundgrades.com/About.aspx
    "FUNDGRADES® is an independent proprietary research methodology developed by Financeware, Inc. and the staff of its SEC Registered Investment Adviser (DBA Wealthcare Capital Management). There are no affiliations with any fund providers, broker dealers or investment management firms that manage funds...only independent, objective perspectives.
    Wealthcare Capital Management uses these screening criteria in providing its fiduciary services to ERISA and advisory clients and exposes the criteria and results on the FUNDGRADES® site as a free educational service. Data is provided to Financeware by Thomson/Reuters, one of the largest financial data providers in the world."
  • Portfolio Risk Mitigation Summary
    Hi Guys,
    I was anticipating some heat from Forum participants challenging me for being far too presumptive and arrogant with regard to my personal risk control mechanisms during a market meltdown. My signals feature technically-oriented parameters.
    So I braced for charges that never materialized. I steeled myself by recalling an old adage often cited by US airmen during World War II: “If you are not taking flak, you are not on target.” But the flak was totally missing. Perhaps I was off target.
    I want to thank those Forum members who did respond in a reasoned, an informative and a kind way. I really do appreciate your contributions to the discussion. That type of interaction stimulates learning, and learning helps sharpen market understanding and decision making. That was my sole purpose. I was aspiring for far more diverse and energetic responses, accompanied with high emotions and sharp edges. In that respect, I fell short of my expectations.
    While reading and reflecting on the few replies, I am reminded of a notable quote offered by Warren Buffett at one of his recent Berkshire Hathaway stockholder annual sessions. The quote went something like this: “There is so much that’s false and nutty in modern investing practice and modern investment banking. If you just reduce the nonsense, that’s a goal you should reasonably hope for.”
    I suspect that much of what is “false and nutty” is related to overly complex modeling and imprudently assembled financial products. These models and products have generated false myths and uninspired (sometimes downright disastrous) portfolio performance.
    Remember the heavily promoted Nifty-Fifty growth stocks in the late 1950s and their ultimate collapse in the 1960s. I fell victim to that irrational exuberance.
    And remember academia-driven Portfolio Insurance in the 1980s that failed so miserably to protect portfolios in the October 1987 sudden equity crash. I escaped that trap.
    Recall the Real Estate bubble in the late 80s with its heavy-handed S&L involvement and its subsequent dramatic unwinding in the early 1990s. I had enough reserves and geographic diversity to outlast that systemic failure.
    The Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) debacle in 1998 is yet another illustration of an academically encouraged strategy that resulted in the demise of that organization because of excessive leverage, and a failure to regression-to-the-mean modeling in a timely manner. I never even knew this problem existed before its final resolution.
    Of course, we are still trying to recover from the current housing crisis that in part was encouraged by faulty Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) designs and sold by profit hungry institutional banking agencies. The holdings were not independent of each other as assumed, and the statistics were not normally (Bell curve) distributed as postulated. I avoided the specific CDO snake pit, but, of course, its synergistic impact of the overall economy persists.
    Learning by doing is always the best classroom, especially when investing. As Jesse Livermore said about a century ago, “The game taught me the game. And it didn’t spare me the rod while teaching.”
    Also, Jesse observed that “The game does not change and neither does human nature.” And finally, from Livermore, who experienced both the rewards of prescience market calls, and the destitute of bankruptcy from failed calls: “The speculator’s deadly enemies are: ignorance, greed, fear and hope.” The marketplace is a hard teacher.
    By the way, it is a pity that Jesse Livermore committed suicide. He died a poor, lonely, broken man.
    I believe that some of the industry’s and academia’s sophisticated models do offer some detailed structural insights, but they also often fail to capture the market’s major trends. At times, modeling simplifications can uncover that fundamental trending more successfully than more complex models. Also, these more simple formulations are accessible and deployable by private investors, thus permitting them to make their own judgments and decisions.
    Several well recognized aphorisms nicely summarize my overarching viewpoints on this matter.
    “Common sense is not all that common.” Continuous learning is a necessary ingredient to enlarge an investor’s financial and investment acumen and databases. It’s the price we pay for participation in the marketplace if we harbor any prospects for success in that enterprise.
    “If it gets measured, it gets done.” Private investors must gain familiarity with a few market yardsticks if they expect to capture average or above average returns. Otherwise, they are an unexpected volunteer victim to the professional market hucksters and their media enablers who shamelessly tout them and their products. We can do better then that with just a little awareness and effort.
    “None of us are as smart as all of us.” So let’s keep the communication links, open, on a friendly basis, and at a high, principled level. Your contributions will not only be helpful to others, but will focus and crystallize your own thinking on any investment issue that you address. Constructive group leadership is superior to individual leadership on any topic.
    An early recognition and reaction to global market trends is an indispensable tool that serves to protect and preserve our retirement portfolios. Enough said; just apply history’s sometimes ignored lessons learned. Stay alert everyone.
    Best Regards.
  • An Informal Recession/market Trend Model
    Thank MJG,
    Having an exit strategy whether its an all out fire ( I presently own RIMM) or a smoldering smokey stock market (all my other fund equity holdings at this time) is probably more important to me than my buy decisions. I enjoy your analytic thoughts which seem based on money (oops...many) hours of research as well as reflection. Thanks for the concrete math and the links.
    As an involved investor I am attempting to strike a balance between over simplification and too many data points. In this economy I try to remind myself of the saying:
    "Can't see the forest for the trees"
    Our present economy (the forest) has many more species (markets and market manipulators), weather extremes (potential black swans) and decision makers (political forest rangers, market analysts, financial pundits). I try to remind myself that sometimes the health of a forest may require a lightning strike and fire to release new seeds.
    Like the animals of the woodlands we need the tools to know when it is time to step out of the forest and let nature take its course.
    Thanks for sharing some of your sell signal strategies with us.
  • Wait and Hope
    Fantastic read. "The fact that the U.S. finds itself in its current predicament really ticks me off. Cathartic moments and beneficial change can occur after experiencing great pain. As a nation, we had a chance following the financial crisis, but blew it." Exactly, and now it's too late (I think.)
  • An Informal Recession/market Trend Model
    Hi Guys,
    I am surprised that a flood of Forum protest postings did not materialize following my submittal of a single parameter Recession probability Projection (RPP) model. The RPP uses the government bond yield curve as its only independent input parameter.
    The reason for my expected Forum blowback was that I included a quote from Albert Einstein cautioning that although simplification is a worthy goal, it must be tempered by not oversimplifying.
    Economic and investment markets have been rigorously studied for decades, less rigorously for centuries. More recently, I reviewed Jack Ablin’s “Reading Minds and Markets” which explores the same concepts in a less formal manner. The fundamental goal is to identify and use a few econometric and market indicators to signal broad market direction.
    Rudyard Kipling notably said: “ There are 9 and 60 ways of constructing tribal lays, and every single one of them is right!” Indeed.
    So there are many ways to skin a cat; there are many ways to forecast market trends. With so many comprehensive models in play there are benefits to be gained with simplification to this 3-ring circus. Therefore, although I reported a one factor model in my earlier posting, I now unveil an expanded Recession Equity Assessment Model (REAM).
    In its expanded form, my present REAM also trades on a multi-dimensional analysis to project equity market direction. By only referencing the Fed Yield curve model, I am potentially vulnerable to oversimplification shortcomings.
    Most private investors do not have the resources or time that professional money managers can commit. So a practical multi-factor equity market trend model must be less data intensive, less mathematically dense, and less sophisticated then the models used by financial wizards.
    I decided to incorporate six factors in my composite recession/market trend model. For each factor, rather than examining a plethora of indicators to characterize each factor, I elected to choose a single metric for that characterization. All the metrics I employ are readily available to all investors. I also elected to construct a weighting scale of these factors with regard to any portfolio adjustments when a directional change is predicted.
    The six factors are: (1) Fiscal, (2) Valuation, (3) Momentum, (4) Macroeconomic, (5) Liquidity, and (6) Sentiment (Psychology). A single metric is used to measure the state of each factor with respect to the directional likelihood of the equity marketplace.
    The Fiscal factor is considered dominant; the Valuation and Momentum factors are rated primary; the other 3 factors are ranked supplementary. Portfolio realignment percentages are scaled according to these classifications.
    The yield curve is the metric used when assessing the Fiscal (1) factor. That’s a precise adoption of the referenced NY Fed model. The only inputs needed are the 10-year Treasury note and the 3-month Treasury bill current yields. If the yield difference between these two bonds becomes less then 0.22 percent, a deteriorating market is signaled. Based on that signal, my equity holdings will be reduced by 20 % and moved to a short duration fixed income product like Vanguard’s Short-Term Corporate bond fund, VFSUX.
    The Fed yield model is one of two key mandatory action signals. The other is the Momentum factor to be discussed later. These immediately generate trading activity. The other factors are not acted upon unless one of these two factors penetrate their respective threshold levels.
    A primary factor in the model is the Valuations (2) parameter. Is the market underpriced or overpriced? I use the Greenspan-Yardeni Inverted Yield metric for this assessment with a few slight modifications. Instead of comparing the inverted P/E curve for the equity proxy against the 10-year treasury, I use the Barclay 10-year corporate bond yield. I use the average between the S&P 500 Index P/E current and P/E projected ratios as a proxy for the marketplace. When the Barclay yield exceeds the equity yield, the equity market is deemed overpriced. A 15 % portfolio adjustment into fixed income is executed.
    The Momentum (3) factor is evaluated by examining the difference between the 65-day and the 200-day S&P 500 Index moving average plots. The momentum metric is a primary factor and controls, along with the Fiscal factor, if the signals from the other four factors will be implemented. If the 65-day moving average penetrates the 200-day data series on the downside, a sell signal is generated. The reverse is actionable on a surging equity market. A 15 % portfolio realignment is executed if this test is satisfied.
    The Macroeconomics (4) factor is addressed by recognizing the year-over-year real (adjusted for inflation) GDP growth rate. Historically, US government demographics data support a 1 % annual population growth rate. Therefore, the real GDP growth rate must exceed that level for a marginally healthy economic environment. If the 1 % GDP growth rate is not achieved, a recession and/or poor market performance is expected. If that condition is recorded, a 10 % portfolio reallocation is made into fixed income holdings. The GDP growth rate data is easily accessed on the Bureau of Economic Analysis website.
    The Liquidity (5) factor is assessed by comparing the M2 money supply annual growth rate against the most recent year-over-year actual GDP growth rate that includes inflation. If the M2 rate falls below the real GDP growth rate, money is tight and the economy is likely to be constrained. That is a negative scenario. A 10 % portfolio shift downward from equity positions to short term fixed income holdings is dictated. This again is a supplemental realignment dependent upon the direction of the Fiscal and Momentum factors. The St. Louis Fed website provides monthly M2 money supply updates.
    Market Sentiment (6) is the final factor in the model. The metric I selected to represent the evasive market psychology is the AAII Sentiment Indicator which reflects the weekly feelings of about 100,000 participating members. I use this as a contrarian’s signal. The data is readily available for free on the AAII website. The model contrasts the current bullish percentage against the historical average. The historical average is about 31 % and changes slowly. If the bullish sentiment exceeds that level, I interpret this finding as a overly optimistic popular judgment. The herd usually overreacts. If the 31 % is exceeded I convert 10 % of my equity positions into fixed income units. Again, this factor is conditional upon the Fiscal and Momentum elements.
    That’s it; that’s the complete package. The required data to score the factors is accessible on the Internet. The analyses demand a little research and simple arithmetical calculations.
    You probably noticed that the sum of all the portfolio realignments do not total 100 %. That’s by design. I have a firm belief that the market always behaves with residual uncertainty and with worrisome unknowns. Therefore, my portfolio is never completely without some equity positions. If all six factors are triggered in the direction of a market meltdown, I still plan to retain about 20 % of my original equity positions.
    Note that the percentages that I quoted in earlier paragraphs pertain to the equity portion of a diversified portfolio.
    Today, a scoring of the six-factor REAM formulation all signal no recession and reasonably positive equity market prospects. Therefore, I am presently in a holding pattern. However, some trend lines do not appear promising. I suspect dark horizons, and finding a safe harbor after the storm arrives is sometimes challenging.
    I’m sure many of you use more elegant and more sophisticated tools then those that I outlined in this posting. I’m still trying to simplify.
  • Asian Dividends | News, etc.
    WSJ: Funds with Maximum Flexibility
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703421204576329423615516668.html?mod=WSJ_PersonalFinance_PF14
    Having that kind of flexibility gives go-anywhere funds the ability to "cover a lot of ground that I can't," says veteran financial planner Vern Hayden, who says he doesn't have the resources to stay on top of so many markets and regions. Mr. Hayden allocates as much as 50% of his clients' assets at Hayden Wealth Management to these types of funds.
  • Recession Forecasting to Control Risk
    Hi Guys,
    A few weeks ago, I suggested that a top-down, econometric-driven approach to making investment decisions might be beneficial to many Forum members. If you favor an aggressive frequent trading policy, this type of analyses is definitely not your cup of tea.
    I’m sure everyone has been exposed to the financial communities warnings that by missing just a few of the best performing days, irreparable damage would do violence to your portfolio. Of course, these same sell-side hucksters often omit demonstrating the very positive portfolio impact on returns that missing the worst performing days would similarly produce. Both presentations are just bad science. The likelihood of either event series happening is near zero, and it is a worthless exercise to worry about a nonevent.
    Market timing can have a major impact on end wealth, especially when considering the basic equity/fixed income portfolio asset allocation mix. A prudent question is: How does an amateur investor accomplish this task with respectable reliability? The market unknowns and uncertainties will never be fully eliminated. This smells like a job for probability theory and statistical analyses.
    Several models have been developed and updated for many decades that confront this issue. I have often mentioned, but not to endorse, such a model proposed and developed by Elaine Garzarelli. After some initial successes, her predictions have recorded mixed results in more recent market stress tests.
    Garzarelli’s market timing model includes 14 separate indicators. These 14 signaling components are grouped into 4 equally weighted sectors. The four groupings reflect Cyclical, Monetary, Value, and Market Sentiment factors.
    The Cyclical group contains industrial production and corporate earnings measurements. The Monetary group consists of seven elements related to monetary policy such as interest rates, yield curves, and money supply. The Value group is comprised of inverted composite corporate earnings yield-to-interest rate metrics and P/E equations. The Sentiment group incorporates surveys of the number of bullish financial advisors and mutual fund cash levels. All this is very complex with a lot of computer-driven, numbers crunching, linear curve fitting analytics.
    More simple models do exist and have demonstrated reasonable prediction accuracy. As Albert Einstein remarked: “Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not one bit simpler. ”
    A much simpler method is to deploy moving averages to modify the baseline equity/fixed income mix. Simply increase the fixed income allocation when an equity market proxy like the S&P 500 Index price record penetrates below its 200-day moving average, and reverse the adjustment when the penetration is in the opposite direction.
    An alternate path to forecasting market behavior is to explore corporate earnings growth rate possibilities. Excluding speculative perturbations (which in excess contribute to the creation of bubbles and panics), earnings growth directly impacts the fundamental returns delivered by the equity markets.
    A tight correlation exists between corporate profits and GDP growth rate. So, if GDP growth rate could be reliably forecasted, then tightly-linked market movements could be accurately assessed. The simplest definition of a recession is two consecutive quarters of negative GDP growth rate. Therefore, if we can reliably project an upcoming recession, we can anticipate poor equity market performance.
    One challenging alternate portfolio realignment approach is to adjust the top-tier asset allocation holdings as a function of a recession probability projection (RPP). There are many complex models used to complete that RPP analysis. None are totally reliable signaling instruments.
    One such RPP model has been developed and updated by Credit Suisse. Credit Suisse (CS) wisely cautions that “ modeling is an aid to judgment, not a substitute for it.” That’s a very perceptive warning for any complex econometric model. A paper that summarizes the CS analytical approach is found at the following confusing and extended address:
    http://doc.research-and-analytics.csfb.com/docView?language=ENG&source=ulg&format=PDF&document_id=856579291&serialid=ZXa19to77uOvxxu3QDrFZhjlKfCBy8H58U1BxvxgQG4=
    The CS construction is representative of a host of competing formulations; I have no idea of the relative accuracy or the false signal frequency of these alternate RPP models or even of the CS model itself.
    The CS model includes 7 factors like the Fed Funds rate, S&P 500 percentage change, payroll growth, housing permits, consumer expectations, jobless claims, the TED short term interest rate spread, and relative energy prices. Most of the required input data is entered for either 6-month periods or year-over-year changes.
    Some modelers use over two hundred signal generators. I have no idea how they handle this data overload condition. I get confused when the factors reach the high single digit level, and become seriously suspicious over potential data mining contamination.
    I prefer a modern form of Occam’s Razor: The simplest explanation (read model) is usually the most robust and reliable. Simple RPP models also exist.
    The New York Fed has examined the recession forecasting issue extensively. They have examined several independent variables to guide a recession prediction, and have concluded that “in predicting recessions two or more quarters in the future, the yield curve dominates the other variables.”
    They conclude that: “The yield curve – specifically the spread between the interest rates on the ten-year treasury note and the three-month Treasury bill – is a valuable forecasting tool.”
    To examine their findings and judge if it is a candidate to be added to your decision-making toolbox, I suggest you access this summary paper:
    http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues/ci2-7.pdf
    The Fed’s correlation suggests that if the spread decreases to 0.22 % (almost flat yield curve), the probability of recession climbs to 20 %. This value was extracted from a table published in the referenced paper. Recently, in applying that model from 1960 to 2010 the NY Fed calculated 11 recession signals. All 8 recessions recorded in that timeframe were correctly identified. However, three false signals were triggered. Nothing in the econometric modeling arena is perfect.
    I personally check this single parameter Fed model at least on a weekly basis. The requisite data are commonly available in any daily newspaper’s financial section. It is yet another excellent illustration of Occam’s Razor in action.
    Of course none of these methods and techniques are flawless. Since some residual uncertainty always remains, I make my equity/fixed income mix adjustments incrementally over time and more energetically as the probabilities depart from the threshold 20 % recession probability tipping point that I established for my purposes based on the referenced study. You get to choose your own tipping point.
    The overarching goal is to control and mitigate risk. This approach will attenuate the downside dangers that are always present and ready to take a huge bite from end wealth accumulation. The simple mathematics are such that recovering from any percentage loss requires a yet higher percentage gain. Investing is never easy, so…….
    Simplicity is always good.
    By the way, current application of the techniques outlined in this submittal (even the more complex formulations) conclude that the probabilities of a near-term recession are low, single digit. That’s comforting given the declining economic indicators and the exacerbating nature of recent market performance. But none of these techniques are foolproof.
    Best Regards.
  • Janus Protected Series-Growth JPGDX- 20% downside protection.
    Morn'in,
    I have not read thru the prospectus; but if this fund and similar were an offering of my company, I know that my bean counters and the math computers would have figured every angle to protect me (the company), too.
    I also presume there must be an insurance product behind this for the protection.
    This is all well and good in "normal" times; but I do believe that a worse case scenario would put on in a long line for a payout of any insurance product.
    I tracked the actions of a very large insurance company during the financial melt that holds many investment portfolios. This company was able to purchase (at the very last days) a small/failing savings & loan so that the ins. co. could be elegible for TARP/TALF monies from the Fed. programs; as the ins. co. had its monetary fanny hanging out to far and continued and a deeper economic problem during the 2008/2009 would have placed them and their customer base in peril with the lack of an ability to pay acct holders.
    I am sure the prospectus only contains language to the effect that none of one's monies is "really" guaranteed by anything but full faith and credit on the ability of the company(s) to honor the return of invested monies.
    There are those who will point out similar protections for any insurance products via state mandates. This may indeed be true; but had the 2008 melt gone further down hill; most insurance product holders would still be in line to get "their" money.
    Last week, Prudential had its first customer (I recall a pension program) in Floride with some similar "guarantee" via a "product". Related somewhat to this is a recent report that annuity sales are up some 34% or there abouts this past 12 months. The market melt has been a large blessing for those in the insurance products business.
    My two cents worth on a one cup of coffee start.
    OUR house will continue to attempt our own downside risk/guarantee program through knowledge.
    Thank you for the post...........always some interesting products coming to the market, eh???
    Regards,
    Catch
  • Questions on OSTIX and HABDX...
    Howdy Shosta,
    Not that you don't know; but we may find the general and sometimes specific prospectus guidelines the only "psuedo" gauge of what a multi sector bond fund may be or become.
    M* and Bloomberg and surely among other services too have a most difficult time of establishing and/or to classify a multi sector fund of any flavor.
    The only near guage I/we are able to use at this house is to allow M* to attempt to find a holdings style pattern for a fund and give a reference by perctentage of the last known holdings for the fund, which may be 3 months out of date.
    Fido's new Global High Income Fund FGHNX does give one an upfront name that indicates the direction of the fund; but the guidelines here have a lot of latitude for what % makeup may be on any given date:
    "Strategy:
    Normally investing primarily in income producing debt securities, preferred stocks, and convertible securities, with an emphasis on lower-quality debt securities, of U.S. and non-U.S. issuers, including emerging market countries. Potentially investing in non-income producing securities, including defaulted securities and common stocks. Investing in companies in troubled or uncertain financial condition. Allocating investments across different countries and regions. Investing in securities issued anywhere in the world, including potentially significant investments in U.S. issuers. Using a base neutral mix of approximately 60% U.S. high yield, 20% emerging markets debt, 15% European high yield, and 5% Asian high yield. Adjusting allocation among markets within the following ranges: U.S. high yield (40%-80%); emerging markets debt (5%-35%); European high yield (0%-30%); and Asian high yield (0%-10%)."
    PTTRX Pimco Total Return is generally noted as an intermediate term bond fund; but I sure would like to be in the room for buys/sells for about 30 days to find the real actions.
    Regards,
    Catch
  • Picking Alternative to Fairholme a Challenge
    Yacktman is not an apples-to-apples comparison, but I think that's fairly close and I think a more conservative concentrated fund. Additionally, while it has not had a good year this year either, there is also investing with Berkowitz enemy and partial Mets owner David Einhorn via Greenlight Reinsurance (GLRE), although that is a roundabout way of investing with Einhorn. Fairfax Financial Holdings (FRFHF.PK) is another roundabout insurance company investment, this time with Canadian value investor Prem Watsa. While Fairfax has not done quite as well recently, it did manage to avoid the credit crisis entirely, rising 11% in 2008. The only issue with Fairfax: it is nearly $400 a share. Still, Watsa and Einhorn are highly regarded investors and Fairfax and Greenlight RE are an indirect way to invest with both.
  • More Forecasting Follies
    Hi Greg,
    Thank you for your perceptive comments and penetrating questions. You have it exactly right. I have a continuing and healthy skepticism with regard to anyone’s ability to forecast future market behavior with any persistent level of accuracy.
    I freely admit that I should be included in that dubious cohort. I suspect all private and professional investors, with a few rare and somewhat lucky exceptions, belong in that grouping.
    But, if you invest in the marketplace, forward looking projections are required, regardless of their inherent, inaccurate nature, and their many historical failures. How else are investment decisions to be made?
    I surely can claim many such forecasting failures. Mostly, I continue the exercise to identify market direction for the coming year, not absolute returns. The absolute return aspect of my analysis is more a by-product of the study, and not my primary takeaway. Asset Allocation decisions demand some imprecise prediction of expected returns for the major category holdings.
    I do not fully trust these low fidelity projections because of their lack of precision, not because the purveyors are charlatans. The uncertainties in the requisite inputs dominate the analysis outcome, and should cause all investors to pause and reflect. But some estimates are needed.
    I attempted to indicate my softness on forecasters by introducing the topic with the three quotes that I selected to demonstrate the low regard I hold for these overtaxed and overly hyped souls. The title of my submission is also a giveaway to my feelings.
    Perhaps a sidebar is needed to explain why I generated this forecast at this particular time. The back-story is as follows.
    I infrequently give an investment talk to a small group (like 30 expected) of senior citizens. I am scheduled to deliver one such talk next week, and am preparing. My posting reflects some of the data and points that I will make at this meeting. I often make my preparations do double duty.
    I’ve done this several times in the past, and have usually been disappointed by the Q&A session that follows the presentation. I attempt to present a top-down approach that identifies and summarizes general market returns, macroeconomic conditions, market momentum, valuation metrics, and investor (professional and private) sentiments.
    Most session participants are relatively unsophisticated, but reasonably wealthy, seniors. So I always conclude with an endorsement of passively managed mutual fund/ETF Index products. That’s my lame attempt at simplification. The meeting organizers have asked me to return for several years so they don’t object to that incomplete approach. I am definitely an amateur at this formal financial presentation stuff.
    However, some participants demand specific individual stock recommendations. They want tips; I don’t offer tips. I attempt to satisfy them with the types of analysis and projections that I submitted to this forum. I make a few numbers to illustrate my portfolio holdings, and this seems to gain the confidence of the session attendees.
    With respect to your specific questions, I decided to “stay the course” based on a similar analysis that I completed at the end of 2010. This update did not alter my market opinion. I started the year with a roughly 50 % equity asset allocation; I will finish the year with a similar percentage. I was considering a possible reduction of my 50/50 equity/fixed income allocation to a 30/70 mix. Based on my analysis and judgment of its applicability, I rejected the candidate change. Of course, if a Black Swan appears I will reassess my positions.
    I usually do this top-down assessment once each year. I have both added and subtracted signal elements from the mix over time. I try to limit the factors that I include in my study since I have limited resources and even more limited time to devote to the process. I have completely abandoned individual equity and bond holdings because of the laborious and endless analyses and decisions needed to manage a diversified portfolio. I now exclusively use mutual fund/ETF products. Consequently I feel the top-down, macro-oriented approach is consistent with my current investing philosophy.
    Sentiment indicators are a minor part of my investment decision making. I try hard not to follow the wisdom of the crowd since it is prone to both fear and greed stampedes. I do NOT follow the markets on a daily basis. I do subscribe to the WSJ and spend 15 minutes each day looking at their data sets. I evaluate my holdings quarterly. Today, I do not know, and do not care to know, its present value. In this way, I tend to isolate myself from fleeting market sentiment.
    I have never been a greedy investor. My bottom-line goal is to do the market averages over a 5-year period which should capture some market cycles. I do have a portion of my portfolio committed to active management. However, over the long haul, my most optimistic hope is that I incrementally add 2 % return above market performance. I do not characterize that as an excessively greedy goal.
    Greg, thanks for your comments. In the deep recesses of my mind I recall getting a CXO Advisory Group heads-up from a FundAlarm poster; I believe that poster was you. I owe you another thanks for that fine input.
    Best Wishes.
  • More 0n a Balanced fund Portfolio (P: MJG)
    Hi Equalizer,
    Thank you for researching the calculation of correlation coefficients. I do it the old fashion way with a lot of error prone data entries and application of a statistical computer code.
    If reliable, the Low Risk Investments Discovery Tool website that you uncovered will save me and other Forum members a considerable amount of time.
    To verify the reliability of the Low Risk calculations, I compared computed results from three other websites for several mutual funds. The three alternate websites were Morningstar, WSJ/Lipper, and Yahoo Financial (powered by Morningstar so not an independent source). Here are some findings.
    The standard deviation (volatility measure) values correlate tightly.
    When adjusted for the number of data points used in the analyses, the correlation coefficients seem reliable compared to my earlier work. Some data set adjustments are needed. I used annual data over a 15-year timeframe; the most common data frequency is monthly data collected over 3 years. The correlation coefficients must be adjusted by the square root of the ratio of data points used in each analysis.
    I am puzzled by the discrepancy in reported annual total returns. The Low Risk site consistently reports higher values contrasted to all other sources examined. Why?
    Care must be exercised to assure that the annual returns are total in that they include both asset capital appreciation and reinvested dividends. These sites recognize that distinction. Also care must be exercised to distinguish between average annual returns and compound return. These outfits acknowledge that crucial difference.
    Of course. in my labor intensive effort, I may have made a data entry error, but the sites are automatic and should be free of that issue.
    I do not have a firm answer to the “why” question.
    One possible speculation is that the Low Risk site calculates total return by computing additional shares at each distribution release, and then assumes that the final number of shares were active for the entire study period. That’s wrong and will overestimate returns. That’s a guess on my part.
    So the correlation coefficients seem reliable for a 3-year period using monthly inputs. The annual return data is highly suspect.
    I hope this helps.
    Best Wishes,
  • Our Funds Boat,+.09% week, +4.81% YTD, no changes, 5-28-11 (EOM,no text)
    Hi hank,
    Me gots a little free time before the short journey to Bay City for the wedding. You're looking to re-fi, eh??? And good to your house, too; to stay ahead of the markets this past week.
    And about that 10 year bond....don't know. I joked about the 10 year at 2.9% a few weeks ago; but I suspect only some more real grief from something silly in the world could push to this lower yield. Pretty much all is known about the Greek monetary basket case; and I figure all of that is already factored into the bond numbers.
    It appears some of the other bond sectors are just kinda riding along; and I still feel that this is not unlike the broad equity areas of maximum head scratching and just what will become of the markets this year. As noted at FA in the early part of the year; that this may be a most trying year to pull a good return on one's money. There is gonna be a shift in our money futures; WE all just have to attempt to master the when and where, eh???
    Will be taking a closer look next week, but I am not pleased about sitting on 15% of our money in a cash acct. Likely moves will be to Fido short term bond fund (FSHBX) and Fido Real Estate Income (FRIFX) which is about 50% real estate bonds. Not that the housing market is great now and is at least several years away from any kind of health, not unlike the financial sectors that hold real estate. BUT, the FRIFX will place some money from the bonds and although single housing stinks; folks are renting and some well placed moves by fund mgrs may benefit.
    As a side note......if one could determine the MI weather for the next 4 months; it appears RICE in MI would be a good cash crop!!!
    Hope your immediate area finds your safe from any flooding. We are on relatively high ground and lots of other folks would have water flooding before us. But, the sump pump has been very busy.
    Take care of you and yours,
    Catch
  • Moderate risk retirement portfolio allocation
    Hi Skipper,
    Congratulations on your recent retirement. I’m sure you and your wife will enjoy it for many happy and hopefully prosperous years.
    Congratulations also on your current financial status; it seems that you have prepared well for that retirement.
    You have already received some excellent suggestions relative to completing your portfolio. In particular I would endorse and encourage the advice to get your wife involved in the understanding and execution of your retirement portfolio. This need not be a time consuming or complex process, especially since it appears that you have already endorsed an investment approach that favors an infrequent trading policy that uses passively managed mutual fund products.
    I recommend that you offer your reluctant wife an introductory investment book that might whet her financial appetite. Two candidate books that conceivably could satisfy that mission are Burton Malkiel’s “The Random Walk Guide to Investing” and Daniel Solin’s “The Smartest Investment Book You’ll Ever Read”. Both books are clearly written, provide simple, excellent discussions of the investment process, and are breezy reads. An added benefit, is that each volume is under 200 pages long so they are not intimidating.
    You appear to have made your top-tier asset allocation decision with your current equity/bond mix. You have partially implemented that strategy with cost containment Vanguard holdings for one-half of your portfolio. Your choices are excellent.
    Given what I perceive as your broad asset allocation policy and your investment philosophy, I too see no need to hire an investment advisor. Any potential value-added must be measured against the sure increase in cost of implementation and recurring cost. History suggests that the incremental cost penalty of such a decision is not likely to be rewarded with any excessive returns. Advisor ability to forecast market movements are just as cloudy as yours. Also, by avoiding an advisor, you will not be exposed or encouraged to increased trading frequency pressures beyond your comfort zone.
    How about your baseline total portfolio construction?
    If you have no special market insights or strong investment preferences of prejudices, I would suggest that you expand your portfolio positions to more or less capture the global marketplace capital distribution with Index products from Vanguard whenever possible.
    I have taken the liberty to deploy your current positions as a firm starting point, and postulated that you wish to retain them. I have augmented that portfolio with additional holdings such that the total adds to 100 %. I assume you have some cash holdings such that you will not be forced to enter the market during any substantial market downturns. The average of these downturns is like two and one-half years.
    Here is my proposed portfolio with a few comments that justify each position.
    (1) Vanguard Total Stock Mkt (VTSAX) – your core equity position
    (2) Vanguard Total Bond Mkt (VBTLX) – your baseline longer duration bond position.
    (3) Vanguard Total International Stock Mkt (VGTSX) – your core foreign holdings, mostly in developed economies.
    (4) Vanguard Small Cap Value Index (VISVX) – diversification into a class that potentially enhances portfolio returns that reflects the Fama-French small value factor findings.
    (5) Vanguard REIT Index (VGSIX) – diversification into commercial property assets.
    (6) Vanguard Emerging Markets Index (VEICX) – more foreign exposure into less developed foreign markets.
    (7) Vanguard Inflation Protected Securities (VIPSX) – Inflation insurance.
    (8) Vanguard GNMA Inv (VFIIX) – diversification into the housing sector.
    (9) Vanguard Short Term Investment Grade Corporate Bonds (VFSUX) – Short duration bonds that are relatively insensitive to Interest rate movements that serve to act like a second cash reserve cushion.
    I propose a 60/40 equity/fixed income mix, mostly guided by your present asset distribution. I assume you are comfortable with your present positions so I kept the holdings, but I did alter some of the percentages. I attempted to minimize actions on your part, but some trading activity is required.
    Here is a provisional asset allocation using 9 mutual fund entities. ETF products are easy substitutes if you prefer.
    (1) VTSAX –- 30 %
    (2) VBTLX – 20 %
    (3) VGTLX – 10 %
    (4) VISVX – 10 %
    (5) VGSIX – 5 %
    (6) VEICX – 5 %
    (7) VIPSX – 5 %
    (8) VFIIX – 5 %
    (9) VFSUX – 10 %
    There are a zillion equally attractive alternate portfolios. This portfolio has very low costs. It also offers sufficient diversification such that portfolio volatility is probably one-half that of an all-equity portfolio without significantly sacrificing expected annual returns. This portfolio should deliver fewer negative annual returns than a more aggressive portfolio which should allow you to sleep better at night. Also this type of portfolio demands less monitoring which should permit your family more free time to access attractive retirement options, like extensive world travel
    Over the next five to ten years, you should address asset allocation adjustments as your lifestyle, the economy, and investment opportunities evolve. Given the steady eroding impact of time, it is likely that your portfolio will require a more conservative asset allocation. An adjustment to the 50/50 or even the 30/70 equity/fixed income mix might be dictated by conditions.
    These adjustments should be made deliberately and incrementally. Do not rush to judgment. In most scenarios there is no need to hurry.
    I hope this candidate portfolio helps you and your wife just a little bit.
    Best Wishes,
    MJG
  • Moderate risk retirement portfolio allocation
    Thanks, Catch. He's a fee-based planner who charges 1.5 percent of assets under management. His firm is based locally with his name and is affiliated with UBS Financial Services. The account would be a "UBS Strategic Advisor Acccount." A model portfolio he suggests included funds from a variety of families such as Templeton, Lord Abbett, First Trust, Loomis Sayles, Janus, Miller, and he tells me they have access to most mutual funds. He spent a lot of time with me on issues like risk tolerance and investment history, mainly my Vanguard 401K which was mostly equities for many years. Told him my main goal is capital preservation with moderate risk, whatever that means. Also told him I never wanted to go through another 2008 again with 45 percent loss. I could probably tolerate 10-15 percent downturn but not a whole lot more at this stage in my life. Thanks again.
  • Slow Learning
    Hi Catch,
    Thank you for sharing your observations and your interpretations of those observations with all of us. You make a compelling case.
    I had similar experiences and have arrived at nearly identical conclusions with regard to our individual investor class skill set. As a group, we have been coddled and have been much abused by the flimflam tactics of charlatans. Although some of our investment underperformance is due to these fraudulent, self-proclaimed experts, I suspect that much of our victimization is due to our own greed, fear, herding, and overconfidence. As a cohort, we literally beg to be victims by our lack of basic market understanding and our limited mathematical skills.
    For almost two decades I have been visiting the Las Vegas MoneyShow on a regular basis. For the most part, those in attendance can be easily classified as successful individuals. Many are very knowledgeable and disciplined investors. However, I am always amazed by the huge subset that are only attending to collect specific stock tips. The hucksters and the market touts have a field day with these poor souls. These folks almost never listen to the many seminars that are designed for educational purposes.
    I am not denigrating this uninformed group of investors. I have been an investor for over five decades; I certainly counted myself as a solid member of that unfortunate cohort for at least three of those decades. I actively searched for stock tips. I became a slave to technical methods (My first investment book purchase in the late 1950s was the Edwards and Magee classic “Technical Analysis of Stock Trends” that I religiously exercised with pencil and graph paper). I visited wire houses frequently, and subscribed to several financial newsletters that promised outsized rewards. None delivered.
    Although I enjoyed some limited successes, I suffered many more painful disappointments. Investing was never as easy as Peter Lynch suggested in his well known book “Beating the Street”.
    I only began to extricate myself from the financial hole that I had dug for myself (with just a little encouragement from my broker friends), when I bought Burton Malkiel’s “A Random Walk Down Wall Street”. That book inspired me to become a more disciplined, a more patient, a more persistent, and a much more knowledgeable investor.
    I have not stopped learning since the early 1980s, but I am by nature a “slow learner”. I continue my painful and fragile removal from the uninformed class of investors who often accept too much market risk, and are not fully compensated for that risk.
    The not so secret means to removal from that failing club are a better understanding of market fundamentals and momentum, some macroeconomics, a decision-making discipline, cost containment, and recognition of destructive behavioral traps. Underpinning all these techniques is a familiarity with mathematics, particularly statistics and probability theory. In an uncertain investment universe, statistics and probability are the only tools that can bring some order to a very chaotic environment.
    I am not now an active investor and my trajectory is to become even less active with the passage of each year. I have few financial regrets and even fewer axes to grind.
    My only purpose in participating in this forum is to encourage members to become more conversant with mathematical concepts and with the findings from relatively pure academic research. I trust if you master these subjects to even a small degree, you will become a more successful investor. Late in my investment career, I did and was rewarded handsomely.
    Again, thank you for your insightful commentary.
    Best Wishes,
    MJG