Fund has been around for years but has had a lackluster performance. Fund changed its investment style from domestic micro cap fund to predominately health/biotech micro/small cap fund.
Website states that management would close the fund when it gathers $100m in assets.
http://www.perkinsfund.com/performance.html

“The study findings, released Friday, portend a long era of muted returns for higher education institutions, which will likely encourage them to have a fresh look at financial and investment strategies in order to meet critical return targets and sustain their mission of providing urgently needed support to students. The new study was based on responses of 705 institutions representing $638 billion in endowment assets, and covers the fiscal year July 1, 2019, to June 30, 2020.”
“Endowments’ average one-year returns were 1.8% as of June 30, compared with 5.3% for the previous fiscal year. The historical target return for endowments has been 7.5%, comprising spending requirements, but in recent years, endowments have been challenged to meet this target, according to the study.”
Article
NOTE - Study may be a bit misleading since it measures the one-year returns as of June 30 - shortly after the pandemic induced selloff. However, 1.8% seems like a dismal one-year return. My sense is that both 2019 and 2020 were pretty good years for most investors - despite the March / April pummeling.

I have owned IOFIX for several years but also traded it several times at Fidelity and Schwab. I checked my 1099-DIV for 2018,2019 Nondividend Distributions and they were at zero. To tell you the truth, I really don't care, I just copy all these numbers to my tax software annually.

was watching Druckenmiller interview w/ GS. He was saying that he buys the junk bond crash every 7 years it seemed to him but didn't own them long term.
When is time/what will be the signs to sell the junk bond funds like ARTFX? What do you think the current yield of that fund is?

I hear you loud and clear @sven on valuations and equity P/E... BUT... the stories covering that topic and sending out the alarms have been have been increasing in frequency the last 3 years. Then in March it was an I told you so moment but it ended up not being.
@derf I’m open to learning the value of bonds. Heck.. I’ve even admitted that I own a bond fund in each of my accounts. I’m trying to be conservative and note- I’m not yet relying on investments for retirement income. I’m not retired. When I do... perhaps I’ll pay even closer attention to them. It’s just for the last 10 plus years... I don’t understand how I benefitted from owning them when just comparing to an S&P 500 Index.
Still - love the conversation here and learning different perspectives.

Article in the FT today partially addresses the issue. Hard to link to it if no subscription. It’s the top one in the attached search query. Try this
Article: Should equity investors worry about rising interest rates? - Michael Mackenzie
Excerpt: “Bullish sentiment remains very high. The latest monthly survey of global fund managers by Bank of America this week highlighted that cash levels in portfolios are being cut to their lowest level in eight years”.

The card market is crazy right now. I was a collector years ago and held on to some stuff. I sold a few things recently for crazy profits including a Peyton Manning card I bought for $20 and sold for over $400.

Feb 20th Episode:

Beyond Diversification: What Every Investor Needs to Know About Asset Allocation:

On October 28th, Sébastien Page and Chris Dillon discussed principles from Sébastien’s recent book, “Beyond Diversification.” Sébastien combines his 20 years of investing experience; analysis from more than 200 academic articles; insights shared from a cast of expert colleagues at T. Rowe Price; and, perhaps most importantly, practical lessons passed down by his father, a renowned finance professor.

beyond-diversification-insights-webinar-replay
Against the Wind (CNBC Interview):

Sebastien Page's Bio and Articles:
Sébastien Page, CFA, Head of Global Multi-Asset

I reacquired some sets from my childhood around 1990-1991. I remember the 1968 Ryan rookie card worth $1200 being sold for $12.00 by a fill-in salesperson! Just a few years ago, the media was bemoaning the waning interest in baseball cards because the collectors were aging out, but with meager interest rates and inflated stock values the unloved has become the dearly loved !

5.25% front-load. Nope. This method sounds too complicated for ME. (I had to edit this down just a bit. Straight from the Morningstar report.)
...will close to new investors starting March 12, 2021. The fund will no longer be able to receive subscriptions from new investors from that date; however, existing investors will continue to have the ability to make additional investments or to reinvest distributions. Assets under management have swelled to $15.6 billion as of Jan. 31, 2021, following a rush of inflows in 2020. Soft-closing the fund is a prudent decision aimed at preserving the strategy’s ability to effectively execute options trading, and further reinforces its Morningstar Analyst Rating of Silver for the cheapest share classes.
Attractive fees, a transparent and consistent process, and an experienced manager elevate JPMorgan Hedged Equity ahead of its peers... Morningstar Analyst Rating of Silver.
...aims to provide smoother equity returns by a systematically implemented options strategy. (T)he team purchases puts 5% below the S&P 500’s value. To offset the cost of the puts, the team first sells puts 20% out-of-the-money ...to protect the fund from quarterly losses in the 5%-20% range; if markets fall less than 5%, the fund should fall in line with the market, and if the market falls more than 20%, the fund should incur the same incremental losses beyond negative 5%. The team also sells call options to generate enough option premium income to cover remaining cost of the hedges. The systematic options overlay structure has led to a dependable outcome even in the most volatile markets, such as in the first quarter of 2020, when it contained losses to less than 5%.
Hamilton Reiner is the lead manager and architect of the strategy. Reiner joined JPMorgan in 2009 and has over three decades of equity and options trading experience.
Assets have grown at a staggering rate, but the strategy should be able absorb the influx relatively easily as it uses liquid securities. In the past three years through August 2020, assets have grown from just over $1 billion to nearly $9.7 billion thanks to solid performance and low fees. Institutional and retirement share classes, in particular, are a lot cheaper than the options-based Morningstar Category average. These low fees coupled with JPMorgan’s transparent process make it an interesting option.
This fund uses a well-defined and thoughtful approach to options trading. Its transparent and repeatable process should deliver predictable results over the long term. The strategy earns an Above Average Process rating.
The strategy aims to provide a smoother ride to equity investing by purchasing 5% out-of-the-money put options and selling 20% out-of-the-money put options over a U.S. equity portfolio. This structure, called a put-spread, is designed to protect capital when markets sell off 5%-20% in a given quarter but also has a lower cost compared with outright put protection. However, since the short option position is so far out-of-the-money, management also sells a call option to cover the price of the long put position. The call options are usually sold 3.5%-5.5% out-of-the-money, depending on the amount of income needed to cover the cost of the long put, but periods of heightened volatility can move that target higher. The level at which the call strikes are written will determine the strategy’s upside cap for the quarter.
The team intends to generate a small level of alpha in the equity portfolio by slightly overweighting attractively priced stocks and slightly underweighting expensive stocks based on fundamental analysis. Since the constitution of the equity portfolio closely replicates the S&P 500, the use of the index options is not problematic from a hedging perspective.
The core long equity portfolio should track the S&P 500 closely as it constrains tracking error to 1.5% annually. It aims to outperform that index by tweaking the individual stock exposure within a 1-percentage-point range using a dividend discount model that ranks stocks from most attractive to least attractive based on forecast earnings and company-specific growth catalysts. The team creates a well-diversified portfolio that mitigates risk associated with individual holdings, with the resulting portfolio holding around 200 stocks. Sector weightings resemble the S&P 500 with modest underweightings in real estate and consumer staples and a small overweighting in consumer discretionary.
The team constructs a zero-cost option overlay at the beginning of each calendar quarter and resets it at the end of the quarter. Call premiums received should improve with persistently high market volatility and higher interest rates, thus improving the strategy’s upside in such a market environment. This was the case at the beginning of 2020’s second quarter when the call options had a strike price closer to 7% out-of-the-money following a period of extremely high volatility. However, in periods of serious market stress (such as Black Monday in 1987, where the S&P 500 dropped 23% in a single day), the short out-of-the-money put leg of the spread may expose the fund to additional losses.
An experienced and dedicated manager and access to JPMorgan’s ample resources earn this strategy an Above Average People rating.
The core team tasked with managing this strategy is small, but concerns about its size are assuaged by the options overlay’s systematic implementation and access to a strong support team. Lead portfolio manager and strategy architect Hamilton Reiner joined the firm in 2009 and has extensive experience trading derivatives, with a career dating back more than three decades. Prior to joining JPMorgan, Reiner held senior positions at Barclays Capital, Lehman Brothers, and Deutsche Bank, and he spent the first 10 years of his career at O’Connor and Associates, an options specialist firm. It was announced last year that Reiner would be responsible for leading JPMorgan’s U.S. structured equity team, although this new responsibility should not interfere with his portfolio management duties on the option-based strategies. Raffaele Zingone, the other named portfolio manager, joined the firm in 1991 and is responsible for the equity portfolio implementation. He directs JPMorgan's deep bench of 26 equity analysts, who average 20 years of industry experience.
Reiner has more than $1 million invested alongside investors, signaling a strong alignment of interest between management and shareholders. Zingone has between $500,000 and $1 million invested in the fund.
Parent |
Above Average Jun 2, 2020
J.P. Morgan Asset Management’s strong investment culture, which shows through its long-tenured, well-aligned portfolio managers and deep analytical resources, supports a renewed Above Average Parent rating.
Across asset classes and regions, the firm's diverse lineup features many Morningstar Medalists, such as its highly regarded U.S. equity income strategy that’s available globally. There's been some turnover in the multi-asset team recently, but it remains deeply resourced and experienced. Manager retention and tenure rates, and degree of alignment for U.S. mutual funds compare favorably among the competition. Managers' compensation emphasizes fund ownership over stock ownership, which is distinctive for a public company.
The firm continues to streamline its lineup and integrate its resources further. For instance, in late 2019, the multi-asset solutions division combined with the passive capabilities. The firm hasn’t launched trendy offerings as it’s mostly expanded its passive business lately, but acquisition-related redundancies and more hazardous launches in the past weigh on its success ratio, which measures the percentage of funds that have both survived and outperformed peers. Fees are regularly reviewed downward globally; they're relatively cheaper in the U.S. than abroad. Also, the firm is building its ESG capabilities and supports distinctive initiatives on diversity.
Performance
This strategy has consistently met performance expectations.
Since its December 2013 inception, the strategy has returned 7.8% annualized through August 2020, beating the options-based category average by nearly 4.7 percentage points annualized. It has also outperformed on a risk-adjusted basis. Its Sharpe ratio of 1.0 since January 2014 trounces the category average of 0.3.
The options overlay is designed to protect capital when the S&P 500 drops 5%-20% in a given quarter. This means investors will be exposed to losses if the S&P 500 loses less than 5% in a three-month period. However, this hasn’t stopped the strategy from achieving its goal of lower volatility relative to the S&P 500. Since December 2013, it has had a 6.7% monthly standard deviation compared with the S&P 500's 13.8%. Moreover, the maximum drawdown (based on monthly data) has been limited to negative 7.9% relative to the S&P 500’s negative 19.6%.
Investors should note that the intraquarter experience will vary given that option pricing is dynamic until expiration. Options’ values are marked to market daily, which often results in intraquarter deviations from the quarter-end return. For example, the strategy was down nearly 19% at one point in the first quarter of 2020 but ended the period down 4.9%.
Price
It’s critical to evaluate expenses, as they come directly out of returns. The share class on this report levies a fee that ranks in its Morningstar category’s second-cheapest quintile. Based on our assessment of the fund’s People, Process and Parent pillars in the context of these fees, we think this share class will be able to deliver positive alpha relative to the category benchmark index, explaining its Morningstar Analyst Rating of Bronze.

I have owned VHT for at least 10 years and never looked for an other. I think it covers health well.

These are funds acquired from Gurtin Funds two years ago. PIMCO retained Gurtin as their submanager. The name change appears to be purely cosmetic for now, i.e. no change in management.
The more significant section adds that PIMCO may soft or hard close the two "Opportunistic" funds.
Wild speculation based on no additional information: Gurtin feels that it may not be able to manage the funds if they grow much larger, and PIMCO is debating whether to drop Gurtin or comply with its desire to slow inflows. I can't recall PIMCO closing any of its funds.

I've dealt with Amy a few years back & found her to be very helpful. Thanks @InformalEconomist.
Stay Safe, Derf

Hi, guys.
I wanted to follow up with the GP folks before sharing anything. Exchanged notes with their president yesterday, and we've just sent this note to the folks on MFO's mailing list. I wanted to share if with you against the prospect that any of it is interesting to you.
David
- - - - -
On February 12, Grandeur Peak announced their intention to institute a "hard close" for four funds and a soft close on one fund. A hard close is one that stops additional purchases by both new and existing shareholders; a soft close stops new investors from opening accounts. The funds affected are:
Hard closed: Global Opportunities, International Opportunities, International Stalwarts and Global Micro Cap.
Soft closed: Emerging Markets Opportunities.
Each of the affected funds returned between 30-50% in 2020; Global Micro Cap and Emerging Markets have already posted double-digit returns for 2021. The hard closed funds all have four star ratings from Morningstar and are MFO Honor Roll funds; in addition, International Stalwarts is an MFO Great Owl which signals consistently first-tier risk-adjusted returns.
The public explanation was "we carefully review capacity at both the strategy and firm level. We are committed to keeping our investment strategies nimble to fully pursue their investment objectives without being encumbered by their individual asset base or the firm’s collective assets."
I asked president Eric Huefner to talk a bit about the necessity to close a $60 million fund and the oddity of hard-closing one of their least capacity-constrained funds. He noted that Global Micro Cap closed on the day it was launched but has doubled in size in the past 12 months. That's due to modest inflows, "sticky" investors and a 50% return in 2020. Grandeur's goal is "total investment flexibility in the micro-cap arena"
The Stalwarts funds were created, primarily, to serve the needs of investment advisors who had worked with Grandeur for years but found that Grandeur's "core" funds were now closed and, hence, inaccessible to new clients. The suite of Stalwarts funds were designed to give investors access to Grandeur's style through funds that targeted slightly larger (hence, more liquid) stocks. The hope was that those funds would not have to close as quickly as the small- and micro-cap focused core funds. I asked about what had happened to limit capacity. Mr. Huefner noted that total capacity for the Stalwarts strategy - funds + SMAs, US/global/international - was in the $5-7 billion range with International having more assets than the other two combined. "We soft closed the Int’l Stalwarts strategy in June [but] the AUM in the International Stalwarts strategy has still grown more than 40% since then. Given the continuing rapid growth, it felt necessary to close it in order to preserve space for our other Stalwarts strategies."
If you believe that the market will continue on its recent trajectory, dominated by US large tech stops, then there's nothing much you need to do. If you believe that the market might be rotating in response to a new administration, a new environment or simple exhaustion, you might anticipate international outperforming domestic, developing outperforming developed, small outperforming large. These funds are at the vanguard of investing in those style.
Possible responses to their closing:
Check your target asset allocation, whether for the individual fund or the asset class it represents. Consider whether you want to make an additional allocation now, in an admittedly pricey market, to bring your investment in line with your target.
In my case, Global Micro Cap is my third-largest holding and represents 15% of my portfolio. As much as I'm delighted by its performance - 18% annually since launch - it would be hard for me to justify allocating more there now.
Consider alternative GP funds as options. The young Global Contrarian fund has an R-squared of 97 against Global Micro Cap. Both have substantial micro cap exposure (about 40%) with Contrarian's stocks being a bit larger and noticeably lower priced than Micro Caps.
Similarly, Global Stalwarts has a correlation to International Stalwarts of 98 and a nearly identical Sharpe ratio, annual return and maximum drawdown. Global is about 55% international.
Consider Rondure, Wasatch and Seven Canyons funds as options. All four families are driven by Wasatch alumni. While they have very distinctive perspectives and strengths, all have a shared perspective on global small- and micro-cap investing and a respect for their investors as partners. By way of example, Rondure New World (four star, $250 million) has an R-squared of 95 against Emerging Markets Opportunities and Wasatch EM Small Cap (four star, $520 million) has an R-squared of 93. These are all very solid advisors with investor-centered cultures and strong records, though not identical strategies. Between them, 11 of their 24 eligible funds (those with records of three years or more) have earned an MFO Great Owl designation.

Hi @LewisBraham and @Old_Joe

Is it me or is there something unsavory sounding to the word "money" as a verb? It makes it sound like money is something you do instead of something you earn through work.

Financial Literacy ??? Is this the question related to "money" as a verb or just a random thought placed in this thread?
I've been outside removing too much snow and the static temp is -10 F. Perhaps I just have a brain freeze with the money and verb statement.
Lastly, if I didn't want to expand the reserve of our money by something I do (investing); with the base money having arrived over many years of what was earned through hard work; I would be spending my time at web pages discussing why my fudge brownie recipe is better than yours.
Thank you for the reply.
Catch

How does TSDLX differ from PRWBX ? TSDLX has 27% foreign vs PRWBX 16% . NTF at Schwab, but tf at Fidelity.

H Carew - I’ll dare to guess here based on recollection.
I believe PRWBX is focused a bit shorter on duration (1-3 years). TSDLX appears to be targeting the 3 year range - give or take. Hard to know for sure because TSDLX has only been open about 6 weeks.
By prospectus TSDLX is allowed to invest something like 30% in junk bonds - though they’re not planning to go that high. PRWBX is for the most part investment grade.
So, under “normal” conditions (HA) you’d expect TSDLX to do a little better.

Well, I'll discover what becomes of these indicators some time Tuesday morning.
Note: I've checked these links periodically over several years and have not seen "all green" (as I write) for Global Markets.
FINVIZ futures (11pm, EST)
Global Markets Overview (11pm EST)
Informational purposes only :)
Good Evening,
Catch

Taking reports of side effects now the vaccines have been given to over 40 million people is fraught with difficulty, as there is no longer a placebo group to compare to. Anyone who has a serious medical problem after the vaccine will likely be reported to the FDA but that does not mean that the vaccine caused the stoke or heart attacks or whatever. The frequency of adverse reaction the FDA reports in post marketing studies are reflective of whatever reports they receive.
30,000 people were in both of the Pfizer and Moderna studies which is a huge number. It is large enough to give us confidence that the most serious side effects would show up, and could be compared to their frequency in the placebo group.
I would suggest people who are interested read the original FDA data both Moderna and Pfizer submitted. You can quickly go to the section on side effects and see the actual data that compares the vaccine recipients to their placebo counterparts. The tables are clear and easy to follow.
Here is Moderna
https://www.fda.gov/media/144434/download
The text for "deaths" follows.
"Serious Adverse Events Deaths As of December 3, 2020, 13 deaths were reported (6 vaccine, 7 placebo). Two deaths in the vaccine group were in participants >75 years of age with pre-existing cardiac disease; one participant died of cardiopulmonary arrest 21 days after dose 1, and one participant died of myocardial infarction 45 days after dose 2. Another two vaccine recipients were found deceased at home, and the cause of these deaths is uncertain: a 70-year-old participant with cardiac disease was found deceased 57 days after dose 2, and a 56-year-old participant with hypertension, chronic back pain being treated with opioid medication died 37 days after dose 1 (The official cause of death was listed as head trauma). One case was a 72-year-old vaccine recipient with Crohn’s disease and short bowel syndrome who was hospitalized for thrombocytopenia and acute kidney failure due to obstructive nephrolithiasis 40 days after dose 2 and developed complications resulting in multiorgan failure and death. One vaccine recipient died of suicide 21 days after dose 1. The placebo recipients died from myocardial infarction (n=3), intra-abdominal perforation (n=1), systemic inflammatory response syndrome in the setting of known malignancy (n=1), COVID-19 (n=1), and unknown cause (n=1). These deaths represent events and rates that occur in the general population of individuals in these age groups.
Non-fatal Serious Adverse Events Among participants who received at least one dose of vaccine or placebo (N=30,351), the proportion of participants who reported at least one SAE from dose 1 to the primary analysis cutoff date (November 25, 2020) was 1% in the mRNA-1273 group and 1% in the placebo group. The most common SAEs occurring at higher rates in the vaccine group than the placebo group were myocardial infarction (0.03% in vaccine group, 5 cases vs. 3 cases in placebo group), cholecystitis (0.02% in vaccine group, 3 cases vs. 0 cases in placebo group), and nephrolithiasis (0.02% in vaccine group, 3 cases vs. 0 cases in placebo group). The small numbers of cases of these events do not suggest a causal relationship. The most common SAEs occurring at higher rates in the placebo arm than the vaccine arm, aside from COVID-19 (0.1% in placebo group), were pneumonia (0.05% in placebo group) and pulmonary embolism (0.03% in placebo group). Occurrence of other SAEs, including cardiovascular SAEs, were otherwise balanced between treatment groups. "
I think it is fair to say these vaccines are very safe, and at least so far, very very effective

Up TO DATE is probably the best single source for updated medical information available to health care professionals. It is not cheap ($350 a year) but it is peer reviewed and edited by top academic physicians, many of them from Hopkins, Harvard, Yale, Stamford and other "top ten" medical schools
Here is their summary recommendation and summary of Side effects
" For individuals who are eligible for vaccination according to local allocation priorities, we recommend COVID-19 vaccination (Grade 1B). Selection of vaccine depends on local availability. The different vaccines have not been studied head-to-head, and thus, comparative efficacy is uncertain."
A Grade 1 B recommendation
A Grade 1 recommendation is a strong recommendation. It means that we believe that if you follow the recommendation, you will be doing more good than harm for most, if not all of your patients.
Grade B means that the best estimates of the critical benefits and risks come from randomized, controlled trials with important limitations (eg, inconsistent results, methodologic flaws, imprecise results, extrapolation from a different population or setting) or very strong evidence of some other form. Further research (if performed) is likely to have an impact on our confidence in the estimates of benefit and risk, and may change the estimates.
Moderna Safety and side effects – Local and systemic adverse effects were dose dependent and relatively common after the second dose; most were of mild or moderate severity (ie, did not prevent daily activities or require pain relievers) [61]. Among participants younger than 65 years, fever occurred in 17 percent, and severe fatigue, headache, myalgias, and arthralgias occurred in 10, 5, 10, and 6 percent, respectively.
Pfizer ( essentially the same) Safety and side effects – Local and systemic adverse effects were dose dependent and relatively common after the second dose; most were of mild or moderate severity (ie, did not prevent daily activities). Among participants younger than 55 years, fever occurred in 16 percent and severe fatigue, headache, and chills, occurred in 4, 3, and 2 percent, respectively [49]. Rates among older participants were slightly lower. "
This has been what I have heard form friends and family who have been vaccinated. Young people have more side effects, but at the same time they are more able to deal with them.

I listened to that Grantham interview on Bloomberg 2-3 times one day recently. He lays out a convincing case. But there are equally good arguments on both sides.
As far as Grantham’s argument goes he’s focused on three areas: (1) He thinks artificial risk asset impetus has been supplied from over a decade of easing by the Fed and other central banks. Since he doesn’t think this can continue much longer (deficits / unrealistically low rates) he sees an eventual popping of the “bubble”. (2) He sees a near hysterical chasing of return today irregardless of risk - a euphoria he equates with the final stages of bull markets. (3) He takes issue with high valuations in some sectors - technology particularity.
It should be noted that Grantham is more sanguine re value stocks, thinking there are pockets of opportunity in that depressed sector. He sounds downright bullish on emerging markets - if one has a long enough time horizon.
Each investor needs to consider his own time frame, risk tolerance, overall financial situation before undertaking any changes. I’ve grown a bit more cautious over the past couple months. The last two years were good to most investors. So, irrespective of Grantham, I see no compelling reason for a retiree to be overly aggressive at this point. I’m sharing how my allocation has changed in recent months as I try to protect 50+ years of accumulated retirement savings. Your situation is doubtless different and so should be your approach.
* End of 2020: Alternatives 25%, Equity/Balanced Funds 25%, Diversified Bond 25%, Cash & cash alternatives 15%, Real Assets & Commodity 10%.
* Today: Alternatives 33%, Equity/Balanced 20%, Diversified Bond 20%, Cash & cash alternatives 15%, Real Assets & Commodity 7%, Benchmark Fund (PRSIX) 5%.
Explanatory Notes:
- TMSRX accounts for about 50% of the alternative portion. PRPFX comprises most of the rest.
- I’ve gone much shorter on the diversified bond holdings. DODLX is the riskiest one at 50%. The rest consists of short term bond funds like newly opened TSDLX.
- I’ve moved most of the cash into a medium duration TIPS index fund,
- I’ve switched from TRRIX to PRSIX as my benchmark and have added a small allocation to that fund. One difference between the two above funds ... PRSIX commits 0-10% to a Blackstone hedge fund. TRRIX does not.
- There remains a small spec position in a mining fund.