how are companies going to roll over debt when they need to refinance at higher rates?

The debt/equity ratio is now a feature in all my screens on MFO premium. I'm also looking for good Martin ratio numbers.
Like you, I am looking for opportunities where the return hasn't relied on the usual suspects.
For those unfamiliar with the Martin ratio, here is the definition from MFO premium:

Like Sharpe and Sortino, it measures excess return, but relative to its typical drawdown. After the 2000 tech bubble and 2008 financial crisis, which together resulted in a “lost decade” for stocks, investors have grown very sensitive to drawdowns. Martin excels at identifying funds that have delivered superior returns while mitigating drawdowns. It too is best used when comparing funds of same category over same evaluation period – this very comparison is the basis for determining a fund’s MFO Rating metric.

Factoring in current events, the "market" has been incredibly resilient this year.
The recent Fed’s Survey of Consumer Finances indicated the median net worth
of American families climbed 37% between 2019 and 2022 after adjusting for inflation.
Consumers were in a strong financial position which allowed continued spending in 2023.
It will be interesting to see how the "market" reacts if/when spending materially deteriorates.
American Household Wealth Jumped in the Pandemic

@msf, thanks!
One tab I didn't look was Geeks + Lawyers - I thought that I was neither (-:). BUT there is all the info that I was looking for in the rest of the site. This included the CRITICAL info in the SAI that the fund was a series of the Financial Investor Trust (so, one has to look for that at Edgar/SEC).

I'm not sure I'd call a related distributor (a la Fidelity, Vanguard, etc.) a third party, as that term often suggests independence. Rather, a distributor is a separate legal entity (whether independent or a subsidiary), perhaps a distinction without a difference.
The 40 basis points mentioned is more significant, as that's the rack rate that Schwab and Fidelity charge for NTF funds. They charge significantly less to carry TF funds, so the fund might be able to go that route instead. In addition, Fidelity and Schwab carry funds from a few families that decline to pay even this fee (they charge investors a higher TF instead). Realistically though, the brokerages are going to sell funds without charging for shelf space only if the funds are so popular that the brokerages benefit from carrying them anyway.
It also said that fee sharing arrangements do exist with some 3rd party firms.
The prospectus says only that these arrangements may exist. Also that shares are available directly or via retirement plans.

Generally, shares may be purchased, exchanged or redeemed through retirement plans or directly from the Fund. ...
The Adviser and/or its affiliates may enter into arrangements to make payments for additional activities... These payments are often referred to as revenue sharing payments”

https://secure.alpsinc.com/MarketingAPI/api/v1/Content/dgifund/the-disciplined-growth-investors-fund-pro-20230831.pdf
It's boilerplate - disclosing potential conflicts of interest. IOW, legalise. As stated on this page (I assume from the original website) linking to the prospectus: "Some people prefer legalise to English." (Okay, I admit it; I'm one of those people :-))
https://www.dgifund.com/geeks-lawyers
The SEC filings for the fund are here:
https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?CIK=S000033265&action=getcompany&scd=filings
The fund is a series of the Financial Investors Trust, as are Seafarer Funds (SFGIX, SFVLX) and a variety of other funds. Here's the full prospectus for the trust:
https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/915802/000139834423016245/fp0084788-1_485bposixbrl.htm

It feels like there are two dominant retail investment strategies:

1. Buy and hold index funds, or
2. Actively trade individual stocks and, while you’re at it, maybe options or crypto.

Many ordinary people do not want to think about their investments much, and modern finance has designed a product that is ideally suited for them. It is the index fund (or index exchange-traded fund), whose essential thesis is that thinking about investments is unnecessary and in fact bad, and you should just buy the market and save on costs.
Other people, though, do want to think about their investments, and they want to think about investments that are fun to think about: stocks (or options or crypto) that are volatile, stocks of companies that do fun or interesting or world-changing things, stocks of companies with charismatic and entertaining chief executive officers, meme stocks.
There is not much in between. In particular, the whole industry of active mutual fund management is built on the idea that, if you don’t want to manage your investments, you can pay someone else to do it for you. But that idea feels passé in 2023. These days, if you don’t want to manage your investments, the accepted approach is to pay someone else almost nothing to almost not manage them for you: An index fund will do almost no managing and charge almost no fees, and that is widely considered the optimal approach. And if you want to manage your investments, you want to manage your investments; you want to pick fun stocks, not hire a star mutual fund manager to do the stock picking for you.[1]
Where does that leave the active mutual fund managers? Bloomberg’s Silla Brush and Loukia Gyftopoulou report that things are bad for them:

Across the $100 trillion asset-management industry, money managers have confronted a tectonic shift in investor appetite for cheaper, passive strategies over the past decade. Now they’re facing something even more dire: The unprecedented run of bull markets that buoyed their investments and masked life-threatening vulnerabilities may be a thing of the past.
About 90% of additional revenue taken in by money managers since 2006 is simply from rising markets, and not from any ability to attract new client money, according to Boston Consulting Group. Many senior executives and consultants now warn that it won’t take much to turn the industry's slow decline into a cliff-edge moment: One more bear market, and many of these firms will find themselves beyond repair. …
More than $600 billion of client cash has headed for the exits since 2018 from investment funds at T. Rowe, Franklin, Abrdn, Janus Henderson Group Plc and Invesco Ltd. That’s more than all the money overseen by Abrdn, one of the UK’s largest standalone asset managers. Take these five firms as a proxy for the vast middle of the industry, which, after hemorrhaging client cash for the past decade, is trying to justify itself in a world that’s no longer buying what it’s selling. …
“It’s a slow but surely declining trajectory,” said Markus Habbel, head of Bain & Co.’s global wealth- and asset-management practice. “There is a scenario for many of these players to survive for a few years while their assets and revenues decline until they die. This is the trend in the majority of the industry.”

Cheery! What do you do about this? One approach is to get into some adjacent business that does not rely on stock-picking; Abrdn “cut the business into three parts: a mutual fund business, a wealth unit that also serves retail investors and a platform for financial advisers — a strategy that has yet to prove it’s working.”
The other approach is for active managers to get out of liquid easily indexed public markets and into something else. Abrdn has also “largely abandoned competing in large-cap equity funds, choosing instead to emphasize small-cap and emerging-market strategies.” And of course there is private credit:

For many other firms, private markets — and, specifically, the private-credit craze — are now the latest perceived savior. Almost everyone, from small to giant stock-and-bond houses, is piling into the asset class, often for the first time. In the past year and a half, a surge in M&A in the space has been driven by such houses, including Franklin, that are eager to offer clients the increasingly popular strategies, which typically charge higher fees. Others have been poaching teams or announcing plans to enter the space.
“I think that’s a big driver for many of these firms — they look at their own financials and think about what’s going to keep us afloat over the next few years,” Amanda Nelson, principal at Casey Quirk asset-management consultancy at Deloitte, said in an interview.

“Just buy all the stocks” is a cheap and easy investing strategy that is also endorsed by academic research, but “just make private loans to all the buyouts” sort of obviously doesn’t work. So there is room for investment selection, and fees, there.
Meanwhile at the Wall Street Journal, Hannah Miao reports that actually retail stock-picking works great:

Wall Street has long derided amateur investors as unsophisticated market participants, prone to buying high and selling low. But the typical individual investor’s long-term mindset and penchant for risk-taking has proved fruitful in the technology-driven market of the past decade, defying the “dumb money” caricature.
The average individual-investor stock portfolio has risen about 150% since the beginning of 2014, according to investment research firm Vanda Research, which began tracking the data nine years ago. That beats the S&P 500’s roughly 140% during the same period.

Some of this is about stock selection: Recent years have been good for the stocks that retail investors tend to like.

The typical small investor holds an outsize position in megacap tech companies. Apple, Tesla and Nvidia alone make up about 40% of the average individual’s stock portfolio, according to Vanda. Although big tech stocks plunged last year, those investments have dominated the market for most of the past decade and have helped fuel the S&P 500’s 10% advance this year.

But some of it is apparently behavioral: Individual investors can be more contrarian than professionals can.

One advantage small investors have over professionals: They don’t have to worry about reporting performance to clients. That helps some individuals feel comfortable riding out market downturns. …
Everyday investors are known to buy the dip, piling into markets during weak periods. Many jumped into stocks in March 2020 when the market plunged at the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, and rode the high as shares rebounded.

Crudely speaking, if index funds offer market performance, and retail investors on average outperform the market, then professional investors on average will underperform the market: “Over the past decade, about 86% of all large-cap U.S. equity funds have underperformed the S&P 500, according to S&P Dow Jones Indices.”
This seems bad for the big asset managers? They are squeezed from both sides: There is the rise of indexing, but there’s also the pretty good performance of individual investors who pick their own stocks. For a long time now, one argument for active management has been along the lines of “sure index funds look good in a rising market, but wait until the market goes down; then people will see the value of active stock selection.” But in fact people have seen the value of owning a lot of Apple and Tesla, which they can just do on their own. The real argument for active management surely has to be something like “sure index funds and also individual stock trading look good in a market dominated by the biggest names, but wait until Tesla and Apple underperform and the way to make money is by buying stocks that retail investors have never heard of.” Which is a harder pitch.

BULLISH. Asset/money managers (AB, AMG, BEN, BLK, FHI, IVZ, TROW; dividend yield 0.0-8.9%; fwd P/E 7.2-17.3; market-cap 3.0-94.4 billion; should benefit from rising investor interest in bonds)
FUNDS – INCOME. GOLD is rising due to inflation and geopolitical tensions. Gold-bullion ETFs are GLD, IAU, etc. Gold-mining ETFs are GDX, GDXJ, etc. Some gold-miners pay variable dividends. Attractive are NEM, FNV, etc. (Ratio GDX:GLD or $XAU:$GOLD has lot of catching up to do – i.e., the gold-bullion has moved but the gold-miners not so much yet.)
FUNDS. Stock picks by AI have been disappointing as seen by lagging performance of AI-powered ETFs AIEQ, KOMP, WIZ. A problem is that the AI selections are based on lots of historical data and overweighted industrials and financial but underweights techs: Their proponents say that beating the market isn’t their objective, and that they should be used as supplements for other holdings (remember that when you see their ads next time).
FUNDS – Q&A. David SAMRA, international value ARTKX. He looks for undervalued stocks with strong balance sheets and good management; the expected return is 30%+ (time?). In some cases, his fund/firm becomes a minority shareholder – important in Europe to effect changes. Consumer-oriented companies are attractive now due to high inflation and rates. He also looks for indirect beneficiaries of AI.
EXTRA, FUNDS. With long-term rates rising (bond vigilantes are back), bonds and bond-proxies have slumped. Consider these DIVIDEND-ETFs: Dividend-growth VIG, current-dividend VYM, dividend-blend SCHD, international VIGI. M* recently upgraded some ratings on them and calls them “best in class”.
EXTRA, FUNDs (some duplication). After the SEC setbacks in the courts, and the SEC decision not to appeal the most recent adverse court ruling in SEC vs GBTC/Grayscale, there is hope in the market for the approval of physical/spot-crypto ETFs within months (pending are from BLK, Fidelity, IVZ, ARK, Grayscale, etc). The most immediate beneficiary may be Grayscale GBTC (at double-digit % discount now) if its conversion to ETF is also approved. But the court has only asked the SEC to reconsider and to come up with new reasons for rejection (as its old reasons weren’t valid) or approve it; GENSLER/SEC may continue to foot drag by claiming a new 240-day review period for GBTC to take into account the changed situation, but that is seen as unlikely.
https://ybbpersonalfinance.proboards.com/thread/516/barron-october-2023-market-week

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1318342/000139834423019535/fp0085685-1_497.htm (advisor class)
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1318342/000139834423019536/fp0085685-2_497.htm (Institutional class)
497 1 fp0085685-2_497.htm
KL Allocation Fund
Institutional Class Ticker: GAVIX
A series of Investment Managers Series Trust (the "Trust")
Supplement dated October 20, 2023, to the Prospectus and
Statement of Additional Information ("SAI"), each dated January 1, 2023
*** IMPORTANT NOTICE REGARDING PROPOSED FUND REORGANIZATION ***
Based on the recommendation of the Advisor, the Board has approved the reorganization of the Fund into the AXS Astoria Inflation Sensitive ETF (the “Acquiring Fund”), an existing series of Investment Managers Series Trust II (the “Reorganization”). The Reorganization will occur pursuant to an Agreement and Plan of Reorganization (the “Plan”). The Plan provides for the Fund to transfer all of its assets to the Acquiring Fund in return for shares of the Acquiring Fund and cash in lieu of fractional Acquiring Fund shares (if any) and the Acquiring Fund’s assumption of the Fund’s liabilities. Each shareholder of the Fund will receive shares of the Acquiring Fund and cash in lieu of fractional Acquiring Fund shares (if any) equal to the value of the shares of the Fund owned by the shareholder prior to the Reorganization. The Reorganization is not generally expected to result in the recognition of gain or loss by the Fund or its shareholders for U.S. federal income tax purposes (except with respect to cash received by shareholders in lieu of fractional shares, if any). AXS Investments LLC will bear the costs related to the Reorganization.
The Acquiring Fund and Fund each seek long-term capital appreciation; the Acquiring Fund and Fund have different principal investment strategies and principal risks. The Acquiring Fund invests principally in securities which have the potential to benefit, either directly or indirectly, from increases in the rate of rising costs of goods and services (i.e., inflation). The Fund employs an allocation strategy by investing, in three asset classes: equity, fixed income and cash or cash equivalents. AXS Investments LLC and Astoria Portfolio Advisors LLC are the investment advisor and sub-advisor, respectively, of the Acquiring Fund. The Advisor will not be involved in the management of the Acquiring Fund. The Acquired Fund’s portfolio manager, Steven Vannelli, CFA, will become a portfolio manager at AXS Investments LLC and will participate in the Acquired Fund’s investment committee. The Acquiring Fund is expected to have a lower management fee and total annual fund operating expenses as the Fund.
The Fund operates as a mutual fund and the Acquiring Fund operates as an actively managed exchange-traded fund (“ETF”). ETFs may provide benefits to shareholders compared to mutual funds, including additional trading flexibility, increased transparency, and the potential for lower transaction costs and enhanced tax efficiency. Additional information regarding the differences between mutual funds and ETFs and potential impact to shareholders will be included in the combined prospectus/proxy statement noted below. In order to receive shares of the Acquiring Fund as part of the Reorganization, Fund shareholders must hold their shares of the Fund through a brokerage account eligible to hold and trade shares of an ETF. If you are unsure about the ability of your account to accept Acquiring Fund shares, please call 1-888-998-9890 or contact your financial advisor or other financial intermediary.
The Board will call a meeting of the shareholders of the Fund to vote on the Plan. Management of the Trust expects the shareholder meeting to be held on or about January 12, 2024, at the offices of Mutual Fund Administration, LLC, 2220 E. Route 66, Suite 226, Glendora, California 91740. If the Reorganization is approved by Fund shareholders, the Reorganization is expected to take effect in the first quarter of 2024.
Shareholders of the Fund will receive a combined prospectus/proxy statement with additional information about the shareholder meeting, the proposed Reorganization, and the Acquiring Fund, including information about the Acquiring Fund's investment strategies, risks, fees and expenses. Please read the proxy materials carefully, as they will contain a more detailed description of the proposed Reorganization.
Please file this Supplement with your records.

An essay in yesterday's Financial Times argues in favor of radically simplifying one's strategic asset allocation. It argues, at base, that unusual assets produce unusual returns only until they are discovered by the hoi polloi and the industry arbitrages away the exceptional gain. As a result, the real money is made by first movers and the real costs are borne by those of us who try to get in later.
Here's the core:

On average, research shows around 100 per cent of their total returns can be ascribed to their choice of policy benchmark [i.e., their strategic asset allocation], along with around 90 per cent of their return volatility. The outcomes of those judgments are often complex.
Jan Loeys, JPMorgan’s veteran asset allocation guru, says in a recent client note that this complexity is both pointless and counterproductive. Pointless, because investors need only two assets: a global equity one and a local bond one, with the relative amounts driven by their ability to withstand short-term drawdowns and return needs. (Less is more when it comes to strategic asset allocation," FT.com, 10/17/2023)

The FT allows subscribers to share a limited number of articles with non-subscribers, so that link should work for folks who want to look at the argument but don't have an FT account.
David

I’m not trying to convince anyone to buy CDs and Treasuries, just trying to wrap my head around investing in them. For most of my investing history, cash investments have yielded next to nothing. Treasuries and short term bonds fared little better.
Many financial planners and experts say you can safely withdraw about 4% a year from a portfolio in retirement. I am unlikely to live 20 or more years, based on my family history, although my wife could. So, if I can buy a 20-year Treasury yielding 5.15%, that will pay more than my income needs for longer than my expected life span, what’s not to like? I have no intention in putting all of my portfolio in Treasuries, just a portion that would make up the long portion of a ladder.
I’m trying to decide whether to convert more of my bond funds into Treasuries. My bond funds are currently yielding close to 6% but continue to lose value. I know that at some point they will start increasing in value again, and selling now will lock in my losses, so I don’t plan to totally abandon them. But I no longer view them as low-risk investments to anchor my portfolio. I also plan to continue holding 40-60% of my portfolio in stock funds.
So, if I buy a 20-year Treasury that pays dividends semiannually, is that income compounded, or simply paid out in cash every 6 months? So far, the Treasuries I’ve bought are all zero-coupons that you buy at a discount and mature at full cash value. I haven’t bought any 5-year or longer Treasuries, so I don’t understand if the interest is compounded or simply paid out at regular intervals.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/811030/000089418923007621/osterweistotalreturn497eli.htm
497 1 osterweistotalreturn497eli.htm 497
OSTERWEIS TOTAL RETURN FUND – OSTRX
Supplement dated October 16, 2023
to the Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information (“SAI”), each dated June 30, 2023
Osterweis Capital Management, LLC, the Adviser to the Osterweis Total Return Fund (the “Fund”), has recommended, and the Board of Trustees of Professionally Managed Portfolios has approved, a plan of liquidation and the termination of the Fund. This decision was made due to the Fund’s inability to obtain a level of assets necessary for it to be viable.
Effective with the close of business on October 16, the Fund will no longer accept purchases of new shares. The Fund will be closed to new purchases, whether from existing or new investors.
The liquidation of the Fund is expected to occur after the close of business on December 15, 2023 (the “Liquidation Date”). Prior to the Liquidation Date, the Fund will engage in business and activities for the purposes of winding down the Fund’s business affairs and reducing the Fund’s portfolio (to the extent practicable) to cash in preparation for the orderly liquidation and subsequent distribution of its assets on the Liquidation Date. During this transition period, the Fund will no longer be pursuing its investment objective or be managed consistent with its investment strategies as stated in the Prospectus. This is likely to impact Fund performance.
Shareholders of the Fund may redeem their investments as described in the Fund’s Prospectus. The proceeds per share to be distributed to each remaining shareholder of record on the Liquidation Date will be the net asset value per share of the Fund less any required tax withholdings, after all expenses and liabilities of the Fund have been paid or otherwise provided for. For U.S. federal income tax purposes, the receipt of liquidation proceeds will generally be treated as a taxable event and may result in a gain or loss. At any time prior to the Liquidation Date, shareholders of the Fund may redeem or, subject to investment minimums and other applicable restrictions on exchanges, exchange their shares of the Fund for shares of another Osterweis fund (if available) pursuant to the procedures set forth under “SHAREHOLDER INFORMATION—Exchange Privilege” in the Prospectus.
Any IRAs still invested in the Fund on the Liquidation Date will be redeemed and distributed using an age-based distribution code and may be subject to tax withholding. If you hold your shares in an IRA account directly with U.S. Bank, N.A., you have 60 days from the date you receive your proceeds to reinvest your proceeds into another IRA account and maintain their tax-deferred status. Direct IRA shareholders wishing to avoid mandatory withholding taxes from being taken from their liquidation because they plan to roll over their proceeds to another IRA should submit a written redemption request to the Fund with enough time to be received prior to liquidation day. Any redemption request will be processed on the day received provided the request is in good order. Shareholders who own the Fund through a financial institution or brokerage should consult their financial advisor.
You may be subject to federal, state, local or foreign taxes on exchanges or redemptions of or liquidating distributions made on Fund shares. You should consult your tax advisor for information regarding all tax consequences applicable to your investment in the Fund.
Please contact the Fund at (866) 236-0050 or your financial advisor if you have questions or need assistance.
Please retain this supplement for your reference.
From Osterweis:
https://www.osterweis.com/files/Osterweis_Prospectus_2023.pdf

This year is challenging for smaller cap funds when the broader index is dominated by the large tech stocks. Only one out three, FMIMX, did decently, the rest trailed considerably. So we pause until the market broaden out. Not indexing in the smaller caps for us as many small stocks are not profitable.

The Russell 2000 index contains many stocks which are unprofitable.
"The small cap market is fraught with landmines – weak companies that have been able to survive in this era of easy money; at the end of 2022 approximately 40% of companies in the Russell 2000 Index were unprofitable."
https://am.jpmorgan.com/us/en/asset-management/adv/insights/market-insights/market-updates/on-the-minds-of-investors/is-there-an-opportunity-in-small-caps/
There is a profitability screen for S&P 600 index inclusion.
"Financial Viability: Companies must have positive as-reported earnings over the most recent quarter, as well as over the most recent four quarters (summed together)."
PDF

”Cash looks tempting. With interest rates for cash in the region of 5 per cent, why not avoid the volatility that comes with stocks? And with short-rates higher than longer-term interest rates, why lock up cash in a longer-term government bond?”
https://www.ft.com/content/49c1df89-7890-4643-920b-10443a05592e
By Karen Ward
Published in The Financial Times
(Offered as a contrarian point of view)

Have a heart, Your Honor!
Perhaps the judge did and may have offered parole in say just under 10,000 years :-)
Several countries have introduced CBDCs. The Fed is still evaluating digital-dollar.
Cryptocurrencies and central bank digital currencies may share much of the same technology, but they are substantially different entities with different characteristics and objectives.
From the IMF:

Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) are digital versions of cash that are issued and regulated by central banks. As such, they are more secure and inherently not volatile, unlike crypto assets. ...
In 1993, the Bank of Finland launched the Avant smart card, an electronic form of cash. ... it can be considered the world’s first CBDC.

https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2022/09/Picture-this-The-ascent-of-CBDCs
The main objectives I've seen put forth for CBDCs are: (1) to serve the unbanked and under-banked, and (2) to facilitate secure, speedy transactions.
(Here's the full White House list of objectives.)
Those are fine objectives. Though I don't see what CBDC could offer that banks could not if they offered a form of "universal service" (with outreach programs) and perhaps made some technological upgrades. For example some transit systems now accept bank cards in addition to their own payment cards. Does it really matter whether the form of payment is a digital bank card or a government issued digital currency card?
Most of the benefits arise from "digital" not from "central bank". Much as securities transactions have become easier and faster with (digital) book entry instead of physical paper stock certificates.
Cryptocurrency is different and was promulgated on the objective of decentralization (no controlling authority). While the cryptocurrencies are not controlled by governments (clearly differentiating them from CBDCs), they have still tended toward centralized control.

[Decentralization] was the premise of the initial Bitcoin white paper, which offered a cryptographic solution intended to allow payments to be sent without involving any financial institution or other trusted intermediary. However, Bitcoin became centralized very quickly and now depends on a small group of software developers and mining pools to function. As internet pioneer and publisher Tim O’Reilly observed, “Blockchain turned out to be the most rapid recentralization of a decentralized technology that I’ve seen in my lifetime.”

https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2022/09/Point-of-View-the-superficial-allure-of-crypto-Hilary-Allen
So, there is something there that may not be obvious to all.
Sizzle?
Or as Clara Peller put it, where's the beef?

Not exactly.
The bank then has two options:
1. Sell the property at a significant discount (let's say $200M)
2. Add value to the property themselves then sell it
Assuming the lender perfected its security interest (i.e. did a UCC 9 filing to put the world on notice that it had a type of lien on the property), then in #1, the buyer would get the property subject to a $300M lien.
how many buyers do you think are out there for distressed $200M office buildings
None, and even fewer (if that were possible) who would buy a $200M office building with a $300M lien against it. Even for $1. That $200M sale ain't a-gonna happen.
As far as walking away from the loan (neither option 1 nor option 2) goes, it is premised on at best a somewhat incomplete understanding of non-recourse loans. Most loans aren't.

WHERE ARE NON-RECOURSE LOANS USED?
These loans are often used to finance commercial real estate projects and other projects that include an extended completion period. In the case of real estate, the land acts as collateral for the loan. A non-recourse loan is also used in financial industries, with securities placed as collateral.
HOW DO I QUALIFY FOR NON-RECOURSE LOANS?
Clearly, the majority of the risk and exposure with non-recourse loans rests with the lender. Therefore, a non-recourse loan may be more difficult to qualify for than a recourse loan. Commercial lenders will often only extend non-recourse loans to finance certain types of properties and only to worthy borrowers. Stable finances and an excellent credit score are two of the most important factors that a lender will look at. Generally, the loan requires the property to be a larger city, be in good condition, and have good historical financials, too.

https://fidelityca.com/non-recourse-loan-financing/
If a large player walks away from a debt, especially one that it could pay, its reputation will be mud for a long time. Most players won't risk their reputation. Though there are exceptions, and they might get lucky - they might find "a reckless institution willing to do business with clients nobody else would touch."
Historically, non-recourse mortgages arose out of the Great Depression. They made the news in the 1990s when several regional real estate markets collapsed and so many homeowners who were underwater simply walked away.

Non-recourse loans are a unique characteristic of the US mortgage market and first emerged in state legislation in the 1930s. A decrease in demand for real estate and the ensuing precipitous drop in prices during the Great Depression led to the realization of mortgages at minimal prices, significantly below their outstanding balances. As a result, not only did borrowers lose the roofs over their heads to lenders but also faced lawsuits by the same lenders for the significant remainder of their debt. This harsh reality caused many states to adopt borrower-friendly legislation. ... In effect it gave the borrower a put option

https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg/vol42/iss2/2/
There are roughly a dozen non-recourse states, the largest of course being California. But it's not so simple there. A bank may execute a non-judicial foreclosure, bypassing the courts and getting a relatively quick sale. If it follows this path, it has no recourse for any deficiency (shortfall). This is the norm for small potato mortgages (I suppose that means $3M homes in California).
However, a bank is not likely to let a creditor with deep pockets like Brookfield simply walk away with a $100M deficiency. It will go through the courts. In California, judicial foreclosures are not non-recourse (pardon the double negative).
Commercial Mortgage Foreclosure (CA), Practice Note, Alston and Bird LLP (14 pages)
Yes, companies like Brookfield will default on a loan (with no recourse), hand back the keys, then buy the same asset back for a huge discount.
Pretty crazy if you ask me
Yes, the idea that they will, or even can, do this is pretty crazy.

Here's a link to a transcript of a very recent M* interview by Christine Benz and Jeffrey Ptak of TRP's David Giroux. It's a pretty lengthy read. The interview is also available on the M* Longview podcast.
https://www.morningstar.com/financial-advice/david-giroux-i-want-look-forward-not-backward

M* The Long View podcast with David Giroux (PRWCX, TCAF). Scroll a bit for full transcript.
https://www.morningstar.com/financial-advice/david-giroux-i-want-look-forward-not-backward

Accounts at financial institutions are considered to be inactive if there has been no activity (aside from automatic divs/interest/CD renewals) for some period of time, often 12 months.
The institution continues to hold your assets, though it may "close" the account, or it may prohibit all transactions (including cashing checks), or it may simply start charging inactivity fees. (Vanguard does not charge inactivity fees.)
There is some confusion about the term "dormancy". Some institutions say that an inactive account is "dormant". That is how Vanguard is using the term according to your post. Others wait until the next phase (below) before calling the account dormant.
A financial institution is required to turn over ("escheat") account assets to your state after some longer period of time. Depending on the state, this is three years or longer. Some institutions say that this is when an account becomes "dormant". Vanguard uses "dormancy" this way in its prospectuses, e.g. for VMFXX:

Dormant Accounts
If your account has no activity in it for a period of time, Vanguard may be
required to transfer [escheat] it to a state under the state’s abandoned property law,
subject to potential federal or state withholding taxes.

https://personal.vanguard.com/pub/Pdf/p030.pdf?2210171184
Until the assets escheat, you can recover inactive account assets by notifying the institution (Vanguard) that you are still alive, still interested in the assets, and go about reactivating the account (or possibly opening a new account).
Note that the rules are more forgiving for retirement accounts. It's a mess that I'm not going to sift through now.
https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/faqs-on-unclaimed-property-aspects-of-retirement-assets
Once burned, twice shy. Wells Fargo did this to me several years ago. Ever since then I've kept a log of the last time I contacted the institution (and what constitutes "contact") or conducted a transaction. When it gets close to a year (even if the institution says it doesn't care about inactivity, just escheatment), I will contact the institution. Or make a $5 deposit, or something.

Not that I'd be interested, but given current market conditions and trends, I would be hesitant to buy into any 'newfangled' retail-oriented vehicle. Usually when such things are rolled out, the markets generally roll over hard and early-investors buying into it while still riding their trading high will get sucker-punched soon after purchase...which kind of echoes what staycalm said about trend-chasing, perhaps.
MSF: I agree that 1.25+./85 fee + 6% expenses is high, but still looks better than the 2-and-20 model most hedge funds charge their deep-pocketed pigeons. That said, there's still a front-end load of up to 3.5% on Class S (retail) shares which is an added expense if purchased through "certain financial intermediaries."
*munches popcorn and watches*

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/915802/000139834423018651/fp0085333-1_497.htm
497 1 fp0085333-1_497.htm
Financial Investors Trust
Vulcan Small Cap Fund
(the "Fund")
Supplement Dated September 29, 2023
To The Summary Prospectus, Prospectus, and Statement of Additional Information ("SAI"),
each Dated August 31, 2023
Effective October 1, 2023, each class the Fund will re-open to purchases from new shareholders. Accordingly, the following changes are effective as of such date:
The first paragraph in the "Purchase and Sale of Fund Shares" section of the Summary Prospectus and the Summary Section of the Prospectus is hereby deleted in its entirety.
The first three paragraphs in the "Buying, Exchanging and Redeeming Shares – Buying Shares" section of the Fund's Prospectus are deleted in their entirety.
The fourth paragraph in the "Buying, Exchanging and Redeeming Shares – Buying Shares" section of the Fund's Prospectus is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:
"The Vulcan Funds retain the right to limit inflows into the Vulcan Funds."
The second, third, and fourth paragraphs in the "Purchase, Exchange & Redemption of Shares" section of the Fund's SAI are deleted in their entirety.
The fifth paragraph in the "Purchase, Exchange & Redemption of Shares" section of the Fund's SAI is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:
"The Vulcan Funds retain the right to limit inflows into the Vulcan Funds."
INVESTORS SHOULD RETAIN THIS SUPPLEMENT FOR FUTURE REFERENCE
Fund closed at the close of business November 29, 2013
https://www.mutualfundobserver.com/discuss/discussion/9192/vulcan-value-partners-small-cap-fund-to-close-to-new-investors

IMO, robo-advisors are nothing more than hyped-up allocation funds that are liked by the younger generation. If one is willing to spend a little time, one can achieve a similar effect with traditional allocation funds (static-allocations; Income, conservative-allocation, moderate-allocation, aggressive-allocation) or TDFs (glide-path allocation). A lot of PR has gone into promoting robo-advisors as something novel when it is just some old wine in new bottles.

No argument here.
The key is the highlighted section. People have to be willing, and interested, in spending a little time. Many are not, though that may seem weird to MFO readers :-).
As to being able to achieve similar effect with TDFs, Vanguard says the same thing. I quoted a portion of Vanguard's disclosure above. Perhaps I should have included more of it, as it echoes what you are saying. In essence, for the extra fee, you get handholding and some advice but otherwise similar investments, especially if one sticks to index funds (a common makeup of TDFs, not just at Vanguard):

Vanguard offers a range of different solutions to help you meet your financial goals, including self- directed brokerage services, single fund investments (such as Vanguard’s Target Retirement Funds), and different investment advisory programs. If you are considering investing through a total market index investment setting, you should understand that each of the Four Totals [Total Stock, Total Bond, Total Int'l Stock, Total Int'l Bond] is a share class of the mutual funds that are used (or are substantially similar to the mutual funds used) in Vanguard’s Target Retirement Funds. In certain circumstances, your recommended standard portfolio will contain identical allocations to the four Total Funds that are available in a Vanguard Target Retirement Fund, which is generally available at a lower cost than the Services.

https://personal.vanguard.com/pdf/vanguard-digital-advice-brochure.pdf
OTOH, if one is willing to spend the time with the advisor, one can wind up with portfolios that are significantly more personalized.