Good stuff.
The more times I see/hear a PM in the financial pr0n media, the less I want to have money with them. Bob Arnott, Bill Gross, Jeff Gundlach, Michael Hassenstab, Cathie Wood, etc, etc. They all can be 'rock stars' with legions of fawning fans and media coverage -- until they aren't.
TRP's David Giroux is a rock star, but I get the distinct sense that he tends to eschew the media and is very selective with where and how often he's quoted or interviewed -- which I find refreshing. (You might be able to say the same about Buffett, too, maybe.)

Surprisingly, GP's version of events concerning First Republic doesn't contain so much a shred of admission that they made any kind of error.
"Our very selective approach to investing in Banks led us to own First Republic at portfolio weights that expressed a high degree of conviction in the company’s risk-adjusted return profile. As you are likely aware, over the past month, First Republic experienced a significant crisis, as collateral damage from the Silicon Valley Bank (SIVB US) collapse, which resulted in a severe de-rating of the FRC share price. A fair question for anyone to ask is how to reconcile our very selective approach to investing in banks with a large position in a bank that has experienced a significant crisis. At a very high level, our investment thesis on First Republic was based in its application of a world-class client service model to arguably the world’s most attractive banking client markets (specifically, the high net worth and high-end professional services markets in urban coastal population centers across the United States). That strategy for First Republic had enabled the company to structurally grow earnings while preserving exceptionally conservative underwriting standards. In other words, while First Republic is a bank, we observed that its unique model and exposure profile largely neutralized most of the quality attributes that generally make banks less attractive and more risky. Put another way, an attribute-by-attribute analysis of First Republic, reinforced over its long successful track record, made us comfortable treating First Republic as we would treat best-in-class growth companies we discover in other industries.
"However, after SVB Financial shared its post-close announcement on Wednesday, March 8th, highlighting elevated deposit attrition, the sale of available-for-sale securities at a material loss, and an equity capital raise, we spoke with First Republic’s CFO in order to confirm our knowledge of the company’s exposure to deposits from early-stage companies, net unrealized losses in available-for-sale securities, and other aspects of its capacity to avoid the negative feedback loop that SVB was beginning to experience. We left that balance sheet review confident enough to continue holding our positions. What destabilized our confidence was Friday’s announcement that SVB Financial would enter receivership and the recoverability of uninsured deposit balances at SVB was in question. As these revelations became clear, we concluded that the probability of contagion extending to First Republic depositors had become too high to justify continuing to hold our positions. In other words, we concluded that First Republic had ceased to be an investment opportunity and had instead transitioned to more of a pure gamble on which wagering our clients’ funds was unacceptable. We proceeded to exit our entire investment position in First Republic at the next opportunity (the Monday morning pre-market) as efficiently as we could without further pressuring the share price."
https://secure.alpsinc.com/MarketingAPI/api/v1/Content/grandeurpeakglobal/grandeurpeakglobal-comm-20230421.pdf
If they can't find any mistake in their investment process, then what's to prevent them from making the same mistake again?

My thinking is the more concentrated a fund is in a few stocks, the more managers need a forensic accountant to go over the financial documents of their companies with a fine tooth comb looking for fraud or problematic areas. But for funds with 100 or 200 stocks as many Grandeur funds are, it seems less necessary. There is less individual company risk in a 1% position than a 5% one.
That said, Silicon Valley Bank wasn’t a case of fraud or hidden funny numbers like Enron or Worldcom. These were risks on the balance sheet in plain sight. Maybe managers just didn’t believe rates would rise as quickly as they did and instead thought that SVB would have time to adjust and reduce its rate exposure.

Think Grandeur Peak was careless with respect how they handle the risk on the stock and their fund levels. The worst part was they did not even apologize for this mistake. I found this data from their 2022 annual report. If you look up these two banks, Grandeur Peak was one their largest investor. My question for GP is how can they concentrate the risk by holding two similar banks. I invested with them awhile back and sold the entire position in mid 2021. They were just too volatile for my taste.
Queen Road Small Cap fund I have did not hold the same kind of bank stock as Grandeur Peak funds did. The annual report even pointed out why a bank it invested in stands out differently from SVB. Clearly, the fund manager knows their financial holdings well.

So many obstacles now to converting empty office buildings including old zoning laws, and the fear of lost equity in nearby homes to be but a few. Interesting read, but will probably be behind a NYTimes paywall. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/01/upshot/american-cities-office-conversion.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare
“There is an aging office building on Water Street in Lower Manhattan where it would make all the sense in the world to create apartments. The 31-story building, once the headquarters of A.I.G., has windows all around and a shape suited to extra corner units. In a city with too little housing, it could hold 800 to 900 apartments. Right across the street, one office not so different from this one has already been turned into housing, and another is on the way.
But 175 Water Street has a hitch: Offices in the financial district are spared some zoning rules that make conversion hard — so long as they were built before 1977. And this one was built six years too late, in 1983.”

On Averages
Averages are often misused in the financial industry. Almost everything is averaged arithmetically (i.e. simple average) when other averages such as geometric averages (for TR, etc), harmonic ratios (for P/E, P/B ratios, etc) may be more appropriate; in some cases, no averaging method is applicable but simple averages are used anyway (SD, Sharpe Ratio, etc).
BTW, the M* document @msf linked also says (my bolds),
"Morningstar generates this figure in-house, based on the most-recent portfolio holdings submitted by the fund and stock statistics gleaned from our internal U.S. equities databases. (Our U.S. equities department receives prices from ComStock, a division of Interactive Data Corporation. , and gathers earnings information from a company's most-recent annual and quarterly income statements.) Negative P/Es are not used, and any PE greater than 60 is capped at 60 in the calculation of the average." https://awgmain.morningstar.com/webhelp/glossary_definitions/mutual_fund/mfglossary_Price_Earnings_Ratio.html
I think that Stock Rover (SR) also uses harmonic averages for ratios (P/E, P/B, etc), but then goes ahead and uses simple average for SDs - I cannot find a link now. SR was also making some other errors in handling cash, m-mkt funds, yearend CG distributions, and after several back-and-forth communications to get to the right person/team, SR fixed them. https://ybbpersonalfinance.proboards.com/thread/318/stock-rover-sr
As for contacting organizations for errors or data, the worst are Yahoo Finance and Vanguard - either they don't respond, or they don't care and send form letter responses. The best in this respect are Fidelity, Portfolio Visualizer (PV), StockCharts, StockRover (SR).

Yes, that is my understanding too, @WABAC. People scurrying away after they lost in 2022 while all bond funds lost money with rising rates is likely a good sign for the future of TIPS. I have small holdings in a short and long TIP ETF. Money-wise I'm about even with where I bought a few months ago. The financial environment for TIPS is probably better today than when I bought so I'm holding... but I've been wrong before :).

I agree with @yogibearbull.
I briefly used a financial account aggregator as a test several years ago.
It was nice to consolidate all my accounts in a "single pane of glass."
While I liked this feature, the increased risk wasn't worth it.
All my account passwords were changed after the aggregator trial...

@Crash said ”Can't find apples to apples anywhere. Crud”
That’s because bond funds are nearly impossible to compare. Too many moving parts: Credit quality, average duration, average maturity, countries & regions included, dollar hedged or non-hedged (if outside the U.S.) Throw into that sauce the manger’s philosophy, his / her appetite for risk, prior experience and their overall view of the domestic or global macro picture. One big attribute you do have control over is the ER. That’s a bigger factor with fixed income funds than with stock funds generally because the expected return is lower and that ER takes a bigger bite out of the expected return. That .74% doesn’t look cheap on the surface, but I don’t know enough about how the fund invests to say it’s out of line. hedging / short selling / use of leverage / investing in lower quality bonds all cost more (if it so engages). International investing, if included, also increases cost.
Look for a website that shows things like average duration and the dispersion among credit qualities ranging from AAA (government backed) all the way down to C (in default). Tells you a lot about the risk (and is one good way to compare different funds). I think M* will display that if you click the “holdings” tab. And I’m pretty sure Fido’s website will as well.
Past performance? Was that during the 30+ year bond bull market dating back to Paul Volker? Or are we talking about the bear market of the past 2 years when when rates stabilized and than spiked sharply? Or maybe we’re looking at some “combo” performance figure including portions of both the bull and bear markets … :)
-
@Crash said, ”And HARRIS is involved, somehow. Sub-advisors?”
Harris Associates, Chicago, operates the Oakmark Funds. I believe Harris was independent at one time. For many years now it has been owned by the giant NATIXIS of France. Nothing wrong with Natixis. Well regarded, but a bit pricey. Many of their funds are front-loaded. I’ve owned some funds under the Natixis umbrella over the years - most recently GATEX, which I sold more than a year ago.
”Harris Associates L.P. is a Chicago-based investment company that manages $86 billion[1] in assets as of September 30, 2022. Harris manages long-only U.S. equity, international equity, and global equity strategies which are offered through its mutual fund company, the Oakmark Funds, and other types of vehicles. Harris is wholly owned by Natixis Investment Managers, an American-French financial services firm that is principally owned by BPCE. Harris Associates retains full control of investment decisions, investment philosophy, and day-to-day operations.”
Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harris_Associates

Back to the original post in this thread. It makes me giggle to read the phrase, "slightly Luddites."
All manner of financial "everything" has been dreamed up and created, in order to devise instruments to be bought and sold in the Markets. Remember Michael Burry? He went to GS to ask them to invent an instrument by which he could short the housing market. Smarter than them all.
He exploited what he was able to see in the statistics. OK. But "everything" needs to be regulated. Because the Market owns no conscience. PEOPLE ought to, but too often don't. And the people who too often don't, have lots of money to put to work. And Larry Summers jumped down the throat of Brooksley Born for pointing out the need to regulate (or more tightly regulate?) credit derivatives. Summers opposed it, vehemently.
(And yes, the Head of the CFTC could not accurately be labeled as just a "staffer.")
That episode with Born in Summers' office goes back a lot of years. Perhaps it is too far back in the rearview mirror to matter anymore? Perhaps uncle Larry can be forgiven? At any rate, regulations, in turn, depend upon humans with a conscience in order to be enforced. Regulations cannot stop greed, but the regulations can prevent particular instances in which naked greed is center-stage and obvious. And we need more regulation, not less. Maybe more precisely, what I want to express is the need for a fundamental overhaul, so that regulations do not need to be created for A, B, C and onward all the way to Z, like continually sticking fingers into holes in the dike. I don't bet we'll ever see such a thing, though: too many vested interests would find their own oxen would be gored.

The large projected decline in commercial real estate prices, combined with the substantial increase in office vacancies, contributes to projected loss rates on office properties that are roughly triple the levels reached during the 2008 financial crisis.
Let us hope that 'haircut' doesn't take place.

On CREs,
"The test's focus on commercial real estate shows that while large banks would experience heavy losses in the hypothetical scenario, they would still be able to continue lending. The banks in this year's test hold roughly 20 percent of the office and downtown commercial real estate loans held by banks. The large projected decline in commercial real estate prices, combined with the substantial increase in office vacancies, contributes to projected loss rates on office properties that are roughly triple the levels reached during the 2008 financial crisis."

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1014913/000110465923075579/tm2319682d1_497.htm
497 1 tm2319682d1_497.htm 497
Filed pursuant to Rule 497(e)
Registration No. 333-07305
1940 Act File No. 811-07685
FRONTIER FUNDS, INC.
Supplement to Prospectus Dated October 31, 2022
Frontier MFG Select Infrastructure Fund
Institutional Class Shares (FMSIX)
Service Class Shares (FMSSX)
The Board of Directors (the “Board”) of Frontier Funds, Inc. (the “Company”), based upon the recommendation of Frontegra Asset Management, Inc. (“Frontegra”), has determined to liquidate the Frontier MFG Select Infrastructure Fund (the “Fund”). Frontegra is the Fund’s investment adviser and MFG Asset Management is the Fund’s subadviser. After considering a variety of factors, the Board concluded that it would be advisable and in the best interest of the Fund and its shareholders that the Fund be closed and liquidated as a series of the Company, effective as of the close of business on the liquidation date, August 23, 2023.
The Board approved a Plan of Liquidation that determines the manner in which the Fund will be liquidated. Pursuant to the Plan of Liquidation and in anticipation of the Fund’s liquidation, the Fund will be closed to new purchases, additional investments and incoming exchanges, except for purchases made through an automatic investment program or the reinvestment of any distributions or a purchase exception that is approved by the officers of the Company, effective after market close on June 29, 2023. After the Fund is closed to new investments, shareholders will be permitted to exchange their shares of the Fund for shares of the other available Frontier Funds or to redeem their shares of the Fund, as provided in the Fund’s prospectus, until the liquidation date. No redemption fees will be imposed by the Fund in connection with redemptions or exchanges; however, please note that your financial intermediary may charge fees in connection with redemptions or exchanges.
Prior to the August 23, 2023, liquidation date, the Fund will no longer actively pursue its stated investment objective, and MFG Asset Management will begin to liquidate the Fund’s portfolio. The Fund’s portfolio managers will likely increase the Fund’s assets held in cash and cash equivalents in order to prepare for an orderly liquidation and to meet anticipated redemption requests. As a result, the Fund is expected to deviate from its stated investment objective, policies and strategies.
Pursuant to the Plan of Liquidation, any shareholder who has not exchanged or redeemed their shares of the Fund prior to the liquidation date of August 23, 2023, will have their shares redeemed in cash and will receive one or more payments representing the shareholder’s proportionate interest in the net assets of the Fund as of the liquidation date, after the Fund has paid or provided for all taxes, expenses and any other liabilities, subject to any required withholdings. The automatic redemption of Fund shares on the liquidation date will generally be treated the same as any other redemption of Fund shares for tax purposes, so that shareholders (other than tax-exempt accounts) will recognize gain or loss for income tax purposes on the redemption of their Fund shares in the liquidation. In addition, the Fund and its shareholders will bear transaction costs and tax consequences associated with the disposition of the Fund’s portfolio holdings prior to the liquidation date. The Fund expects to have declared and paid a distribution or distributions, which, together with all previous such distributions, will have the effect of distributing to the Fund’s shareholders all of the Fund’s investment company taxable income and net capital gain (after reductions for any available capital loss carryforward), if any, realized in the taxable periods ending on or prior to the liquidation date. The distribution or distributions will include any additional amounts necessary to avoid federal income or excise tax. Shareholders should consult their tax adviser for further information about federal, state and local tax consequences relative to their specific situation.
Important Information for Retirement Plan Investors
If you are a retirement plan investor, you should consult your tax adviser regarding the consequences of a redemption of Fund shares. If you hold your Fund shares through a tax-deferred retirement account, you should consult with your tax adviser or account custodian to determine how you may reinvest your redemption proceeds on a tax-deferred basis. If the redeemed shares are held in a qualified retirement account such as an individual retirement account (IRA) and you have made no election regarding tax withholding, the redemption proceeds may be subject to a 10% federal income tax withholding and any applicable state required withholding. If you will receive a distribution from an IRA or a Simplified Employee Pension (SEP) IRA that is terminating as a result of the liquidation of the Fund, you must either roll the proceeds into another IRA within 60 days of the date of the distribution in order to avoid having to include the distribution in your taxable income for the year, if applicable, or request that the distribution be made directly to another IRA or eligible retirement plan. Please note you can make only one tax-free rollover of a distribution you receive from an IRA to another (or the same) IRA in any 12-month period, regardless of the number of IRAs you own. If you receive a distribution from a 403(b)(7) custodial account (tax-sheltered account) or a Keogh account, you must roll the distribution into an eligible retirement plan within 60 days in order to avoid disqualification of the plan and inclusion of the distribution in your taxable income for the year. If you are the trustee of a qualified retirement plan or the custodian of a 403(b)(7) custodial account (tax-sheltered account) or a Keogh account, you may reinvest the proceeds in any way permitted by its governing instrument.
This supplement should be retained with your Prospectus for future reference.
The date of this Supplement to the Prospectus is June 28, 2023.

Harry was in interesting soul. His work lays, as you point out, the foundation for much of the modern finance industry. And yet he, himself, was not a finance guy and not particularly interested in the subject. He started out writing algorithms and running simulations. Financial markets were merely a rich source of interesting data with which to test the models.
Early on he ran a quant merger arbitrage hedge fund, the first of its kind. But he wasn't wedded to it and I get the sense he didn't stick around all that terribly long.
A surprisingly large number of fund managers have their credentials in mathematics, computer science, physics or engineering. I wonder if for them, as for Harry, all this money stuff is just an interesting puzzle to work out?

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1438681/000158064223003318/alphamarksupplement.htm
497 1 alphamarksupplement.htm 497
Supplement dated June 26, 2023
to the Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and
Statement of Additional Information (the “SAI”) of AlphaMark Fund (the “Fund”)
ALPHAMARK FUND
Ticker Symbol: AMLCX
This Supplement provides new and additional information beyond that in, and should be read in conjunction with, the Fund’s Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and SAI.
The Board of Trustees of AlphaMark Investment Trust (the “Trust”), after notice of the Advisor’s termination of the investment advisory agreement and based on information provided by AlphaMark Advisors, LLC (the “Advisor”), has determined that it is in the best interest of the Fund and its shareholders that the Fund be liquidated. In connection therewith, the Board has approved a Plan of Liquidation and Dissolution (the “Plan”) for the Fund. Effective immediately, the Fund will cease to pursue its investment objective, will cease selling shares, and the Fund’s investment manager, AlphaMark Advisors, LLC, may begin liquidating the Fund’s investments.
Pursuant to the Plan, the Fund will liquidate its investments and thereafter redeem all of its outstanding shares by distribution of its assets to shareholders in amounts equal to the net asset value of each shareholder’s Fund investment after the Fund has paid or provided for all of its charges, taxes, expenses and liabilities. The Advisor anticipates that the assets of the Fund will be fully liquidated and all outstanding shares redeemed on or about July 31, 2023 (the “Liquidation Date”). This date may be changed without notice to shareholders, as the liquidation of the Fund’s assets or winding up of the Fund’s affairs may take longer than expected.
Until the Liquidation Date, you may continue to freely redeem your shares, including reinvested distributions, in accordance with the section in the Prospectus entitled “How to Redeem Shares.” Unless your investment in the Fund is through a tax-deferred retirement account, a redemption is subject to tax on any taxable gains. Please refer to the “Dividends, Distributions and Taxes” sections in the Fund’s Prospectus for general information. You may wish to consult your tax advisor about your particular tax situation.
As a result of the anticipated liquidation of the Fund, the Fund is expected to deviate from its stated investment strategies and policies and will no longer pursue its stated investment objective. The Fund will begin liquidating its portfolio and will hold cash and cash equivalents, such as money market funds, until all investments have been converted to cash and all shares have been redeemed. During this period, your investment in a Fund may not experience the gains (or losses) that would be typical if the Fund were still pursuing its investment objective.
Any capital gains will be distributed as soon as practicable to shareholders and reinvested in additional shares prior to distribution, unless you have previously requested payment in cash.
ANY SHAREHOLDERS WHO HAVE NOT REDEEMED THEIR SHARES OF THE FUND PRIOR TO THE LIQUIDATION DATE WILL HAVE THEIR SHARES REDEEMED AUTOMATICALLY AS OF THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS ON THE LIQUIDATION DATE. THE PROCEEDS OF ANY SUCH REDEMPTION WILL BE EQUAL TO THE NET ASSET VALUE OF SUCH SHARES AFTER THE FUND HAS PAID OR PROVIDED FOR ALL OF ITS CHARGES, TAXES, EXPENSES AND LIABILITIES. ANY LIQUIDATING DISTRIBUTION, WHICH MAY BE IN CASH OR CASH EQUIVALENTS EQUAL TO EACH RECORD SHAREHOLDER’S PROPORTIONATE INTEREST OF THE NET ASSETS OF THE FUND, DUE TO THE FUND’S SHAREHOLDERS WILL BE SENT TO THE SHAREHOLDER’S ADDRESS OF RECORD. IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS OR NEED ASSISTANCE, PLEASE CONTACT YOUR FINANCIAL ADVISOR DIRECTLY OR THE FUND AT 1-866-420-3350.
IMPORTANT INFORMATION FOR RETIREMENT PLAN INVESTORS
If you are a retirement plan investor, you should consult your tax advisor regarding the consequences of a redemption of Fund shares. If you receive a distribution from an Individual Retirement Account or a Simplified Employee Pension (SEP) IRA, you must roll the proceeds into another Individual Retirement Account within sixty (60) days of the date of the distribution in order to avoid having to include the distribution in your taxable income for the year. If you receive a distribution from a 403(b)(7) Custodian Account (Tax-Sheltered account) or a Keogh Account, you must roll the distribution into a similar type of retirement plan within sixty (60) days in order to avoid disqualification of your plan and the severe tax consequences that it can bring. If you are the trustee of a Qualified Retirement Plan, you may reinvest the money in any way permitted by the plan and trust agreement. If you have questions or need assistance, please contact your financial advisor directly or the Fund at 1-866-420-3350.
This Supplement and the Fund’s Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and SAI provide relevant information for all shareholders and should be retained for future reference.

Select excerpts are listed below.
"Nearly 95% of all stocks in the 1940s and 1950s were owned by individual investors. They were mostly buy-and-hold investors, just looking to earn some dividends. More than 95% of all trading was done by individual investors. Today that number is more like 2% with 98% of trading being carried out by institutional investors and machines."
"The precipitous decline in fees can be traced back to both Vanguard and a change in rules instituted by the SEC back in 1975. That’s when the SEC abolished fixed-rate commissions for stock trading. Before then investors were paying an average of 1-3% to buy or sell a stock. So the costs didn’t scale even if the size of your trades went up. Plus the bid-ask spreads were wide enough to drive a truck through."
"During the 1980s, mutual fund assets jumped from $241 billion to $1.5 trillion. The charge was led by money market funds, which soared from $2 billion to $570 billion, accounting for almost half the increase."
"We went from 1% stock market ownership in 1929 to 19% in 1983 to nearly 60% by 2000. Almost 60% of households who owned stocks had purchased their first share after 1990. One-third of all buyers entered the market in 1995 or later."
"The S&P 500 lost around 10% in total during the first decade of the 21st century, a 10 year stretch that saw the market get chopped in half twice. Things felt pretty bleak coming out of the Great Financial Crisis of 2008."
Link

I have great respect for Leuthold and think they may well be right in this particular case, but having been to Vanguard's offices, I can't help remembering this framed poster described here:
https://ritholtz.com/2014/02/the-best-investment-advice-youll-never-get-2/

In July 1971, the first index fund was created by McQuown and Fouse with a $6 million contribution from the Samsonite Luggage pension fund, which had been referred to Fouse by Bill Sharpe, who was already teaching at Stanford. It was Sharpe’s academic work in the 1960s that formed the theoretical underpinning of indexing and would later earn him the Nobel Prize. The small initial fund performed well, and institutional managers and their trustees took note.....
...But even in San Francisco, as in the country’s other financial centers, Fouse and McQuown’s findings were not a welcome development for brokers, portfolio managers, or anyone else who thrived on the industry’s high salaries and fees. As a result, the counterattack against indexing began to unfold. Fund managers denied that they had been gouging investors or that there was any conflict of interest in their profession. Workout gear appeared with the slogan “Beat the S&P 500,” and a Minneapolis-based firm, the Leuthold Group, distributed a large poster nationwide depicting the classic Uncle Sam character saying, “Index Funds Are UnAmerican,” implying that anyone who was not trying to beat the averages was nothing more than an unpatriotic wimp. (That poster still hangs on the office walls of many financial planners and fund managers.)

I suspect that poster might be a collector's item now. Bogle welcomed the challenge and found it amusing.

BRK is in several S&P indexes.
But it's only in the MSCI USA Financial Index, not in the MSCI USA Index. QUAL just selects from the latter. I tried to find why BRK isn't there, but couldn't find a reason as the broader index does have financials.
Years ago, when there was only BRK-A, even the S&P excluded it due to its very high price (= low liquidity for indexing). Some companies may also be excluded if they have dual class structures, except for the grandfathered ones, but I haven't looked at BRK capital structure.

Thanks, @msf. For purposes of completeness, a slight correction to your guidance.
Your: "Declare the full amount on Sched B, line 1, and at the bottom of that line you subtract the accrued interest paid to the seller as a "Nominee Distribution"."
I have to subtract the accrued interest paid to the seller as "Accrued Interest" and not as "Nominee Distribution."
(If it were a Nominee Distribution, I will be required to issue a Form 1099-INT to the person I paid the accrued interest. I have no way of knowing the seller. The word Nominee has a legal connotation and I have not undertaken to be or function as a nominee for the seller.)
Looking at the instructions to form 1099-INT, the brokerage (in this case) is required to report on a Form 1099-INT issued to the seller the amount of accrued interest received from me upon sale of their bond.
(Not looking for a comment but just noting the reality - The issue discussed here is a trap for the unwary created by the reporting rules convenient for the IRS and the financial intermediaries, who always aspire to do the least amount of perceived work possible and the IRS on the other hand would rather have more income reported than require (fight) the financial intermediaries to report on the buyer's Form 1099-INT only the amount of interest beneficially received by the buyer (coupon received minus accrued interest paid to seller).
Good thing I caught this before filing my tax return. I checked with some friends and family and they all filed without taking a deduction for the accrued interest paid over to the seller. Good for the IRS, some of them do not want to spend the time to file an amended return to get a refund.
P.S.: 2022 is the first year I bought bonds in my taxable account. I have purchased bonds in the IRA going as far back as post GFC.
Thank you.

OMFL might be worth a look but I'm not exactly sure what you're looking for specifically.
From Invesco site:
Product Details
"The Invesco Russell 1000 Dynamic Multifactor ETF (Fund) is based on the Russell 1000 Invesco Dynamic Multifactor Index (Index). The Fund will invest at least 80% of its total assets in the securities that comprise the Index. The Index is constructed using a rules-based approach that re-weights large-cap securities of the Russell 1000 Index according to economic cycles and market conditions, reflected by expansion, slowdown, contraction or recovery. The securities are assigned a multi-factor score from one of five investment styles: value, momentum, quality, low volatility and size. The Fund and Index are reconstituted and rebalanced based on economic indicator signal changes, as frequently as monthly."
More on OMFL