Don't know much about the tax angle, but VEIPX is one of the best V'rd LCap value funds in the last 5-10 years.

I likely wrote a bit too compressed.
The M* figures in the article are as of 9/30/2015. When one quotes YTD figures, one has to be clear on what the "date" is in "year to date". (The Nov 2 dateline of the article is the date the article was written, not necessarily the date of the data within the article.)
M* shows YTD (D = Nov 3) for PREMX of 3.14%. Likely rounding was done differently by Bloomberg; I'm not going try to figure out why the two figures differ by 0.01%. They're basically the same.
If you're looking at YTD performance that includes October and part of November, it would be nice to know what was in the portfolio that produced that performance. Unfortunately, funds report their portfolios with a 30 day lag (at least I think that's the delay), so the best you're going to get is a portfolio as of 9/30/15.
It seems to me that if that's the portfolio one is looking at, then one should also be looking at the performance that this particular portfolio achieved - that is, the returns through the same date, 9/30. Not that it makes a big difference. The portfolio is in constant flux, day by day and even minute by minute, so a snapshot still doesn't tell you what happened along the way to achieve the performance shown.
The raw data for holdings should be the same regardless of the source of you data. That is, Bloomberg, M*, the fund page, should all report exactly the same holdings for a fund on a given date.
But any analysis of the holdings (average credit rating, percent in cash, etc.) is going to vary from source to source. That's because while two sources (M*, fund page) may use the same names (e.g. percent in cash), their calculations may be different.
M* throws bonds with maturities under 1 year into the cash bucket. So if you have a portfolio that is filled entirely with bonds where half mature in six months and half mature in 10 years, M* will say that your portfolio is 50% cash, 50% bonds. My guess is that when M* analyzes the country exposure of the portfolio, it only looks at the 50% in long term bonds. And the country exposure of those bonds may be different than the country exposure of the short term bonds. So what's reported as country exposure might depend on whether you look at just the long bonds or all the bonds.
I haven't even gotten into derivatives, in part because I haven't tried thinking through how one might analyze them. Suffice to say that TGBAX plays enough games with currency exposure (it bears no relationship to the bond country exposure) that one should be able to come up with very different figures depending on how one treats derivatives.
Ideally, one should read up on how all of the numbers are calculated. (I've posted before about how M* computes average credit quality in a way that gives a lot more weight to lower graded bonds.)
If one doesn't fully understand what the numbers mean (I certainly don't), the next best thing is to stick with one source (M*, Bloomberg, some other aggregator). That way, any summary figure (e.g. average credit quality) is computed the same way for each of the funds one is comparing. M* will compute credit the same way for PREMX as for VTBIX.

I would continue to hold and add to these funds. Go play golf and come back in thirty years.
For those less lucky, here's some tips on how to access closed funds:
investorplace.com/how-to-invest/funds/mutual-funds/closed/
Also,
Closing Mutual Funds: Investment Protection Or Trap?
"When your fund or prospective fund is closing, knowing the positive and negative implications of the closure is important for deciding what to do, especially because you'll usually have a short period of time to act. Determining whether the fund is already damaged or whether it's maintaining its strategy, and therefore saving itself from compromising its goals, should be key when you're evaluating a fund's closure. Remember to direct your investments or they will direct you."
investopedia.com/articles/mutualfund/03/080603.asp

I own another microcap fund from a fund company that also flies a bit under the radar, Buffalo Fund's Emerging Opportunities Fund (BUFOX). The fund has 53 holdings with a recent concentration in Technology. It's off its high by 20%, but boosts a 5 yr avg return of over 15%. The reality is that this fund experienced a MAXDD of 48% and it took 6 years to dig out of that hole. These funds are not for the faint of heart and in my opinion require an entry and exit strategy. These funds move in cycles so attempt to buy the lows.

Love seeing these old "ST" tickers from the old Strong Funds where I once invested. Wells inherited these from Dick Strong when he was banned from the securities business by the SEC. Bought up what was left of his firm and kept the old fund names for awhile. The "Advantage" label came from Strong too. But I can only recall it applying to their Ultra-Short bond fund.
While he was a crook, Strong actually had some pretty good funds and some talented managers. 15 years have passed. Possibly Wells is trying to distance themselves from the origin of some of these.
Memories :)

Depends on how this may fit into your larger investment strategy for college savings, as these two funds are quite different. But in terms of an "all-in-one" solution I would go with GLRBX. The fund has a healthy slice of stocks--50% currently--to add some return. SDGIX is a bond fund, and frankly I wouldn't expect much from a bond fund over the next 3-5 years. While a loss of principal is always possible over a time frame as short as 3 years, I'd say the odds are much higher for that occurring in a global bond fund (even a good one like SDGIX) than a conservative allocation fund with stock exposure.

FYI: ( Click On Article Title At Top Of Google Search)
It has taken index fund evangelist John Bogle 40 years to get the mutual fund industry to be comfortable talking about fees. Everyone now agrees that they matter. But there’s another way Bogle likes to look at fees that no one’s talking about. Instead of just comparing funds’ expense ratios, as is standard practice, he thinks investors should also examine the total dollars that each fund collects in fees.
There are two reasons why calculating total-dollar fees matters. One is legal. “The Gartenberg court decision in 1982 determined that a mutual fund fee has to be so large as to offend the conscience of the community before the courts will intervene,” Bogle says. “A percentage fee can never offend anyone’s conscience. What does one say about a fee that should be 0.5% but is 0.75% instead?”
Regards,
Ted
https://www.google.com/#q=Mutual+Fund+Fees:+How+Low+Is+“Low”?+barron's

Crowdfunding for everyone. Pretty exciting, thinks wired.com. So now you and grandma can invest in startups.
http://fortune.com/2015/10/30/its-official-startups-can-soon-raise-money-from-your-grandma/
There will be some income limitations, and platforms set up by issuers to handle the investment can be held legally liable for issuer fraud against investors. Beyond that, however, not all issuers will be required to undergo and disclose an audited financial review, and I suspect you'll be on your own.
http://www.howardlindzon.com/crowdability-the-sec-approves-equity-crowdfunding/
"The media will tell you your Grandma is about to get gutted by hucksters.
She might.
But she was also getting pitched 3D printing stocks and the safety oil income trusts a few years back by her ‘registered’ financial advisor."
@bnath001 Are you a rational person? If so, then Jeffrey Carter believes in you, because he's "a huge fan of individual liberty." He'd tell you to go for it--- the Full Monty! :)
http://pointsandfigures.com/2015/11/01/sec-approves-crowdfunding-for-everyone/

David, Love the commentary as always, super appreciate your time and wisdom, but I wonder if, in the future, when you speculate on the overall market, you might want to cite a few reputable sources (Ned Davis, for one) who think we're actually in a secular bull? It's far from unanimous that the U.S. market is overpriced and ripe for a fall.
FWIW, I recently spoke to the top hedge fund manager here in Brazil (29% / year since fund started in 1997, only one down year ever, 2008, down only 6%, and this is Brazil!) who thinks EMs in general (not just Brazil) are broken and developed country equity markets are currently priced for 5-7% real returns (i.e. post inflation) in the coming years. He's also betting that the dollar will keep rising against most world currencies.
Who knows if he's right, and maybe it's just a question of seeing the warts better when you're close up, but your general vision, that we should be shifting equity allocations from the US to EMs, is by no means a consensus.

Usually my son and I drive back for the week between Christmas and New Years. He rampages with his cousins, I wander through the Strip and anxiously peck out the New Years issue.

That's not you? Damn. And here I thought we could go clubbing together.
Nuts. Well, maybe an after Christmas coffee in the Strip? With luck I'll be raiding Prestogeorge's some time just before New Years.

Would appreciate opinions on the future of I-bonds
when interest rates rise. All of ours are over 5 years
old and about 25% of our savings. they took a small hit in September,
I am 82 yrs of age and wife is 79 years young
highest regards to all
BILL circa33

So we are suppose to buy commodities based on some gold bug whose flagship fund (PSPFX) has lost money over the past 1,3, 5, and 10 years?? One of my luckier moves in my trading/investing lifetime was staying as far away from commodities as possible. That and making my own decisions and *never* listening to the so-called experts here, there, or anywhere. The market has a way of making fools of experts and more so those who act on their advice.

I have to agree RPHYX and RSIVX are "hold" for me. I'm not going to add any more money at least for a couple of years, assuming I will still hold until then.

I’ve a different take on the Riverpark commentary. I’ve had an unwanted degree of familiarity for some time, with Verso, Newpage and the now-merged entity, due to my ‘day-job’. (and please excuse me, a lot of this is based on recollection). Riverpark’s explanation of the problems at Verso are incongruous with my perception/experience with them.
(Old-) Verso and the merged Verso have been bleeding cash perpetually. Without the merger, Verso would probably likely have had a “corporate event” already. Newpage itself, had entered, then emerged from BK a few years ago. Its trip through BK, allowed Newpage to de-lever somewhat. So along comes Verso, somewhat like a parasitic organism to extract Newpage’s cash to prolong its own existence.
Riverpark’s commentary states that Verso has “exceeded expectations with respect to achieving synergies (of the merger)”. I can tell you with certainty that is a (Verso-) management talking point they put out when their horrific Q2-2015 results came out. – Trying to seduce investors to have faith in a management team, DESPITE the poor results. Riverpark is just parroting Verso’s earnings release/presentation materials, presumably taking it at face value. I viewed the “exceeding expectations” comment from Verso as an indictment --- if they were ahead of the curve in terms of slashing costs, and STILL their reported results were so poor, then they must REALLY be in trouble – and presumably the low-hanging fruit of the synergies has been done. (So not much more to be done to help them.)
As part of the merger (which, I believe closed in January) they did some type of bond exchange. Seem to recall the effect of it was to cram down a principal haircut on some bondholders. In return, the bondholders got a token lump-sum cash-out payment (further draining the merged entity of needed liquidity!!), and higher interest rates on the “new” bonds, some/much of it PIK, not cash. Possibly also a lightening of covenants. Why would you want to lend to a borrower who is doing a principal haircut of its debt? Isn’t that a major red-flag?
A key problem is ownership – Verso is controlled by private-equity firm Apollo. If memory serves, Apollo had large (likely controlling) stakes in both Newpage and Verso. Apollo has a particularly ugly history of asset-stripping companies which it controls, leaving them debt-hobbled to such a degree that servicing the debts eventually becomes impossible. The (predictable-) outcome occurs frequently enough with Apollo, that I view it as a standard Apollo business model. I’ve seen them play this game time and again. Verso, like Apollo’s prior ‘projects’ need not face bankruptcy – all that needs to happen is for Apollo to a)buy a substantial amount of Verso’s bonds at the steep discount provided by Mr. Market, then b) surrender it to Verso in return for equity. In this way, Verso could de-lever. It’s remaining bonds would no doubt substantially rebound in price, lowering its cost of capital.
But doing so, is not in Apollo’s playbook. They extract cash, they don’t contribute cash. I could readily cite other ‘red flags’ over the past year on Verso, but am running long. Attributing Verso’s problems to the regulators is diverting blame. By the way, why didn’t Riverpark mention Apollo, its control of Verso, and its sordid history with other investments?
I’ve a small ‘stub’ holding in RPHYX, having sold most of it earlier in the year as junk spreads kept widening. At that time, also sold a ‘starter position’ in RSIVX which was doing nothing. I was contemplating adding to my RPHYX position shortly, as I suspect junk may continue to be buoyed. Frankly, I’d no idea Verso was a significant holding of Riverpark’s. That it was (is ?) is troubling to me, given my familiarity with Verso -- Verso was never (in the past 3 years) a credit that a prudent portfolio manager would own – at least not without hedging it (possibly by shorting the equity).
After reading the Riverpark commentary, I am rather dis-inclined to add to my Riverpark position at this time. Their explanation of Verso is absent some critical understanding of what they invested my money in. Verso should have been a VERY EASY problem to keep out of the portfolio.

SCFAX is the retail version. It'll turn three years old this week. Good performance, seems steady. Looks like Schwab might be the only way around the front load, unless TD knows of a different path?
David

Hi Bee,
From my posts you likely recognize that I love simple plans.
Consequently, my concept for a mutual fund ladder is far less nuanced than yours. In fact, I perceive my ladder as having only two rungs.
My ladder has a short term rung that has sufficient resources to withstand a major disaster or market drawdown, like 3 years worth of possible needs. A low cost short term government and/or corporate bond fund satisfies that requirement, like from Vanguard.
My other rung contains all my other mutual fund holdings. I contemplate holding them for at least one total market cycle to test their robustness against a bull and bear experience. I suppose that translates to a planned minimum holding period of 7 to 10 years, situationally dependent.
I'm a very patient investor.
Best Wishes.

MFO summarized the highlights of the conference call when RNDLX reopened at the end of August 2013: http://www.mutualfundobserver.com/2013/10/october-1-2013/
Since reopening, assets have about doubled ($2 billion now, according to Morningstar). Performance has been good overall, but its 1-year and YTD returns are noticeably lagging, say, DoubleLine's massive DLTNX. It is making a strong comeback over the past month, though.
For what its worth, I had about half of my bond allocation in the fund for several years until about a month ago (with my luck, it was most likely before it made its comeback). I lowered my bond allocation and consolidated it all with PIMIX.

Let me echo Lewis's bewilderment. As a practical matter, most funds will toil in anonymity for 3-5 years regardless of how good they are. Advisor screens routinely, I'm told, exclude folks who don't yet have a three year record. So "not much traction" should have been written into the business plan.
The firm was underwriting the fund's operation to the tune of 0.4% - about a quarter million a year - but part of that cost is likely mystery money. That is, there are some management expenses (e.g., attorney fees) that are already born by William Blair, a fraction of which are allocated to each fund. The prospect that liquidating the fund will materially reduce expenses, especially if its assets don't stay in-house, are limited.
I'll ask.
David

2.5 years and couldn't really get much traction... Only ~$60 million. Probably felt there wasn't enough money going into global small cap strategies and the $ that is...... Well, we all know where that has been going.