CW bashing is unjustified (at this point

@wxman123 - Kindly point out where you see “bashing” here.
CNBC advertised this as a 90 minute interview. Absent commercials and moderator’s questions CW was given at least 60 minutes of largely uninterrupted nationally broadcast air time to promote her investing methods / funds.
My question (posted yesterday) was simply whether more should be done in these types of shows to inform investors that the speaker is presenting “best case” outcomes and that there are also substantial risks associated with those investments.You and I know that. But I don’t think we should assume that the tens of thousands of viewers who happened to watch all do. I’d be just as concerned had David Giroux or Mario Gabelli been allowed to talk for an hour or more promoting their funds without adequate attention being paid to the risks involved.
Here’s a link to a partial transcript from yesterday’s program. I don’t think CNBC allows free access to previous interviews, but if someone can prove me wrong and link the entire interview it would be appreciated.
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Some of us remember the class with which Louis Rukeyser conducted his Wall Street Week program In the 70s - 90s. Representatives of mutual funds or other financial products were given about 10 minutes one-on-one with Lou. Usually the questions weren’t hard hitting, but on several occasions he did drill down. Another 10 minutes was spent with a panel of four highly qualified investment experts questioning said presenter in a round table setting. The show ran 30 minutes and did not have commercials. To me this is a better way to let them air their product to the public than what transpired at CNBC yesterday.

The best questions in that interview are from Josh and the moderator did not give time to answer his second question but kept repeating his own hysterical softball questions for the purpose of increasing outrage / viewership - survivor bias I guess. Too bad that even these financial media (CNBC, Fox Business, Bloomberg) seem to operate the way Facebook operates (targeting hysteria, outrage, fear, and other extreme human emotion). Not sure if the world has always been this way because I only started paying attention (consuming media) recently.

@stayCalm- "OT" refers to the "Off-Topic" MFO discussion section. It's the designated section for commentary which has either very limited or no direct connection to financial matters. msf's unwarranted snub notwithstanding, some of the oldest if not finest MFO posters may be found there. It's accessed via a link at the top left of each MFO page.
@msf- just kidding! :)

Let us hope no misdirected “newbies” accidentally stumble into OT on their first visit.
They’d surely wonder what the the board is about. I understand the reason for OT’s existence (I think).
Yet, it’s hard sometimes to draw a clear distinction between financial and non-financial issues. The many posts after two 737 Max disasters might be an example - as there were repercussions for the airline and aircraft industry which did impact some peoples’ investments and portfolio positioning. And who can argue that Covid-19 (stimulus checks, border closings, business closings, online shopping, near 0 short term interest rates, liquidity issues) wasn’t an economic event?

I saw that already. I prefer to trust (no pun intended) legal documents over marketing literature.
In any case, there's a difference between handing money over to a bank and having that money sit in an insured account. If the money is in an individual insured bank account waiting to be swept into an omnibus account, what type of bank account is it in? Is it in a savings account or a demand deposit account? Either way, where's the bank disclosure statement that must go along with that bank account?
What appears to be happening, and one must say "appears" because nothing is disclosed, is that the bank is merely holding your money for a day before moving it to an account (the Deposit Account). It's as if you went into a bank, handed the teller your cash, and before the teller did anything with it, gunmen with six-shooters a-blazin' grabbed the money out of the teller's hand.
Sure, the bank would likely still be on the hook for that cash. But the FDIC wouldn't be. It insures accounts, not banks. If a bank goes bust, the FDIC isn't going to cover its electric bill.

FDIC deposit insurance coverage depends on two things: (1) whether your chosen financial product is a deposit product; and (2) whether your bank is FDIC-insured.

https://www.fdic.gov/resources/deposit-insurance/brochures/deposits-at-a-glance/index.html

>> They joined IRA Financial Trust eager to build a nest egg in crypto.

what could go wrong?
>> IRA Financial Trust has acknowledged an incident occurred and is investigating it, telling CoinDesk in an emailed statement the “suspicious activity” affected “a limited subset of our customers with accounts on the Gemini cryptocurrency exchange.”

ah

@stayCalm- "OT" refers to the "Off-Topic" MFO discussion section. It's the designated section for commentary which has either very limited or no direct connection to financial matters. msf's unwarranted snub notwithstanding, some of the oldest if not finest MFO posters may be found there. It's accessed via a link at the top left of each MFO page.
@msf- just kidding! :)

Risk of crypto theft is applicable to any type of financial account whether SD IRA or not. Coinbase account holders can also lose money if Coinbase goofs up on security best practices.
Setting aside the crypto aspect, risk of assets being stolen from a SD IRA account is quite remote. Other risks as called out in linked article I agree with.
Cash in an SD IRA account can have FDIC protection depending on how the SD IRA custodian is set up. For example see footer at https://www.goldstartrust.com

an account labeled “Benjamin Choe'' began withdrawing bitcoin, ether and U.S. dollars from user accounts. One user said he lost 13 ETH, 1 BTC and thousands of dollars in a matter of minutes

Crypto may have been the bait, but the theft wasn't crypto-specific.
Self directed IRAs are already a wild west environment. They're structured to give investors nearly unlimited control over what types of investments are put into the IRA. Contrast that with a brokerage which limits you to stocks, bonds, derivatives, mutual funds, ETFs, and the like.
Also unlike brokerages, self directed IRA custodians don't have SIPC insurance to protect you against theft. The custodian, IRA Financial has "reason to believe that there are some bad actors posing as IRA Financial employees looking for crypto account-related information." Good luck recovering losses.
https://www.nerdwallet.com/article/investing/self-directed-ira

@sma3 Thank you for catching my misstep. I’ll (cheerfully) edit earlier post to delete comment.
Here’s the name of DFND - Clearly not a Simplicity offering: Siren DIVCON Dividend Defender ETF
I don’t have any opinion on PFIX as long as folks understand the potentially very high volatility and that it can move both ways. I own a few like that myself. :(
In hindsight, perhaps a 30 year fixed rate mortgage at 2.75% or 3% would constitute an interest rate hedge? In that case, the bank, government or financial institution is the lender / investor.

Anybody subscribe and can read the entire article? I just got this snippet, although the argument is familiar
"The Economist offers an insightful big picture overview this week in What would happen if financial markets crashed?:
Today America’s financial system looks nothing like it did before the crashes of 2001 and 2008, yet lately there have been some familiar signs of froth and fear on Wall Street: wild trading days on no real news, sudden price swings and a queasy feeling among many investors that they have overdosed on techno-optimism. Having soared in 2021, shares on Wall Street had their worst January since 2009, falling by 5.3%. The prices of assets favoured by retail investors, like tech stocks, cryptocurrencies and shares in electric-car makers, have plunged. The once-giddy mood on r/wallstreetbets, a forum for digital day-traders, is now mournful.
It is tempting to think that the January sell-off was exactly what was needed, purging the stock market of its speculative excesses. But America’s new-look financial system is still loaded with risks. Asset prices are high: the last time shares were so pricey relative to long-run profits was before the slumps of 1929 and 2001, and the extra return for owning risky bonds is near its lowest level for a quarter of a century. Many portfolios have loaded up on “long-duration” assets that yield profits only in the distant future. And central banks are raising interest rates to tame inflation."

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/822632/000119312522041565/d448645d497.htm
497 1 d448645d497.htm WILLIAM BLAIR FUNDS
WILLIAM BLAIR FUNDS
WILLIAM BLAIR BOND FUND
WILLIAM BLAIR SHORT DURATION BOND FUND
WILLIAM BLAIR ULTRA-SHORT DURATION BOND FUND
Supplement to the Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information dated May 1, 2021, as Supplemented
Upon recommendation of the Adviser, the Board of Trustees of William Blair Funds (the “Trust”) determined that it was in the best interests of each of the William Blair Bond Fund, William Blair Short Duration Bond Fund, and William Blair Ultra-Short Duration Bond Fund (each a “Fund” and collectively the “Funds”) to redeem all the shares of the Funds on or before April 15, 2022 (the “Liquidation Date”), and then terminate the Funds. Shareholder approval of the liquidation is not required. The Funds will be closed to new investors effective February 14, 2022 but will remain open for investment until February 28, 2022 for existing shareholders.
At any time prior to the Liquidation Date, the Funds’ shareholders may redeem all or a portion of their shares or exchange their Fund shares for shares in the corresponding class of another fund of the Trust pursuant to procedures set forth in the William Blair Funds’ Prospectus. If you wish to exchange your shares into another fund of the Trust, or would like to request additional copies of the Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information for the Trust including other funds for which you may exchange your shares of the Funds, please call William Blair Funds Shareholder Services or your William Blair client representative at the following numbers:
For Class N and Class I Shares
Call: 1-800-635-2886
(In Massachusetts 1-800-635-2840)
For Class R6 Shares
Call: 1-800-742-7272
If you are invested in the Fund through a financial intermediary, please contact that financial intermediary if you have any questions.
Liquidation of Assets. The Funds will depart from their stated investment objectives and policies as they liquidate holdings in preparation for the distribution of assets to investors. During this time, the Funds may hold more cash, cash equivalents or other short-term investments than normal, which may prevent one or more of the Funds from meeting their stated investment objectives. Any shares of the Funds that have not been redeemed or exchanged prior to the Liquidation Date will be redeemed automatically at their net asset value per share on the Liquidation Date.
Dated: February 14, 2022
William Blair Funds
150 North Riverside Plaza
Chicago, Illinois 60606
Please retain this supplement for future reference.

Just don’t lose sight of the fact the same individual is also bearish on equities. “… guiding the financial markets into a very nasty mess“ encompasses a lot more than just bonds.
FWIW - I checked RPSIX the other day and it seems to have held up fairly well during the recent bond selloff. Looks like RPEIX is its largest holding - a bond fund designed to counteract rising rates.

We have an entire generation of investors who have never been "weaned" off artificial interest rates. They have no clue about real interest rates. Many of them don't even know what a bond is, limiting their "knowledge and wisdom" to NFTs, crypto scams, trend chasing, paid-to-play idiots, forever fearful of falling behind their index bogies. Add in the "Robin Hood" generation of newly minted "geniuses", and you get a very toxic brew of ignorance, guiding the financial markets into a very nasty mess.
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Excerpted from: Bill Fleckenstein's “Market Rap” / Question & Answer Portion. Posted Friday, February 11 by an anonymous reader / contributor. It’s a paid subscription site and so I rarely quote from it. But I thought the above to be a particularly succinct and sobering take on bonds and today’s investment climate - whether you agree or disagree.

Yes let's bail out the rich, especially the richest of them. And let's give more handouts and bail outs and tax breaks to businesses, and the oil companies and Wall Street financial firms and the airlines and corporate agriculture and on and so forth because we've always seen how well that works out. For them anyway. Yeah baseball fan, let's see something substantial and not your usual pathetic whining.

scaremongering vs public investment, round 381 (PK; with the internal links, if it opens for you:
https://messaging-custom-newsletters.nytimes.com/template/oakv2?campaign_id=116&emc=edit_pk_20220211&instance_id=52851&nl=paul-krugman&productCode=PK&regi_id=22268089&segment_id=82386&te=1&uri=nyt://newsletter/9e7bf527-28b4-5fb5-b5b2-7ba39b7d9954)
otherwise:
A few days ago, Tressie McMillan Cottom published an insightful article in The Times about the power of “folk economics” — which she defined as “the very human impulse to describe complex economic processes in lay terms.” Her subject was the widespread enthusiasm for cryptocurrency, but her article sent me down memory lane, recalling the role folk economics has played in past policy debates.
Just to be clear, the “folk” who hold plausible-sounding but wrongheaded views of the economy needn’t be members of the working class. They can be, and often are, members of the elite: plutocrats, powerful politicians and influential pundits. In fact, elite embrace of folk economics was a large part of what went wrong in the global response to the 2008 financial crisis. And it’s starting to have a destructive effect now.
So, memories: When the 2008 financial crisis struck, economists, believe it or not, had an intellectual framework ready to go, pretty much custom-made for that situation — because it was devised in the 1930s during the Great Depression. The “IS-LM model” was introduced by the British economist John Hicks in 1937 as an attempt to encapsulate the insights of John Maynard Keynes, who had published “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money” the previous year. There’s endless argument about whether Hicks was true to Keynes’s vision — which is irrelevant for my discussion now — because Hicks is what economists brought to the table in 2008.
According to IS-LM (which stands for investment-savings, liquidity-money), public policy normally has two tools it can use to fight an economic slump. Loosely speaking, the Fed can print more money to drive interest rates down, or the Treasury can engage in deficit spending to pump up demand. After a financial crisis, however, the economy gets so depressed that monetary policy hits a limit; interest rates can’t go below zero. So, large-scale deficit spending is the appropriate and necessary response.
But folk economics sees deficits as irresponsible and dangerous; if anything, many people have the instinctive feeling that governments should cut back in hard times, not spend more. And this instinct had a big, adverse effect on policy. True, the Obama administration did respond to the slump with fiscal stimulus, but it was underpowered in part because of unwarranted deficit fears. (This isn’t hindsight, and I was tearing my hair out at the time.) And by 2010, influential opinion — the opinion of what I used to call Very Serious People — had shifted around to the view that debt, not mass unemployment, was the most important problem facing the United States and other wealthy nations.
This wasn’t what conventional economics said, and there was no hint that investors were losing faith in U.S. debt. But deficit scaremongering came to dominate political and media discussions, and governments turned to austerity policies that slowed recovery from the Great Recession.
Did economists unanimously oppose austerity? Hey, have economists ever unanimously agreed on anything? (There’s less disagreement within the profession than legend has it, but still.) Indeed, a handful of prominent economists managed to come up with arguments that seemed to support the folk theory that deficits are always bad — an episode that I always think of when I see demands for new economic thinking. You see, during the last crisis the new ideas that actually influenced policy did indeed go against conventional economics — but in ways that supported, rather than challenged, the prejudices of the powerful.
Two papers in particular had a malign influence. One, by Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna, asserted that cutting spending in a depressed economy was actually expansionary, because it would increase confidence. The other, by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, declared that government debt had big, negative effects on growth when it crossed a critical threshold, around 90 percent of gross domestic product.
Both papers were widely criticized by other economists as soon as they were circulated, and in fairly short order their empirical claims were pretty much demolished by other researchers. But their arguments were eagerly adopted by influential people who liked their message, and a funny thing happened to the discourse in the media: To a large extent, these speculative (and wrong) arguments for austerity were both accepted as fact and presented as the consensus of the economics profession. Back in 2013, I cited a Washington Post editorial that declared “economists” believed that terrible things happen when debt exceeds 90 percent of G.D.P., when in fact this was very much not what the rest of us were saying.
And I’ve been hearing echoes of that misrepresentation in some current debates, as people advocating new economic ideas — or at least what they claim are new ideas — assert that conventional economic thinking was responsible for austerity policies after 2008. Um, no: Fiscal austerity was exactly what conventional economics told us not to do in a depressed economy, and it was only the peddlers of unorthodox economics who gave austerity policies intellectual cover.
Which brings us to our current moment. This time around, fiscal stimulus wasn’t underpowered, and there’s definitely a case to be made that excessive deficit spending in 2021 was a factor in rising inflation (although we can argue about how big a factor, since inflation is also up a lot in countries that didn’t engage in much stimulus). But now what?
As I said, the IS-LM model tells us that policymakers have two tools for managing the overall level of demand: fiscal and monetary policy. When you’re trying to boost a deeply depressed economy, monetary policy becomes unavailable, because you can’t push interest rates below zero. But if you’re trying to cool off an overheated economy, monetary policy is available: Interest rates can’t go down, but they can go up.
And because changing monetary policy is easy, conventional analysis says that monetary tightening is the way to go. Indeed, the Fed has made it clear that it intends to do just that. Getting the pace and size of rate hikes right will be tricky, but conceptually it isn’t hard.
But the folk economics position — where by “folk,” I mainly mean Senator Joe Manchin — is that excessive government spending caused inflation, so now we have to call off any new spending, even if it’s more or less paid for with new revenue.
Well, that’s not what conventional economics says; on the contrary, the standard model says that the Fed can handle this while we deal with other priorities.
And while conventional economics isn’t always right, anyone attacking it now should ask themselves whether they’re doing so in a constructive way. In particular, I’m seeing a lot of denigration of monetary policy from people who don’t seem to realize that they are, de facto, giving aid and comfort to politicians who don’t want to invest in America’s children and the fight against climate change.

My suggestion is not to futz around in this space because there are only two you need. First, KBWP for stability plus growth in the financial space and then BTO to buy on big dips. Works like clockwork.

His conclusion, as he tipped, was a 2-handed conclusion:
"If you believe that last year's surge in inflation is a precursor to a long time period when inflation is likely to stay high, and come in above expectations, you should be shifting your holdings away from financial to real assets, and within your equity holdings, towards small cap stocks, stocks trading at lower pricing multiples (PE, Price to Book) and companies with more pricing power. If, on the other hand, you believe that inflation worries are overdone, and that there will be a reversion back to the low inflation that we have seen in the last decade, staying invested in stocks, and especially in larger cap and high growth stocks, even if richly priced, makes sense."

You mean, stuff like Real Estate. Gold-silver-uranium? Assuming a persistent high inflation rate?

@carew388 pointed out that DODBX has a heavy weighting in banks. Any other funds over weighting the banks?
USNews lists these as Financials:
usnews.com/funds/mutual-funds/rankings/financial

Agreed, the manager investment should be more specific as for experienced managers $1 million isn’t much, but I think many investors would be surprised to learn how many managers don’t even invest that much. Moreover, whenever any regulator suggests creating a $5 million or $10 million band for investment disclosure, the industry fights it tooth and mail. In fact, they fought the original disclosure requirements, an irony as many managers look at insider ownership at stocks they’re considering as a key indicator and would surely be angry if that ownership disclosure was taken away. Still, given how few managers eat their own cooking in a meaningful way, the $1 million threshold is significant. The younger and less experienced the manager, the more meaningful it is as that $1 million is potentially a more significant part of their net worth.
As for risk control, the point Yogi is making regarding suitability proves the other point I made. If you’re a 22 year old bond fund manager, you’re going to invest in bonds even if you think bonds are dramatically overvalued and your personal portfolio is 100% stocks and you invest nothing in your fund. And if you’re a growth stock manager, you’re going to buy growth stocks even if your own portfolio is 100% cash and you think the market will crash. Sure, prospectuses often provide leeway for risk control, but in practice it rarely happens. And with good reason if you consider that many funds are designed to stick to a portion of the style box for financial advisors to build bespoke portfolios for clients and for specific allocations in 401ks. The best place to find such risk control is in flexible allocation funds and boutique funds where the manager owns the fund company and has complete control over the firm so he/she won’t be fired if that defensive positioning is wrong.