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Here's a statement of the obvious: The opinions expressed here are those of the participants, not those of the Mutual Fund Observer. We cannot vouch for the accuracy or appropriateness of any of it, though we do encourage civility and good humor.
  • AQR’s Asness: No Simple Explanation For Quant Failure In 2018
    Mr. Asness states,
    “Success is sticking with [the strategy] with its ups and downs. To survive long term, brace for the short term,” he said.
    He admits that it’s easier to stick with a strategy that is intuitively easier to understand, “even if it’s not a better strategy.”

    I state, "Whatever floats your boat, Mr. Asness". No money or recommendations from me, however.
    Example: FBALX, inception date, 11-6-1986
    --- 10 year annualized return = 12%
    --- Lifetime annualized return = 9.17%
    FBALX , not unlike similar funds; has been through several market turmoil periods.
    Have a good remainder.
    Catch
  • Lipper: Mutual Fund Category Performance: Yardsticks & Indexes As 5/10/19
    @Derf: Links are from 5/10/19 WSJ Yardsticks & Indexes.
    Regards,
    Ted
  • Register for Webinar - Wednesday, 15 May 2019
    As highlighted in this month's commentary, we have two sessions planned, one hour each nominally, on Wednesday 15 May 2019 at 2pm and 5pm eastern ... 11am and 2 pm pacific.
    Like last time, we will employ easy-to-use Zoom web conferencing tool.
    Intention is to help walk users with the new QuickSearch tool, a "lite" version of MultiSearch, plus provide an update on our premium site’s latest features, like the Compare tool, empty column hide option, and ability to export (up to 25) funds from results table to Watchlists.
    Please register here for the first session, or here for the second session.
    Thank you!
  • M*: Q&A With David Giroux, Manager, T. Rowe Price Capital Appreciation Fund: Text & Video: (PRWCX)
    FYI: ( Unfortunately, PRWCX is closed to new investors.)
    Hi, I'm Jason Kephart, senior analyst on Morningstar's Multi-Asset and Alternatives Research Team, and I'm joined today by David Giroux, portfolio manager of T. Rowe Price Capital Appreciation, a fund that's been on a Joe DiMaggio-like streak over the last decade. It hasn't finished worse than 29th in the category over any single year over the last 10 years.
    Regards,
    Ted
    https://www.morningstar.com/videos/928989/the-sector-powering-t-rowe-price-capital-appreciat.html
    M* Snapshot: PRWCX:
    https://www.morningstar.com/funds/XNAS/PRWCX/quote.html
    Lipper Snapshot PRWCX:
    https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/fund/prwcx
    PRWCX Is Ranked #6 In The(50/70 E) Fund Category By U.S. News & World Report:
    https://money.usnews.com/funds/mutual-funds/allocation-50-to-70-equity/t-rowe-price-capital-appreciation-fund/prwcx
  • Barron's Cover Story: 7 Dividend Stocks For Volatile Times Ahead
    FYI: After a rocky week in the stock market, as a trade standoff with China renewed volatility, shrewd investors might want to play some defense. Bring on the dividend stocks.
    “It makes sense to be positioned a little more defensively right now,” says Thomas Huber, portfolio manager of the T. Rowe Price Dividend Growth fund (ticker: PRDGX). “You can make a good case for that. All you have to do is look back at the fourth quarter and see what happened.”
    Stocks of companies that pay robust and growing dividends are generally less volatile in times of market turmoil—as was the case in last year’s fourth quarter, when the S&P 500 index lost 13.5%, dividends included. And dividends, especially those that are growing and are well covered by cash flows, can provide steady income in times of uncertainty.
    Regards,
    Ted
  • Vanguard Long-Term Bond Index Fund fee being implemented on purchases
    https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/794105/000093247119007082/ltbond497052019.htm
    497 1 ltbond497052019.htm VANGUARD LONG-TERM BOND INDEX FUND 497
    Vanguard Long-Term Bond Index Fund
    Supplement Dated May 10, 2019, to the Prospectus and Summary Prospectus for Investor Shares and Admiral™ Shares Dated April 26, 2019
    Effective July 10, 2019, the Fund will charge a 0.50% fee on all purchases of its Investor Shares and Admiral Shares, including shares that you purchase by exchange from another Vanguard fund. Purchases that result from reinvested dividend or capital gains distributions are not subject to the purchase fee.
    Unlike a sales charge or a load paid to a broker or a fund management company, purchase fees are paid directly to the Fund to offset the costs of buying securities. This fee is separate from, and in addition to, other expenses charged by the Fund.
    Prospectus and Summary Prospectus Text Changes
    Effective July 10, 2019, the following will replace similar text under the heading “Fees and Expenses” in the Fund Summary section:
    Fees and Expenses
    The following table describes the fees and expenses you may pay if you buy and hold Investor Shares or Admiral Shares of the Fund.
    Shareholder Fees
    (Fees paid directly from your investment)
    Investor Shares Admiral Shares
    Sales Charge (Load) Imposed on Purchases None None
    Purchase Fee 0.50% 0.50%
    Sales Charge (Load) Imposed on Reinvested Dividends None None
    Redemption Fee None None
    Account Service Fee (for fund account balances
    below $10,000) $20/year $20/year
    Annual Fund Operating Expenses
    (Expenses that you pay each year as a percentage of the value of your investment)
    Investor Shares Admiral Shares1
    Management Fees 0.13% 0.04%
    12b-1 Distribution Fee None None
    Other Expenses 0.02% 0.03%
    Total Annual Fund Operating Expenses 0.15% 0.07%
    1 The expense information shown in the table reflects estimated amounts for the current fiscal year.
    Examples
    The following examples are intended to help you compare the cost of investing in the Fund’s Investor Shares or Admiral Shares with the cost of investing in other mutual funds. They illustrate the hypothetical expenses that you would incur over various periods if you were to invest $10,000 in the Fund’s shares. These examples assume that the shares provide a return of 5% each year and that total annual fund operating expenses remain as stated in the preceding table. You would incur these hypothetical expenses whether or not you were to redeem your investment at the end of the given period. Although your actual costs may be higher or lower, based on these assumptions your costs would be:
    1 Year 3 Years 5 Years 10 Years
    Investor Shares $65 $98 $134 $241
    Admiral Shares $57 $72 $89 $139
    Prospectus Text Changes
    In the More on the Funds section, a new section “Purchase and Transaction Fees” will be added after the “Temporary Investment Measures” section:
    Purchase and Transaction Fees
    Vanguard Long-Term Bond Index Fund charges a fee of 0.50% on all purchases of shares, including shares that you purchase by exchange from another Vanguard fund.
    In addition, Vanguard Total Bond Market Index Fund, Vanguard Short-Term Bond Index Fund, and Vanguard Intermediate-Term Bond Index Fund each reserve the right to charge the following transaction fees to investors whose aggregate share purchases into a Fund equal or exceed the following amounts:
    Vanguard Fund Transaction Fee Aggregate Purchases
    Total Bond Market Index Fund 0.25% Over $500 million
    Short-Term Bond Index Fund 0.15 Over $200 million
    Intermediate-Term Bond Index Fund 0.25 Over $100 million
    Each of the Vanguard Total Bond Market Index Fund, Vanguard Short-Term Bond Index Fund, and Vanguard Intermediate-Term Bond Index Fund may impose these transaction fees if an investor’s aggregate purchases into a Fund over a 12-month period exceed, or are expected to exceed, the indicated amounts upon notice to the client in conjunction with a purchase that triggers application of the fees. The transaction fees will be assessed only if the client elects to proceed with the purchase. Generally, these fees will not apply to transactions coordinated in advance between a client and Vanguard.
    Unlike a sales charge or a load paid to a broker or a fund management company, purchase and transaction fees are paid directly to the Fund to offset the costs of buying securities.
    See Investing With Vanguard for more information about fees.
    In the Investing With Vanguard section, the following will replace similar text that begins with the heading “Transaction Fees on Purchases”:
    Purchase and Transaction Fees
    Vanguard Long-Term Bond Index Fund charges a fee of 0.50% on purchases of shares, including shares that you purchase by exchange from another Vanguard fund.
    In addition, Vanguard Total Bond Market Index Fund, Vanguard Short-Term Bond Index Fund, and Vanguard Intermediate-Term Bond Index Fund each reserve the right to charge the following transaction fees to investors whose aggregate share purchases into a Fund equal or exceed the following amounts:
    Vanguard Fund Transaction Fee Aggregate Purchases
    Total Bond Market Index Fund 0.25% Over $500 million
    Short-Term Bond Index Fund 0.15 Over $200 million
    Intermediate-Term Bond Index Fund 0.25 Over $100 million
    Each of the Vanguard Total Bond Market Index Fund, Vanguard Short-Term Bond Index Fund, and Vanguard Intermediate-Term Bond Index Fund may impose these transaction fees if an investor’s aggregate purchases into a Fund over a 12-month period exceed, or are expected to exceed, the indicated amounts upon notice to the client in conjunction with a purchase that triggers application of the fees. The transaction fees will be assessed only if the client elects to proceed with the purchase. Generally, these fees will not apply to transactions coordinated in advance between a client and Vanguard.
    Purchase fees will not apply to Vanguard fund account purchases in the following circumstances: (1) purchases of shares through reinvested dividends or capital gains distributions; (2) share transfers, rollovers, or reregistrations within the same fund; (3) conversions of shares from one share class to another in the same fund; (4) purchases in kind; and (5) share rollovers to an IRA within the same Vanguard fund for plans in which Vanguard serves as a recordkeeper. Unlike a sales charge or a load paid to a broker or a fund management company, purchase and transaction fees are paid directly to the Fund to offset the costs of buying securities.
    © 2019 The Vanguard Group, Inc. All rights reserved.
    Vanguard Marketing Corporation, Distributor...
    (includes institutional classes also)
  • Wintergreen Fund, Inc. to liquidate
    @msf - At one time I considered OAKBX a value fund. Not sure what to call it now as I’ve exited it and moved on. Lipper lists Phillip Morris as its #10 top holding at over 2%.
    http://www.funds.reuters.wallst.com/US/funds/holdings.asp?YYY622_SuprvwupcKfK8narNwhYhxuZTH3KwZb8EX/lL+8rQLeCbgT/Ri6qo6ed7MYWE8cK
    Added: Whatever they’re “smoking” over there, I wanted no part of it after a dismal 4th quarter - lagging the S&P and most peers.
  • Wintergreen Fund, Inc. to liquidate
    While there's little here that I disagree with, I do wonder how relevant it is to the past five years - the ones M* characterized as growth leaning. Yes, traditional value metrics like P/E were skewed following GFC. But was that still true from 2013 onward?
    Yes, tobacco stocks have traditionally been regarded as value stocks, and troubled in the 90s due to the anticipated 1998 settlement. But these days? I'm having a hard time finding value funds with tobacco stocks in their top 25 holdings. I spot checked DODGX, LLPFX, VEIRX, TAVFX, PRFDX (MO is #23 at 1.37%), MDISX (BATS is #21 at 1.50%), YAFFX (KT&G is #25 at 0.68%), TBGVX. Maybe I'm just not looking at the right funds, but it looks like value funds aren't finding much "value" in tobacco.
    We can each define value investing however we want. Just look at Bill Miller. I think your observation about concentration and protection goes a long way toward explaining the failure of this fund, value or not.
  • Wintergreen Fund, Inc. to liquidate
    And yet one would be hard pressed to call tobacco stocks growth stocks either. More to the point, tobacco stocks were mainstay investments at Franklin Mutual Series where Winters was previously: https://wsj.com/articles/SB120372692782187229
    In fact, he was involved with some of these companies prior to creating Wintergreen:
    https://wsj.com/articles/SB106729117987212000
    These are lumpy value stocks with litigation surrounding them and difficult mergers, the kind Price always focused on. What I do think is different is the concentration of positions in such stocks and the failure to invest more in safer conventional arb plays to provide balance in the portfolio. Also, lest I forget, ridiculously high fees. Finally, I would add that value stock investing isn't quite so easy to represent as the style box would have us believe. Consider that after the 2008 crash, many stocks had depressed earnings or no earnings even though their share prices had been crushed. Just looking at the p-e ratios for such companies would lead one to believe they were growth stocks because the "e" part of the equation was so depressed. This is often the case with asset value plays as opposed to earnings value plays even in non-crisis environments. They have little in the way of earnings so their p-e's are elevated and sometimes even their book value is also artificially depressed because in the case of a real estate company the company may not want to increase the estimated value of their properties for tax reasons. It's the same logic a home owner uses who tries to keep the assessed value of their properties low.
  • Wintergreen Fund, Inc. to liquidate
    RIP
    Here are its return and risk numbers through April:
    image
  • Wintergreen Fund, Inc. to liquidate
    Certainly that describes the fund's portfolio now. Looking at its performance graph (e.g. in the latest [Dec 2018] annual report), one can see it diverge sharply from the S&P 500 starting around 2012-2013. It also significantly underperformed its category starting around 2012, with the exception of 2016.
    The fund has been investing in Consolidated Tomoka since 2006. Going along with your comment about Berkowitz, Wintergreen held a significant portion of Consolidated Tomoka (over 5%) since day one. But it didn't represent an excessively large portion of the fund until the last 2-3 years. So while this stock holding does help explain more recent problems (thanks!), there's more to the story than one stock and a manager's obsession with it.
    At the end of 2013 CTO represented about 2.6% of Wintergreen. The fund's top holdings were Jardines (7%), Swatch (7%), and Berkshire Hathaway, with a good amount of tobacco thrown in (BAT and Reynolds, over 10% combined).
    At the end of 2014, tobacco moved up, with Reynolds in top spot (7.3%) but also BAT (6.8%) and Altria (4.7%). Consolidated Tomoka appears in the top ten at 4.7%, primarily through appreciation (50%+) but also because of some AUM shrinkage (15%). The fund continued to hold the same number of shares as it had since 2012; they represented 21% of CTO. (The 2014 annual report has a discussion of this holding.)
    By the end of 2015, Consolidated Tomoka had grown enough to have become the fund's second largest holding (9.3%). Again, with no additional stock purchases, and with tobacco still the dominant holding - Reynolds (12.4%), BAT (8.5%), Altria (6.3%). CTO's performance (down around 6%) was in line with the fund's 2015 performance (down7%). The rise to 2nd largest holding was thus due to the fact that people were pulling money out of the fund and Winters didn't sell off CTO pro-rata. AUM dropped over 50%.
    So arguably it wasn't until 2016 that CTO began to dominate the fund. But Winters also continued favoring tobacco during this period. By the end of 2016, CTO constituted 13.9% of the fund, while tobacco kept pace, with Reynolds now at 19.5%, BAT at 9.4%, and Altria at 7%. Tobacco stocks now accounted for three of the four largest holdings. CTO was essentially flat on the year, while the fund itself performed well relative to its peers, gaining 6.67%.
    Once again, the increased fraction of the fund that CTO represented was a result of people pulling money out of the fund (AUM down nearly 1/3) and Winters hanging on to CTO, and onto the tobacco stocks. Note also that real estate didn't grow much as a fraction of the fund in 2016 (just to 13.9% up from 13.5%), because Winters gave up on his other real estate holding, Sun Hung Kai.
    By the end of 2017, CTO was the fund's largest holding, at 20.4%. BAT (now owning Reynolds) was 16.1%, and Altria 5.7%. That was a result of CTO appreciating 20% and AUM shrinking 20%. Again, no change in the number of shares owned by the fund.
    Finally, by the end of 2018, CTO represents 42.6% of the company (despite underperforming in 2018), BAT is still the second largest holding, but that's just 5.9% of the fund. Tobacco and every other stock have become nearly immaterial.
  • AQR’s Asness: No Simple Explanation For Quant Failure In 2018
    FYI: Quantitative investment strategies suffered poor performance last year, but there isn’t one intuitive way to pinpoint exactly why it happened, said Cliff Asness, managing principal and chief investment officer at AQR Capital Management.
    It’s easier to explain why one individual component of a multifactor strategy underperformed, such as why the value factor lagged, he said. But explaining total performance in down years is difficult, especially over the short to medium term.
    Regards,
    Ted
    https://www.fa-mag.com/news/aqr-s-asness--no-simple-explanation-for-quant-failure-in-2018-44771.html?print
  • Wintergreen Fund, Inc. to liquidate
    “In contrast, Wintergreen's shows this narrow slice solidly across the growth column. He's been investing in growth stocks since at least 2014”
    Thanks @msf - Sounds like you nailed it. And I hate it when managers deviate from their (stated / normal / assumed ) approach in pursuit of better gains. I guess I’m confused as to whether Winters conveyed his emphasis on growth to his investors?
    Hope Winters can find work somewhere else. (I still think he sounds like a nice guy.)
  • Wintergreen Fund, Inc. to liquidate

    To me this has as much to do with the fickleness of investment trends as anything else. We have very short memories and tend to think things will always remain as they are. It’s possible Winters had it right, but was out of step with the current indexing / momentum driven investment climate. Who knows? I don’t pretend to. But don't dismiss Winters as an investing lightweight. The picture is a bit more complex than it might appear on surface.
    OTOH, the Mutual Series funds have continued to do moderately well with their old familiar deep value/vulture style. So perhaps it just required a bit of evolution over time, and Winters went off track.
    MUTHX, M* writes: "Cheap stocks and merger-arbitrage plays typically constitute 80% to 90% of assets, while the remainder is in distressed debt and cash."
    MQIFX, M* writes: "Its strategy is similar to that of other Franklin Mutual Series offerings, but it holds far more debt than its siblings. Cheap stocks and merger-arbitrage plays typically comprise 55%-75% of the fund's assets, while the remainder of the portfolio is invested in distressed debt and cash."
    These sound very much like Michael Price's Mutual Series funds. Their style box shows what you'd expect, offset well into the value column. In contrast, Wintergreen's shows this narrow slice solidly across the growth column. He's been investing in growth stocks since at least 2014 (that's as far back as M* shows style boxes on a fund's portfolio page).
  • Sell In May?
    Hi Guys,
    Myths are resilient. They seem to be believed even when accumulating evidence doesn’t justify them. Such is the case with the sell in May flawed wisdom. Simply put, it is wrong. When investing, the historical database supports a buy and hold strategy. Here is a Link that documents that conclusion:
    https://www.forbes.com/sites/rickferri/2013/04/08/busting-the-sell-in-may-and-go-away-myth/#58a398878808
    From that article: “ The clear winner in this three horse race was a buy and hold investment strategy”. Indeed, myths are resilient, but the data shows the hard truth. So, stay the course!
    Best Regards
  • Fidelity Launches Fidelity Women’s Leadership Fund: (FWOMX)
    FYI: Fidelity Investments®, one of the industry’s most diversified financial services organizations with more than $7.4 trillion in client assets1, today announced the launch of Fidelity Women’s Leadership Fund (FWOMX). The actively managed mutual fund is available with both retail and advisor share classes, with no investment minimums.
    Regards,
    Ted
    https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20190508005124/en/Fidelity-Investments®-Launches-Fidelity-Women’s-Leadership-Fund