@FD1000, you make a good point looking at the last 3 month spurt. In that case I agree the time to buy was 3 months ago (sounds like a Geico commercial :) ). I was looking at it as what to expect from a long term, next 3-5 years, investment in Munis (or maybe bonds in general) and in that way I wouldn't be comfortable that 1 year or 3 year Muni returns will out-perform CD's or even a money market like they did in past years. But who knows. And maybe that changes if in a taxable account versus tax deferred.
I agree with the point you made though.

FYI: RiverPark Advisors, LLC today announced the conversion of the RiverPark Floating Rate CMBS Fund (RCRIX, RCRFX) to an open-end mutual fund with daily liquidity from an interval fund. The strategy is managed by Edward L. Shugrue III, as it has been since its inception in 2010. The strategy has not had a down year since its inception and has averaged 6.16% per year over that period. The conversion was effective as of November 12, 2018.
Regards,
Ted
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20190205005181/en

FYI: -Catalyst Funds, an alternative-focused mutual fund company, today announced the launch of the Catalyst Enhanced Income Strategy Fund (EIXIX). The Fund employs an income-focused strategy that invests in a variety of non-traditional income asset classes.
Regards,
Ted
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20190205005219/en

I'm not seeing any evidence why Munis would return any more than the MM you are in. They have been a go-no-where investment for over 2 years now. Curious what you see that is going to change that? No, I don't think you can be late to the party. Quite a bit early maybe.

The numbers show a different story
year to date MUB is up 0.6% while a good MM FZDXX is only at 0.2%...for 3 months MUB is up 3.1% while FZDXX 0.6%
Matt is diffidently late because the next 3 month will not be at 3.1% for MUB. I continue to own Munis as long as they have their momentum.

(Unable to read the wsj article.)
I’ve normally gravitated to funds that preached value investing. There are are many different ways to define what a “value stock” represents. But the most important thing IMHO is that the “worst news” has already been discounted by the market so that these stocks aren’t likely to fall much further. Should be just the recipe for a patient long term investor.
Obviously, value hasn’t been the place to be for at least a decade. But it would be sad if managers who preach value investing were to begin acting contrary to the contract they have with their investors and stray from the value approach in search of better return.
Louis Navellier made 10 recommendations in late 2018 for stocks he felt were top value picks. https://investorplace.com/2018/11/10-value-stocks-to-buy-for-december/.
Here’s Navellier’s list:
Wendy’s, Boeing, Intel, Microsoft, Amazon?, Berkshire Hathaway, J.P. Morgan Chase, Proctor & Gamble, United Health Care, Chevron
Of the above, only one, United Health Care, is among OAKBX’s top 25 holdings (my previous post).
:) Just noticed OAKBX holds Phillip Morris. Hard to argue with that one. I think it’s been considered a “value stock” for about as long as I’ve been investing (50 years).

The Hulbert article offers the following list of value stocks for the DIYer who can't find a fund for the job:
• Bank OZK OZK 3.55% (OZK)
• Brighthouse Financial BHF -0.83% (BHF)
• Capital One Financial COF 0.63% (COF)
• Citigroup C 0.61% (C)
• Goldman Sachs GS 0.60% (GS)
• Gulfport Energy GPOR -0.12% (GPOR)
• Mallinckrodt MNK -0.67% PLC (MNK)
• New York Community Bancorp (NYCB)
• PennyMac Mortgage Investment Trust PMT 1.24% (PMT)
Financial services figure prominently. OAKBX has a few, but Citigroup is the only one in common.

Vanguard for NMVLX - $10K min.
https://investor.vanguard.com/mutual-funds/profile/overview/BC82?FundIntExt=EXT

I deserted OAKBX late in 2018 after a near 15-year marriage. It got ravaged during the December market rout. It is, of course, supposed to be a value fund. BTW - It’s been hot ever since I left. :)
Interested what folks think of these top 25 holdings. Is that fund still true to its value roots, or has it morphed into something else? Thanks for any observations.
Symbol Name % Weight
GM General Motors Co 4.95%
BAC Bank of America Corporation 4.80%
TEL TE Connectivity Ltd 3.93%
-- United States Treasury Notes 1.25%
MA Mastercard Inc A 3.11%
NSRGY Nestle SA ADR 2.98%
CVS CVS Health Corp 2.58%
UNH UnitedHealth Group Inc 2.36%
DEO Diageo PLC ADR 2.26%
GOOG Alphabet Inc Class C 2.18%
PM Philip Morris International Inc 2.12%
-- United States Treasury Notes 2.12%
C Citigroup Inc 1.82%
CHTR Charter Communications Inc A. 1.78%
-- United States Treasury Notes 1.75%
FL Foot Locker Inc 1.73%
ORCL Oracle Corp 1.69%
ALLY Ally Financial Inc 1.67%
BWA BorgWarner Inc 1.63%
-- United States Treasury Notes 2.38%
-- United States Treasury Notes 1.62%
NOV National Oilwell Varco Inc 1.41%
LEA Lear Corp 1.30%
GLEN Glencore PLC 1.30%
AIG American International Group Inc. 1.23%
Source: https://ycharts.com/mutual_funds/M:OAKBX/holdings

>> the only way for us to deal with the mountain of government debt at this point will be to inflate our way out of it.
Studzinski has lots of quaint bearish notions, but in this matter he really oughtta study up mo and better, Blanchard e.g., if he is going to be a working financial columnist.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/01/10/very-good-economic-idea-may-be-about-replace-very-bad-one/
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/09/opinion/melting-snowballs-and-the-winter-of-debt.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/10/opinion/united-states-economy-public-debt.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/02/opinion/krugman-nobody-understands-debt.html

I don't have access to the article. But....the emerging markets fund I mentioned in the recent Emerging Market Funds thread is offered by a firm that represents itself as a classic value fund shop. PZVEX invests only in stocks in the lowest "normalized" P/E ratio quintile at the time of purchase.
https://snl.com/Cache/1001247182.PDF?O=PDF&T=&Y=&D=&FID=1001247182&iid=4162576
M* puts the fund's P/B ratio at 0.90 vs 1.70 for the category average....but that doesn't say what the ratio looked like at the time of initial stock purchase.
Here is how the Pzena folks describe their investment process:
pzena.com/OurApproach/Index?KeyGenPage=306616
This info is not offered as a "rebutal" but rather just as an example of a firm that labels itself as a classic value shop......

Mark Hulbert's column today in the WSJ Investing in Funds section is quite revealing. For those who subscribe:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/want-to-invest-in-a-true-value-fund-good-luck-finding-one-11549249860?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=1
For those who don't, Hulbert points out, citing a study by a trio of academics, that no ETFs and only a couple of nearly unknown OEFs really invest in pure value stocks, those "that trade for the lowest ratios of price to book value."
Maybe our members have a favorite value investor or fund to offer by way of rebuttal.

(Sorry, didn't see Ted's post from earlier this morning)
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/277751/000119312519026477/d613622d497.htm
497 1 d613622d497.htm 497
Janus Investment Fund
497 1 d613622d497.htm 497
Janus Investment Fund
Janus Henderson Global Unconstrained Bond Fund
Supplement dated February 4, 2019
to Currently Effective Prospectuses
Effective March 1, 2019, William H. Gross, the Portfolio Manager for Janus Henderson Global Unconstrained Bond Fund (the “Fund”) intends to retire. In connection with Mr. Gross’ retirement, effective on or about February 15, 2019, Nick Maroutsos will become the new Portfolio Manager of the Fund, and the Fund will change its name to Janus Henderson Absolute Return Income Opportunities Fund. The Fund’s investment objective and principal investment strategies are not changing, and the name change is intended to align the Fund’s name to other Janus Henderson products managed by Mr. Maroutsos using the absolute return income investment approach.
The Fund is expected to experience increased shareholder redemptions as a result of the above changes, which may cause the Fund to sell portfolio securities at times when it would not otherwise do so. As a result, the Fund may deviate from its stated investment strategies and policies in order to meet redemption requests. Increased shareholder redemptions and efforts to realign the Fund’s portfolio to reflect Mr. Maroutsos’ investment approach may also accelerate the realization of taxable income to shareholders if such sales of investments result in gains, and will also increase transaction costs. In addition, increased shareholder redemptions would result in the Fund’s current expenses being allocated over a smaller asset base, which would lead to an increase in the Fund’s expense ratio, but will not alter the expense caps currently in place for each share class of the Fund.
Based on the above changes, effective on or about February 15, 2019, the Fund’s prospectuses are amended as follows:
1. Under “Management” in the Fund Summary section of the Fund’s prospectuses, the following paragraph replaces the corresponding paragraph in its entirety:
Portfolio Manager: Nick Maroutsos is Executive Vice President and Portfolio Manager of the Fund, which he has managed since February 2019.
2. Under “Investment Personnel — Janus Henderson Global Unconstrained Bond Fund” in the Management of the Funds section of the Fund’s prospectuses, the following information replaces the corresponding information in its entirety:
Nick Maroutsos is Executive Vice President and Portfolio Manager of the Fund, which he has managed since February 2019. Mr. Maroutsos is also Portfolio Manager of other Janus Henderson accounts. He joined Janus Capital in 2015, and is a member of the Janus Global Macro leadership team. Prior to joining Janus Capital, Mr. Maroutsos was a Founder and Managing Director of Kapstream Capital, now a Janus Henderson subsidiary. Prior to forming Kapstream Capital in 2006, Mr. Maroutsos held positions with Pacific Investment Management Company LLC from 1999 to 2005. Mr. Maroutsos holds a Bachelor of Arts in Economics from the University of California at San Diego and an MBA from the UCLA Anderson School of Management.
Effective on or about February 15, 2019, all references to William H. Gross are deleted from the Fund’s prospectuses.
Supplement dated February 4, 2019
to Currently Effective Prospectuses
Effective March 1, 2019, William H. Gross, the Portfolio Manager for Janus Henderson Global Unconstrained Bond Fund (the “Fund”) intends to retire. In connection with Mr. Gross’ retirement, effective on or about February 15, 2019, Nick Maroutsos will become the new Portfolio Manager of the Fund, and the Fund will change its name to Janus Henderson Absolute Return Income Opportunities Fund. The Fund’s investment objective and principal investment strategies are not changing, and the name change is intended to align the Fund’s name to other Janus Henderson products managed by Mr. Maroutsos using the absolute return income investment approach.
The Fund is expected to experience increased shareholder redemptions as a result of the above changes, which may cause the Fund to sell portfolio securities at times when it would not otherwise do so. As a result, the Fund may deviate from its stated investment strategies and policies in order to meet redemption requests. Increased shareholder redemptions and efforts to realign the Fund’s portfolio to reflect Mr. Maroutsos’ investment approach may also accelerate the realization of taxable income to shareholders if such sales of investments result in gains, and will also increase transaction costs. In addition, increased shareholder redemptions would result in the Fund’s current expenses being allocated over a smaller asset base, which would lead to an increase in the Fund’s expense ratio, but will not alter the expense caps currently in place for each share class of the Fund.
Based on the above changes, effective on or about February 15, 2019, the Fund’s prospectuses are amended as follows:
1. Under “Management” in the Fund Summary section of the Fund’s prospectuses, the following paragraph replaces the corresponding paragraph in its entirety:
Portfolio Manager: Nick Maroutsos is Executive Vice President and Portfolio Manager of the Fund, which he has managed since February 2019.
2. Under “Investment Personnel — Janus Henderson Global Unconstrained Bond Fund” in the Management of the Funds section of the Fund’s prospectuses, the following information replaces the corresponding information in its entirety:
Nick Maroutsos is Executive Vice President and Portfolio Manager of the Fund, which he has managed since February 2019. Mr. Maroutsos is also Portfolio Manager of other Janus Henderson accounts. He joined Janus Capital in 2015, and is a member of the Janus Global Macro leadership team. Prior to joining Janus Capital, Mr. Maroutsos was a Founder and Managing Director of Kapstream Capital, now a Janus Henderson subsidiary. Prior to forming Kapstream Capital in 2006, Mr. Maroutsos held positions with Pacific Investment Management Company LLC from 1999 to 2005. Mr. Maroutsos holds a Bachelor of Arts in Economics from the University of California at San Diego and an MBA from the UCLA Anderson School of Management.
Effective on or about February 15, 2019, all references to William H. Gross are deleted from the Fund’s prospectuses....

I’ve always been leary of EM equity funds. Perhaps unjustified - but it relates to approximately 35 years ago when a fee-based advisor moved me (and his other clients) from TEMWX, which at the time was a great fund, into TEGOX*, Templeton’s new EM fund. (At that time it represented 100% of my assets.) His stated reason was that the latter would outperform. But it never did as long as I was with him and Templeton. The first had lower fees and an enviable track record. Much easier to “digest” during falling markets. The second had high fees and poor erratic performance at that time.
I do like to own some EM bonds however. Currently own PREMX. I perceive them less risky than EM equities and still offering potential above average long term return. A big reason they’ve spiked recently is in response to the Fed’s 180-degree change in posture and the subsequent pullback in the dollar vs many foreign currencies. As for EM equities, many globally diversified equity funds commit anywhere from 5-25% of their assets to EM equities. (Read Prospectus / Fund Report.) Gets you the EM equity exposure while leaving the harder part (where, when, how much to commit) to the managers.
* Just noticed this fund has been liquidated.
FWIW

Whether he was simply lazy or dishonest, I was bothered by the fact that for after-tax performance he compared small cap funds with the S&P 500:

For the “after fee” performance record, we ... look[] at mutual fund out and underperformance versus the S&P 500 ... [O]ver the 15-year investment horizon (2002 to 2017), ... one in 23 small-cap managers were able to outperform their benchmark index after fees.

This use of a wrong "benchmark" is made more egregious by that fact that he says that large cap funds are leading (his point #3). So we may assume that the large cap benchmark (S&P 500) did better than small cap benchmarks.
He compared small cap funds with a large cap index that outperformed an appropriate small cap benchmark, thus making small cap funds appear worse.
Honest in the sense of "mea culpa"? Perhaps. Intellectually honest? I'm not so sure.

A more mild-mannered, more tame idea: PRIDX. Not a real EM fund, not even close. It's "smid."
10.48% in the Americas. Half of that is in Latin America.
Europe Emerging: ZERO.
Asia Emerging 14.08%
So, it's about 20% EM.
...I'm sticking with it, after grabbing and re-deploying profit.

Ted:
Thanks - Below is the link to the M* article that I believe that you meant to provide:
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/910303/a-closer-look-at-vanguards-active-factor-etfs.html

Don't have time to read the underlying paper now, but a few thoughts come to mind regarding his first point. Namely that funds are reportedly outperforming "less often" before fees.
He uses "less often" to mean smaller percentage. We don't know if the fund universe has grown with lots of lousy funds that decrease the percentage of successes or that there are actually fewer funds outperforming.
More important is Sharpe's simple argument that before fees, the average dollar invested in the market must match market performance. If fewer funds are outperforming, that strengthens the possibility (above) that there are just more lousy (small) funds. The data doesn't show that actively managed dollars (pre-expense) are doing worse now. They can't be, per Sharpe.
One needs to be precise here. Actively managed dollars invested in the market must on average match market performance. If the cash drag on funds has increased (percentage of fund assets on the sidelines in cash) has increased, then of course the average fund performance will have decreased. But the average performance of the fraction of fund dollars actually invested will not have. They may just be getting held back more forcefully by larger cash drags.
The average actively managed cost figures quoted are for actively managed dollars (i.e. dollar-weighted average of funds), and not the simple average expense ratio of actively managed funds as stated in the piece. See, e.g. here. This is important because while the dollar weighted average of ERs is dropping, that doesn't say anything about the simple average of ERs. It can easily be the case that the simple average isn't dropping at all; merely that people are moving their dollars to cheaper funds. This seems to put his conclusion about fund expenses being unrelated to performance in doubt - because he's looking at performance fund-by-fund, not weighted by dollars.
Ptak at M* knows what he's writing about and what gaps exist in his (and others') work. I'd start with his paper to understand what's really going on.

https://www.gurufocus.com/news/808561/fund-performance-before-and-after-fees-does-it-matter
Funds are increasingly underperforming both before fees are included as well as not included in their return calculation

FYI: In one respect, Scott Moore probably never belonged at American Century funds. “I grew up in a small town called Carterville, Illinois, with a population of about 3,000,” says the 54-year-old entrepreneur and manager of Nuance Mid Cap Value. Though American Century is hardly a Wall Street behemoth, for Moore, working at the Kansas City, Mo.-based firm with $100 billion in assets and 1,300 employees still required some cultural adjustments.
Moore now runs his boutique, three-fund shop— Nuance Mid Cap Value (ticker: NMAVX), Nuance Concentrated Value (ticker: NCAVX), and Nuance Concentrated Value Long-Short (NCLIX)—that is more like Carterville than Kansas City. The firm has 16 employees and defined capacity constraints for each fund. Mid Cap Value is the largest at $935 million. Combined with privately managed accounts run in an identical style, the strategy has $1.3 billion, and Moore sees its total capacity at $2 billion and $3.5 billion for his entire firm.
Regards,
Ted
https://www.barrons.com/articles/big-returns-at-fund-with-small-town-values-51548943200?mod=hp_DAY_9
Nuance Funds Website:
http://www.nuanceinvestments.com/funds

FYI: Every few years, Steve Romick pens a long letter to clients about looming risks for the stock market. His timing is usually too early—credit-default swaps in 2002, subprime mortgages in 2005, excess leverage in banks and investment banks in 2006—but eventually the dangers came to pass. Recently, Romick wrote his latest jeremiad, this time about the risks lurking in sovereign and corporate bonds.
Regards,
Ted
https://www.barrons.com/articles/a-winning-mutual-fund-prepares-for-the-next-storm-51549044547?mod=hp_DAY_10