Not surprising, the poorest performing sleeve within my portfolio, not counting my demand cash sleeve, has been my investment cash sleeve which is up 0.1%.

Geez - I’m having trouble keeping up. I’d swear cash was the “hot” place to be only a month ago.

Thanks @Ted - An informative discussion.
Some take-aways:
- Reminds me a lot of Peter Lynch 30 years ago. Both are / were more concerned about product, and much less so with price performance, technical indicators or indexes.
- Loved his comment: “There are good active managers and there are bad active managers.”
- Repeated reference to autonomous driving. My Accord has “level 1” capability which allows it to self-steer, provided it can discern a clearly marked center line. Biggest problem is it cannot tell smooth portions of a roadway from the pot-holed and broken-up areas. To be able to steer around those (endemic on our local roads) I often have to turn it off. Only mention it because I’m wondering how the designers will work around that issue?
- Nothing surprising about T. Rowe. After 25+ years, I know them to be excellent at sorting out the macro trends.
- On GE, if you’re familiar with Arthur Miller you’ll recall Willy Loman also held them in high esteem. Hearing his Hastings refrigerator had broken again ...
“I told you we should’ve bought a well-advertised machine. Charley bought
a General Electric and it’s twenty years old and it’s still good, that son-of-a-
bitch ... Whoever heard of a Hastings refrigerator?” (Death of a Salesman - Act 2 )
Couple disappointments:
- Little if any discussion of fixed income.
- Mack’s lead-in suggested some bearishness on Giroux’s part. But I didn’t sense that. I’d say he’s very macro oriented and bearish on some big names while being positive on others - depending largely on sector.

DVSMX is making the best YTD run for me. With the ^RUT up nearly 10%, thus is not surprising.

FYI: So many people have John Bogle stories.
For some, it is a chance encounter at a conference and a whispered word of advice. For others, it is a formal meeting. In one case, it was an airplane day trip and train ride just to meet the man.
Many others never met him, but remember the moment his investment and life philosophies clicked, and suddenly thrust their minds into focus.
When Mr. Bogle, the Vanguard founder who popularized the low-cost index mutual fund and helped put billions more dollars in the pockets of millions of people, died on Wednesday at the age of 89, he inspired an outpouring of memories.
Regards,
Ted
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/17/your-money/jack-bogle-vanguard.html

Here are some additional clarifications:
1. A syndicate can be a group of borrowers and/or a group of lenders; there is even a loan syndication association which created rules on how to manage a syndication : https://www.lsta.org/

Of course a syndicate can bring together lenders and/or borrowers. I never said otherwise. Though most likely there would be a syndicate of borrowers and a syndicate of lenders, but not a single syndicate comprised of "a group of borrowers and/or a group of lenders."
What I did say is that syndication is an action. So "rules on how to manage a syndication" would be rules on how to manage the process of syndicating a loan.

2. Repo, Reverse Repo and Securities lending are ALL very similar in essence, here are the evidences:

The evidences are somewhat lacking with regard to securities lending.

3. Accounting rules which recognize the similarity - The accounting standard board called FASB recognizes that similarity in their FIN 41 clarification, see Note #2 at the bottom of page number FIN41-2: https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=1175801626916&acceptedDisclaimer=true
"For purposes of this Interpretation, a REVERSE REPURCHASE AGREEMENT (reverse repo) refers to a transaction that is accounted for as a collateralized lending in which a buyer-lender buys securities with an agreement to resell them to the seller-borrower at a stated price plus interest at a specified date or in specified circumstances. The “receivable” under a reverse repurchase agreement refers to the amount due from the seller-borrower for the repurchase of the securities from the buyer-lender. IN CERTAIN INDUSTRIES, THE TERMINOLOGY IN REVERSED; THAT IS, ENTITIES IN THOSE INDUSTRIES REFFER TO THIS TYPE OF AGREEMENT AS REPO".

Sure, in a repurchase agreement one side sells, one side buys. One side calls it a repo and the other side a reverse repo. Maybe these terms get reversed. But one side always "buys securities with an agreement to resell them" to the other side.
Nowhere is there mention of a loan of securities absent a sale, though as the note indicates, the mechanics/accounting look like a collateralized loan. Which is why I previously analogized it to a "mortgage". (Closer mechanically to a deed of trust and promissory note.)

4. Legal wording of the agreement – all those agreements (Repo, Reverse Repo and Securities lending ) are standardized agreements created by SIFMA and are very similar in their essence : https://www.sifma.org/resources/general/mra-gmra-msla-and-msftas/

"Wording" and "essence" are virtually antonyms. One refers for form, the other to substance. "Letter" and "spirit" if you prefer.
The legal wordings of the master repurchase agreement and the master securities loan agreement are structurally very different. So you might want to describe a bit more about the "essence" of these agreements.
Certainly as far as mechanics go, there's little difference between selling something with an agreement to repurchase, and lending something (so long as one grants all rights inherent in ownership). Though the master loan agreement draws a distinction between the treatment of government securities (clearly relevant here) and other securities, while the master repo agreement does not.
Where they part is precisely in essence. The motivation, or essence if you will, of a securities loan is the interest of the borrower in possessing the security temporarily. That is, the borrower in this transaction is the one taking possession of the security (and giving collateral).
The motivation of a repo agreement is found in the seller who wants cash temporarily. That is, the effective borrower in this transaction is the one getting cash by giving up possession of the security (which serves as collateral - see your FIN-41 note 2 above).
Borrower is the one wanting something; borrower pays.
International Capital Markets Association, FAQ #13: What is the difference between repo and securities lending?

If you feel more comfortable with a brand name you should go over there, this discussion is interesting but no one is trying to make anyone invest in this fund.

It's not that I'm more comfortable with brand names; I often seek out boutiques. Rather it is that I'm less comfortable with this specific fund.
To make me comfortable with a fund that is newly formed, that uses a management company that has never managed a fund before and couldn't launch an ETF, that employs a manager who has never managed a fund before, it's going to take more than a one year record built on leverage. Especially when 30% of assets are at risk with a single counterparty with even less history.
Seafarer this ain't. Though to mirror your comment, no one is trying to make anyone divest of this fund.

Old_Skeet's three best year-to-date fund performers through January 18, 2019 are MFS New Discovery Value Fund (NDVAX) +10.22% ... Pimco Commodities Strategy Plus Fund (PCLAX) +9.78% ... and, Principal Small/Mid Cap Dividend Fund (PMDAX) +9.39% which are all found in the growth area of my portfolio. In compairson, an equal weighted S&P 500 Index Fund (VADAX) that I follow (and generally use as an equity spiff fund) is up +8.09% while a cap weighted 500 Index fund (OGEAX) that I also follow is up 6.62%. In addition, my All Weather 20/40/40 master portfolio is up just short of 4% while its bogey the Lipper Balanced Index is up 3.3%. Unless we get into a protracted stock market decline I'm not looking for my master portfolio to continue to outperform the Lipper Balanced Index although I find it interesting that it currently is outperforming it since stocks have been on a recent uptrend so far this year. The portfolio's outperformace is due in part to the strong performace of its hybrid income sleeve which is also the largest sleeve within the portfolio, at about 25%, and it is up 4.4% (ytd). Not surprising, the poorest performing sleeve within my portfolio, not counting my demand cash sleeve, has been my investment cash sleeve which is up 0.1%.

Here are some additional clarifications:
1. A syndicate can be a group of borrowers and/or a group of lenders; there is even a loan syndication association which created rules on how to manage a syndication : https://www.lsta.org/
2. Repo, Reverse Repo and Securities lending are ALL very similar in essence, here are the evidences:
3. Accounting rules which recognize the similarity - The accounting standard board called FASB recognizes that similarity in their FIN 41 clarification, see Note #2 at the bottom of page number FIN41-2: https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=1175801626916&acceptedDisclaimer=true
"For purposes of this Interpretation, a REVERSE REPURCHASE AGREEMENT (reverse repo) refers to a transaction that is accounted for as a collateralized lending in which a buyer-lender buys securities with an agreement to resell them to the seller-borrower at a stated price plus interest at a specified date or in specified circumstances. The “receivable” under a reverse repurchase agreement refers to the amount due from the seller-borrower for the repurchase of the securities from the buyer-lender. IN CERTAIN INDUSTRIES, THE TERMINOLOGY IN REVERSED; THAT IS, ENTITIES IN THOSE INDUSTRIES REFFER TO THIS TYPE OF AGREEMENT AS REPO".
4. Legal wording of the agreement – all those agreements (Repo, Reverse Repo and Securities lending ) are standardized agreements created by SIFMA and are very similar in their essence : https://www.sifma.org/resources/general/mra-gmra-msla-and-msftas/
Those legal agreements and the legal opinions supporting them are the protections that all of the industry uses, including the fund, this is a standardized market in which everyone uses the same legal agreements therefore everyone has the same legal protections no matter the size of the entity.
If you feel more comfortable with a brand name you should go over there, this discussion is interesting but no one is trying to make anyone invest in this fund.

"As the name of the counterparties clearly states these are SYNDICATIONS"
Minor item first, I guess. A SYNDICATE is a group acting together for a purpose; in the financial arena that's often a group of lenders coordinating a sizeable loan, or a group of actors facilitating (underwriting) the new issue of a security. In this context, SYNDICATEs are generally temporary (unlike the LLC here).
https://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/syndicate
In contrast, a SYNDICATION is the act of forming a SYNDICATE, or (often in the media context) an act of distributing (selling) something (such as a news column) to multiple buyers (who are not themselves a SYNDICATE).
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/syndication
King Features Syndicate is a SYNDICATION company in the business of putting out content in SYNDICATION. Just as Zeitgeist Films is a distribution company that is in the film distribution business. "Syndication", "distribution", these are attributive nouns; as used, they're not standalone nouns.
You might have been thinking about SYNDICATE desks, though there's no mention of "desk" in the company names.
Really, though, if we're going to read stuff into names, what should we make of the management company New York Alaska ETF Management LLC? This company has never managed an ETF.
Though it tried; it filed in 2015 first to manage the "1-3 Month Liquidity Bonds ETF", which later that year was apparently renamed "1-3 Month Enhanced Short Duration ETF". It was to have traded under the ticker TBIL. Apparently it gave up the ghost at the end of 2016; last filing appears to have been 12/26/16.
https://sec.report/CIK/0001627597
In the meantime (mid 2016), it proposed offering essentially a clone in open end form, called "1-3 Month Enhanced Short Duration Fund". It wanted to use the ticker BILLX, but the SEC felt that this sounded like a MMF. Ultimately this evolved into what you know and love as the "Enhanced Ultra Short Duration Mutual Fund", STATX.
" I called up the fund, asked them questions and they explained it all to me and gave me a lot of info on this Repo and Securities lending industry. ... iShares, which is one of the biggest fund managers in the world, actually does the same thing ... [see] [a link to an article on securities lending]"
This may be the most disconcerting statement so far. The fund is conflating reverse repurchase agreements with securities lending.
While they look very similar, they're quite different. I'll try to illustrate with an analogy.
I own a house. I give you use of the house for a fee. (In real estate terms, I'd be leasing it to you.) You can use the house as you wish (e.g. sublease it), so long as you pay me the rental fee and return it to me as we agree upon.
I own a house. I need cash, so I turn it over to a third party as collateral (via a deed of trust), you give me cash, and I sign a promissory note that says I'll pay you back with interest. This use of third party trustee and promissory note is the way "mortgages" are effected in many western states.
Notice that either way, you get the house, I get cash to use. In the first, I'm "lending" you the use of the house and making a profit on the rent. In the second, I'm borrowing money and putting up the house as collateral. You're the one making the money here.
I own some securities. I give you the use of those securities (lending them to you, perhaps so that you can sell them short, who knows?). You pay me "rent" for the use of the securities. That's what iShares does, that's what most funds do to make money. It's how Vanguard sometimes manages to beat the indexes it's tracking, in spite of its expenses. We're talking relatively small amounts here (i.e. barely enough to cover index funds' costs).
I own some securities. I need cash. I sell sell them to you (effectively giving you collateral for the money you "lend" me). We make an agreement that I will give you back the cash with interest (i.e. repurchase the securities for a higher price) at an agreed upon time. What we've made is a repurchase agreement.
Notice that either way, you get the securities, I get the cash to use. In the first, I'm lending you the use of the securities and making a profit on the "rent". In the second, I'm effectively borrowing money and putting up the securities as collateral. You're the one making money here.
Two very different arrangements despite superficial similarities. The fact that you were told that these are the same I find quite disturbing. I begin to understand how Mona could have been told that the fund accrues dividends daily.
Here's Vanguard's paper on how it lends securities. A key takeaway is on p. 6 - all the measures that Vanguard takes to minimize risk in these transactions. They include limiting the amount of loans to any one counterparty. I have faith in Barclays as well. What's New York Alaska ETF Managment doing to protect your investment?

I know its rather early in the year, but looking at my portfolio in Morningstar, found a nice surprise as to whats doing best - small cap value fund UBVSX up over 12% ytd. It had a rather dismal 2018, as most small cap funds. Wonder if anyone else had a surprise in either small cap value or other category that surprised you. My next highest is my most aggressive large cap growth fund MSEQX, they could not be more different from each other. Chances are they will look very different by year end, but nice to start out the year like this :)

The initial asset allocation and holdings information for this new fund is now available at M*. M* has it pigeon holed as 50 to 70% equity. So far, its far short of that. The description in the prospectus had made me wonder how they came up with that designation. Anyway, here is the asset allocation info:
Cash 26.00%
US Stocks 12.54%
Non US Stocks -0.20%
Bonds 61.03%
Other 0.64%
As of 12/31/2018

Yes, I have invested in this fund and before I did I called up the fund, asked them questions and they explained it all to me and gave me a lot of info on this Repo and Securities lending industry
For example:
iShares, which is one of the biggest fund managers in the world, actually does the same thing that they do under the fund symbol:”SHV” (and StateStreet does it under : “BIL”) but the majority of the enhanced returns that they generate go to IShares and StateStreet following the 2013 victoy iShares had against two pension funds that sued them for taking those profits, read this article:
http://www.securitieslendingtimes.com/securitieslendingnews/article.php?article_id=218875

No real reason whatsoever to invest in the fund.
Fund management will announce the benefit of the reorganization in its shareholder proxy vote. Poor performance and lack of assets have hindered the fund to grow.
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1558107/000139834418017599/fp0037575_497.htm

According to the announcement, "Effective January 28, 2019, the Fund is closed to investment by new and existing shareholders."
But January 28 is 9 days from now, right? So can you help us to understand whether there any reason to like this fund?

To effect a merger.
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1558107/000139834418018590/fp0037914_n14.htm
January 27, 2019
Dear Shareholder:
On behalf of the Board of Trustees of ALPS Series Trust (the “Trust”), we are pleased to invite you, as a shareholder of the Clarkston Select Fund, to a Special Meeting of Shareholders to be held on March 13, 2019, at 10:00 a.m., Mountain Time, at the offices of the Trust at 1290 Broadway, Suite 1100, Denver, Colorado 80203.
At the Special Meeting, you will be asked to approve two proposals.
Proposal 1: Proposed Agreement and Plan of Reorganization
Under an Agreement and Plan of Reorganization, the Clarkston Select Fund (the “Selling Fund”) will be reorganized into the Clarkston Fund (the “Acquiring Fund”) subject to shareholder approval (the “Reorganization”).

A quick note on your numbers, and then a longer discussion of reverse repos.
From fact sheet: 0.40% ER + 3.96% yield = 4.36% gross return
70% Treasuries @ 2.4% + 30% @ 7.5% = 3.93%
(I agree with you that 2.4% is a reasonable guesstimate for 3 mo. Treasuries; I just picked up some at that rate.)
A minor point, but one needs a 9% return on the reverse repos to achieve the 4.36% gross return from the fact sheet.
Either I don't understand repurchase agreements, or the descriptions in the fund docs are weird. If the latter is true, is it something that should give anyone pause. If the former is true, then I should still personally decline to invest, as I don't believe in investing in things I don't fundamentally understand.
My understanding of a repurchase agreement is that the owner of a security, in need of cash, temporarily sells a security for the cash along with making an agreement to repurchase the security at a higher value. Typically overnight. A transaction equivalent to a collateralized loan, and a net cost to the borrower. That is, the borrowing side sells the security, to be repurchased later.
From the other party's perspective, it is a lender of cash, the buyer of a security, to be sold later with the higher sale price treated as imputed interest. That's a reverse repo.
Here's the best page I've been able to find that explains this (including 1.5 min video):
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/reverserepurchaseagreement.asp

For the party selling the security (and agreeing to repurchase it in the future) it is a repurchase agreement (RP) or repo; for the party on the other end of the transaction (buying the security and agreeing to sell in the future) it is a reverse repurchase agreement (RRP) or reverse repo.

The reason I'm making such a big deal over this is that the fact sheet says that "the fund purchases securities as either lender or borrower with the agreement to sell them at a higher price". It's saying that whether the fund is a borrower (repurchase agreement) or a lender (reverse repo), the fund first buys and then sells. That contradicts my description of a repo (sell first, then buy), as well as Investopedia's.
This matters because it is claiming that in both repos and reverse repos, it makes money by buying the security and reselling it at a higher amount. Both sides of an agreement can't be buying first.
Let's look at the prospectus. Under risks of a reverse repo (p. 6), it describes a transaction where it first sells the security (one risk is being unable to timely repurchase "the securities sold by the fund.") I think it has got repos and reverse repos backward in the risk sections, but my point here is that one of them involves the fund selling first, then repurchasing, again contradicting the fact sheet's wording.
You write about the cash flow as reducing volatility. What the prospectus says: "Leverage Risk: Leverage risk is the risk that certain transactions of the Fund, including the Fund’s use of reverse repurchase agreements, will give rise to leverage, causing the Fund’s shares to be more volatile than if they had not been leveraged."
Let's stop right there. This fund is 30% in reverse repos, which it describes as leverage. Short term (overnight) or not, a 30% leveraged fund is not my idea of a low risk fund.
Reading on in the prospectus, we finally get to a full paragraph where it explains how it uses the term "reverse repurchase agreement":

In a typical reverse repurchase agreement, the Fund enters into a contract with a counterparty under which (i) the Fund sells securities for cash or cash equivalents to the counterparty, and (ii) the Fund agrees to repurchase the securities at an agreed-upon price, date and interest payment. Reverse repurchase agreements provide the Fund with a source of liquidity that can be invested elsewhere for no more than six days and/or earn income at either fixed or floating (variable) interest rates and fees. While a reverse repurchase agreement has legal characteristics of both a sale and a secured transaction, economically it functions as a loan from the counterparty to the Fund, in which the securities purchased by the counterparty serve as collateral for the loan.

So it seems that rather than generating income (as the fact sheet states) by selling back securities at a higher price, reverse repos actually incur borrowing costs for the cash the fund gets. Then how does it make money?
The correct way to answer this question is to say that it invests the cash in something that pays a higher rate than its borrowing cost. That is, after all, a conventional way of making money with borrowed cash. See, e.g. this document describing government uses of reverse repos (two basic uses - meeting short term cash flow needs, and investing in higher-yielding instruments).
http://www.gfoa.org/ensuring-safety-reverse-repurchase-agreements
Instead, here's how the fund says it makes money on this borrowed cash (from the June 30, 2018 semiannual report):

There are many existing examples that borrowers earn profit in spite of their borrowing activity for example: Banks borrow money via selling deposits and then charging high fees for additional activities related to the deposit including they charging high fees for allowing deposit buyer (the bank’s lender) to make payments (incoming and outgoing) from and to the deposit therefore, the bank actually profits a lot more than the cost it pays for the borrowing since the added commissions turn the borrowing activity into a profitable activity. In the Fund’s case, the fund charges additional fees that turn its borrowing activity into profits by charging fees for allowing its counterparties to substitute the proceeds (collateral) it receives for reasons such as substituting collateral durations.

The fees the fund is charging aren't the 7.5% that you suggested, nor the 9% that I came up with. The semiannual statement reports that the fund is charging a 13.0% "fee rate", at least if I'm reading this part of the statement correctly.
When I see 13% being charged to counterparties for what sounds like "allowing" them to serve as the counterparty in a repurchase agreement (i.e. purchase short term Treasuries so that these securities show on their books overnight), I really wonder about the safety of these agreements.
Maybe I've read most of this wrong - I'm just picking it up as I go along. If so, as I said at the top, that just means I personally don't understand enough to invest in this. At the very least, it suggests looking deeper into the counterparties for these agreements, which amount to 30% of the assets of the fund.
I just did a fast search on the first of the two counterparties, Institutional Syndication LLC. It turns out that the other counterparty, North American Liquidity Resources LLC is the same compny, renamed. Quickly too, since the company was just organized in 2017.
It was formed in 2017 (STATX commenced operations April 13, 2017), organized in Nevada (not unusual, after Delaware, Nevada is a popular place to organize companies), run out of Staten Island, with the same address as that of its executive officer.
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1721520/000172152017000004/xslFormDX01/primary_doc.xml
The executive officer is no longer registered as an investment adviser representative, but had worked (from 1/2015 to 11/2016) at New York Alaska ETF, which you may recognize as the management company of STATX.
https://adviserinfo.sec.gov/Individual/4522455 (click on detailed report pdf link for full report)
According to this page, he was formerly their Chief Compliance Officer and Chief Investment Officer.
https://relationshipscience.com/person/victor-amadeo-chilelli-jr-194903034
None of this is intended to imply that there is anything improper with the reverse repos. It's just the information that came up when I searched on these companies and officer.

FYI: (Fund is closed to new investors.)
In a WEALTHTRACK exclusive, 5-star manager David Giroux explains why more companies’ businesses are at risk.
Regards,
Ted
https://wealthtrack.com/david-giroux-on-growing-secular-risks-in-companies-exclusive-with-fund-manager-of-year-winner/
M* Snapshot PRWCX:
https://www.morningstar.com/funds/xnas/prwcx/quote.html
Lipper Snapshot PRWCX:
https://www.marketwatch.com/investing/fund/prwcx
PRWCX Is Ranked #19 In The (50-70/% E) Fund Category By U.S. News & World Report:
https://money.usnews.com/funds/mutual-funds/allocation-50-to-70-equity/t-rowe-price-capital-appreciation-fund/prwcx

Of course I did, and do. And over the entire last 90min-plus, moment to moment and finally at the end of the session, the google data for djia was 150-250 points higher than reality. Period. Thought it was weird, and in my experience unique (online since like 1996 and tracking before that through other means), and so I posted. Alas.

Here are some additional clarifying facts that appear on the fund’s website that provide an answer to your question:
The Fund creates a higher return by conducting Securities lending, Repurchase & Reverse Repurchase agreements ; this clarification appears in the fund fact sheet: http://www.tbil.co/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Mutual-Fund-Fund-Fact-Sheet-Final-01.11.19.pdf , it states in the Investment Approach part: “IN ORDER TO INCREASE INCOME, the fund is permitted to enter into fixed/variable interest rate Securities lending, Repurchase & Reverse Repurchase agreements”.
Additionally, in the fund’s website, under the ARTICLES Tab ( http://www.tbil.co/articles/ ), you have a lot of info about the Repo market (the market in which you trade Repurchase agreements and Reverse Repurchase agreements), those articles are from sources such as Bloomberg, Risk Magazine and Securities Lending Times are very interesting since they show that Mutual Funds are ETFs are slowly entering into these markets in order to earn better returns, here are two examples of those articles from the Fund’s ARTICLES Tab ( http://www.tbil.co/articles/ ):
ETFs OFFERING TASTY SEC LENDING RETURNS:
http://www.securitieslendingtimes.com/securitieslendingnews/article.php?article_id=220699#.V4e3fcLfOHu
REPO RATE HITS 7.25% ON YEAR-END VOLATILITY:
https://www.risk.net/derivatives/6263606/repo-rate-hits-725-on-year-end-volatility?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=RN.Derivatives.RL.EU.A.U&utm_source=RN.DCM.Editors_Updates&im_amfcid=2376027&im_amfmdf=150a592b1a6f2ca496ab241b389d87b9
If you look at the fund’s fact sheet, you can also see that the fund’s major holdings is a blended portfolio of US treasuries & Reverse Repo transactions which jointly earned a net return of between 3.5% - 4.00% annually since the fund earns for example 7.5% on its Reverse Repo trades and 2.4% on its treasury bills; all the manager needs to do is to daily adjust the composition of the allocation between those holdings to create a blended return of 3.5%-4.00% annually.
That good return also acts as a cushion that absorbs the low price volatility of US treasury bills which the fund holds therefore, created a nice steady increase in value of the fund of about 1 cent per day which over 365 days accumulates to $3.65 annually which is 3.65% per every $100 which is the price of each fund unit.

Will not be able to do much as the fund is "hard" closed. Funny, why they did not just liquidate the fund when they "hard" closed it since the fund had only $12.8M?
Why prolong the agony?

M* says they have $12.8 million in AUM and its a large value fund. It sounds more like planning to liquidate rather than being worried about anything else.