Dear friends,
Messrs. Berkowitz and Schaja chatted with me (and about 30 of you) for an hour tonight. It struck me as a pretty remarkable call, largely because of the clarity of Mr. Berkowitz's answers.
The snapshot: 20-2
5 stocks, likely all US-domiciled because he likes GAAP reporting standard (even where they're weak, he knows where the weaknesses are and compensate for them), mostly north of$10 billion in market cap though some in the $
5-9 billion range. Long only with individual positions capped at 10%. They have price targets for every stock they buy, so turnover is largely determined by how quickly a stock moves to its target. In general, higher turnover periods are likely to correspond with higher returns.
His background (and why it matters): Mr. Berkowitz was actually interested in becoming a chemist, but his dad pushed him into chemical engineering because "chemists don't get jobs, engineers do." He earned a B.A. and M.A. in chemical engineering at MIT and went to work first for Union Carbide, then for Amoco (Standard Oil of Indiana). While there he noticed how many of the people he worked with had MBAs and decided to get one, with the expectation of returning to run a chemical company. While working on his MBA at Harvard, he discovered invested and a new friend, Bill Ackman. Together they launched the Gotham Partners LP fund. Initially Gotham Partners used the same discipline in play at the RiverPark funds and he described their returns in the mid-90s as "spectacular." They made what, in hindsight, was a strategic error in the late 1990s that led to Gotham's closure: they decided to add illiquid securities to the portfolio. That was not a good mix; by 2002, they decided that the strategy was untenable and closed the hedge fund.
Takeaways: (1) the ways engineers are trained to think and act are directly relevant to his success as an investor. Engineers are charged with addressing complex problems while possessing only incomplete information. Their challenge is to build a resilient system with a substantial margin of safety; that is, a system which will have the largest possible chance of success with the smallest possible degree of system failure. As an investor, he thinks about portfolios in the same way. (2) He will never again get involved in illiquid investments, most especially not at the new mutual fund.
His process: as befits an engineer, he starts with hard data screens to sort through a 1000 stock universe. He's looking for firms that have three characteristics:
- Durable predictable businesses, with many firms in highly-dynamic industries (think "fast fashion" or "chic restaurants," as well as firms which will derive 80% of their profits five years hence from devices they haven't even invented yet) as too hard to find reliable values for. Such firms get excluded.
- Shareholder oriented management, where the proof of shareholder orientation is what the managers do with their free cash flows.
- Valuations which provide the opportunity for annual returns in the mid-teens over the next 3-5 years. This is where the question of "value" comes in. His arguments are that overpaying for a share of a business will certainly depress your future returns but that there's no simple mechanical metric that lets you know when you're overpaying. That is, he doesn't look at exclusively p/e or p/b ratios, nor at a firm's historic valuations, in order to determine whether it's cheap. Each firm's prospects are driven by a unique constellation of factors (for example, whether the industry is capital-intensive or not, whether its earnings are interest rate sensitive, what the barriers to entry are) and so you have to go through a painstaking process of disassembling and studying each as if it were a machine, with an eye to identifying its likely future performance and possible failure points.
Takeaways: (1) The fund will focus on larger cap names both because they offer substantial liquidity and they have the lowest degree of "existential risk." At base, GE is far more likely to be here in a generation than is even a very fine small cap like John Wiley & Sons. (2) You should not expect the portfolio is embrace "the same tired old names" common in other LCV funds. It aims to identify value in spots that others overlook. Those spots are rare since the market is generally efficient and they can best be exploited by a relatively small, nimble fund.
Current ideas: He and his team have spent the past four months searching for compelling ideas, many of which might end up in the opening portfolio. Without committing to any of them, he gave examples of the best opportunities he's come across:
Helmerich & Payne (HP), the largest owner-operator of land rigs in the oil business, described as "fantastic operators, terrific capital allocators with the industry's highest-quality equipment for which clients willingly pay a premium."
McDonald's (MCD), which is coming out of "the seven lean years" with a new, exceedingly talented management team and a lot of capital; if they get the trends right "they can explode."
AutoZone (AZO), "guys buying brake pads" isn't sexy but is extremely predictabe and isn't going anywhere.
Western Digital (WDG), making PCs isn't a good business because there's so little opportunity to add value and build a moat, but supplying components like hard drives - where the industry has contracted and capital needs impose relatively high barriers to entry - is much more attractive.
Even so, he describes this is "the most challenging period" he's seen in a long while. If the fund were to open today, rather than at the end of April, he expects it would be only 80% invested. He won't hesitate to hold cash in the absence of compelling opportunities ("we won't buy just for the sake of buying") but "we work really hard, turn over a lot of rocks and generally find a substantial number of names" that are worth close attention.
His track record: There is no public record of Mr. Berkowitz alone managing a long-only strategy. In lieu of that, he offers three thoughts. First, he's sinking a lot of his own money - $10 million initially - into the fund, so his fortunes will be directly tied to his investors'. Second, "a substantial number of people who have direct and extensive knowledge of my work will invest a substantial amount of money in the fund." Third, he believes he can earn investors' trust in part by providing "a transparent, quantitative, rigorous, rational framework for everything we own. Investors will know what we're doing and exactly why we're doing it. If our process makes sense, then so will investing in the fund."
Finally, Mr. Schaja announced an interesting opportunity. For its first month of operation,
RiverPark will waive the normal minimum investment on its institutional share class for investors who purchase directly from them. The institutional share class doesn't carry a 12(b)1 fee, so those shares are 0.2
5% (2
5 bps) cheaper than retail: 1.00 rather than 1.2
5%. (Of course it's a marketing ploy, but it's a marketing ploy that might well benefit you in you're interested in the fund.)
The fund will also be immediately available NTF at Fidelity, Schwab, TDAmeritrade, Vanguard and maybe Pershing. It will eventually be available on most of the commercial platforms. Institutional shares will be available at the same brokerages but will carry transaction fees.
Here's
the link to the mp3 of the call.
For what interest that holds,
David
